YouSaid · the spoken record

Mohamed

lines on the record
1,149
first
2009-10-14
most recent
2023-12-15
sittings or episodes
102
sources
un-security-council

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  1. We hope that the Programme of Action will achieve the goal of limiting illicit proliferation and trafficking in small arms and light weapons as soon as possible.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509Resumption1 (2023) · source

  2. Addressing that phenomenon through international cooperation and sovereign national efforts to secure stockpiles and border controls must be matched with stricter and more deterring regulations on manufacturing companies and arms brokers who nurture an economy that will continue to flourish as long as armed conflicts persist in the world. While my country welcomes the progress made by the Open-ended Working Group on Ammunition regarding the development of a global framework to manage conventional ammunition, which concluded its work in New York this year, we call for the need to differentiate between that framework and the relevant United Nations Programme of Action. We look forward to the fourth Review Conference of that Programme, to be held next year.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509Resumption1 (2023) · source

  3. Since our countries still urgently need to build their capacities to counter the illicit trafficking and smuggling of small arms and light weapons in order to implement the Programme of Action and the international tracing of such weapons, the United Nations and in particular the Security Council have a critical role to play in combating the unprecedented proliferation of conventional weapons and their use by unauthorized entities in many parts of the world. It appears that in some regions, particularly in Africa, governmental and official parties are involved in trading such weapons on behalf of terrorist or separatist parties with a view to prolonging or worsening crises. That is a violation of international law and the relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 2370 (2017).

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509Resumption1 (2023) · source

  4. However, international cooperation on the issue should not affect the legitimate right of States to obtain, manufacture and import conventional weapons for self- defence in line with the Charter of the United Nations. We would therefore like to take this opportunity to insist on ensuring that we do not confuse combating illicit trafficking in conventional weapons with imposing political or monopoly restrictions on States’ sovereign right to trade in conventional weapons.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509Resumption1 (2023) · source

  5. Given the close relations between terrorism and organized crime, and the ease with which some non-authorized entities obtain small arms, light weapons and their ammunition, and in the context of my country’s efforts to promote peace and security in the Sahel in particular and in Africa in general, Mauritania attaches great importance to the issue of combating the illicit supply and trafficking of small arms and light weapons. In that regard, we believe in the importance of international cooperation within the United Nations, in particular through its Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects as a consensus tool for promoting cooperation to eradicate this issue, which in our view is a major obstacle to achieving sustainable development in developing countries.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509Resumption1 (2023) · source

  6. Mr. Mohamed Laghdaf (Mauritania) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, I would like to thank your delegation, Mr. President, for convening today’s open debate on the threat posed to international peace and security by the diversion, illicit trafficking and misuse of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition. I would also like to thank the Secretary-General for his report to the Security Council on small arms and light weapons (S/2023/823), both for the very valuable information it contains and for the Organization’s efforts to strengthen international and regional efforts aimed at controlling small arms, light weapons and their ammunition.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509Resumption1 (2023) · source

  7. Their neutrality would lead to the recurrence of what happened in Rwanda in 1994 when the international community failed to address the genocide against the Tutsis. The militias still receive lots of mercenaries from States in the region and the Sahel, in addition to underage children from displacement camps and other areas where they are pushed into the bloody war. The meeting rose at 3.15 p.m.

    2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9503 (2023) · source

  8. The armed struggle movements in Darfur that signed the Juba Peace Agreement in October 2020, including the Justice and Equality Movement, led by Gibril Ibrahim, and the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi, as well as the Sudan Liberation Movement, led by Abdul Wahid Al-Nur, which did not sign the Juba Peace Agreement, emphasized on 18 November that they had abandoned the neutrality that they had maintained throughout the war since April owing to the escalating violations and atrocities perpetrated by the militias against the citizens in Darfur, including Fur, Zaghawa, Masalit and other tribes, based on the right to self-defence which is guaranteed by law, the Constitution and the Charter of the United Nations.

