YouSaid · the spoken record

Mohamed

lines on the record: 1,149
first: 2009-10-14
most recent: 2023-12-15
sittings or episodes: 102
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“However, there is no mention in the report of the reluctance of donors to honour their pledges, or of the sanctions related to Darfur, which need to be reassessed pursuant to the paragraph 1 of resolution 2620 (2022), which provides for introducing amendments to or suspensions of, or else eliminating altogether or phasing out, the sanctions, based on the current situation and in view of the positive political developments and the tireless efforts being made to form a new civilian Government. The resolution is limited to the security situation in Darfur and delegating a Panel of Experts to monitor progress implies that its mandate should be expanded to include monitoring and reporting on the developments of the political and security situation in the Sudan.”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9210 (2022) · source
“The report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (S/2022/898) recognizes the significant positive impact of the reconciliation agreements, which have contributed to enhancing stability and security in the region. With regard to the objectives set out in the report, we note that most of them are unquantifiable and unimplementable. They do not concern Darfur since they address national issues, such as political and economic governance objectives and the formation of the Joint Supreme Council for Security Arrangements to address disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. They should be limited only to the regional context. A number of paragraphs refer to advancing and accelerating the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement.”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9210 (2022) · source
“In that context, we call on the international community to honour its pledges to support the peace process in Darfur. The dynamics of the peace process were enhanced through significant progress in reconciliation among the tribes in West and South Darfur in recent months, thanks to the efforts of the Vice-President of the Sovereignty Council. Those efforts led to the success achieved in strengthening the presence of State institutions and the rule of law, addressing land disputes and the return of displaced persons and refugees to their villages and purchasing the equipment needed with the limited national resources available in order to improve the security situation.”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9210 (2022) · source
“While transboundary militias still have a presence, and adverse effects of the security situation in the region continue, in our view peace cannot be quantified by an ideal index of a total absence of violence. While certain countries may call for that, in our view it is a utopian request that humankind has failed to achieve since Adam’s fall from Eden. Resolution 1591 (2005) has been overtaken by current developments on the ground, especially now that the war in Darfur has come to a total halt. However, political and security challenges continue while the Transitional Government is making significant efforts to achieve security and peace in the region, foremost among them through the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, in collaboration with partners in the peace process, which is key to establishing peace.”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9210 (2022) · source
“That was followed by the creation of a security-keeping force in the region to curb the flow of weapons from neighbouring countries. The assessment team also maintained that issues related to land, water and the climate and environment were major factors fuelling the conflict, owing to their impact on tribal communities, nomads, herders, farmers, IDPs and refugees. While it is true that from time to time we have witnessed intercommunal conflicts due to those factors, they are not politically driven — in fact, the motives behind some of them are criminal in nature. The security situation in Darfur has improved significantly, to the extent that the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur was terminated.”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9210 (2022) · source
“First, the situation in Darfur had improved since July 2004 in the wake of the glorious revolution of December 2018 and positive developments such as the political agreement on establishing the structures and institutions of the transitional period and the Constitutional Declaration signed in 2019 by the Freedom and Change Forces and the Transitional Military Council, as well as the adoption of a national plan of action for the protection of civilians in May 2020 and the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement in October 2020. The Juba Peace Agreement is considered to represent the best opportunity to achieve comprehensive and sustainable peace, along with a permanent ceasefire, and includes protocols on power- sharing, a permanent ceasefire, security arrangements and addressing the root causes of conflict in Darfur.”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9210 (2022) · source
“The team also consulted with the Transitional Government and the parties to the Juba Peace Agreement, as well as political parties, civil-society organizations and women’s and youth groups, in addition to assessment teams and the Panels of Experts on the Sudan, the Central African Republic, Libya and South Sudan. It arrived at the following conclusions.”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9210 (2022) · source
“Mr. Mohamed (Sudan) (spoke in Arabic): I would like to congratulate you, Madam President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of December, and to express our confidence in your wise stewardship of its work. We also appreciate the work of Ghana during its presidency of the Council last month. We took note of the report of the Secretary-General issued on 31 July 2021 entitled “Review of the situation in Darfur and benchmarks to assess the measures on Darfur” (S/2021/696), which included coverage of the visit from 12 to 26 June 2021 of a Secretariat assessment team to the Sudan, specifically the cities of Khartoum, Nyala and El Fasher, in addition to South Darfur and North Darfur and the Kass, Kalma and Abu Shouk camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs).”
