YouSaid · the spoken record

Mulet

lines on the record: 286
first: 2008-03-11
most recent: 2017-11-07
sittings or episodes: 21
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“These pledges, from the European Commission, France, Luxembourg, Norway and the United States, demonstrate donors' firm commitment to DIS, which is acknowledged and highly appreciated. Nonetheless, given the $7.2 million still to be mobilized, we invite members of the Council to assist us in generating additional pledges from other donors. MINURCAT's support for DIS is essential to achieving some of the objectives relating to the fulfilment of the Mission's mandate, especially the strengthening of Chad's capacity to ensure the security of refugees, displaced persons, civilians and humanitarian workers, to maintain law and order and ensure respect for human rights. With DIS now deployed, efforts are currently focused on improving its training and capacities.”
2009-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6204 (2009) · source
“I take this opportunity to highlight a number of points of particular interest, as well as the most significant 2 developments that have taken place since the report was issued. As the report indicates, MINURCAT continues to train, advise and monitor the Detachement integre de securite (DIS), the Chadian community police force tasked with preserving law and order in refugee camps, internally displaced persons sites and the main cities in the East of the country, as well as with assisting in creating a security environment conducive to carrying out humanitarian activities. If it is to continue this support and to finance new programmes in the justice and prison sectors, the MINURCAT Trust Fund will requires $21.7 million for 2010. To this end, pledges totalling $14.5 million were made at a donor meeting held in Brussels on 2 October.”
2009-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6204 (2009) · source
“Mr. Mulet: Before I start, I would like to confirm to the Council the very sad news of the death this morning of the Deputy Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), Brigadier Ahmed Moinuddin, who was shot down in Islamabad while on leave in his home country of Pakistan. He had taken over his responsibilities as Deputy Force Commander of UNMIS in the Sudan on 24 June. (spoke in French) I thank the Council for the opportunity to update it on the situation in eastern Chad and the north-east Central African Republic. The Secretary-General's quarterly report (8/2009/535) on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) is before the Council.”
2009-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6204 (2009) · source
“The plan is expected to be finalized by July 2009 and will be presented in outline form in the next report of the Secretary-General on MINURCAT. I would like to reiterate, however, that achieving the benchmarks endorsed by the Council - including the voluntary return and resettlement of internally displaced persons, the demilitarization of refugee and internally displaced person camps, and improvement in the capacity of Chadian authorities to provide security with respect for human rights in eastern Chad - will require broad efforts involving many actors. In particular, we will continue to rely on the support of the Council to ensure that MINURCAT has the military assets and political support necessary to carry out its very important mandate.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“Unfortunately, certain legal arrangements are yet to be finalized, including amendments to the Status of Mission Agreements to reflect the military component of MINURCAT. We have called upon the Governments of Chad and the Central African Republic to conclude these amendments, which were submitted to them in draft form on 3 and 18 March, respectively. We also look forward to the finalization of memorandums of understanding with Libya and Cameroon to provide for the transit of goods through their territories, which are currently under discussion with both Governments. Finally, further to the request of the Council, I am pleased to report that the Mission is developing a strategic workplan, including mechanisms to measure and track progress on the implementation of MINURCAT's benchmarks.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“As outlined in the report, significant efforts were made during the reporting period to put in place the necessary legal and administrative arrangements for the deployment of MINURCAT's military component. As the Council is aware, on 13 February the United Nations and the Government of Chad signed a memorandum of understanding on the transfer of sites and infrastructure. In accordance with that agreement, MINURCAT is working to build new airport parking spaces as quickly as possible. Following a recent Government request that MINURCAT provide prior notification of its aviation parking needs, we have reiterated that the memorandum of understanding provides for unimpeded access to the two airport parking spaces in N'Djamena and Abeche.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“In the coming weeks, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations will conduct a midterm review of the DIS, in cooperation with other departments and United Nations agencies. The review will take stock of the concept and performance of the DIS, including the issues I have just described, as well as the impact of United Nations support and the way forward. We will also assess the funding situation and means of increasing international support for the DIS and broader rule-of-law efforts by MINURCAT in eastern Chad. It is vital that we match the deployment of the DIS with corresponding progress in the areas of judicial and penal reform and respect for human rights, and I encourage Council members and donors to support these needs through the Trust Fund for the Support of the Activities of MINURCAT.