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1995-11-22
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2023-09-20
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un-security-council

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  1. I reiterate my view that as the problems facing the two peoples are man-made, so too can a workable solution be forged among them. In the face of such crises, one of the highest priorities for the international community has always been to prevent the situation from degenerating into further violence. With that said, perhaps one of the best ways to contain the situation in the West Bank is to restore the status quo. All the delicate issues related to the status of Jerusalem could then be discussed in a reasoned and more dispassionate manner through the negotiations on final status.

    1996-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3698Resumption1 (1996) · source

  2. Although this decision may have been based upon practical considerations, the highly sensitive political factors should have been taken into consideration. Indeed, given the extremely fragile and sensitive state of affairs in Jerusalem, opening the entrance was perceived by Palestinians as a deliberate challenge to the status quo in that city. In this regard, my delegation believes that the violence that has ensued from this action could have easily been anticipated and thus avoided. As I mentioned at the Council meeting convened on 15 April to discuss Israel's measures to close its borders with the West Bank and Gaza, it is the wisdom, courage and patience of both Israelis and Palestinians that will enable them to overcome the crisis before them.

    1996-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3698Resumption1 (1996) · source

  3. We consider the latest clashes in the West Bank, which have been deemed the worst since the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, to be detrimental not only in terms of the heavy casualties, but also because of the nature of the fighting between the Israeli military and the Palestinian police force. If steps are not taken to curb the fighting, then the current situation in the West Bank, which has turned into a grim confrontation between organized forces, may do immeasurable damage to the already shaky efforts for a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the region. As we are well aware, the catalyst for this explosive and tragic turn of events was the Israeli decision to open a new entrance to a tunnel that runs under a major religious site in Jerusalem.

    1996-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3698Resumption1 (1996) · source

  4. Traditionally, the month of September at the United Nations has been one which, with the commencement of a new session of the General Assembly, rings with renewed hopes for peace. With the recent developments in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, however, a sombre shadow has been cast over this Chamber today. My delegation, fully recognizing the far-reaching implications which the Middle East carries for international peace and security, has consistently supported the peace process in that region and has closely followed the progress of its implementation.

    1996-09-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3698Resumption1 (1996) · source

  5. We are also grateful to the United States Government for the generous financial support it has committed to ECOMOG. We remain confident that the active engagement of ECOWAS in Liberia can serve as a model of successful cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in addressing the new kinds of challenges to international peace and security we now face in the post-cold-war world.

    1996-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3694 (1996) · source

  6. In view of the commitment of ECOWAS to revive the peace process and remain engaged in Liberia through the installation of a new Government on 15 June 1997, my delegation fully supports the extension of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) mandate for a period of three months, as recommended by the Secretary-General. We also support the deployment of additional military observers within the Mission's currently authorized strength, as developments warrant. With these remarks, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution before the Council. In concluding, I wish to express my Government's appreciation to those African States contributing troops to the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), despite serious financial constraints.

    1996-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3694 (1996) · source

  7. By ensuring the independence and impartiality of the electoral Commission, the international community can avoid a situation in which the conscience of humanity may be disturbed by the unfortunate election of any of those who commits the heinous crime of violating the basic rules of international humanitarian law. We share the view that the United Nations should play a central role in the organization and conduct of the elections. In this regard, we believe that the Council should give serious consideration to the request by ECOWAS and the Liberian parties for assistance. We encourage the Secretariat to study the optimal ways and means by which the role of the United Nations can be enhanced to support the efforts of ECOWAS and to create conditions conducive to peace, stability and national reconciliation in Liberia.

    1996-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3694 (1996) · source

  8. In this connection, the growing influence of Liberia's civil society, manifested in the course of ECOWAS decisions and the designation of the new Chairperson of the Council of State, Ms. Ruth Perry, are encouraging signs for peace and democracy in Liberia. We look forward to a greater involvement of civil society in the process of free and fair elections. We also emphasize that if disarmament is to have true significance, it should be backed by strict enforcement of the arms embargo imposed on Liberia by resolution 788 (1992). Given the vital importance of the elections for the future of Liberia, the imperative of ensuring the impartiality and independence of the electoral Commission cannot be overemphasized.

