YouSaid · the spoken record

Mohamed

lines on the record
1,149
first
2009-10-14
most recent
2023-12-15
sittings or episodes
102
sources
un-security-council

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  1. (spoke in French): Since you gave the floor to Mr. Ibrahim Mudawi, Madam President, I hope that I can have a minute or two to respond to his comments. (spoke in English) Accordingly, I think that Mr. Mudawi is an important man, an academician, and I welcomed his statement, but I found it to be a very gloomy account of the current conditions in the Sudan. As he is an academic, I will refer him to Professor Roger Mac Ginty’s book, entitled Everyday Peace, in which the author writes that peace is resilient, growing and persisting within many disruptive elements. It requires transgressing standard narratives and the involvement of actors in peacebuilding. It is therefore is like a weed growing up through concrete. Peacebuilding cannot be achieved through highly politicized methods or by taking sides.

    2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source

  2. Sanctions cannot be in place for more than 17 years without an objective assessment and comprehensive review of benchmarks, which must be realistic, doable and measurable. Maintaining the sanctions as they are would lead to deviations from the stated goals. It also makes us wonder about the unstated goals of the sanctions. Consensus on the request by the Sudan was within reach for the first time since the imposition of the sanctions, but for the sudden move by the penholder. The Sudan is ready to work with Council members that are willing to objectively assess the punitive measures, with a view to setting practical, realistic and doable benchmarks for reviewing the sanctions. The meeting rose at 10.15 a.m.

    2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9128 (2022) · source

  3. Lifting the sanctions imposed under resolution 1591 (2005) and other relevant resolutions will allow the Sudanese Government to rebuild the capacity of its security forces and law enforcement agencies and bring about and promote peace in Darfur and other areas with long borders that enable transnational organized crime groups to engage in trafficking in persons and weapons and assist in the perpetuation of other transnational organized crimes. Imposing sanctions has a direct and negative effect on stability. That is why we continue to believe that an immediate lifting of the sanctions is important. Lastly, it is disappointing that the negotiations among Security Council members on setting criteria and benchmarks for reviewing the sanctions have stalled for the second time. They were supposed to have been concluded by the end of August.

    2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9128 (2022) · source

  4. The full force will be 12,000-strong — 50 per cent of them will be Government forces and the remaining 50 per cent will be former members of armed groups that signed the Agreement. The Government provides equipment and vehicles to the force from its own scarce resources. That is a fundamental step to implement the security arrangements, which have not been sufficiently implemented for lack of international financial support and broken promises by donors in that regard. I would like to clarify that the Government, while implementing the Juba Peace Agreement, facilitates the work of the Permanent Ceasefire Committee, chaired by the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan.

    2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9128 (2022) · source

  5. They strengthen the presence of the State and rule of law institutions, address land disputes and the return of refugees and displaced persons to their villages. We call upon the international community and peace-loving nations that want security and stability in Darfur to support the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement with the necessary financial and technical resources. We would like to thank friendly countries that have supported those efforts. In that context, the first batch of 2,000 members of armed groups that are signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement have completed their training and will now make up the core of the joint force to establish security and protect civilians in Darfur.

    2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9128 (2022) · source

  6. The Government is also committed to addressing the remaining social and security challenges, such as intermittent communal clashes. Such acts of violence can occur in any country, regardless of its status or location. They have been known historically and socially in Darfur for decades, and they are being addressed through traditional dispute-settlement mechanisms that support official efforts undertaken by State security and justice bodies. In that regard, I would like to note that, over the past few weeks, several reconciliation meetings have been held among tribes in western and southern Darfur, under the auspices of the Vice-President of the Sovereignty Council, and those meetings have been successful.