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“In our response to these problems, we must strike a balance between maintaining the credibility and safety of the DIS and the need for the contingent to retain the trust of those it is intended to support, namely internally displaced persons, refugees, the local population and the humanitarian community. Following the attack on the DIS of 15 April and given the current lack of law and order in eastern Chad, the Government of Chad has proposed to equip the DIS with AK-47 submachine guns. This proposal requires careful consideration in order to ensure that the DIS maintains its community policing character, consistent with the concept endorsed by the Council in resolution 1778 (2007) of 25 September 2007.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“In a further troubling incident, DIS officers themselves came under attack on 15 April, when a group of around 25 armed individuals attacked the DIS station in Farchana and stole a number of weapons, as well as ammunition, communications equipment and personal belongings. A DIS officer and a security guard were injured. Information gathered by a MINURCAT fact-finding team suggests that the attackers may have been military elements. The Government of Chad has also launched an investigation into the incident. The events just described highlight two different problems: cases of ill-discipline and the vulnerability of the DIS to attacks.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“But the DIS is a very new body and needs to be further consolidated and guided to carry out its vital functions in a manner consistent with its concept of operations. This is made clear by recent incidents of DIS ill-discipline, notably the alleged murder of a civilian by a DIS commander in Farchana on 22 March. We are working with the Government of Chad to ensure that DIS posts are equipped with gun safes and weapons storage facilities, where the weapons of off- duty DIS officers would be kept. We are also encouraged that the Chadian authorities have submitted this case to the judicial system.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“Between mid-January and 19 April, 17,621 new refugees were counted in a number of sites near the border, where they have been receiving assistance from the humanitarian community since February. Access to these sites, however, is difficult and will be even more so after the start of the rainy season. (spoke in English) Given the lack of security in eastern Chad, MINURCAT support to the Chadian community police force known as the Detachement inte'gre de securite' (DIS), which provides law and order in refugee camps and other humanitarian sites, is particularly critical. The 850-strong DIS is now fully trained, and 775 officers are deployed across eastern Chad, a significant achievement on the part of MINURCAT and the Government.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“In March, 15 non-governmental organizations wrote to the Government of Chad to express their concern regarding the security situation, which, according to them, is currently deteriorating. They cited the great number of incidents of banditry and armed attacks against humanitarian personnel. Beyond the zone of responsibility of MINURCAT, in eastern Chad, other developments are also ground for concern. A meningitis epidemic has developed in the country, with 914 cases counted by the World Health Organization as of 15 April. In southern Chad, the ongoing flow of refugees from the Central African Republic into the Salamat region was the result of clashes between Central African Armed Forces and rebel factions in the north of the country.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“I would like to encourage the members of the Council to use their influence to re-launch the Dakar process and to prompt the Government of Chad, the political opposition and the armed opposition groups to make more progress in moving towards lasting and inclusive peace in Chad. In this regard, the Secretary-General welcomes the efforts of Libya and Qatar. In the absence of political reconciliation, especially in Darfur, the humanitarian situation remains particularly difficult. As the Secretary-General indicates in his report, 250,000 Sudanese refugees, 160,000 internally displaced persons and 700,000 among the local population in the east of Chad are 3 dependent on humanitarian assistance.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“The implementation of the 13 August 2007 agreement between the Chadian Government and the political opposition is currently deadlocked as a result of disagreement regarding the electoral law. The troops of the armed Chadian opposition remain outside the process and continue to consolidate their forces in western Darfur. On the Chadian side of the border, Chadian National Armed Forces have also strengthened their positions, and the climate is tense. In such a context, relations between the Sudan and Chad remain difficult. I hope that the Contact Group for the 13 March 2008 Dakar agreement between Chad and the Sudan will be able to meet again in the near future.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“Furthermore, although MINURCAT is capable of conducting an average of 15 ground patrols per day, these are currently limited in duration and scope, as longer patrols require reliable and effective air support to guarantee medical evacuation capacity. I would therefore like to call upon the members of the Security Council to do everything within their power to ensure that MINURCAT has the military helicopters required to implement its mandate and to minimize the risks facing the Mission's troops. It is all the more urgent to strengthen MINURCAT given the security, political and humanitarian challenges described the report of the Secretary-General. At the political level, there has been little progress in the implementation of the political processes under way in Chad and between Chad and the Sudan.