    2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9503 (2023) · source

  9. The States that the Sudan has accused of supporting those militias want us to believe that those lethal weapons fell to the militias out of the sky. In conclusion, crimes of ethnic cleansing are still being committed against multiple tribes in Darfur leading to displacement in the region.

    2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9503 (2023) · source

  10. The support provided to the rebel militias by their sponsors in the region has resulted in a protracted war. The military intelligence apparatus has concluded that the militias have received weapons and supplies through the aforementioned airports. The rebel militias have received military support that included all kinds of weaponry, namely, medium and heavy artillery, mortars, 122-mm howitzers, D30, small and large rocket launchers, drones, reconnaissance and combat aircraft, along with communication and jamming devices. They recently received anti-tank Kornet rockets used by the mercenaries from the windows and roofs of high buildings against moving targets up to 10 kilometres away. Those rockets are guided by lasers and very expensive.

    2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9503 (2023) · source

  11. They are strengthening their relationship with the armed stakeholders in neighbouring States and transferring foreign fighters and military equipment. They use airports in neighbouring States to transport weapons, ammunition and equipment to the militias. They established field hospitals in those States to treat the wounded of those militias and to transport them abroad to receive treatment. That constitutes a crime of aggression and a violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of the Sudan, as well as a flagrant violation of international law, and demands the strongest condemnation of the Council. We have always said that the Rapid Support Forces are not only one party but multiple parties that mobilized mercenaries and provided them with weapons and equipment to invade the Sudan.

    2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9503 (2023) · source

  12. Furthermore, the mercenary militias are raping underage women and turning medical facilities into military barracks. They confiscated the Turkish hospital in Nyala. Those militias are displacing citizens through indiscriminate bombings and continuing their forced recruitment of children, sending them to the battlefield in Zalinji. They are practicing force displacement and killing civilians from the Masalit tribe and burning their places. They killed and burned persons related to the late Wali, or Governor, Khamis Abakar. They burned the El Geneina market place, especially shops owned by persons of the Masalit tribe. They are killing prisoners and wounded soldiers of the armed forces. The rebel militias and their allies receive support to bolster their fighting capabilities.

    2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9503 (2023) · source

  13. For that reason, we demand that an embargo on the transfer of arms and military equipment to the allies of the Rapid Support Forces and mercenary invaders, as well as States, be imposed by the Security Council, if Council members wish to safeguard peace and security in Darfur, and that the armed forces be excluded from the arms embargo that has been imposed on them since 2004. With regard to the situation in the Darfur region, the militias and their allies who perpetrated acts of aggression against civilians there are continuing their violations in South Darfur and Central Darfur states. They are forcibly entering civilians’ homes, expelling their residents and looting their properties, in addition to robbing banks and stealing financial deposits, torturing citizens and targeting anybody related to officers in the armed forces.

    2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9503 (2023) · source

  14. At the same time, the allies of the militias provide political cover for their war of aggression which has not been condemned. They called for a new arms embargo to be imposed on the armed forces, as well as an aerial embargo because, from their strange perspective, that would achieve their political objective and defeat the armed forces which, under the Charter of the United Nations and the Sudanese Constitution, have the right to self-defence, to address the aggression and to preserve the territorial integrity of the Sudan.

    2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9503 (2023) · source

  15. We call upon the United Nations and the international community to strengthen the Government’s efforts and to promote the capabilities of regular forces, along with relevant units in the armed forces that secure camps for displaced persons and villages for voluntary return, to help enforce the principles of international humanitarian law and to enhance the capacities of the police to combat sexual violence, employed by militias and invaders as a deliberate method to displace citizens by forcing them to leave their homes and replace them with foreigners. The geography of resolution 1591 (2005) needs to be carefully read and reviewed, taking into account the dynamics of the current force. The armed forces are facing an alliance of militias and invaders while an arms embargo is imposed on those forces in Darfur.

