YouSaid · the spoken record

Mulet

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286

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2008-03-11

most recent

2017-11-07

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21

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un-security-council

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1. “But if the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops is to be achieved under this scenario - for example, before political and security agreements have been finalized - an impartial stabilization force formed by a coalition of willing States of about 8,000 highly trained and capable troops, together with police officers, would be required. Under this scenario there would still be clan tensions, extremist elements and the potential for the resumption of conflict. The stabilization force would therefore require timely and accurate intelligence on extremist and other groups. The force would also need strong physical protection at its bases to defeat attacks by mortars and rocket-propelled grenades.”

   2008-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5858 (2008) · source

2. “Scenario 3 envisages a measured improvement in both the political and security situations and the acceptance and implementation by the major clans and factions, including a critical mass of armed opposition groups, of a code of conduct on the use of arms. While that may be short of a full security agreement - a ceasefire and/or the cessation of hostilities - it would establish a minimum code of behaviour among the armed groups, including a commitment not to attack United Nations and humanitarian personnel. The Ethiopian Government and the TFG would have indicated readiness to consider a phased withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Mogadishu. Under this scenario it is assumed that the political dialogue between the Government and the opposition would have commenced.”

   2008-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5858 (2008) · source

3. “The objective under the contingency plan in this scenario would be for the United Nations to further enhance its political support to the peace process through the relocation of UNPOS headquarters - in addition to the limited number of personnel initially deployed under scenario 1 - to Mogadishu in order to facilitate political dialogue on the ground. Subject to the presence required, security arrangements could take considerable time to put in place and entail a major investment in resources and physical protection measures. This further assessment will be undertaken by DSS during the month of April, in close consultation with the Department of Political Affairs, UNPOS, the Department of Field Support and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.”

   2008-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5858 (2008) · source

4. “The Security Council may also consider the establishment of a maritime task force, formalizing the unilateral initiatives presently being undertaken by individual Member States, either as a United Nations task force or as an international task force under a United Nations mandate. This contingency arrangement would also provide medical, logistic and in extremis support for United Nations personnel in Somalia. Scenario 2 envisages a measured improvement in the political process, with at least a critical mass of the opposition parties supporting political dialogue. Under this scenario, while the security situation would still be volatile, dialogue on security arrangements would have commenced, creating the conditions necessary for strengthening the United Nations presence in Mogadishu and other areas of south and central Somalia.”

   2008-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5858 (2008) · source

5. “Under this scenario, the current security situation does not allow for deployment of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and United Nations country team personnel in Mogadishu and the south and central parts of the country. However, the Department of Safety and Security (DSS), in consultation with the designated official, could develop viable options for security arrangements that would allow a limited number of UNPOS staff and United Nations country team members to relocate from Nairobi to Mogadishu and other parts of south and central Somalia. The relocation would enable the United Nations to effectively facilitate the mediation efforts on the ground and address critical gaps in humanitarian and recovery assistance.”

   2008-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5858 (2008) · source

6. “Possible future developments are presented in the annex to the report before the Council under four scenarios, leading up to the possibility of deploying of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. Based on those scenarios, the Secretariat has further developed contingency plans on the support that could be provided by the international community to the peace process in Somalia. Scenario 1 generally represents the current situation in Somalia. The TFG, with the support of national and international partners, continues to work on the development of an inclusive and viable political process, including by initiating dialogue. Meanwhile, the security situation remains volatile.”

   2008-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5858 (2008) · source

7. “Threats against the United Nations have also appeared on Islamist websites. In summary, while the Transitional Federal Government has made some progress in its efforts to start an inclusive and viable peace process by reaching out to opposition groups, the security situation in many parts of Somalia, particularly in the capital of Mogadishu, remains complex, volatile and unpredictable. Due to the complexity of the conflict, shifting alliances and extremist activity, the situation in south and central Somalia can change daily, making any location that is safe one day potentially dangerous the next. I would now like to refer to the contingency plans for a possible United Nations peacekeeping operation.”