    2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9128 (2022) · source

  7. The transitional Government has made great efforts to enhance security, peace and stability in Darfur. Chief among those efforts was the achievement of the Juba Peace Agreement in October 2020. The Government is currently committed to implementing the provisions of the Agreement, in cooperation with the partners of the peace process. That will help sustain peace in Darfur. The Sudanese Government is committed to shoulder its national responsibility and duty. We are relying on limited domestic financial resources. The international community has not honoured its pledges towards the peace process in Darfur. Nevertheless, I would like to stress that the Sudan is committed to implementing the agreement and all the provisions as stipulated.

    2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9128 (2022) · source

  8. Mr. Mohamed (Sudan) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, I would like to congratulate you, Madam President, on assuming the presidency of the Security Council during the month of September. We express our appreciation to the People’s Republic of China for presiding over the Council last month. I also thank the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005), concerning the Sudan, on the Committee’s quarterly report. The sanctions imposed on the Sudan under resolution 1591 (2005) are no longer consistent with the reality on the ground in Darfur. The situation today has changed since they were first imposed in 2005. Darfur has been able to overcome the state of war and the security and political challenges of the past.

    2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9128 (2022) · source

  9. As I stated earlier, it is one of the most important priorities of the transitional Government and one of the most important elements for achieving peace throughout our country. We want to underscore that we are fully and strongly committed to fighting impunity, in particular for international crimes related to Darfur.

    2022-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9113 (2022) · source

  10. The Government of the Sudan would like to recall the principle of legal complementarity, as outlined in the Rome Statute of the ICC, which allows for bilateral cooperation between the Sudanese Government and the Office of the Prosecutor. The transitional Government stresses its commitment to productive cooperation with the Office of the Prosecutor, consistent with its moral and legal obligations. At the same time, we expect such cooperation to be reciprocal in order to deliver justice and provide redress to victims according to the options under consideration and the dialogue launched to achieve stability and ensure the Sudan’s sovereignty and unity. In conclusion, we emphasize that the issue of addressing impunity is a noble goal in the achievement of justice. It is not a contentious one.

    2022-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9113 (2022) · source

  11. In the light of the current political transition in the Sudan, its immense challenges and the fragility and sensitivity of the situation, it is imperative that those options be examined in order to determine which would be the best way to achieve justice, establish social harmony and preserve the Sudan’s unity and sovereignty. That requires that all the members of the Security Council fully support the measures taken by the Sudanese Government, in line with their international commitments, which would help lead to sustaining peace and stability and to the delivery of justice and the prevention of impunity. We must underscore that the Juba Peace Agreement has created a new reality in the Sudan, particularly in Darfur. The international community must support that reality.

    2022-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9113 (2022) · source

  12. We welcome the reference in the Prosecutor’s report acknowledging the steady improvement of the situation in Darfur. We also welcome the report’s recognition of the cooperation between the Government of the Sudan and the Office of the Prosecutor during the reporting period, in line with the principles of international criminal law and the Rome Statute of the ICC. Former Prosecutor Bensouda agreed to three options for dealing with suspects and individuals wanted by the Court. First, the trial of suspects and wanted persons of the ICC would take place before a Sudanese court. Secondly, the suspects and the wanted would appear before the ICC. Thirdly, the Sudan would accept the option of prosecuting those individuals before a hybrid court that is supported internationally.

    2022-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9113 (2022) · source

  13. The Sudanese judiciary and the Public Prosecutor’s Office have been investigating all the violations registered in Darfur since 2001, in line with the Sudan’s obligations under international law and the four Geneva Conventions. However, as the Council is aware, the transitional Government bears the responsibility for preventing impunity through credible national procedures. A failure to prevent impunity would encourage the same individuals to commit further violations and encourage others to believe that they would not be punished and held accountable. The transitional Government is also working to enshrine the principles of transitional justice as one of the most important mechanisms for achieving societal peace and stability.

    2022-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9113 (2022) · source

  14. In order to achieve peace, development, justice and accountability, the transitional Government eagerly signed the Juba Peace Agreement in 2021. It set out a comprehensive road map to address the conflict and post-conflict arrangements. Among the most important pillars of the Peace Agreement are the security arrangements for the protection of civilians through the deployment of joint forces in all parts of Darfur, pursuant to the national plan for the protection of civilians, the national plan for the protection and promotion of human rights and the 2019 Constitutional Declaration. The transitional Government has amended a number of laws in order to abolish immunities for officials that could otherwise impede the achievement of justice and enable impunity.