    2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9503 (2023) · source

  16. Enhancing the protection of civilians requires financial support for strengthening the regular forces and the Darfur Joint Protection Force in order to more effectively combat human and drug smuggling and support the supplemental National Action Plan on the protection of civilians, referred to the Security Council. That also requires addressing climate change and promoting efforts made by the armed forces that repel attacks waged by the Rapid Support Forces, which seek to displace and kill civilians, loot their property, rape women, employ sexual violence and carry out identity- based killings. All of that is no longer a secret that needs further evidence. It has been documented in video and audio recorded by the invaders who support the Rapid Support militia.

    2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9503 (2023) · source

  17. There is no longer a war between the Darfur movements that joined the Juba Peace Agreement in October 2020 and the Sudanese Armed Forces, but they joined together to bolster the Sudan against the aggressive attack supported by States of the region that are mobilizing mercenaries to undermine the stability, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Sudan. With regard to monitoring the implementation of the National Action Plan, there is a mechanism designated for that purpose, supervised by the Minister of Cabinet Affairs and chaired by the Minister of the Interior. That mechanism includes all relevant ministries and institutions. That Plan was submitted to the Council two years ago.

    2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9503 (2023) · source

  18. I can briefly say that the international community’s failure to uphold its commitments regarding the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process is one of the reasons that impeded the full implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, despite the commitment of the transitional Government to implement relevant activities and programmes. With regard to the progress made in the National Action Plan for the Protection of Civilians, the transitional Government developed the Plan before the war.

    2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9503 (2023) · source

  19. The mandate of the Sanctions Committee includes reviewing the implementation of the sanctions measures and indicators, which were reduced from four to two, namely, indicators two and three — on security arrangements and the protection of civilians, respectively. The resolution imposed an arms embargo and an assets freeze. In that context, we would like to touch upon threats to stability in the Darfur region, violations of international humanitarian law and human rights violations, including attacks on civilians, sexual violence against women, gender-based violence and violence targeting women and children in conflict areas by the militias of the Rapid Support Forces. I stress that the sanctions imposed under resolution 1591 (2005) are limited to the Darfur region and do not include the rest of the Sudan.

    2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9503 (2023) · source

  20. Mr. Mohamed (Sudan) (spoke in Arabic): The Security Council imposed an arms embargo on 30 July 2004, pursuant to resolution 1556 (2004), which included all non-governmental entities and individuals, specifically the Janjaweed militias, who had an active presence in the north, south and west states of Darfur at the time. Resolution 1591 (2005) extended the scope of that arms embargo to include all parties related to the N’Djamena ceasefire agreement and other combatants in those states. The resolution imposed travel bans and assets freezes on specific individuals and established the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005), concerning the Sudan, to oversee the four indicators, as well as a Panel of Experts to assist the Committee.

    2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9503 (2023) · source

  21. A high-level Sudanese delegation will meet the Secretary-General and certain members of the Security Council next week in order to discuss this issue in detail, as a follow-up to the meeting held between the Secretary-General and the President of the Transitional Sovereignty Council in September on the sidelines of the high-level segment of the General Assembly. In that connection, we recall the principle that states that the success of United Nations mechanisms hinges on the consent of host countries.

    2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source

  22. The current situation in the Sudan requires a total overhaul of the Mission, which no longer meets the aspirations of the Sudanese people and Government. It has not responded to the priorities that accompany the political transition and has sought objectives outside of its mandate. Accordingly, I would like to convey to the Security Council the decision of the Government of the Sudan to immediately end the work done by UNITAMS for the reasons clarified in a letter issued today by the Foreign Minister of the Sudan addressed to the Secretary- General. I would like to reaffirm to the Council that the Sudanese Government will continue to engage constructively with the United Nations in order to address the interests of the Sudan and establish a new mechanism that meets the needs and demands of the current circumstances in the country.