2022-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9210 (2022) · source
“They should mobilize the resources required for the completion of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process as a priority within the implementation of the security arrangements protocol. Peacebuilding operations should also be carried out with the international community to provide technical and logistical support, including capacity-building in the areas of illegal immigration and cross-border crimes, especially arms smuggling and human trafficking. Finally, peacebuilding operations must mobilize donors to provide the support required to realize the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, particularly those pertaining to poverty eradication and addressing the root causes of conflict and violent extremism.”
2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181Resumption1 (2022) · source
“Other tasks include coordinating with UNICEF on the implementation of field surveys for integrating human rights into the curricula of both general and higher education, providing financial and material resources for State police to reinforce patrols and community policework and supporting the establishment of subheadquarters for national mechanisms for the protection of civilians. As stipulated in the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, peacebuilding efforts should support the implementation of the third stage of the national project for the collection of weapons and unlicensed vehicles.”
2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181Resumption1 (2022) · source
“Peacebuilding operations should include the implementation of quick-return and quick-impact projects in the areas and villages of voluntary return in order to encourage IDPs to return to their places of origin, homes and communities. It is also important to work with donors to provide the resources required for the implementation of reparations as a basis for reconciliation and the support needed for the implementation of our national plan for the protection of civilians, field protection and environmental protection. Peacebuilding operations should support the establishment of detection and early-warning mechanisms to avoid communal and intercommunal confrontations.”
2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181Resumption1 (2022) · source
“It will also be necessary to raise awareness of women’s sectors in various communities and groups, especially communities of internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as of the importance of women’s participation in the political process. And it will be vital to coordinate with international electoral observation centres such as the Carter Center, which work alongside UNDP to train local observers from various civil-society organizations. The mobilization of United Nations organs and agencies, especially UNDP, UNICEF and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, is key to rehabilitating returnees and facilitating their voluntary return in calm areas and host communities, as well as in the provision of education, health and water facilities.”
2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181Resumption1 (2022) · source
“In the Sudan, we expect peacebuilding efforts to help mobilize the necessary resources and provide support for national efforts aimed at establishing the necessary mechanisms for drafting our Constitution, without prejudice to the national ownership of those efforts. They should also coordinate and unify the efforts of the United Nations country team and all other organizations and agencies, including international financial institutions, in order to provide the necessary support for transition and peacebuilding as stipulated in paragraph 2 (iv) (c) of resolution 2524 (2020). Peacebuilding efforts should be coordinated with the work of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Development Fund for Women in order to support the participation of women in accordance with our constitutional document of 2019.”
2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181Resumption1 (2022) · source
“The main aims of peacebuilding should target the restoration or improvement of governance and governance institutions, the consolidation of established peace agreements and the restoration of human and State security. Peacebuilding operations should also help to launch socioeconomic reconstruction and development; promote healing, reconciliation, justice and human rights; provide humanitarian emergency assistance; encourage the participation of women and young people; build strategic partnerships at the national, regional, continental and global levels and bolster resource mobilization.”
2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181Resumption1 (2022) · source
“What the process of nationalizing peacebuilding means to us is the ability to exercise options, circulate knowledge, wisdom and experiences and synthesize practices from within communities themselves in order to initiate various community and sectoral initiatives and cooperative mechanisms while constantly modifying the practices and modalities of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding should be implemented by focusing on the principles of resilience and national or local ownership in sustaining peace. It should endeavour to achieve realistic peace through peaceful means by positively linking the international peacebuilding process to local political, cultural and social legitimacy and by targeting methods of establishing peace through contexts that promote sustainability with the participation of the largest possible number of local actors.”
2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181Resumption1 (2022) · source
“However, it also seeks to achieve several other short- and long-term goals through its goodwill and good offices, such as the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration of armed units; security sector reform to prevent the recurrence of conflict or war; and the monitoring of elections and institution-building in conflict-affected areas, in accordance with national ownership. Among the expected objectives are stimulating, peaceful and constructive processes that aim to increase self- regulatory efficiency in order to enable societies to effectively manage internal and external pressures. To accommodate the diverse interests and needs of communities, they should be represented through practical efforts to build inclusivity within a process of partnership and collective learning.”