    2022-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9113 (2022) · source

  15. The Government of the Sudan has demonstrated serious cooperation with the ICC, especially with the Office of the Prosecutor, where various delegations were received and a memorandum of understanding was signed in August 2021. As I speak before the Council today, a high-level delegation led by Prosecutor Khan is in Khartoum. The people of Darfur have previously suffered killing, destruction and displacement. The Government of the Sudan has therefore given special attention to Darfur and its people and has made achieving complete, just and sustainable peace its top priority. That means ensuring the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their villages and solving the problem of land and ownership.

    2022-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9113 (2022) · source

  16. Mr. Mohamed (Sudan) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, and your friendly country on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for the month of August. I also want to thank Mr. Karim Khan, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), for briefing the Council today from Khartoum. Since its glorious December 2018 revolution, Sudan has witnessed significant positive developments that have laid the groundwork for a new political reality that will undoubtedly lead to the establishment of a system where freedom, justice and the rule of law prevail. We have already started to consolidate a sustainable structure for democratic civilian rule where people’s sovereignty is ensured, and actions are governed by law and underpinned by justice with no place for impunity.

    2022-08-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9113 (2022) · source

  17. We stress our continued cooperation and coordination on all matters related to child protection and the prevention of any forms of grave violations against them.

    2022-07-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9096Resumption1 (2022) · source

  18. In that vein, my Government would request a more meticulous approach and greater objectivity in that type of report, free of any generalizations or inaccurate information, with a focus on supporting the Government’s efforts to prevent and stop any intercommunal conflicts that could lead to such violations against children. There is a need to assist the Government to dispose of any explosive remnants of war, which are the main cause of the death and maiming of children. The Government should also be supported in its negotiations with other armed movements non-signatories to the October 2020 Juba Peace Agreement, so that we can ensure the protection of children in the context of peacekeeping operations. To conclude, the Government of the Sudan encourages and welcomes the field visits by Ms. Virginia Gamba de Potgieter and her team.

    2022-07-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9096Resumption1 (2022) · source

  19. With respect to the segment on the Sudan in the Secretary-General’s report (S/2022/493), dated 23 June 2022, I would like to reiterate that the Government of the Sudan is fully committed to promoting and protecting children’s rights and preventing any grave violations against them in areas of armed conflict. We stress the implementation of the 2016 national plan to protect children. I would also like to refer to our efforts to revitalize and reactivate the plan to prevent any grave violations against children, which led to the delisting of the Sudan from the 2018 list of child violations.

    2022-07-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9096Resumption1 (2022) · source

  20. The establishment of a number of technical committees that provide training and capacity-building for the child-protection units and mechanisms affiliated with the armed forces reflects the positive steps taken and the tireless efforts made to provide protection and promotion for children’s rights in conflict-affected areas and prevent any grave violations against them. Turning to legal protection, the law provides for mechanisms to protect children survivors of violence and sexual abuse. Units for the protection of families and children were established, as well as children’s prosecutors and courts. The National Council for Child Care has formed a special prosecution unit to combat violence against children and has taken measures to protect children from sexual violence.

    2022-07-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9096Resumption1 (2022) · source

  21. In order to achieve those endeavours and efforts, the Government has established a number of structures to prevent such violations, as follows: the reconfiguration of the high-level Sovereign Council, presided over by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Social Development; the membership of the Ministry of Defence; the Secretariat General of the National Council for Child Care and other relevant ministries, as well as partners of peace signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement and the UNICEF Executive Director in the Sudan.

    2022-07-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9096Resumption1 (2022) · source

  22. My Government continues its efforts to reintegrate the armed movements and groups signatories to the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement into the road map on protecting children from violations, in line with the implementation of the joint plan between the Government of the Sudan and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for children and armed conflict, signed in 2016.