   2008-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5858 (2008) · source

8. “Between June and September 2007, there was a sharp increase in standoff attacks, improvised explosive device incidents, mine attacks and assassinations, but a marked decrease in armed clashes. Since September, concerted efforts by the Ethiopian armed forces and the actions of the TFG against anti-Government elements within Mogadishu have increased. Of note is the fact that, during the last quarter of 2007, attacks by anti- Government elements became more coordinated and began to be conducted during daylight hours. Security incidents occur almost daily, mostly by insurgents targeting TFG elements, as well as Ethiopian and AMISOM. personnel. On 8 and 9 February 2008, the United Nations common compound was targeted by hand grenade and improvised explosive device attacks.”

   2008-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5858 (2008) · source

9. “Political tensions within and between clans are driven by control over resources. In many cases such tensions are linked to the activities of criminal and insurgent elements but cannot be separated from them. (spoke in English) The continued threat of abduction, kidnapping and extortion limits the capacity of United Nations and humanitarian agencies to operate in the country. At the same time, the United Nations country team estimates that the size of the population in need of humanitarian aid is now approaching 2 million people. The general security trend in Mogadishu appears proportional to the level of military efforts undertaken by the Ethiopian armed forces and the Transitional Federal Government coalition to defeat the anti- Government elements or conduct forcible disarmament.”

   2008-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5858 (2008) · source

10. “Security conditions in the north are relatively more stable than those in central and southern Somalia. In those areas, the conflict remains extremely complex, characterized by inextricable alliances between clans, sub-clans and extremist elements, fighting for control of political and economic space, and temporary alliances of some groups, aimed at forcing the withdrawal of the Ethiopian Armed Forces from the country. As the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has limited capacity to regulate economic activity and maintain law and order, criminal and other armed elements are free to control the collection of revenues from customs, the port and commerce, as well as those generated by and water and land distribution. In addition, such groups engage in the trafficking of arms, drugs and human beings.”

    2008-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5858 (2008) · source

11. “The mission visited Merka, Baidoa and Kismayo and spent three days in Mogadishu, where it met with the Prime Minister and other Government Ministers and assessed the security situation on the ground. It was the first United Nations mission to visit Kismayo since the resumption of armed conflict at the start of the second half of 2006. In Mogadishu, the team visited various districts of the capital to assess the security situation. In assessing possibilities for a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia, the fact-finding mission conducted a comprehensive analysis of the security situation, including threats and risks to the security of United Nations personnel. In that regard, it is important to note that the situation is not the same throughout the country.”

    2008-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5858 (2008) · source

12. “Allow me to thank you, Mr. President, for having granted me this opportunity to present to Council members the recommendations of the fact-finding mission to Somalia, which was led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The mission was dispatched in response to the presidential statement of 19 December 2007 (S/PRST/2007/49), in which you tasked the Secretariat to consider further support to the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and to update contingency planning for a possible United Nations peacekeeping operation to succeed AMISOM. The mission visited the region from 7 to 25 January 2008 and consulted the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Mr. Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, the African Union and regional and Somali stakeholders.”

    2008-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5858 (2008) · source

13. “On 17 and 18 March, the United Nations and African Union envoys will convene informal consultations with regional and international partners at Geneva to take stock of the situation and hopefully to reach an understanding on the way forward. Meanwhile, the continued hostilities in Darfur serve as a stark reminder that urgent international engagement and concrete action are necessary to encourage and pressure the parties to the conflict to lay down their weapons and commit themselves to the path of dialogue.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

14. “With the movements having made little progress in terms of unifying their positions and agreeing on a negotiating team, there is little prospect of beginning substantive negotiations with the parties any time soon. In particular, the two most significant political and military factions - the JEM-Khalil Ibrahim and the Sudan Liberation Movement Abdul Wahid faction - remain outside the process. In addition to the Government's clear commitment to a military solution, there is also disagreement between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and the National Congress Party on the Darfur question. The lack of a clear Darfur strategy in the Government of National Unity itself, including regarding the role of Minni Minnawi, does not indicate seriousness about making peace.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

15. “At the same time, if we are to reconfigure UNAMID into a robust, credible and proactive peacekeeping presence, we must redouble our efforts to work with troop- and police-contributing countries to address the practical challenges faced by the Mission, such as gaps in force composition and the readiness of incoming troops. But UNAMID cannot be a substitute for political engagement. UNAMID is one element of an international strategy. When fully deployed, the Mission will address a broad range of responsibilities, the protection of civilians being foremost among them. But it will not be a tool for addressing the causes of the conflict. The Vitality of the political process is critical to real lasting progress. According to Special Envoys Eliasson and Salim, the situation on the political front is not promising.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