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“I cannot stress strongly enough the risk posed by the lack of military helicopters to the operational effectiveness of the force. The concept of operations provides for the presence of military helicopters with the capacity to carry out both day and night operations, to ensure that the force has the required mobility, capacity to project and deterrent force 24 hours a day. 09-31234 The Mission's civilian helicopters have a capacity that is limited to medical evacuations and providing support to patrols as a result of restrictions concerning night operations and the need for prior approval regarding their landing sites.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“That leads me to the second difficulty, which we must overcome as soon as possible: the lack of elements essential to the force, particularly a communications unit in Abeche' and most of the military helicopters required. Currently, we have received offers of only six military helicopters, including four Mi-8s provided by the Russian Federation; 12 more helicopters are still needed. It has also been difficult to operationalize the helicopters that we already have. Those four helicopters can be used for operations only with the written agreement of the troop contributor. We are trying to obtain such authorization as swiftly as possible. In addition, although Uruguay has pledged to provide two helicopters, that commitment must still be approved by the Uruguayan parliament.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“In his report, the Secretary-General foresees a progressive strengthening of MINURCAT'S force from 2,085 troops on 15 March to 3,845 by the end of June, to reach its full strength of 5,200 by the end of 2009. Regrettably, we are now obliged to make a number of adjustments following the delays to which I have just referred. When the rainy season begins at the end of June, MINURCAT's force strength will probably be approximately 3,000 troops, with units present in all sectors and a small reserve force in Abe'che. We expect that, with the full deployment of contingents later in the year, the force's strength will reach 4,700 troops by the end of 2009. We will reach the ceiling of 5,200 troops only if Member States provide the Mission with military helicopters and their support elements.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“In a context of strong global demand, MINURCAT had only an extremely brief window of time between the Council's authorization of the force and the transfer of authority; the troop-contributing countries had only two months to prepare. 09-31234 Thus, Ghana recently indicated that it would not be able to deploy a full battalion to Farchana by 15 May, as initially planned, because of delays in acquiring equipment for the contingent. Ghana will be able to deploy only a vanguard of 200 troops by mid-May; the remaining 600 troops will deployed by October. Moreover, the Nepalese battalion, which will constitute the reserve force in Abeche, will be able to deploy only 285 troops before the rainy season begins, also because of delays in acquiring equipment for the contingent.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“It has benefited from the decision of several countries that have contributed troops to EUFOR to extend the deployment of their troops under MINURCAT. In addition, several other Member States, including Ghana and Togo, were also able to deploy troops before the transfer of authority between EUFOR and MINURCAT on 15 March. Thanks to those contributions, MINURCAT's force numbered 2,085 troops when authority was transferred and 2,425 on 22 April. Despite those auspicious beginnings, there is now an urgent need to reinforce MINURCAT up to its authorized strength and to equip it to meet the challenges facing it. As a result, we are concerned by the difficulties that we have encountered in the area of force generation.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“I thank members for the opportunity to update them on the situation in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic. The Council has before it the quarterly report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) (S/2009/ l 99), which contains comprehensive information about the situation. I should like to take this opportunity to highlight several points of special interest and to inform members about several key developments that have occurred since the issuance of the Secretary-General's report, in particular concerning force generation and the Detachement integre' de securite (DIS). As members are aware, MINURCAT, which took over from the European Union-led military force (EUFOR) on 15 March 2009, is a new force.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“As outlined in the current report, the general humanitarian situation in Southern Sudan and the transitional areas has seen very significant numbers of IDPs returning to their homes, and the focus is shifting to recovery and development. At the same time, however, there is an urgent need to focus on the issues that will enable the parties to achieve the referendum and ensure stability post-2011. That will require the parties to cooperate and compromise. While they will have to bear the brunt of the work, international assistance will remain vital in numerous areas, including in disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating parties and assisting in confidence-building, mediation, human rights and capacity-building.”