    2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source

  23. However, the performance of the Mission in achieving the goals set forth in the relevant Security Council resolutions was disappointing. The Sudan has made clear in many Council meetings its comments and positions with regard to Mission’s performance. The Sudanese Government also called for a strategic review of the Mission’s work and for redefining its future actions. The Under-Secretary for the Foreign Affairs Ministry also visited New York in April 2022 and submitted Sudan’s comments to the Secretariat and to the members of the Security Council, along with a road map to rectify the Mission’s working methods. Regrettably, no changes have been made when it comes to the Mission’s operations.

    2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source

  24. We recognize the need to secure the financial resources pledged at the donors conference for the Sudan, as the lack of funds constitutes a major challenge. As the Council knows, resolution 2524 (2020) established UNITAMS and was adopted through positive engagement between the Sudan and the United Nations on a consensual basis, pursuant to the 27 February 2020 letter from the previous President of the transitional Government to the Secretary-General, reflecting the concerns of the Government during the transitional period. We welcomed the cooperation of the Secretary- General, the Security Council and the entire United Nations and their appreciative response to the political transformation and change in the Sudan following the revolution.

    2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source

  25. The delegation of the armed forces, which participated in the latest negotiations in Jeddah, reaffirmed the Sudanese commitments to facilitate humanitarian work; complete customs-clearance processes within a week; address visas and issue multiple entry visas to the country directors of humanitarian organizations; cancel travel authorizations, especially in regions suffering from epidemics; grant work authorizations and extend them to the country directors for one year, or six months for other officials; appoint liaison officers and create a platform for joint humanitarian issues led by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; and facilitate the entry of 98 trucks currently in Port Sudan into all regions and guarantee their security and that of its personnel, along with relief assistance, until they reach their final destination.

    2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source

  26. We are cooperating with the United Nations when it comes to security dangers, protection measures and national measures to ensure rescue and humanitarian assistance in accordance with United Nations and national legal parameters. Of course, there are justified parameters established by Governments when it comes to security, safety and health. The President of the Transitional Sovereignty Council has created a high-level governmental committee to ensure the proper functioning of crossing points and to receive humanitarian assistance.

    2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source

  27. We call for stricter measures to address the systematic criminal acts, including compelling the mercenaries and those who support the militias by providing them with weapons to stop doing that. Certain delegations noted that weapons must not be provided to both parties. That would harm the armed forces. The Rapid Support Forces do not import weapons; they receive them as gifts from other States, which are therefore partners and responsible for the perpetrated atrocities. With regard to humanitarian assistance, the risks emanating from the current humanitarian situation call the Government of the Sudan to cooperate with the United Nations to mitigate its effects, particularly in vulnerable groups, such as women and children.

    2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source

  28. The oversight by the transitional Sovereignty Council is only an administrative oversight. We welcome the condemnation by the Human Rights Council, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Norway, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide and the Deputy Head of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS). They all have condemned the atrocities committed by the Rapid Support Forces against civilians in the Sudan, including sexual violence and killings based on ethnicity. We call on other States to condemn those heinous crimes and to ensure that the militia leaders committing those crimes against the Sudanese people are held accountable.

    2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source

  29. However, justice institutions in most of the Sudan’s states — in 15 out of 18 states — are functioning normally except in the capitals of some states in Darfur, namely, Nyala, Zalingi and El Geneina, as well as Khartoum Bahri, owing to security reasons as a result of the attacks launched by the Rapid Support Forces militias. In Darfur, there are 32 prosecutor offices, including 68 prosecutors in 54 local districts. The report (S/2023/861) states that the Public Prosecutor’s Office was put under the control of the transitional Sovereignty Council. That is not correct. The Public Prosecutor’s Office is an independent body pursuant to article 32 of the constitutional document for the transitional period from 2019 to 2020. No entity can intervene in the work of the Public Prosecutor’s Office.

    2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source

  30. We call on the international community and sisterly countries to address those acts of sexual violence by providing medical assistance as a priority to save lives, because there is a severe shortage of post-rape hospital treatment and of preventative medicine for sexually transmitted infections, AIDS and hepatitis. We have established a joint plan between the Unit for Combating Violence Against Women and the United Nations Population Fund to strengthen national mechanisms to protect women and children and to combat violence against women even within the state of emergency in a number of the states in the country. With regard to justice, there have been major repercussions in terms of justice owing to the ongoing armed conflict. Of course, armed conflicts affect all walks of life and justice institutions in the Sudan are no exception.