16. “As a result, many of the computers, radios and vehicles used by former AMIS military and police personnel are incompatible with United Nations networks and standards. Given the implications for the effectiveness of the force's command and control, as well as for its morale, the United Nations is working with the AMIS liquidation team to complete that work as soon as possible. 08-26748 In authorizing the deployment of UNAMID, the Security Council committed significant resources as part of its overall effort to contribute to a solution to the crisis in Darfur. That investment is at risk due to a number of well-known challenges. Foremost among them are the security situation and the determination of some parties to continue to pursue their objectives through military means, with such a devastating impact on the civilian population.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

17. “We urge the Council once again to support our efforts to find and deploy those assets to the Mission as soon as possible. In the short term, the ability of UNAMID to absorb new units is constrained by its limited logistical capacity and the lack of mission enablers for the establishment of transit accommodations. But it ultimately depends on the level of self-sustainment of the incoming units. The force is also facing challenges in its transition from the AMIS to the UNAMID logistics supply system. Similarly, the mission is further hampered by ageing equipment inherited from AMIS. Until the process of AMIS asset liquidation is complete, communication equipment and vehicles transferred from AMIS cannot be processed for United Nations registration, licensing and maintenance.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

18. “The Council will recall that the transportation of the Chinese engineering and Bangladeshi formed police unit equipment took seven weeks in November and December last year, during which the units were not operational. We cannot afford a repeat of those delays, and we look to the Government of the Sudan to facilitate the administrative and security arrangements for the earliest possible arrival of UNAMID cargo in the area of operations. With the exception of Ethiopia's pledge of four light tactical helicopters, credible offers for utility helicopters and the remainder of the light tactical helicopters, aerial reconnaissance aircraft and logistics and transport units remain outstanding. Those mission- critical gaps make the job of deploying UNAMID extremely difficult.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

19. “It is absolutely critical that the incoming troops have self-sustaining capability and equipment to enable them to patrol and effectively carry out their operations. As Force Commander Agwai has said over and over, without self-sustainment, incoming troops are a burden to the Mission and become part of the problem, not the solution. 08-26748 Preparations are also under way for the arrival of the next three formed police units, from Nepal, Indonesia and Egypt. The major equipment of the Nepalese formed police unit arrived in Port Sudan on 18 February. The Mission is working with Sudanese authorities to ensure the speedy release and transportation of that equipment.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

20. “The remaining five African infantry battalions are not expected to deploy before mid-2008, when their major equipment procurement and initial training programmes have been completed. The timely deployment of those battalions will be linked to donor countries' efforts to support troop contributors with equipment, training and self- sustainment capability. We are grateful to the United States and Canada for their initiative to establish a group of friends of UNAMID, which will work with troop-contributing countries to accelerate the readiness of their troops to deploy. The priority for this support is to increase the capacity of the existing ex-AMIS troops and their rotations, which are due to deploy in the next three to four months.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

21. “The Nigerian level-II hospital is scheduled to arrive in El Geneina during the first week of April. With respect to the deployment of additional infantry units to UNAMID, the Egyptian battalion is expected to deploy its lead company group to Nyala on 19 March, with the remainder of the battalion completing its deployment on 15 April. The Ethiopian battalion's lead company group is scheduled to arrive in El Fasher on 7 April. The remainder of the Ethiopian battalion will complete its deployment on 15 May. As agreed with the Government of the Sudan, preparations for the deployment of the Thai infantry battalion and the Nepalese force and sector reserve units continue, and their deployments are scheduled to take place once the Egyptian and Ethiopian battalions have arrived in Darfur.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

22. “In addition, the 135-person advance party of the Chinese engineer company is now permanently based in the Nyala supercamp, where it continues its work to develop the infrastructure for the Mission in that town. The unit's main body of 175 troops is scheduled to complete its deployment to Nyala by early April. The formed police unit from Bangladesh is co-located with the Chinese engineering unit in Nyala and is patrolling on a daily basis. During the coming weeks, we look forward to the deployment of a number of additional enabling units and infantry to UNAMID, and the beginning of scheduled rotations of current troops. The Egyptian transport unit is scheduled to arrive in Nyala this Sunday, 16 March, and the Egyptian engineer unit is scheduled to arrive in El Geneina on 24 March.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