2008-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6010 (2008) · source
“We are also concerned by statements of Government officials of an intention to expel United Nations staff members or Mission components that are thought to have cooperated with the International Criminal Court, even though they are performing their authorized functions, as directed by the Security Council. In that regard, we expect the Government to abide by the status-of-forces agreement and to ensure the safety, security and protection of United Nations premises and staff. We will be counting on the full support of the Council in that regard. Since the previous report to the Council (S/2008/485), there has been significant progress in implementing the CPA, which has contributed to a normalization of the situation in many areas of the Sudan.”
2008-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6010 (2008) · source
“The request by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for an arrest warrant against President Omer Al-Bashir has become a focus of political life in 3 the Sudan. It could have serious security and other implications for both UNMIS and the African Union- United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur and could potentially derail the CPA process. Nevertheless, UNMIS has continued to carry out its mandated tasks and will ensure that security measures are in place in the event of an indictment. However, we are concerned about suggestions of an uncontrolled reaction to an indictment by the population against UNMIS.”
2008-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6010 (2008) · source
“Recently, there have been a number of reports by external think tanks on the potential for conflict in Southern Kordofan, another of the three transitional areas straddling the border between the North and the South. While agreeing that the situation remains volatile, UNMIS also points to certain positive developments, including the recent opening of areas controlled by the Sudan People's Liberation Army that were previously closed. Given the continued precariousness of Southern Kordofan, the Mission is monitoring the situation closely and developing a conflict management strategy for all the transitional areas, which are likely to be the most volatile during the rest of the CPA interim period.”
2008-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6010 (2008) · source
“The parties now have six weeks to present oral arguments before the Panel and to submit written documentation by 12 December. The Panel is expected to issue its final decision by June 2009. Demarcation of the 1 January 1956 border is a key element of CPA implementation and a determining factor for the division of oil wealth, the northern boundary of Abyei and final redeployment. Following a number of delays, it is still unclear when the Border Commission report will be issued. In any event, it would be important for the parties to start discussing possible future arrangements on border-related questions, regardless of the outcome of the referendum in 2011.”
2008-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6010 (2008) · source
“Although the Abyei civilian administration has been appointed, it has not yet been deployed. Nevertheless, the relatively stable security situation in the Road Map area has encouraged displaced civilians to start returning to their homes. The United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) now enjoys full freedom of movement within the Road Map area, enabling it to monitor the situation and providing it with the means to better predict and prevent conflict. In another welcome development, on 28 October, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague announced the appointment of Pierre-Marie Dupuy as the Presiding Arbitrator of the Abyei Arbitration Panel, which will decide on the boundaries of the area, as called for by the Abyei Road Map Agreement.”
2008-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6010 (2008) · source
“Although implementation of the Road Map for the Return of Internally Displaced Persons and Implementation of the Abyei Protocol is behind schedule, important progress has been made, in particular on the security front. Troops from both sides have essentially withdrawn from the mutually agreed Road Map area, except from small pockets in the north and south. The newly formed Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) battalion has taken charge of security, with more deployments to follow. In addition, a joint integrated police unit is now patrolling and manning checkpoints in Abyei town. However, in order to sustain progress, the Government and the donor community must support the development of the rule of law in Abyei, 08-58804 particularly the judicial system, and address security and reconstruction needs.”
2008-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6010 (2008) · source
“During his visit to the Sudan in October, Under- Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy met in Juba with officials of the Government of Southern Sudan, who acknowledged that they would need to agree with the National Congress Party on a date for elections. For its part, the NCP has made clear that it expects the elections to take place on time, that is, before the July 2009 deadline. However, that target date falls in the middle of the rainy season, during which the preparation and holding of elections would be nearly impossible. In addition to significant logistical challenges that need to be addressed, massive voter education is required, particularly in the south, where illiteracy is high and where voters will be casting up to 12 ballots. The situation in Abyei has improved considerably in recent months.”