    2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source

  31. Those assaults were accompanied by forced disappearances of women and girls and repeated acts against their honour and dignity by a number of members of the Rapid Support Force militias. Girls in the district of Halfayet Almuluk were repeatedly kidnapped, including minors. Reports confirm that forced disappearances of women and girls by the militias of the Rapid Support Forces have taken a dangerous turn after news about selling detained girls in an act of humiliating human dignity. The enslavement of girls, taking them out of Khartoum or out of the Sudan across the border to neighbouring countries by the Rapid Support Forces, reminds us of what happened with the Yazidi women who were kidnapped, sold and subjected to slavery by Da’esh in Iraq in 2014.

    2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source

  32. They were looted along with 50 cars and 60 homes possessed by judges with the aim of destroying the judicial system. Reports confirm that, since April, 14 cases of sexual violence against young girls between 9 and 18 years of age in Khartoum, Nyala and El Geneina have been documented. Most of the girls were of particular ethnicities and poor families. They were forced into sexual slavery, as is done by Da’esh. CNN has documented one of the most terrible of those cases after the criminals released a video themselves last June. The rebel militias forced women and girls in Khartoum and South Darfur into sexual slavery where they were repeatedly kidnapped and subjected to forced disappearance. The independent national Unit for Combating Violence Against Women has documented 29 cases which can be qualified as sexual slavery.

    2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source

  33. They have looted and damaged Um Kadada hospital in North Darfur where they stole all the equipment, electrical appliances and vehicles leading to a cessation of medical services. That was preceded by looting and destroying hospitals and the university in Nyala city in South Darfur. Facilities of the judicial system in Khartoum Bahri and east of the Nile have been looted. The Rapid Force militias have burned cars and have stolen millions of pounds that were intended for the salaries of judges and employees. The militias have stolen computers and taken over court buildings to use as their headquarters. Criminal Courts and other courts in Khartoum Bahri and in the eastern area were targeted, as well as the Environmental Court, the Civil Court, the Criminal Court and the Children’s Court in other places.

    2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source

  34. Those crimes constitute a systematic strategy to empty the state of its original inhabitants and to re-establish foreign elements and mercenaries, including non-Sudanese there. Moreover, those militias attack camps of displaced persons in Zalingi in central Darfur and perpetrate abominable crimes on the basis of tribal identity. They attacked peaceful villages in Umm Ruwaba in North Kordofan where they committed massacres killing dozens of civilians. They continue shelling residential areas using advanced rockets in places such as Kerery, Um Durman and a market in the suburb killing a large number of unarmed citizens. They continue indiscriminate bombing of residential areas in El Fasher in North Darfur while forcing the inhabitants to leave the area in line with an ethnic cleansing strategy.

    2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source

  35. In recent days, the militias have committed the following crimes: ethnic cleansing in West Darfur, which started in June; the killing of more than 4,000 civilians from the Masalit tribe; the expulsion of most residents of the state capital and the neighbourhood. There are videos praising those expulsions. Moreover, killings by the militias on a tribal basis are increasing to include the village of Ardamata, where they search for new victims while assassinating local leaders such as Mohammed Arbab, his son and eight of his grandchildren; and another leader, Abdelbasit Suleiman, his wife and his son. The militias had already killed the brother of the sultan of Masalit and have continued to hold a large number of residents and torture them to death.