2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181Resumption1 (2022) · source
“Allow me to congratulate you, Madam President, on your country’s assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month, which we believe will be seminal for revitalizing interactive debates on a number of important issues. I want to share with the Council some practical remarks from our national ownership perspective of peacekeeping. Based on my country’s experience, peacekeeping seeks to create favourable conditions that prevent the recurrence of violence.”
2022-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9181Resumption1 (2022) · source
“From this United Nations organ, we call on the regional and international communities to support the two parties in their efforts to achieve security, stability and development, as well as to reach an agreed solution on Abyei’s final status. I also thank the United States for providing financial support to both parties to improve conditions for local communities in Abyei.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“They also stressed the importance of committing to a peaceful, negotiated and mutually agreed solution on Abyei’s final status. I reiterate the Government of the Sudan’s commitment to strengthening cooperation with the Government of brotherly South Sudan, with a view to enhancing the work of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism and the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee. We are eager to establish joint mechanisms between the two countries, based on the terms of the agreements signed between both sides, in order to achieve a solution on Abyei’s final status in accordance with the agreed terms of reference.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“Finally, in the meeting between the two parties on 24 October, namely, Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, Deputy Chair of the Sovereign Council, and Mr. Tut Gatluak, Adviser to the President of South Sudan, both sides agreed to hold joint cooperation mechanisms on Abyei on a quarterly basis, or whenever is necessary, to present proposals to the leadership of both countries in order to reach a solution on Abyei’s final status. The two parties also agreed on mutual cooperation in order to create a healthy and appropriate environment for the communities in both the Sudan and South Sudan, with the aim of activating the bilateral cooperation mechanisms between the two States and supporting security, development and stability in the Abyei region, for the benefit of the local communities and the two countries.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“For its part, the Sudan is fully prepared to establish such a police service in Abyei. Paragraph 7 of the Secretary-General’s report mentions the presence of Sudanese armed forces personnel inside the Abyei Area. We would like to stress that that is not true, and that Sudan’s armed forces have not been present in that location since their withdrawal in 2012. Paragraph 17 of the report of the Secretary-General notes freedom of movement violations against UNISFA and mentions that the Sudanese armed forces denied access to a water point to a UNISFA water truck in Tishwin. However, it is well-known that the Sudanese authorities grant that service free of charge in support of UNISFA. We provide the mission with two water trucks per week, upon request.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“We stress the continued willingness of the Sudanese side to attend joint meetings on Abyei, which demonstrates the commitment of the Sudan to the agreements concluded. With regard to the activity of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism in Sector 1 in Gok Machar, as noted in paragraph 4 of his report, the Secretary-General calls on South Sudan to raise awareness among local authorities and reopen the monitoring sector. That issue requires exerting more pressure on the State of South Sudan to respond, because it is hindering the activities of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. Any delay in the establishment and formation of Abyei’s joint police service and rule-of-law institutions within the Abyei Area is always attributed to the Government of South Sudan.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“With regard to the question of the delayed appointment of a civilian Deputy Head of UNIFSA, as noted in paragraph 5 of the report of the Secretary- General, we believe that such an appointment would constitute a change in the mission. The Sudan is of the view that there is a need to maintain the status quo. With regard to the question of operationalizing the Athony airstrip, as noted in paragraph 3 of the report of the Secretary-General, that was raised at the tripartite meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism held in Khartoum in May and was referred for discussion by the presidential summit of both countries so that a presidential decision may be taken on the matter.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“The presence of United Nations police units and a community police force belonging to South Sudan, without the presence of a Sudanese police force, is not an exemplary situation, because it will be difficult for the United Nations police force to work in the absence of one party and of executive and legislative governance institutions. The formation of a joint police force will enable the Sudanese parties to enter the central and southern sectors of Abyei. If the entry of some United Nations police personnel is approved, the formation of local community police will be conducted under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior. Therefore, we are of the view that the formation of the joint police force should precede the arrival of the United Nations police force due to the need for provision of technical and logistical support.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“Although there are advantages, including the implementation of the Security Council mandate and a demonstration of good faith by the Sudan in cooperating with the United Nations and helping the United Nations police units in peacekeeping operations and the protection of civilians within Abyei Area, as well as providing technical and logistical support to the joint police force upon its formation, there are obvious flaws in allowing the other party to evade the implementation of the agreement of 20 June 2011.