2008-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6010 (2008) · source
“The nine-member National Elections Commission (NEC) has still not been formed; nor has the Political Parties Affairs Council, which is required for the registration of political parties. However, there have been some positive developments. The Joint SPLM/NCP High-Level Political Committee has recently discussed the submission of six laws in the National Assembly for adoption at its current session, including the press and media law, the referendum act and the national security act, three long-awaited pieces of legislation that are Vital for the holding of elections. It is hoped that the subcommittee will meet again on 15 November to review comments before submitting the draft laws to the High-level Committee for final endorsement.”
2008-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6010 (2008) · source
“The Initiative, which has now been renamed the Sudan People's Forum (SPF), has formed seven committees dealing with various issues, including development and reconstruction, security and internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees and voluntary returns, and is tasked with proposing means and mechanisms for handling the conflict in Darfur and other national issues. The SPF has received the final reports of all seven committees, and the Forum's Presidential Board should meet this week to discuss the reports and prepare final recommendations by the second week of November. 08-58804 Preparations for and the holding of free and fair elections will be a major challenge. Despite the July passage of the electoral law, other preparations have made little progress.”
2008-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6010 (2008) · source
“In regard to making unity attractive as called for under the CPA, the Council of States and the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly held their first-ever joint session, in Juba, at which they affirmed the necessity of supporting the CPA and achieving comprehensive economic development for the entire country by making use of the vast resources of the Sudan. They also restated the significance of the popular consultations that will precede the 2011 referendum as well as of adhering to its final result. The official launch of the Sudan People's Initiative, in an effort to seek a political settlement for Darfur, is a significant development that, if inclusive, could go a long way in addressing the concerns of Darfurians and could signal a new era in Sudanese politics.”
2008-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6010 (2008) · source
“Overall, however, the status of CPA implementation remains a mixed picture of slow but continuing progress and a number of major outstanding challenges. The parties have a common interest in keeping the CPA on track, as neither can afford to return to armed conflict. They cooperate on a host of issues and interact on a daily basis in government institutions and security mechanisms. Nevertheless, they continue to postpone and delay the implementation of the more difficult aspects of the CPA.”
2008-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6010 (2008) · source
“Mr. Mulet: I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Council on the status of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). In addition to introducing the report of the 2 Secretary-General of 20 October (S/2008/662), I will provide an update on the most recent developments in the peace process. As the report speaks for itself, I will limit myself to highlighting the key points. The first, and rather significant, point is that no major ceasefire Violations have occurred during the reporting period, and the overall security situation remains relatively calm in Southern Sudan and the transitional areas, including Abyei.”
2008-11-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6010 (2008) · source
“By a unanimous vote, the parliament also adopted an appeal to the international community to replace the CIS peacekeepers with "international peace contingents". Yesterday, the Georgian Foreign Ministry advised that it had sent a note to the CIS Executive Committee notifying it of the aforementioned resolution and of Georgia's renunciation of all obligations related to its membership in the CIS as of 18 August 2008. A day earlier, the Abkhaz de facto foreign ministry had stated that it considered it necessary to maintain the presence of a considerable contingent of Russian peacekeepers on its territory as a security guarantor.”
2008-08-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5961 (2008) · source
“Outside the conflict zone, the Russian forces have reportedly conducted operations to destroy military assets at the Senaki military base and at Poti harbour. No targeting or damaging of public infrastructure has been reported in those areas. UNOMIG has continued to patrol in the Zugdidi sector. It has resumed patrolling in the Gali sector, but only along the main road for the time being. Finally, I would like to mention an important issue that could have implications for our area of operations. As members are aware, UNOMIG counts on CIS peacekeeping forces to provide security for our military observers and our installations. However, on 14 August, the Georgian parliament unanimously voted in favour of Georgia's withdrawal from the Commonwealth of Independent States.”
2008-08-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5961 (2008) · source
“Through the continuous presence and patrolling of UNOMIG, the local population in Zugdidi town has been reassured that, despite the tense situation, there is no direct threat to them. The people who left the town at the beginning of last week have started to return home, and at the moment it appears that almost all of the population has returned to Zugdidi. An issue of serious discontent between the administration and the CIS peacekeeping force remains the fact that the force is still occupying several buildings in Zugdidi town. The Mission has been able to monitor major movements of CIS and Russian troops along the main road, the M27, on the Zugdidi side. It has concluded that some of those forces are concentrated along the southern edge of the zone of conflict. UNOMIG is not in a position to confirm the number of those troops.”