    2022-07-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9096Resumption1 (2022) · source

  23. Mr. Mohamed (Sudan) (spoke in Arabic): It gives me pleasure to welcome Ambassador Fernando Simas, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, and to thank him for presiding over this important meeting on the situation of children in armed conflict and protecting them from all forms of grave violations. I should also like to thank all briefers for their comprehensive presentations. The Government of the Sudan stresses its ongoing endeavours to protect and promote children’s rights, especially those in areas affected by armed conflict.

    2022-07-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9096Resumption1 (2022) · source

  24. We adhere to the stand that the sanctions mechanism must be reviewed in order to take into consideration the following remarks. There should be an assessment of the potential impact of the sanctions on the target State. The States under sanctions regimes should be involved in the assessment process. Sanctions should be fine-tuned to reverse the resultant suffering. Claims of impacted States should be given priority in humanitarian assistance. Improving the Security Council’s working methods is a long-term endeavour. We are confident that the Security Council will be better able to carry out the mandate given to it by the States Members of the United Nations if it continually and persistently improves its working methods and practices. The meeting rose at 6 p.m.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9079Resumption1 (2022) · source

  25. As it tends to be an absolute directorship — a facility, not a blatant subduing or overlordship — it should be freed from politicization, whereby a State under a regime of sanctions is not stripped of its statehood and membership rights. Penholding is procedural. It is never meant to be substantive, perpetual or manipulative to undermine one’s State national interests, in particular its multilateral rights to enjoy membership of all United Nations institutions and committees. It does not consider positively the balance of interests that encompass the State for whose oversight the pen was held. It should not be a mandatory vehicle for maximizing the overseeing State’s national self- interests to the total detriment of the State that was put on hold.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9079Resumption1 (2022) · source

  26. One would aspire that it would engender effectiveness and specific capacities of the purported delinquent State in order to maximize its exposure, with multilateral oversight equipped with those best vestiges of statehood to help the State under the holding regime to become involved in a positive engagement. Penholdership therefore seems to lack transparency. It is nothing more than a self-mandated authoritarian guardianship that holds the State in a post-modern box, managed by a one-dimensional patronship. Penholdership is in need of restructuring, reviewing and reinventing, if it is not outdated. If it continues, it must respect the multilateral interests of the State under the penholdership and the fact that it enjoys equitable sovereignty and has dignity and pride.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9079Resumption1 (2022) · source

  27. Penholdership, per se, has manifested itself as a robust one-dimensional power of overseeing the national self-interest of the penholding State to the detriment of the State under quasi-trusteeship. One can hardly equate it with a system of governance or an advisory task relating to the swift navigation of the State, which was put on hold from its status quo to an experimental correctness of its situation. One would think that it would enshrine an equitable and positive sharing of expertise, wisdom and political experience, with a view to improving the dire condition of the target State by the strange paroxysm of perpetual holding.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9079Resumption1 (2022) · source

  28. How can we ensure that the penholder does not turn into a stick-holder? Penholdership reform is but an actualization of the principle of the sovereign equality of all States Members of the United Nations. It was also possible to bring about, especially compared with the reform debated at length on the veto power and the permanent membership of the Council. Moreover, penholding was based more or less on the past colonial relationship between the penholding Member State and the Member State against which the pen is being held. That is a bizarre contradiction, which runs counter to the principal objective of the United Nations Charter regarding decolonization.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9079Resumption1 (2022) · source

  29. There has been a debate in recent years about the Security Council’s encroachment on the powers of other organs of the Organization, particularly the General Assembly. The reform of the Council’s working methods under Article 24 requires the Council to adhere to its Charter-mandated functions. A quick glance at the Council’s agenda reveals that it is rapidly expanding, necessitating a pause for reflection and meaningful review. It is critical that the Security Council’s tasks and responsibilities be distributed democratically, transparently and objectively among its members. The so-called penholdership is a particular source of concern in that regard. For instance, on what grounds does one country become a penholder while another does not? What are the limits of the penholder’s responsibilities?

