YouSaid · the spoken record

Mulet

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286

first

2008-03-11

most recent

2017-11-07

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21

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un-security-council

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1. “And yet, as I brief the Council today, we have received another determination by the OPCW of the use of sarin in Ltamenah in the Syrian Arab Republic. As I stated to this organ in July, I have hope that together we can end the use of such weapons forever. We must let the gains of the international community be lost. Let us move forward with humanity and renewed collective commitment to end the use of chemical weapons.”

   2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

2. “Attaining a world without chemical weapons is an imperative requiring concrete and unified action. The Security Council has a unique responsibility in that regard, including to deter all those who continue to believe that there is something to be gained from their use. I understand the political issues surrounding the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic. However, this is not a political issue, but an issue about the lives of innocent civilians. Impunity must not prevail. The international community must ensure that it has effective ways to respond rapidly to any future use of chemical weapons, including acts of chemical terrorism. The international community, including the Security Council, has forcefully condemned any use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances.”

   2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

3. “With respect to the responsibility of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Mechanism did not identify specific actors within the Government and institutions of the Syrian Arab Republic. The nature and logistics of the operation would involve a range of actors from different areas. The international community achieved a major milestone when it prohibited chemical weapons in their entirety. When chemical weapons were used despite such prohibition, the Mechanism was established by the Council to identify those responsible. The Mechanism has carried out its mandate in respect of the incidents at Umm Hawsh and Khan Shaykhun. It is now for the Security Council to consider next steps. In doing so, I ask the Council to also consider the victims of those insidious acts.”

   2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

4. “That process requires a high degree of competence and sophistication, and points towards a chemical plant production. The Leadership Panel is confident that when taken together, all these elements constitute clear evidence that the Syrian Arab Republic is responsible for the use of sarin at Khan Shaykhun on 4 April. Aircraft is in the air at the relevant time; the crater is caused; the crater was most likely caused by a high-velocity aerial bomb; a large number of persons are affected by sarin that morning; sarin is found in and around the crater; and samples of the sarin taken from the crater are found to contain unique markers that match those of the precursor from the stockpile of the Syrian Arab Republic.”

   2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

5. “That precursor, known as DF, is a key component of binary sarin, the kind used at Khan Shaykhun. That conclusion is based on the presence of unique marker chemicals that were identified by OPCW laboratories in the samples from Khan Shaykhun, as provided to the Fact-finding Mission by both the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and non-governmental organizations. The same marker chemicals were found in the DF samples from the original stockpile of the Syrian Arab Republic and in sarin made with that same DF. Binary sarin with the same composition of marker chemicals would be very difficult to replicate, even if the exact composition were known. The in-depth laboratory study further revealed the production process used to make the DF precursor.”

   2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

6. “Moreover, experts observed that the metal object protruding from the crater, which was assessed to be consistent with a thin-walled chemical aerial bomb, was too big and too deeply embedded for the IED scenario to be likely. The large number of persons affected by the release of sarin on 4 April, and the fact that sarin reportedly continued to be present at the site of the crater 10 days after the incident, indicate that a large amount of sarin was released, consistent with its having been dispersed via a chemical aerial bomb. Finally, the in-depth laboratory study into the chemistry of sarin revealed that the sarin used in Khan Shaykhun was very likely to have been made from the same precursor that came from the original stockpile of the Syrian Arab Republic.”

   2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

7. “That was the outcome of analysis by several independent, internationally recognized institutes with specialization in areas of forensics, defence and security, as well as two individual experts on energetic materials. While they did not rule out completely that it could have been caused by other means, they said it was very unlikely in the light of the nature of the damage around the crater. Experts examined whether an improvised explosive device (IED) could have caused the crater. They assessed that a crater of that size would require an equivalent of 10 kilograms of TNT, but generally ruled out that possibility on account that such an explosion would cause much more damage than what was observed in the area.”