2008-08-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5961 (2008) · source
“During the previous week, the Abkhaz side HAD crossed the ceasefire line on several occasions despite warnings from UNOMIG not to do so, causing agitation among the local Georgian population. The crossings took place mainly in the areas of the Ganmukhuri and Khurcha "pockets" along the ceasefire line on the Zugdidi side. Occasionally, the Abkhaz crossed over to Georgian villages in the north of the Zugdidi sector, but they withdrew on the advice of the peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). One serious incident occurred on 17 August, when two Abkhaz personnel were killed and two others wounded as a result of the explosion of a radio-controlled landmine in the Ganmukhuri Patriot Youth Camp. The Zugdidi town and district administrations and the police are functioning.”
2008-08-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5961 (2008) · source
“Mr. Mulet: Allow me to update the members of the Council on the situation that has prevailed in and around the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone since my last briefing, on 11 August. In a key development, on 12 and 13 August, the Abkhaz side launched a military operation in the Upper Kodori Valley. No actual close combat took place, because the Georgian armed personnel in the Upper Kodori Valley had been withdrawn beforehand. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili accused Russia and the Abkhaz side of expelling the entire ethnic Georgian population from the Valley. The team base of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) in the Upper Kodori Valley remains closed. The Mission is considering launching a patrol there to assess the situation.”
2008-08-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5961 (2008) · source
“For the time being, UNOMIG has not observed major movements of troops or weapons into the zone of conflict on the Georgian side. So far, the only actions observed have been reinforcements for existing positions along the ceasefire line. Overall, with the exception of the bombing of the Upper Kodori Valley and of targets near Zugdidi, including the Senaki military base, no direct confrontations appear to have broken out as yet in our area of operations. UNOMIG has requested that the CIS peacekeepers provide security for its regional headquarters in Gali and Zugdidi.”
2008-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5953 (2008) · source
“UNOMIG also reports that a number of Ilyushin-76 transport aeroplanes have landed at Sukhumi airport, beginning yesterday evening. It also appears that a number of Russian ships belonging to the Black Sea fleet have moved close to the coast of Abkhazia. Abkhaz forces and heavy weapons have been moved to the administrative border with Georgia across the entire zone of conflict. Bombings have taken place in the vicinity of the Georgian city of Zugdidi, causing panic among the local population, many of whom are trying to seek protection at the UNOMIG regional headquarters located there. As a result of the increasing tension and the bombings in the Mission's area of operations, UNOMIG has had to scale down its operations and is now conducting only essential patrols. The Mission continues to liaise with the sides and with the CIS peacekeepers.”
2008-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5953 (2008) · source
“Bagapsh also stated that his side was coordinating their activities with the CIS peacekeeping forces in order to restore order in the peacekeepers' area of responsibility. He said that Sukhumi had requested Russia to take measures to strengthen the Abkhaz maritime border. Negotiations with Georgia, he said, were only possible after the current Abkhaz operations were completed. UNOMIG has received information from multiple sources that most of the civilian population of the Upper Kodori Valley has left. Throughout last night and today, UNOMIG has obtained information on an ongoing build-up of forces, both Abkhaz and Russian, in and near the zone of conflict. UNOMIG observed a Russian airborne battalion move towards the zone of conflict this morning.”
2008-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5953 (2008) · source
“Following the request for UNOMIG to leave the Upper Kodori Valley, the Abkhaz de facto authorities announced a decision, taken by de facto president Bagapsh, to push the Georgian armed forces out of the Upper Kodori Valley. Beginning yesterday afternoon, UNOMIG has reported ongoing aerial bombardments of Georgian villages in the Upper Kodori Valley. The Mission also observed the movement by the Abkhaz side of substantial numbers of heavy weapons and military personnel towards the Kodori Valley. Earlier today, Abkhaz de facto president Bagapsh gave a press conference, where he announced that their operation in the Upper Kodori Valley was proceeding according to plan. He stated that Georgian civilians and armed personnel had both been given an ultimatum to leave the Upper Kodori Valley.”