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9079Resumption1 (2022) · source

  30. At the outset, may I express my appreciation to the Albanian presidency of the Security Council for having convened this meeting and inviting non-Council members to participate in the debate on the working methods of the Council. The Security Council is entrusted by the Charter of the United Nations with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. To carry out that task effectively, the Council’s work must be transparent, objective and resilient for the benefit of the greater international community as a whole rather than of a specific group of elite countries, with a view to improving the efficiency of the Council’s working methods. That being said, I should like to highlight the following points.

    2022-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9079Resumption1 (2022) · source

  31. In conclusion, after the end of the war and hostilities, and after the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement with the majority of the armed movements participating in the present Government, the situation in Darfur no longer poses a threat to international peace and security, as was the case in 2005 when resolution 1591 (2005) was adopted and followed by subsequent resolutions. The meeting rose at 3.30 p.m.

    2022-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9070 (2022) · source

  32. In order to support peace, the Vice-President of the Sovereignty Council is currently visiting the city of El Geneina with representatives of the parties to the Juba Peace Agreement to check on the areas affected and determine the best way to restore law and order and the rule of law. The Council knows that resolution 1591 (2005) does not allow the State to send military forces or transfer weapons to Darfur. At the same time, however, the Government is being criticized when sporadic violence occurs in the region.

    2022-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9070 (2022) · source

  33. The Sudan submitted a national plan for the protection of civilians to the Security Council. The priority now is to implement the Juba Peace Agreement. We would like to underscore that our Government is making comprehensive efforts to address the root causes of intercommunal clashes in Darfur. Achieving security and stability there is a priority for us. That is why we sent a high-level delegation to West Darfur state after the events in Kerenik, Jebel Moon and Kulbus in order to assess the situation on the ground and submit recommendations to the Defence Council and the Sovereignty Council on taking urgent measures, bringing justice for the victims and prosecuting those responsible.

    2022-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9070 (2022) · source

  34. The current situation is no longer a cause for international concern, and the incidents that occur in Darfur require post-conflict management and sustained peacebuilding. In the wake of the glorious revolution of December 2018, the fact that UNAMID’s mandate was terminated is evidence that there is no longer a need for a United Nations mission to protect civilians in Darfur. The Sudan has expressed its official desire to end the sanctions. It has conveyed that message to all the Heads of Delegations at the United Nations and international envoys who have visited us since the 2018 revolution. Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State of the United States in the Trump Administration, expressed the readiness of the United States to put an end to the sanctions regime.

    2022-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9070 (2022) · source

  35. Comprehensive studies conducted in 2013 showed that targeted sanctions regimes failed to make a difference for the targeted populations. Their success rate does not exceed 10 per cent, with a ceiling of 28 per cent when it comes to changing negative behaviour. Where support for the international normative frameworks is concerned, sanctions have a success rate of only 27 per cent. We also want to stress that the Sudanese Government has not breached the arms embargo, despite the impact that it had on our national security. The situation in the Sudan in 2005 was considered a threat to international peace and security and therefore required subsequent extensions of the sanctions resolution.

    2022-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9070 (2022) · source

  36. It is a transition in which we hope to receive the support of the international community so that the transitional Government can restore peace, security and stability to the region. The lifting of the sanctions imposed under resolution 1591 (2005) and the related resolutions will enable the Sudanese Government to rebuild the capacity of its security forces and law-enforcement agencies to maintain and promote peace not only in Darfur but the entire region. It is a vast region, with long borders where transnational organized crime groups are pursuing activities that include trafficking in persons and weapons and other transnational crimes. Sanctions have a direct and negative impact on the stabilization process. That is why we believe that it is crucial to lift the sanctions immediately.