23. “At the same time, it is important to recognize that UNAMID has a long way to go and is far from having a meaningful presence on the ground. We continue to face difficulties in our efforts to reinforce the Mission, in security, in consistent levels of cooperation with the Government, logistical constraints and force shortfalls. As at 10 March, UNAMID's total strength was 9,178 uniformed personnel, including 7,441 military personnel, 1,597 police officers and one formed police unit. A total of 1,312 civilians were deployed as at that date. The majority of the military and police personnel currently in the Mission was inherited from the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS).”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

24. “and SLA-Abdul Wahid to ensure that the civilians trapped by the fighting are given safe passage to a secure location. The fighting in Darfur makes clear that preparing for political negotiations does not seem to be a priority for either the Government or rebel movements. The implications are dire. On the one hand, negotiations are required to bring this crisis to an end. But with the Government intent on military action and the rebels either fighting or fragmenting, it is difficult to see an opening for political negotiations. On the other hand, a peacekeeping operation alone cannot bring security to Darfur. Nevertheless, we are pressing forward to implement the Council's resolutions and to do all we can to improve the situation.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

25. “The longer-term intent is to reinforce 3 Kulbus with additional troops so as to permit the continuous deployment from there to Seleia of at least a platoon. UNAMID police will also increase their presence in Seleia as soon as appropriate facilities are built. It will take some weeks, however, to establish camp, resupply and communications facilities for a sustained presence in Seleia, since no provisions have heretofore been made for basing troops there. The Force Commander has also increased his contacts with the parties in order for the Mission to better assess their movements, intent and capabilities, while also instilling within them the confidence that UNAMID is an impartial actor in Darfur. The Mission continues to work with the Government, JEM.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

26. “said it would be unwilling to stop fighting unless a ceasefire were part of a broader political framework and discussions on security arrangements. That is an extremely problematic position when we consider the civilian suffering that has been caused by the fighting. While the Government has the primary responsibility to protect civilians, UNAMID has a strong complementary mandate in that regard that it will not be in a position to comprehensively implement until a critical mass of properly trained and equipped new troops and enabling assets are in place. Within its current capabilities, UNAMID vehicle patrols have been mounted into the area south of Jebel Moon from both Kulbus and El Geneina. Those limited operations will continue as long as the situation in the area remains tense.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

27. “In response to the Government's actions in West Darfur, on 5 March the Secretary-General called Foreign Minister Deng Alor and made clear that, notwithstanding arguments of the Government of the Sudan that its actions are in response to the military engagement of rebel movements, civilian suffering of that scale is unacceptable and is sending signals to the international community that the Government has no regard for the lives of its citizens or for humanitarian law. The Secretary-General also stressed that those actions were undermining prospects for political negotiations and posed fundamental challenges to the ability of UNAMID to fulfil its mandate. Mr. Eliasson has also talked to senior JEM. and SLA-Abdul Wahid representatives and asked them to cease all hostilities. JEM.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

28. “In another disturbing development, on 3 March a French special forces officer of the European Union- 1ed peacekeeping force was killed and another was wounded by Sudanese Armed Forces fire when they accidentally crossed into the Sudan. It is clear that the tensions between Chad and the Sudan and fighting carried out by proxy rebel forces have the potential to regionalize the crisis and derail international peace efforts on both sides of the border. The normalization of relations between the two countries is essential if international efforts to restore stability are to succeed. Tomorrow's summit in Dakar between Presidents Bashir and Deby at the invitation of President Wade is an important opportunity in that regard.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

29. “Six Government soldiers were reportedly killed and six wounded in the attack, and three tankers were stolen. There were also security incidents involving inter-tribal fighting in both North and South Darfur. On 27 February, a group of approximately 160 men on horses and camels from the Rizeigat and Salamat tribes attacked Habaniya tribesmen in the town of E1 Sunita in South Darfur and killed 21 people. On 28 February, the Habaniya retaliated and killed 60 people in the area east of Gereida. In North Darfur, fighting between the Zaghawa and Beni Hussein tribes is reported to have 08-26748 displaced approximately 300 people during the reporting period.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