   2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

8. “Witnesses saw and heard aircraft at that time and two of them even recorded video footage showing a series of explosive plumes across Khan Shaykhun at that very time that morning. Forensic analysis confirmed that aircraft and explosion sounds can be heard in the background of those videos. Aircraft of the Syrian Arab Republic were in the immediate vicinity of Khan Shaykhun between 6.30 am. and 7 am. That was established via information provided by the Syrian Arab Republic itself, as well as via information provided by several other sources. The crater from which the sarin emanated was created on 4 April. That was established by satellite imagery. The crater was determined by expert analysis to have been most likely caused by the impact of an aerial bomb travelling at high velocity.”

   2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

9. “and 9.17 a.m., and the chemical analysis of the sarin samples that had been collected by the OPCW Fact-finding Mission from both the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and non-governmental organizations. The Mechanism carefully put together pieces of a complex puzzle of which some parts are still missing. For example, it could not establish with certainty that the aircraft that delivered the chemical bomb took off from the Al-Shayrat air base, or the type of aircraft involved. Yet, the parts of that puzzle that have been established and put together are clear with respect to certain critical elements. Aircraft dropped munitions on Khan Shaykhun between 6.30 am. and 7 am. that day.”

   2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

10. “However, they were not of the nature to change the assessment of the Leadership Panel. Mindful of the complexities of the case and the polarized political environment surrounding the investigation, the Mechanism actively pursued unbiased sources of evidence ofwhat happened in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April. They included video footage from two separate sources taken that morning, which showed a series of explosions across Khan Shaykhun, was authenticated by forensic institutes as not having been manipulated, and verified to have been filmed between 6.42 am. and 6.52 am. on 4 April in Khan Shaykhun; satellite imagery of the crater and its surroundings before and after the incident; video footage and photographs of the crater assessed by a forensic institute to have been recorded between 8.04 am.”

    2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

11. “In the course of conducting its investigation to identify those responsible, the Mechanism examined eight possible scenarios, including that the incident may have been staged in an attempt to place responsibility on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. The mechanism rigorously investigated possible indicators for all scenarios. In doing so, it gathered and closely examined information from a wide range of sources. While expert examination of the crater did not rule out that it could have been caused by means other than an aerial bomb, the Mechanism found nothing to prove that the incident had been staged f and when I say nothing, I mean nothing. Certain irregularities and inconsistencies emerged in the course of the investigation, and they were scrutinized and are described in detail in the annex to the report.”

    2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

12. “The Mechanism determined that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was fighting against groups belonging to the Syrian defence forces from the outskirts ofUmm Hawsh on 15 and 16 September 2016. It also determined that ISIL was positioned along three sides ofUmm Hawsh, specifically to the east and south- east of the village, which was the assessed origin of the chemical mortar shells. Based on the positioning ofISIL and the forensic assessment that the mortar shell came from the direction of ISIL-held areas, the Leadership Panel is confident that ISIL is responsible for the use of the mortar shells containing sulphur mustard. With regard to Khan Shaykhun, on the morning of 4 April 2017 an incident involving sarin killed approximately 100 people in Khan Shaykhun, and affected another 200 people who survived acute exposure.”

    2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

13. “Let me now turn to the findings of the Leadership Panel in the two cases. On 15 and 16 September 2016, two women were found to have been exposed to sulphur mustard at Umm Hawsh. A mortar shell containing sulphur mustard hit the house of one of the victims, who, together with her neighbour, was exposed when cleaning a black substance from the wall of her house. A second mortar shell containing sulphur mustard was recovered lodged in the pavement. The damage to the victim's house indicated that the trajectory of the mortar shell that caused such damage came from the south-east. The trajectory of the second mortar shell found in the pavement was determined to have come from east or south-east of the impact location.”

    2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

14. “When assessing information, the Mechanism systematically and thoroughly examined the source of the information and whether there were factors that may affect its reliability, such as whether information was based on first-hand experience of the events or hearsay, or whether there were concerns as to the chain of custody. When corroborating information considered important to its investigation, the Mechanism paid particular attention to the possibility of circular reporting so as to ensure that corroboration was based on independent sources ofinformation. Questions have been asked about the possible motives for the use of chemical weapons in each case. The Leadership Panel noted that it was not helpful for the investigation to speculate, and focused on technical issues instead.”