    2022-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9070 (2022) · source

  37. We therefore call on the international community to share that burden by providing us with the necessary financial and technical assistance. UNITAMS has also a major role in that regard. The Sudan is determined to continue its efforts to improve the security situation in Darfur by implementing the Juba Peace Agreement and collecting unauthorized weapons. It will also do so by improving accountability and justice and implementing a national plan for the protection of civilians, with the participation of the parties to the Juba Peace Agreement. And we will work to negotiate with the Abdul Wahid Mohamed Al-Nour movement to advance the peace process. The situation in Darfur has changed. We have moved from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.

    2022-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9070 (2022) · source

  38. It is important to note that the Government is committed to upholding the ceasefire and silencing the guns even with parties that are not signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement, with a view to building trust and encouraging them to join a lasting and comprehensive peace process. We underscore that the transitional Government has demonstrated its firm political will to implement the provisions of the Juba Peace Agreement regarding security arrangements and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, as well as establishing and deploying a joint force for the protection of civilians. The goal is to strengthen and promote security in Darfur. We should stress in that regard that these are difficult and complex tasks, and the Government of the Sudan will be unable to achieve them alone.

    2022-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9070 (2022) · source

  39. The training of that first group is an essential step in implementing the security arrangements, which were previously delayed because of a lack of international funding and donors who did not keep their promises. However, the armed factions responded positively to the decisions taken at the meeting of the Joint Supreme Council for Security Arrangements held in El Fasher in March, including on issues relating to weapons collection in the towns and major cities of states, as well as on bringing together the forces of armed groups in areas outside cities. I should clarify here that according to the provisions of the Juba Peace Agreement, the Government is facilitating the work in Darfur of the Permanent Ceasefire Committee, chaired by the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS).

    2022-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9070 (2022) · source

  40. Clashes of that kind could occur in any country, regardless of its status or location. I would like to state here that the Government of the Sudan is fully coordinating its efforts with its partners in the peace process to implement the provisions of the Juba Peace Agreement, in spite of our limited national resources. In that regard, the training of the first group of forces of movements that are parties to the Agreement is under way. Some 2,000 troops of those armed groups are now being trained. They will make up the first group of the security force protecting civilians in Darfur and will be the first set of troops of the joint force responsible for maintaining security in Darfur. There will be 12,000 of them, distributed evenly between Government forces and the forces of groups that are parties to the Peace Agreement.

    2022-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9070 (2022) · source

  41. Our position is that those sanctions no longer reflect the situation on the ground in Darfur as compared with 2005, when they were first imposed, at a time when there was a different regime in power, with different policies and directives. Darfur was ultimately able to deal with the war, as well as its previous political and security challenges, which was why the Council took the decision to end the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2020. UNAMID’s mandate was to protect civilians. The few intercommunal clashes that continue in Darfur do not undermine the fact that the overall situation in Darfur continues to improve and that the Government is determined to resolve any remaining social and security challenges, such as the intermittent intercommunal clashes.

    2022-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9070 (2022) · source

  42. Mr. Mohamed (Sudan) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, I would like to congratulate your country, Madam President, on its assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of June, and to express our appreciation to the United States for presiding over the Security Council last month. I also want to thank the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan for his briefing on the quarterly report on the work of the Sanctions Committee. For the past few years, the Sudan has always asserted its firm position on the sanctions imposed on it under resolution 1591 (2005) and subsequent Security Council resolutions.

    2022-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9070 (2022) · source

  43. In conclusion, while warring parties are fighting for power, it is the Libyan people, the civilians on the ground, who are paying the ultimate price, many with their lives. It is their voices that should guide the Council's actions in bringing an end to this conflict and restoring peace to Libya.

    2019-09-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8611 (2019) · source

  44. We furthermore call on the Council to demand accountability from all parties to the conflict and call on the International Criminal Court to initiate investigations into possible war crimes and crimes against humanity. We call on the Council to protect women human rights defenders. Libyan authorities must ensure an enabling environment for all women, including women human rights defenders, peacebuilders and political leaders. The Council must demand that Libyan authorities, UNSMIL and all parties to the conflict ensure the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all phases of the peace and reconciliation process. UNSMIL's active and public support for substantive engagement by women in conflict and post-conflict dialogue would send a clear message that women's participation and contributions are not only vital, but necessary.