30. “Government air strikes in Jebel Moon resumed on 9 March, and we are extremely concerned about the safety of 20,000 civilians who continue to be trapped in the area. In addition, there are indications that a retaliation by JEM may take place once it has had time to regroup. During February, there was also a marked upsurge in violence in South Darfur. On 29 February, in two separate incidents, Government patrols were ambushed at Amr Gedid and Domaya, north of Nyala, by SLA-Unity and Arab militia respectively, and seven Government soldiers were reportedly killed and 22 injured in the attacks. On 1 March, a commercial convoy of 43 trucks and fuel tankers accompanied by a Government police escort was ambushed by SLA- Unity forces near Gabat Hamada, 85 kilometres north of Nyala.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

31. “In Seleia, however, which suffered large-scale destruction, only 1,500 of the 20,000 civilians have returned. The population's reluctance to return to the town is reportedly due to the presence of large numbers of Government troops in the area. UNAMID believes that a company of soldiers from the Sudanese Armed Forces is present within Seleia, while a brigade - or about 2,400 soldiers - is in the area surrounding the town. Additionally, there are reports of looting and harassment of women by Sudanese Armed Forces and Government-allied militia in and around Seleia. On 5 March, the Government indicated to the United Nations Mission in the Sudan and UNAMID that it will send 500 central police to Seleia. That will be a positive development. The area of Jebel Moon, however, remains inaccessible.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

32. “Together with the Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sudan, he met with senior defence and humanitarian Government officials in Khartoum on 23 February and urged the Government to replace military personnel with national police in the area of Seleia; suspend hostilities through a ceasefire, allowing for a period of tranquillity that would permit civilians to move to safety in that area; and allow humanitarian organizations to provide assistance to civilians. A 10-day period of relative tranquillity indeed followed those discussions between UNAMID and the Government, during which UNAMID sent daily 08-26748 military and police patrols from Kulbus and El Geneina to the northern corridor to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. As a result of that assistance, 90 per cent of the population of Sirba and Abu Suruj have returned.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

33. “and SLA-Abdul Wahid positions in Am Sharow and the Kandare and Kurlungo areas of Jebel Moon, as well as the Wahid stronghold of Deribat, further to the east in Jebel Marra. Fighting between Government forces and JEM. and SLA-Wahid rebels, supported by Chad, continued in Jebel Moon on 22 and 23 February, as well as 26 and 27 February. As a result of the violence, at least 70 civilians have been killed, 13,000 have sought refuge in Chad, and 20,000 are said to be trapped by the violence in Jebel Moon. Joint Special Representative Adada has been active in engaging the Government on the issue and has Visited the areas affected by the crisis.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

34. “Humanitarian agencies were extremely concerned by the deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian assets, in particular clinics and water points in Jebel Moon. The tactics used by the Government included joint Sudanese Armed Forces/Janjaweed militia attacks supported by fighter jets, helicopter gunships and Antonov aircraft. Humanitarian agencies were extremely concerned by the deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian assets, in particular clinics and water points in J ebel Moon. A massive Government attack on Abu Suruj, Sirba and Seleia on 8 February, when we last briefed the Council, was later shown to have caused numerous deaths and tens of thousands of new displacements. On 18 February, the Government and Janjaweed militia attacked JEM.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

35. “As the Council is aware, following the offensive carried out by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in Sirba and Seleia, north of El Geneina, West Darfur, in 2 late December 2007 and early January 2008, the Government of the Sudan launched a large-scale ground and air military campaign aimed at reasserting Government control over those towns, which JEM. had labelled "liberated lands", as well as over the JEM. and Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) stronghold area of J ebel Moon. The tactics used by the Government included joint Sudanese Armed Forces/Janj aweed militia attacks supported by fighter jets, helicopter gunships and Antonov aircraft.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source

36. “Mr. Mulet: Thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Council on Darfur. I will begin with an update on the security and humanitarian situation, in particular the recent violence in West Darfur and its consequences for civilians, as well as on the actions of the African Union-United Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), given its mandated responsibilities and capacity constraints. I will then provide a detailed overview of UNAMID's deployment status and priorities.”

    2008-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5849 (2008) · source