    2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

15. “The study showed that the samples from Khan Shaykhun match a particular chemical from the Syrian Arab Republic stockpile that is required to make sarin. That chemical is the precursor chemical for sarin and is called DF. As I mentioned earlier, the Mechanism operates in a non-traditional setting. It does not have judicial powers and cannot compel the submission of information or documents to it. It relies instead on the voluntary cooperation of witnesses and those in possession of relevant information. The Mechanism cross-checks witness statements and works to ensure that the information gathered is credible and reliable, through means of verification and corroboration, as well as other measures of quality control.”

    2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

16. “With regard to Khan Shaykhun, expert analysis was provided with respect to the nature of the plumes resulting from explosions and their effects, the characteristics of the crater and their likely cause, the remnants of the munitions, the dispersion of sarin, the amount of explosives used and the medical effects. The Mechanism commissioned an in-depth laboratory study with respect to the chemistry of sarin. The objective of the study was to test whether the sarin found in Khan Shaykhun could be linked to chemicals from the original stockpile of the Syrian Arab Republic. The Mechanism sent samples that were collected by the OPCW in 2014 from the stockpile of the Syrian Arab Republic to OPCW-designated laboratories.”

    2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

17. “The forensic institutes and OPCW-designated laboratories are accredited according to international standards. They were engaged by the Mechanism to authenticate photographs and video footage to verify the times and places where they were taken and to provide independent expert assessments and simulations with respect to items depicted, as well as chemical synthesis and analysis. The Mechanism also consulted with several internationally recognized experts on energetic materials and the medical effects of chemical warfare agents. With regard to Umm Hawsh, expert analysis was provided with respect to the impact location, the munition, the trajectory of the munition and its likely delivery method, as well as the medical effects on victims.”

    2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

18. “Regarding Umm Hawsh, witnesses interviewed by the Mechanism included victims of the attack, journalists present in the period immediately following the attack, doctors who treated victims and commanders of non-State armed groups. Regarding the incident at Khan Shaykhun, witnesses included residents, personnel from the Al-Shayrat airbase, Government officials, doctors who treated victims, rescue personnel and commanders of non-State armed groups. The Mechanism also obtained independent expert analysis and assessments. It engaged several internationally recognized forensic and specialist defence institutes, as well as OPCW-designated laboratories, to provide forensic and expert support to the investigation. All of those bodies were selected on the basis of their independence, established expertise and record of outstanding performance.”

    2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

19. “In response to a request for a security assessment in respect of a possible site visit to Khan Shaykhun, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security highlighted challenges, such as indirect artillery fire and recurrent air strikes. Moreover, the Department of Safety and Security advised that any possible access arrangements negotiated with the armed groups controlling the area would not be without residual security risks. Notwithstanding the possible benefits of site visits, the Leadership Panel considered that the Mechanism had gathered sufficient information to come to a solid conclusion in both cases. Witnesses were a very important source of information.”

    2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

20. “The Mechanism considered that if a single chemical munition had been flown from the airbase, there was little chance of finding any trace of sarin or its degradation products without specific information as to where to collect samples. The size of the Al-Shayrat airbase is approximately 10 square kilometres, equivalent to more than 900 football fields, The Mechanism did not visit the sites of the incidents at Umm Hawsh and Khan Shaykhun. While a visit to those sites, in particular Khan Shaykhun, may have been of value it was too dangerous to visit Khan Shaykhun, which is in a situation of armed conflict and under the control of the Al-Nusrah Front, a terrorist organization.”

    2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

21. “The Syrian Arab Republic provided full cooperation and facilitated the Mechanism's requests for access to information and witnesses. The Syrian Arab Republic also provided the reports of its own technical investigations into the incidents, which were carefully reviewed by the Mechanism. For its visit to the Al-Shayrat airbase, the Mechanism had a number of objectives, including to verify the authenticity of the logbooks and flight operations records from 4 April 2017; to review entry and exit records and to interview responsible personnel; to photograph the types of munitions flown on 4 April 2017, in accordance with the records received; and to photograph the means for attaching such munitions onto Sukhoi SU-22 aircraft. Collecting samples at the airbase was not an objective.”