    1996-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3694 (1996) · source

  9. However, we believe that the Liberian faction leaders are fully aware of what they need to do to redeem themselves before the international community for all their past misdeeds. While we welcome the commitment of the Liberian faction leaders to the ECOWAS decisions, we will be watching closely how faithfully they abide by their commitments. The final outcome of the peace process will hinge on whether free and fair elections are held on 30 May 1997. While ECOWAS Foreign Ministers have identified the requisite conditions to ensure free and fair elections, we attach great importance to the full independence of the electoral Commission and to disarmament substantial enough so that the free participation of the Liberian people in the democratic process will not be constrained.

    1996-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3694 (1996) · source

  10. Of these measures, we note in particular the exclusion from future elections of those obstructing the peace process and the invocation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 1996 Summit resolution calling for the establishment of a war crimes tribunal to try all human rights offenses against Liberians. These are clear reminders to the Liberian faction leaders of the alternatives which await them in the event they fail to comply with the peace plan. As the Secretary-General notes in paragraph 53 of his report, the ECOWAS decisions are intended to give the Liberian faction leaders one last chance to restore a democratically elected government. We have not forgotten the atrocities committed by the feuding armed factions in the streets of Monrovia last April.

    1996-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3694 (1996) · source

  11. The situation in Liberia has taken a significant turn for the better over the past several weeks. The cease-fire in Monrovia has held since its re-establishment on 26 May 1996. The stalled peace process has been brought back on track, thanks largely to the patient and concerted efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). We welcome the ECOWAS decision on 17 August 1996 to extend the Abuja Agreement of 19 August 1995 until 15 June 1997, as well as its adoption of a new timetable for the implementation of the Agreement. The firm determination of ECOWAS member States not to tolerate any further obstruction of the peace process is backed by a comprehensive set of measures to ensure compliance by the Liberian factions with the peace plan.

    1996-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3694 (1996) · source

  12. The time is ripe for us to take an initiative for the effective management of the crisis situation in Burundi. Today's debate will give us precious input from many interested countries, which will be used for fine-tuning our deliberations. It is my delegation's hope that this debate will lead us to a package of actions that will best serve the interests of the Burundian people and the international community.

    1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source

  13. But it is not an impossible task, either. On the other hand, there is an equally pressing need for contingency planning on a much bigger scale and of a wider scope, as is well elaborated in the Secretary- General's report. It is unfortunate to find that this contingency planning has yet to be fully developed due to the insufficient level of Members' commitments. My delegation is of the view that we should facilitate, with a sense of urgency, contingency planning as an essential part of our action plan. My delegation wishes to convey its appreciation to the Secretariat for the laudable efforts it has made thus far, despite many constraints, towards this cause. Before concluding, my delegation wishes to express its belief that today's debate on Burundi is very timely and appropriate.

    1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source

  14. Secondly, we cannot afford to wait too long, as this would send the wrong signal to the Burundian parties. We find it imperative to make these parties refrain from violence and commit themselves to a negotiated resolution of the conflict. All our efforts should be directed towards encouraging them to resume, without delay, a process of political dialogue that will bring together all political forces in Burundi without exception and without any preconditions. In this regard, we strongly support the efforts that former President Nyerere, the regional leaders and other international mediators are making to help facilitate this process. To achieve this objective, we ought to consider every option at our disposal. Truly it is not an easy thing to strike a proper balance between the need for action and the risk of action.

    1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source

  15. I am certain that this initiative is bound to have a long-lasting, salutary effect on the democratic future of the African continent. Now that the regional community has come up with its own action, the Security Council has to resume its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and stability in the Great Lakes region. N ow I should like to suggest two overriding guidelines for contemplating the Council's future course of action. First of all, we should bear in mind the importance of taking seriously into account the gravity and volatility of the situation in Burundi. Our action should be oriented towards minimizing the risk of triggering a chain reaction that could inadvertently turn the situation into a major crisis.