2008-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5953 (2008) · source
“Over the past two days, the Abkhaz side has moved troops and heavy weapons into the zone of conflict. Such movement was initially prevented by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping force, but their commander, General Chaban, yesterday informed UNOMIG that they could no longer stop the Abkhaz from moving weapons and personnel into the zone. UNOMIG has confirmed that the CIS peacekeepers did not attempt to stop such deployments. Abkhaz troops and heavy weapons are now present all along the ceasefire line. Yesterday morning, the Abkhaz de facto deputy defence minister requested that UNOMIG withdraw its observers from the Upper Kodori Valley, as their safety could no longer be guaranteed. UNOMIG then withdrew all 15 observers that had been present in the Upper Kodori Valley.”
2008-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5953 (2008) · source
“Mr. Mulet: I will brief the Council on events related to the mandate and area of responsibility of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). I would like to recall some information about the Mission itself. We have 136 military observers; we have 18 United Nations police personnel on the ground, and 311 civilians, in different sites. The key mandated tasks for this Mission are to monitor and verify the implementation by the parties of the 1994 ceasefire agreement, to contribute to the creation of conditions conducive to return of internally displaced persons and refugees, and to promote a political settlement of the conflict. 3 The situation in Abkhazia remains of extreme concern, with a military build-up continuing on the Abkhaz side of the zone of conflict, as well as bombings of the Upper Kodori Valley.”
2008-08-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5953 (2008) · source
“Finally, with regard to support for AMISOM, on 20 February this year we received a letter from Chairperson Konare of the African Union requesting that the United Nations put in place a financial, logistical and technical support package for AMISOM, totalling some $817,500,000. The Secretariat is reviewing that request to see how best the United Nations could respond to it. In the meantime, we encourage Member States to provide additional support to the African Union and to troop-contributing countries of AMISOM. In the meantime, the Secretariat continues to provide 10 planners to the African Union in Addis Ababa, who are supporting the planning for AMISOM.”
2008-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5858 (2008) · source
“The United Nations military personnel who would be required for a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia under this scenario number up to 27,000, with a possible police component of up to 1,500 police officers. Prior to the deployment of any mission, an integrated mission-planning process should be completed, including a comprehensive technical assessment mission to Somalia. The mission would, among other things, maintain a secure environment for the functioning of a broadly accepted political dispensation and assist in the development of security, judicial and corrections institutions capable of ensuring the rule of law and the administrative and institutional capacity necessary to provide basic and social services to the population.”
2008-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5858 (2008) · source
“A number of conditions would be required in order to ensure the best chances of success for an integrated United Nations peacekeeping mission in Somalia under this scenario. The strategic assessment and fact-finding missions further reviewed and refined those conditions with their counterparts on the ground, developing proposals for graduated interlinked political, security and programmatic assistance aimed at achieving an inclusive and stable political and peacebuilding process in Somalia. The conditions include the cessation of hostilities, agreement by all major groups to allow for external monitoring, and an inclusive political dialogue.”
2008-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5858 (2008) · source
“In scenario 4, a viable political process would have taken hold, involving players from southern and central Somalia and "Puntland", with the majority of the parties agreeing to a political power-sharing agreement and agreeing to renounce violence, lay down arms and commit to support the implementation of a Security Council mandate establishing an integrated United Nations peacekeeping operation. Although spoilers would still remain, they would have been marginalized to the extent possible. Under this scenario, the Ethiopian forces would have withdrawn or would be in the process of doing so. A military agreement would have been signed by the major clans and factions outlining key security arrangements, including a ceasefire.”
2008-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5858 (2008) · source
“Troops would need to apply tactical techniques to minimize their vulnerability to roadside bombs and should possess electronic countermeasures to defeat radio- controlled explosive devices. A United Nations force could not be tasked with this role, as the vast majority of United Nations peacekeeping troops do not possess the those capabilities or training. As a result, the Security Council could consider this option only if offers were forthcoming from capable Member States ready to form a coalition of the willing under a strong lead nation, as proposed by Special Representative Ould Abdallah. The combined coalition stabilization force and AMISOM. could allow the withdrawal of the Ethiopian armed forces from Mogadishu.”
2008-03-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5858 (2008) · source