    2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

22. “In conducting its investigations into the incidents at Umm Hawsh and at Khan Shaykhun, the Mechanism collected information from a wide range of sources. In response to requests for information, 12 Member States, including the Syrian Arab Republic, provided case-specific information. The Mechanism interviewed over 30 witnesses in addition to those interviewed by the FFM, and collected and reviewed 2,247 photographs, 1,284 files of video footage, 120 audio files and 639 documents, most of which required translation. I visited Damascus in August. Technical teams visited Damascus in September and the Al-Shayrat airbase in October. Technical teams also visited a neighbouring country on two occasions to interview witnesses and to collect materials. I wish to mention that the Syrian Arab Republic engaged constructively with the Mechanism.”

    2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

23. “In accordance with its mandate, the Mechanism took the findings of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-finding Mission (FFM) thatachemicalweaponhadbeenused asastarting point for each case and actively gathered additional information regarding each incident. It applied the same methodology with respect to both cases and pursued a rigorous and independent examination of the available information. In doing so, it examined possible scenarios as to how the incidents may have happened, including those put forward by Member States. For the incident at Khan Shaykhun, the Mechanism examined eight scenarios; for Umm Hawsh, it examined four scenarios. That methodology ensured that the Mechanism covered all possibilities and conducted a thorough, impartial and objective investigation.”

    2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

24. “Before I go into detail about these findings, I will spend a few minutes outlining the methodology of the Mechanism. In collecting, analysing and assessing information, the Mechanism was guided by the terms of reference, as approved by the Security Council, and the methods ofwork, as outlined in its previous reports. It conducted its work in an independent, impartial and professional manner. In making its findings on responsibility, the Leadership Panel was guided by the evidentiary standards, as set forth in its first report (S/2016/142, annex). In the cases at hand, the Leadership Panel determined that there was sufficient evidence of a credible and reliable nature to make its findings regarding the parties involved in the use of chemical weapons in each incident.”

    2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

25. “Despite the very real challenges of investigating complex cases in the midst of an ongoing armed conflict, the Mechanism has taken great care to ensure that its methodology and findings are technically and scientifically sound. The report contains the findings in respect of, first, the use of sulfur mustard at Umm Hawsh on 15 and 16 September 2016 and, secondly, the use of sarin at Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017. The findings of the Leadership Panel have been drawn on the basis of the sum total of information and evidence obtained by the Mechanism, as set out in the report and its annexes. The Leadership Panel has identified the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant as responsible for the use of sulfur mustard at Umm Hawsh and the Syrian Arab Republic as responsible for the use of sarin at Khan Shaykhun.”

    2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

26. “Mr. Mulet: I thank you, Sir, for the opportunity to introduce the seventh report of the Leadership Panel of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (S/2017/904, annex). I am joined by Ms. Judy Cheng- Hopkins and Mr. Stefan Mogl. Together, the three of us form the Leadership Panel. Members will recall that the mandate of the Mechanism, as established by the Security Council, is to identify, to the greatest extent feasible, individuals, entities, groups or Governments that were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Mechanism is not a judicial body; rather, it is an investigative mechanism that reports to the Security Council.”

    2017-11-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8090 (2017) · source

27. “I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Mr. Abiodun Oluremi Bashua for his dedication to peace in Darfur and his tireless efforts to deliver on UNAMID's mandate during his tenure as Acting Joint Special Representative over the past year.”

    2015-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7545 (2015) · source

28. “In order to fully re-establish its collaborative working relationship with the United Nations and the African Union on UNAMID and allow the mission to effectively discharge its mandate, I would furthermore call upon the Government to lift all existing restrictions on the free movement of its personnel and assets, particularly with regard to access to conflict areas and, importantly, the issuance of visas, consistent with the provisions of the UNAMID status- of-forces agreement. Finally, as Council members are aware, yesterday the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission announced the appointment of Mr. Martin Uhomoibhi of Nigeria as their new Joint Special Representative for Darfur and Head of UNAMID. On behalf of the Secretary-General, I would like to congratulate Mr. Uhomoibhi on his appointment.”