    2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source

  36. The Rapid Support Forces is not a party but parties that receive weapons and fighters while they displace citizens from six states. Citizens from six countries are fighting alongside the Rapid Support Forces. They were apprehended or killed in combat. We must change the way we think about the Rapid Support Forces. In that context, we regret to note that the rebel militias continue to commit atrocities, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and other international crimes to bring the Sudan back to prehistoric times in West Darfur and Central Darfur, North Kordofan and peaceful residential areas in Um Durman, despite their commitments during the Jeddah talks to protect civilians and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

    2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source

  37. The President of the Transitional Sovereign Council and his deputy have carried out regional visits in recent days to explain the real situation in the Sudan and to reiterate the position of the Government, namely, that the war must be brought to an end. The position of the Sudanese Government on ending the rebellion is fully endorsed and supported by all components of Sudanese society, which strongly reject the presence of the rebel Rapid Support Forces and their allies in any security or political format in the Sudan, in particular after our citizens and the world have witnessed the large-scale systematic crimes committed by those militias in Khartoum and in Darfur, particularly the alarming events in the west of Darfur and in El Geneina. We hope that the Prosecutor’s team of the International Criminal Court has taken note of that.

    2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source

  38. Mr. Mohamed (Sudan) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, I would like to thank Assistant Secretary-General Pobee for her briefing. I also thank all those delegations that have expressed their concerns regarding the events in the Sudan in a constructive manner. As for the war, I emphasize that the Sudanese Armed Forces are continuing their just struggle against the rebellious Rapid Support Forces militias that have been waging an all-out war of aggression against the Sudanese State since 15 April. The Sudanese Government continues to take initiatives in the political and security spheres and is cooperating with all regional and international powers to bring an end to the suffering of our people.

    2023-11-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9480 (2023) · source

  39. The Sudan will spare no effort in enabling the mission to fulfil its role, as stipulated in the relevant Security Council resolutions. We therefore welcome the Secretary-General’s recommendation to renew the mission’s mandate and for the mission to provide support for the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. In conclusion, I reiterate the commitment of the Government of the Sudan to strengthen cooperation with the Government of South Sudan with a view to promoting the work of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism and the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee, as well as to ensure the establishment of joint mechanisms between the two countries, based on the terms of the agreements signed between the two sides, leading to a solution to the final-status issues in Abyei, in accordance with the agreed terms of reference.

    2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source

  40. We call on the UNISFA mission to implement quick-impact projects and expand the establishment and implementation of more such projects that will positively affect the lives of the people there, especially in the fields of education, health, drinking water and maintaining security and order. As many people have returned to the Abyei Area following security developments in some cities in the Sudan, we call on UNISFA, in collaboration with the country team and specialized agencies, to provide them with assistance and meet their humanitarian needs. The United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei continues to play an important role in maintaining security and stability in the region until consensus is reached on final-status issues.

    2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source

  41. The Government of Sudan reaffirms its commitment and readiness to establish the temporary administrative and security mechanisms stipulated in the agreement of 20 June 2011 signed between the two parties. It also remains committed to the demarcation of borders in the region and to refraining from encroaching on the territories or undermining the demographic reality that currently exists in the region. Moreover, we affirm that there is no way to resolve the issue of Abyei apart from an agreement between the two States that enjoys the acceptance of societal groups and stakeholders.

    2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source

  42. The Sudan has repeatedly declared its desire, ability and commitment to establish those temporary arrangements, including administrative, police and legislative, and we expect our brothers in South Sudan to implement what they pledged in the 2011 agreement. We all hope that that will be the case. I would like to emphasize the following three points. While the Sudan affirms its keenness to maintain peace, stability and security in Abyei, we stress that unilateral measures should not be taken that may threaten the stability within the purview of UNISFA’s work, and we also stress the need for Abyei to be a demilitarized area in the buffer zone north and south of the zero line, in accordance with the agreements signed between the two countries.

    2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source

  43. Those terms of reference require several agreements to be implemented, along with political, security and administrative measures, including the composition of the joint administration, the joint legislative council and the Abyei joint police, pending agreement between the Sudan and South Sudan on the final-status issues in Abyei in a consensual, realistic and reasonable manner in addressing the situation there in a way that is trusted and acceptable to the social groups in the region and that ensures sustainable peace and social harmony. At present, the Sudan sees no alternative to abiding by, and adhering to, those terms of reference and to implementing their provisions in letter and in spirit.