    1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source

  16. In this context, I should like to stress the critical importance of the decisions of the Arusha II summit. Among other things, we highly value the resolve of the countries in the region to react in a unified, resolute and prompt manner. We fully support the measures taken at the summit to bring to bear upon the Burundian parties an optimal level of pressure so that serious negotiations for a political settlement can be reopened in Burundi. This initiative is a manifestation of the division of labour between the United Nations and the regional communities, and complements the fulfilment of the purpose of the United Nations. It also marks a historic milestone in the furtherance of the region's commitment to democracy by pronouncing itself, in the most unequivocal terms, against the overthrow of a legitimate Government.

    1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source

  17. My delegation believes that the current situation in Burundi underscores the fact that the international community should, with the utmost urgency, make every effort to prevent any further deterioration of the situation and put Burundi back on the track of dialogue for peace and a political settlement. We fully share the Secretary- General's observation that the conflict in Burundi is not susceptible to a military solution and that political mechanisms to share power have to be found with the help of outsiders. In this regard, my delegation cannot fail to express its disappointment at the inability of the Burundian parties to seize the opportunity that was created by the Mwanza and Arusha I processes, driven in particular by the relentless efforts of former President Nyerere.

    1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source

  18. As indicated by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, the generalized lack of safety, the climate of fear, hatred and exclusion and the prevalent culture of impunity are poisoning human relations and paralysing all initiatives to lift the country out of chaos. In particular, we note with grave concern the Secretary-General' s observation that the unfortunate event of 25 July will reinforce the fears of one ethnic group and strengthen extremists on both sides, thus increasing violence and adding to the suffering of the Burundian people.

    1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source

  19. For the last few years, the situation in Burundi has remained a priority on the agenda of this Council. Despite the continued attention and efforts of the international community, however, there have been no signs of alleviation in the plight of the Burundian people. Rather to our despair, the events of one month ago testify to the fact that Burundi is not a land that allows the slightest room for wishful thinking. The latest report of the Secretary-General, of 15 August 1996, gives a detailed account of the political plunge of the Burundian parties, which saw its nadir in the 25 July coup, as well as a vivid description of the precarious security and humanitarian situation, characterized by mass killings that have terrorized large segments of the population.

    1996-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3692 (1996) · source

  20. However, the measures specified in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution to be adopted represent a clear warning of what could follow if, and only if, the Government of Sudan fails to comply with the demands reiterated in paragraph 1 within 90 days. The central merit of this phased approach is that Sudan's compliance within the next 90 days obviates altogether the need to actually implement paragraph 3. We appeal to Sudan to make the best use of the additional grace period allowed under the draft resolution to comply fully and promptly with the demands of the Security Council. With these remarks, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution before the Council.

    1996-08-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3690 (1996) · source

  21. When it comes to paragraph 1 (b) of resolution 1054 (1996), we note that some positive steps have been taken by the Government of Sudan. We welcome the Sudanese Government's condemnation of terrorism and its commitment to ensure that no terrorist activities are tolerated in Sudanese territory. We believe that Sudan's declared commitments should be backed up by further concrete actions. We believe that the purpose of the draft resolution before us is to send a clear message to Sudan that there is no substitute for compliance with the Council's demands. It contains no forceful measures to be implemented immediately.

    1996-08-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3690 (1996) · source

  22. More than seven months have passed since the Security Council first acted upon the issue at hand by adopting resolution 1044 (1996), calling upon the Government of Sudan, inter alia, to comply with the requests of the Organization of African Unity to extradite the three suspects wanted in connection with the assassination attempt on the life of President Mubarak of Egypt and to desist from supporting terrorist activities. Nearly four months ago the Council acted under Chapter VII of the Charter to reiterate its demands by adopting resolution 1054 (1996). My delegation regrets the lack of progress in the implementation of paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 1054 (1996). We believe that the Sudanese Government can and should meet the demands of the Security Council.