    2015-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7545 (2015) · source

29. “A comprehensive resolution of the Darfur conflict, allowing for the return of the over 2.6 million displaced persons to their places of origin, requires first and foremost a political settlement between the Government and the armed movements. The stated intent of the parties to engage in discussions on the cessation of hostilities, as well as the national dialogue in Addis Ababa, is therefore a commendable step in that direction. It is crucially important that those meetings take place as scheduled and that they create momentum for future comprehensive direct talks on Darfur. I would like to urge the Government of the Sudan to maintain its current cooperation in ensuring the swift clearance of UNAMID food rations and their delivery to the mission.”

    2015-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7545 (2015) · source

30. “Regarding the exit strategy, the Deputy Secretary- General, the Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Foreign Minister of the Sudan met in the margins of the seventieth session of the General Assembly in New York, on 29 September, to discuss a framework of cooperation regarding the implementation of the UNAMID mandate and the format and exit strategy based on the parameters and benchmarks set by the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council. Trilateral discussions are expected to continue in early November. I would like to conclude with comments on the overall situation in Darfur and the relationship between UNAMID and the Government of the Sudan.”

    2015-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7545 (2015) · source

31. “In accordance with resolutions 2173 (2014) and 2228 (2015), UNAMID and the United Nations country team continued their work on developing an operational plan for the gradual and phased transfer of tasks to the latter, outlining which tasks will be conductedjointly or transferred and the requisite budgetary requirements. The initial phases of the process are expected to focus on capacity-building for the sexual and gender-based violence prevention mechanisms, andjoint activities in the police, justice and corrections sector.”

    2015-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7545 (2015) · source

32. “In support of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, and despite the tensions surrounding the leadership contest among its signatories, UNAMID continued to facilitate the demobilization of former Liberation and Justice Movement and Justice and Equality Movement-Sudan combatants and to support the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultations process. After extending the term of the Darfur Regional Authority for an additional year in June, on 19 October, President Al-Bashir announced the holding in April 2016 of a referendum to determine the administrative status of Darfur.”

    2015-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7545 (2015) · source

33. “Despite these considerable obstacles, UNAMID remained steadfast in the implementation of its strategic priorities and addressing key challenges to mandate implementation. In response to the growing levels of intercommunal violence and as part of its strategic priorities, UNAMID supported the mediation of intercommunal conflict through capacity-building and engagement with national and local Government, traditional mediators, tribal and community leaders and the Darfur Regional Authority. In this regard, the Mission also focused its efforts on developing early-warning capacity and other preventive measures with local stakeholders, promoting dialogue between farming and pastoral communities and supporting local institutions to address the root causes of the conflict, in collaboration with the United Nations country team.”

    2015-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7545 (2015) · source

34. “In addition, as part of its contingency plan in this context, UNAMID has successfully transported by air locally purchased food items from Khartoum to El Fasher, El Geneina and Nyala. There has been no progress on the issuing of visas since Mr. Ladsous' briefing to the Council two weeks ago. In addition to these operational constraints, in the past four months an increase in attacks against UNAMID and its personnel has been recorded in Darfur, including the killing of a South African peacekeeper by an armed group north of Mellit, North Darfur, on 27 September. I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate my deepest condolences to his family and to the Government of South Africa.”

    2015-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7545 (2015) · source

35. “The Government of the Sudan continued to restrict the air and ground movement of UNAMID and humanitarian actors primarily to conflict areas, citing security concerns. Delays and denials by the Government of customs clearances for UNAMID containers, including food rations and visas for staff, have threatened to significantly undermine mandate implementation efforts. I am relieved to inform the Council that, out of the 190 containers previously blocked in Port Sudan, 52 have been released by the authorities and are being transported to warehouses in Khartoum for further inspections and subsequent transport to the Mission. An additional 52 containers are expected to be cleared and transported to Khartoum this week. The remaining 86 containers are at various stages of the clearance process.”

    2015-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7545 (2015) · source

36. “In subsequent statements to the media, the Sudanese political and armed opposition reiterated their boycott of the process in the absence of a conducive environment for a genuine dialogue, as well as their willingness to participate in a pre-dialogue meeting in Addis Ababa under the auspices of the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP). The AUHIP meeting on the national dialogue, followed by cessation of hostilities talks on Darfur and the Two Areas that were initially scheduled for next week, are now expected to take place, respectively, in Addis Ababa from 16 to 17 and from 18 to 19 November. During the reporting period, UNAMID and humanitarian actors continued to face enormous operational challenges in Darfur.”