    2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source

  44. For its part, the Sudan is fully prepared to provide evidence about that. With regard to the legal establishment, the Sudan reaffirms its commitment to the political and legal terms of reference governing the current situation in Abyei and considers the presence of UNISFA itself to be one of the manifestations and results of those references. The most important of those references is the June 2011 agreement on temporary arrangements for the administration and security of the Abyei Area and the cooperation agreements between the Sudan and South Sudan.

    2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source

  45. No violations by the armed forces were reported. The Sudan has not hindered relief efforts, as attested to by Mr. Griffiths in his tweets last week and by the conference to revitalize efforts to fulfil the pledges made, which was held in Geneva on 15 May. The conference was held during the proceedings of the General Assembly at its seventy-eighth session. The Sudan did not hinder peace efforts, as attested by its participation in negotiations in Jeddah. Instead of characterizing the current conflict in the Sudan as imperilling the Abyei Area, regional organizations should communicate with the countries in the region that are fuelling the conflict by funding the war effort of the Rapid Support Forces, in whose ranks many nationals of those countries have been captured during combat.

    2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source

  46. Some delegations raised the possibility that the situation in Abyei might be a reflection of the ongoing armed conflict caused by the Rapid Support Forces, which continue to openly receive specific armed support from countries in the region, particularly their attacks last week in the Belila and Nyala regions. Those attacks targeted armed forces barracks and were supported by mercenaries. Fifteen nationals of neighbouring countries fighting alongside the Rapid Support Forces were arrested. In addition, fighters from other countries were identified, killed in combat or arrested. In particular, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) expressed its concern about the Rapid Support Forces’s kidnapping of women and girls and their detention in conditions that were tantamount to enslavement.

    2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source

  47. Moreover, a recommendation called upon herders to cooperate with, and show respect for, the people and farmers in villages, in order to ensure peace and stability among herders. Recommendations adopted at the conferences also called for the division of the central route into two parts in order to facilitate the administration thereof, in order for UNISFA to patrol roads within the Abyei box, in the Abyei, Agok, Abyei Ding, Aweil and Abyei- Amiet-Goli areas. Capacity-building and awareness- raising workshops for the committees are to be held, and conferences will be convened for Misseriya and Ngok Dinka youth males and females, with UNISFA to open buffer lines in the region. In addition, humanitarian relief aid will be distributed along the western route.

    2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source

  48. It was also decided to lift the arbitrary fuel surcharge at the Amiet market and to hold annual conferences on transhumance in November, ahead of the migration of livestock, which begins in January, with post-migration conferences being held in May, taking into account climate conditions. It was also recommended that constant communi- cation be maintained between civilian communities and their members, with a view to exchanging information between the parties, and that the frequency of escort se- curity be increased to three times per day, from and to the Amiet market. The need to pay blood money and rep- arations for the theft and plunder of property by criminal gangs was stressed.

    2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source

  49. By way of example, I would like to cite the cessation of criminal acts between the two parties; a commitment to implementing the agreements concluded; the need to arrest the criminals and bring them to justice; the relocation of the detention centre and the community prison from the Amiet market to a site inside UNISFA camps in order to prevent the criminals from fleeing; and the lifting of the charges imposed on persons from both parties who are travelling within the Area. Moreover, UNISFA forces were requested to provide better comprehensive security and to put an end to attacks on villages and the kidnapping of women and children perpetrated by criminal gangs, as well as to stop attacks on cow herders in the areas surrounding the road linking Amiet, Goli and Abyei.

    2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source

  50. Peaceful coexistence and grazing were agreed on with the aim of improving local communities’ economic welfare and strengthening relations among them. The role played by the UNISFA office for the coordination of civil affairs, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the British organization Concordis International in furthering agreement on a grass-roots peacebuilding process between the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka tribes was commended. At that conference, decisions were adopted that were not mentioned in the report.

    2023-11-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9467 (2023) · source