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“The determination of the final status will be based on a bilateral sovereign decision and until then the Abyei Area remains purely Sudanese, pursuant to the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, the Abyei Protocol of 2005 and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. I hope that answers the question of the representative of Norway. The following are my comments on the report of the Secretary-General. The additional United Nations police units at a strength of 590 personnel, which increases the police force to 640 personnel, is considered an amendment to the mission’s mandate. Before the entry of those police units, the joint police force must first be formed.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“The Sudan calls for efforts to be focused on supporting and strengthening the joint mechanisms, including the Legislative Council, the current Joint Administration of Abyei and the police, while consolidating the communal administrations until the final status is peacefully established by the two countries. The peaceful coexistence of the communities of the region must be consolidated, while addressing the humanitarian situation, providing services and implementing quick-impact projects. The Sudan does not recognize the outcome of the unilateral referendum conducted in 2013 by certain elements to annex Abyei to South Sudan. The communities of the region must be granted safety pursuant to paragraph 39 of Abyei Protocol of 2005.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“In response to a number of queries raised in the Council, the Sudan wishes to note that it is committed to the following legal terms of reference on the current status of Abyei: the Abyei protocol annexed to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement; the Agreement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administrative and Security Measures of the Abyei Area, which was signed by the Sudan and South Sudan on 20 June 2011; the bilateral dimension of resolving the problem peacefully pursuant to the agreement supported by resolution 1990 (2011) — therefore, to shift the resolution of the problem from that bilateral framework to a multilateral framework without the consent of the two sides would be unacceptable and would constitute a clear violation of the commitments and resolution 1990 (2011); and the fact that the nature of the United Nations mission in Abyei is temporary to allow it to carry out specific security tasks in accordance with paragraph 29 of the bilateral agreement of 20 June 2011, which cannot be amended without the consent of the relevant parties.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“We stress that Abyei must be free of any armed presence in the buffer zone north and south of the zero line, according to the agreements signed by the two countries. Thirdly, UNISFA continues to play an important role in maintaining security and stability in Abyei until there is consensus on a final resolution of the outstanding issues. The Sudan will spare no effort to enable the mission to play its role pursuant to relevant Security Council resolutions. We welcome the Secretary-General’s recommendation to renew the mission’s mandate for one year until 15 November 2023.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“However, we stress that a settlement on the issue of Abyei cannot be reached without an agreement between the two States that would be acceptable to the stakeholders and social constituencies. Secondly, while the Sudan is committed to maintaining security and stability in Abyei, we are concerned about some incidents that have occurred in the region, such as those that led to the withdrawal and closure of a number positions pertaining to the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, in addition to tribal clashes and tensions between the Ngok and Twic communities. The Sudan calls for de-escalation and the reduction of tensions in the region by refraining from any act that could threaten stability and affect the work of the mission.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“The Sudan has repeatedly declared that it is committed to establishing temporary administrative measures, including a police force and a legislative council. I would therefore like to emphasize the following three points. First, the Government of the Sudan reaffirms once more its commitment and willingness to implement temporary administrative and security mechanisms, pursuant to the agreement signed by the two parties on 20 June 2011, and its commitment to the delineation of borders within the region without encroaching on other territories or undermining the current demographic nature of the region. The Sudan welcomes the sincere efforts of all actors, in particular of the African Union and others.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“All those terms of reference require the implementation of many political, security and administrative arrangements and measures, including the formation of a joint administration, a joint legislative council and a joint police force for Abyei until the Sudan and South Sudan can reach an agreement on the final status of Abyei in a realistic and mutually acceptable way to address the situation there that is accepted and trusted by all social segments of the region in order to ensure a sustainable peace and social harmony. The Sudan has currently no other alternative but to commit to upholding those terms of reference by implementing their provisions in letter and spirit, as they are supported by international legitimacy.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“As is well known, there are political and legal terms of reference that govern the current situation in Abyei, including the presence of UNISFA and, most important of all, the Agreement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area, of June 2011, and the cooperation agreements between the Sudan and South Sudan.”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“Mr. Mohamed (Sudan) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President, and your friendly country on assuming the presidency of the Security Council for October. We pay tribute to your leadership and conduct of the work of the Council in a month when its agenda has been full of important items. I thank Assistant Secretary-General Martha Ama Akyaa Pobee for her briefing on the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), as well as the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa, Ms. Hanna Serwaa Tetteh. We also take note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/760).”