    2015-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7545 (2015) · source

37. “These positive signals, however, did not reduce the evel of distrust between the two sides. On 10 October, President Al-Bashir launched the national dialogue in Khartoum without the participation of the main armed and unarmed opposition groups. In his opening remarks, the President committed to creating an enabling environment for the participation of all citizens in the dialogue and the release of political detainees who have not been charged with an offense, and highlighted the Government's readiness to engage in discussions on a permanent ceasefire with the armed movements.”

    2015-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7545 (2015) · source

38. “With respect to the negotiations, following earlier announcements to this effect, on 28 September President Al-Bashir issued decrees providing for a two-month cessation of hostilities in Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states, and an unconditional pardon to members of the Sudanese political and armed opposition who decide to participate in the national dialogue process. On 18 October, following a meeting of its leadership in Paris, the Sudan Revolutionary Front declared its own six-month cessation of hostilities in Darfur and the Two Areas in accordance with its road map of 14 September. The road map further provides for the protection of civilians, unhindered humanitarian access and the creation of an environment conducive to peace talks and the national dialogue.”

    2015-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7545 (2015) · source

39. “These disputes have been further exacerbated by the involvement of local armed groups in counter- insurgency operations against the armed movements, their access to weapons, continued local influence and widespread impunity for their attacks against other tribes and other criminal activities. The Government of the Sudan, particularly at the state level, has attempted to contain the violence through the swift deployment of security forces in hotspots in North, East, South and West Darfur, and the organization of intercommunal mediation conferences for the cessation of hostilities. However, the underlying causes of these conflicts, related to the use and management of resources and impunity of actors involved in the violence, remain unaddressed.”

    2015-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7545 (2015) · source

40. “achieving considerable gains against the non-signatory armed movements. The operation, which involved a series of violent ground clashes and aerial bombardment, led to over 104,000 newly confirmed displacements, as well as 69,000 unconfirmed cases, mainly located in the inaccessible East Jebel Marra area. Since June 2015, with the exception ofintermittent clashes with the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid, which remains in East Jebel Marra, Government forces have maintained an operational pause during the rainy season. In contrast, there has been no pause in intercommunal fighting, which remains a major source of instability in Darfur and has resulted in approximately one-third of all conflict-related fatalities and 40 per cent of displacement so far this year.”

    2015-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7545 (2015) · source

41. “Mr. Mulet: I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the situation in Darfur. The report of the Secretary-General (S/2015/729) of 25 September, which is before the Council, provides an update and analysis of the conflict, the political situation and the operational environment in Darfur, as well as the mandate implementation efforts of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). I will highlight key developments identified in the report and over the past month. As described in the report, the overall security situation in Darfur remains precarious and unpredictable. From December 2014 to June 2015, the forces of the Government of the Sudan implemented the second phase of the Decisive Summer counter-insurgency operation.”

    2015-10-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7545 (2015) · source

42. “A comprehensive approach is a logical way by which to counter this threat, integrated with a security strategy to combat violent extremism both in Somalia and across the region. Following the joint mission, Al-Shabaab mounted a number of attacks in Somalia that coincided with the holy month of Ramadan. These renewed efforts are a source of concern, which further reinforces the need for the overall security effort in Somalia to become more nimble in order to degrade an increasingly adaptable Al-Shabaab. We are encouraged by the commitments expressed by the African Union and by the troop- and police-contributing countries to work towards that objective. Collective action to take forward the recommendations of the joint mission is urgently needed.”

    2015-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7487 (2015) · source

43. “The package would provide the rudimentary infrastructure, equipment and sustainment items required to jump-start basic policing operations in the regions, including Puntland. We are very concerned about the evolution of Al-Shabaab's threat in Puntland and the potential impact of the situation in Yemen. The security of Puntland should not be forgotten by the international community. We therefore recommend extending the non-lethal support package to the Somali national army, as approved in resolution 2124 (2013), to 3,000 Puntland forces on an exceptional basis until the end of 2016, but only upon completion of their integration into the Somali national army as well, as their formal inclusion in the Guulwade Plan. We are concerned about the unfolding influence of Al-Shabaab in Kenya, as well as the rest of the subregion.”