    2019-09-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8611 (2019) · source

  45. As Secretary-General Guterres himself warns in his latest report (S/20l9/682) on the situation, Libya is likely to erupt into a full civil war unless immediate action is taken. It is a test of the Council's credibility to act now. We therefore call on the Security Council to demand an immediate ceasefire to end the current conflict and ensure that all civilians are protected from attacks, including sexual and gender-based violence, and to stop the transfer of weapons that are being used to perpetuate the violence. All Member States must uphold and enforce the United Nations embargo on all weapons transfers and sales to Libya. The absence of a clear message from the Security Council has led to an intensified stockpiling of weapons on both sides at an alarming rate.

    2019-09-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8611 (2019) · source

  46. They include attacks on Mitiga airport and medical personnel and facilities, in violation of international humanitarian law, which may amount to war crimes. According to the World Health Organization, 106 civilians have been killed, 294 injured and more than 10,000 people displaced across Libya since April. Furthermore, according to UNSMIL, as of 15 August, there had been over 37 attacks on health workers and facilities - with 19 hospitals attacked and 11 medical personnel killed, in clear violation of international humanitarian law. Migrant detention centres have also not been spared. An aerial attack on the official migrant and refugee detention centre in Tajura in July left 46 dead and at least 130 wounded.

    2019-09-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8611 (2019) · source

  47. This was most recently illustrated by the enforced disappearance of parliamentarian and women's rights activist Siham Sergewa, who had expressed political views critical of the offensive of the Libyan National Army (LNA) on Tripoli and had called for the formation of a civilian State. Siham was abducted by armed militias from her home in Benghazi on 17 July. Her fate remains unknown. Siham's case is one of many. Enforced disappearances are used in Libya to deter any kind of dissent and send a message that there are those above the law who can operate with total impunity. Without accountability, the cycle will continue. Since the LNA's offensive on Tripoli began, indiscriminate targeting of civilians and civilian objects have been documented by Lawyers for Justice in Libya, activists on the ground and other international organizations.

    2019-09-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8611 (2019) · source

  48. The only official numbers from the Ministry of the Interior are from 2017, and they indicate that 257 people disappeared in March and April in Tripoli alone. The figure is likely higher across Libya and over the nine years since the conflict started. Militias routinely abduct individuals from their homes, streets, checkpoints and places of work, holding them in unofficial places of detention with no access to lawyers, their families or judicial oversight - usually subjecting them to torture and other ill-treatment. UNSMIL has reported that some of the disappeared have been held for up to two years. Others have never been seen again.

    2019-09-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8611 (2019) · source

  49. In the absence of a central State authority, women have had to take their safety into their own hands by adhering to specific dress codes, travelling only with a male guardian or restricting their movements to the daytime. That has resulted in profound limitations on their freedom of movement and their ability to engage fully in public life. Given the gendered impact of the conflict on Libyan women, it is especially critical that they be meaningfully included in all political talks to bring sustainable peace to Libya. The token representation of women or their inclusion at stages when they can have no influence over the outcome undermines the effectiveness of any peace process. Although poorly documented due to fear of reprisals, enforced disappearances have become a widespread pattern across Libya since 2011.

    2019-09-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8611 (2019) · source

  50. According to 1,300 first-hand interviews conducted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the majority of migrant and refugee women and girls have been systematically gang-raped by traffickers or have witnessed others taken away to be abused along their journey. Migrant and refugee women, who are held in detention centres run entirely by male guards, are also strip-searched and exposed to sexual violence, including rape. Nevertheless, sexual and gender-based violence, on the whole, remains underreported. The State's inability to control the activities of armed groups and militias has left women vulnerable, with no accountability for the attacks against them.

    2019-09-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8611 (2019) · source