2022-10-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9170 (2022) · source
“We reiterate that we will work with the international community in order to address the challenges that hamper the transitional process and impede the attainment of our goals. I wish Mr. Perthes every success.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“Moreover, the Mission has done nothing to provide logistical and financial support for the implementation of the National Plan on the Protection of Civilians. There has also been no progress in the mobilization of economic and development resources and the coordination of humanitarian assistance at the international level, although Mr. Perthes informed me yesterday that he will make efforts this time with the Security Council and the World Bank. In conclusion, I would like to stress that our partners in the transitional process will continue their efforts for its success while emphasizing a commitment to dialogue, which is indispensable to addressing the challenges of the political transition in the Sudan.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“The statistics in the report of those dead and injured does not include the injuries sustained by police. The Mission should seek and rely on information from the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Ministry of Health and the police. In addition, the source of the information was not mentioned. The report does include the efforts of UNITAMS with regard to the political transition, but it disregards the other three strategic objectives within its mandate. That makes me wonder about the role of UNITAMS in making plans to support the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement and its protocols, especially regarding the security arrangements, the DDR programmes, internally displaced persons, land disputes, hawakir and supporting nomads and herders.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“This is all part of our efforts to promote human rights and justice. The report also made no mention of the various initiatives of respected parties from among the Sudanese people to resolve the current crisis. Instead, the report contained information that went beyond the Mission’s purview. Peacebuilding in the Sudan requires political neutrality. Otherwise, it could negatively affect the political scene and delay consensus. The report also referred to instances of rape and sexual harassment based on hearsay, without the required documentation. Human rights issues fall under the purview of the country office of the OHCHR. As I noted, the Sudan has cooperated with international human rights mechanisms and participated in the most recent session of the Human Rights Council.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“Fourthly, the Secretary-General’s report to the Council (S/2022/667) failed to mention important issues. For example, we expected the report to refer to the efforts of the Sudanese Government to develop, promote and protect human rights through the Sudan’s cooperation with international human rights mechanisms. The Sudan has twice hosted the human rights expert, most recently in May. We facilitated his mission, and he was able to meet with high-level officials. In addition, the Sudan attended the fiftieth session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva from June to July and has cooperated with the country office of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Khartoum and with the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, who issued his report from Khartoum for the first time (see S/PV.9113).”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“We look forward to the resumption of cooperation and development aid programmes with bilateral partners so that those economic reforms can achieve their aims. Those are important measures to take instead of simply criticizing the situation. The reforms are important to reduce the impact of foreign debt, access the debt relief for which the Sudan has qualified by taking the necessary steps under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative and complete addressing inherited economic distortion. The international community must bear its responsibility and provide all aspects of humanitarian assistance to the hundreds of thousands of refugees from neighbouring countries and those hosted by the Sudan, in addition to the thousands affected by floods.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“We thank the friendly countries that have been supporting those efforts and stress that UNITAMS has a role to play in that regard. Rather than simply saying that the implementation of the Agreement has been slow, what efforts has UNITAMS made to do its part in order to implement the Agreement at the desired pace? Thirdly, the transitional Government has taken economic and financial measures that include deregulating the Sudanese pound against foreign currencies, lifting subsidies on commodities and addressing the Sudan’s accumulated foreign debt. Those measures are necessary if the Sudan is to address the inherited shortcomings of the economic structure. We are also working on increasing productivity and trade and creating favourable conditions to attract investments that would benefit from the Sudan’s promising potential.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“The training of that first batch is an essential step in the enforcement of the security arrangements, whose proper implementation has faltered due to the lack of international financial support and to the failure of donors to honour their pledges. The Government is facilitating the work of the Permanent Ceasefire Committee, chaired by the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS). The Committee is continuing its work in Darfur. We therefore appeal to the international community to provide financial support for the continued implementation of all provisions of the Juba Peace Agreement, especially given that the security arrangements for the Agreement and the related DDR programmes are organizationally, logistically and financially very expensive and complex.