    2015-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7487 (2015) · source

44. “have an important role to play in this regard, including in Puntland. The finalization ofa realistic police plan, currently being prepared under the structures of the New Deal Compact, is essential. Short-term assistance to jump- start the establishment ofpolice in the regions is needed alongside the recommended increase in AMISOM police, which is expected to provide operational assistance, mentoring and training. That is why the Secretary-General recommends the delivery of an immediate non-lethal support package to the Somali police forces to bridge the gap between assistance that can be provided today and the longer-term support that will be provided under the New Deal.”

    2015-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7487 (2015) · source

45. “Such a renewed spirit of partnership and transparency is a prerequisite for ensuring that our collective resources achieve optimal results. The continued provision of the non-lethal support package to the Somali national army authorized in resolution 2124 (2013) will also be essential to enabling its continued engagement in joint operations alongside AMISOM. A gradual shift of efforts towards establishing and capacitating the Somali police force is equally critical. We must accelerate the development of effective and accountable Somali police forces, particularly in the regions, with a focus on maintaining citizen security. This is important for buttressing State-building efforts, freeing up military capacity and avoiding the militarization of law and order functions. AMISOM and UNSOM.”

    2015-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7487 (2015) · source

46. “If they are to achieve this goal, it is important to devise an enhanced and more coherent architecture for the delivery by international partners of capacity-building support to the Somali national army and Somalia's overall defence sector. More importantly, we must make a more concerted effort to gradually hand over responsibility for security to the Somalis. The adoption on 23 April of the Guulwade Plan for the development of the Somali national army was a critical step forward. It is essential that all Member States abide by their responsibility to effectively coordinate and fully share information on their bilateral contributions to the security sector through the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM).”

    2015-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7487 (2015) · source

47. “The reconfiguration mandated by the African Union Peace and Security Council includes the enhancement of the AMISOM police component, the deployment of requisite capabilities, such as quick-reaction and special forces, to enable AMISOM. to become more agile and to facilitate cross-sectoral operations and the streamlining of AMISOM. command and control. We are encouraged by the ongoing efforts of the African Union Commission to explore concrete avenues to implement AMISOM's reconfiguration. Ultimately, the proposed security strategy will succeed only if the Somali security institutions are supported and able to progressively assume greater responsibility for their own security.”

    2015-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7487 (2015) · source

48. “Only through the dynamic and integrated management of the strategy's implementation can we hope to bring greater and durable security to the Somali people. At the core ofthe proposals ofthejoint mission rests the need to maintain the surge in AMISOM. uniformed personnel until the end of 2016, as recommended by the Secretary-General, while improving the efficiency and effectiveness of AMISOM. We welcome the recommendations of the Chairperson of the African Union, as well as the decision taken by the African Union Peace and Security Council at its 52lst meeting, on 30 June, to undertake a structured and targeted reconfiguration of AMISOM. within the authorized ceiling of uniformed personnel.”

    2015-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7487 (2015) · source

49. “The proposed strategy will be guided by three interlocking objectives: first, enabling the political process at the federal, regional and district levels; secondly, reinitiating offensive operations against Al-Shabaab strongholds as soon as possible, while maintaining continuous and flexible offensive capabilities; and thirdly, enabling consolidation efforts. These objectives are ambitious and will require strong commitments on the part of all partners involved in Somalia. In particular, the Somali Federal Government, the African Union and troop-contributing countries, the United Nations and key partners must plan and implement the strategy together and fulfil their respective commitments.”

    2015-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7487 (2015) · source

50. “The benchmarks cover issues related to the political process and the extension of State authority, the threat level, the development of the Somali security institutions, and the support of the Somalis for the deployment of a peacekeeping operation. I would urge the Council to endorse the adjusted benchmarks. In making its recommendations for the coming period, the joint mission recognized the importance of the international community's engaging in Somalia in accordance with the new federal map. The recommended security strategy is therefore designed to create an enabling environment for the political process to unfold in Mogadishu and the regions during the next critical 18 months.”

    2015-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7487 (2015) · source