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“Those meetings have been successful and have enhanced the presence of State institutions and the rule of law, and they have also addressed land disputes and the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their villages. In the context of the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, the first batch of 2,000 armed movement members who signed the Juba Peace Agreement has graduated. They constitute the core of the joint security-keeping and civilian protection force in Darfur. The authorized strength of the force will be 12,000 members — half Government forces and half Darfur armed movement members who signed the Juba Peace Agreement. The Government is using its own scarce resources to supply the force with equipment and vehicles.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“The Council has undoubtedly noticed that the situation in Darfur is improving incrementally, despite some obstacles here and there due to the complex socioeconomic situation, the impact of climate change on the entire region and the scarcity of international financial support for the implementation of the provisions of the Juba Peace Agreement. We hope these issues will receive the attention of the Security Council and donor countries. In that regard, a number of inter-tribal reconciliation meetings have been held in West and South Darfur over the past weeks under the auspices of the Deputy Head of the transitional Sovereign Council.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“In that context, we renew our commitment to protect civilians in Darfur, especially women and children, in a manner that ensures human dignity and the rights that the Sudan has been committed to upholding since we acceded to the relevant international human rights instruments. We will continue to implement the National Plan on the Protection of Civilians and to form and deploy the joint force for the protection of civilians, which is one of our top priorities in Darfur at this stage. We will also collect unauthorized small arms and implement disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes. A few days ago, we sent the Council the fourth progress report on the implementation of our National Plan on the Protection of Civilians.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“I would like to note that the Sudanese Armed Forces have repeatedly expressed their commitment to sponsoring and protecting the transition in the Sudan until it reaches the desired goals by organizing free and fair elections that reflect the will and aspirations of the Sudanese people. The Sudanese Armed Forces have also committed to preventing any attempt to obstruct the transitional process. Secondly, we affirm our commitment to implementing the Juba Peace Agreement, especially the provisions related to security arrangements. We will spare no effort to engage positively and constructively with other factions that have yet to participate in the peace process.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“He stressed that, after the formation of the executive Government, the Sovereignty Council would be dissolved and a supreme council of the armed forces would be formed to assume command of the uniformed forces and be responsible for defence and security, which are the customary tasks of the armed forces of any country. The political forces, facilitated by the tripartite mechanism, are negotiating to find common ground to lay the foundation for an intra-civilian dialogue and broad political consensus that would ensure the transfer of power to civilians, in accordance with the pledges of the Head of the Sovereign Council.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“First, about two months ago, the Head of the Sovereign Council announced that the military would not participate in the current political process, which I brought up in my previous briefing (see S/PV.9041) to the Security Council in May. The military will withdraw from the political scene to enable the political and revolutionary forces and other national components to form a national technocratic Government that will carry out the tasks needed for the transition. The Head of the Sovereign Council expressed hope that the political and revolutionary forces would engage in an immediate and serious dialogue.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“The Sudanese political forces are aware that the current stalemate is an exceptional situation and that the country needs to reach a political consensus that can lead to the formation of a transitional Government that can accomplish the tasks needed for the transition and set the stage for holding general elections in which the people will be able to choose their representatives fairly and freely. I can confirm that the political process is under way and the dialogue will continue. Ultimately all the parties want to prioritize the interests of the Sudan and its security, stability and transition towards the desired civilian democratic rule. Against that background, I would like to focus on four points.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source
“Calling a spade a spade sometimes does not help. (spoke in Arabic) I would like to thank Mr. Volker Perthes, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS), for his briefing. I also thank all the other speakers for their statements on the Sudan today. The political stakeholders in the Sudan continue their efforts to reach a political consensus. There are various initiatives to reach an agreement among the Sudanese parties with a view to ending the political stalemate and disparity and renew hope in democracy, championed by young Sudanese through their commitment and sacrifices, to build a bright future where the values of freedom, peace and justice prevail.”
2022-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9129 (2022) · source