    1996-08-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3690 (1996) · source

  23. I wish finally to take this opportunity to express my delegation's sincere thanks to you, Mr. President, for having taken the initiative to organize this open meeting devoted to the discussion of the issue of demining in the context of peace-keeping, and for your Government's outstanding contribution towards the resolution of this issue.

    1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source

  24. My delegation firmly believes that we will be able to find such an answer only when the whole spectrum of land-mine problems, ranging from humanitarian concerns to disarmament imperatives is fully addressed. In tandem with many other ongoing efforts by the international community towards the eventual eradication of this scourge, United Nations peace-keeping operations give us the opportunity to contribute to the management of a more immediate danger by actively cultivating the ability of stricken nations to clear already-laid land-mines. We must help mine-ridden nations, particularly those in the developing world, help themselves in shaking off this danger, so that civilians can once again farm their fields and walk the roads of their countries without fear.

    1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source

  25. To this end, it would be worthwhile to further explore how we can strengthen the United Nations demining standby capacity programme and expand the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine-clearance. In this vein, my delegation wishes to note that the Government of the Republic of Korea has been a recent contributor to the Fund. No country can ignore the horrendous magnitude of the land-mine problem. It has become a global crisis warranting a global response. It is only appropriate, therefore, that the United Nations should have played a major role in seeking a solution. The United Nations should continue to lead us in the quest for a comprehensive answer to this global crisis.

    1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source

  26. The transfer of demining technology and the provision of essential equipment are clearly no less important steps. In this regard, my delegation wishes to point to the valiant work of the Cambodia Mine Action Centre (CMAC) as a useful model. Founded by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992, CMAC was later reconstituted as an official organ of the Cambodian Government upon UNTAC's withdrawal. The CMAC demining programme is making extraordinary progress through the training of local deminers and such innovative concepts as a village demining programme involving selected village residents. Thirdly, in addition to peace-keeping missions, we should strengthen the capacity and resources of the United Nations to provide rapid demining assistance on an ad hoc basis, whenever the need arises.

    1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source

  27. Ultimately, the primary responsibility for demining lies with the country affected. After all, complete demining will almost certainly require a longer time-frame than the mandate of peace- keeping missions can sustain. Before their time expires, however, United Nations peace-keepers can give affected countries a jump-start along the long road to recovery by helping them develop their own repository of demining expertise. This knowledge can then be continuously drawn upon, even after the "Blue Helmets" have returned home. Efforts by peace-keepers to foster indigenous demining capacity will have to include the following steps: land-mine assessment, followed by training in mine-awareness; education and training in mine-clearance; and finally, transition of authority to the host Government.

    1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source

  28. My delegation is of the view that there are several concrete steps that we can take towards this end. First, we must ensure that demining be made an integral part of United Nations peace-keeping operations whenever deemed necessary. In this regard, we wish to suggest that the Security Council should review the scope of the mandates of existing peace-keeping missions to make sure that authorization for demining is adequately provided for. Moreover, we believe that demining operations coordinated by the United Nations should be granted a mandate to continue even after the actual peace-keeping operation has ended. Secondly, in carrying out demining tasks, we should concentrate on nourishing the indigenous capacity for safe, fast and effective mine-clearance in order to help affected countries help themselves in the long run.

    1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source

  29. Mines stand in the way of the efforts to achieve other parts of a peace- keeper's mandate, such as distributing humanitarian aid, repatriating refugees, or ensuring fair elections. Thirdly, land-mines can jeopardize an affected country's post-conflict economic and psychological recovery. Not surprisingly, fields will lie fallow and factories idle until farmers and workers feel safe enough to return to their jobs. Mines paralyse agriculture, render roads and bridges impassable, and impose staggering medical and psychological costs on the population. Clearly, for all these reasons, peace-keeping operations in mine-ridden countries cannot succeed without proper demining. Now how can we ensure that mine-clearance efforts in peace-keeping are effective?

    1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source

  30. What I believe we need to focus on today, in our discussion of the role of demining in peace-keeping operations, is how to enhance the capacity and efficiency of mine-clearance in affected countries. It is against this background that I would now like to elaborate on why demining is a particularly pressing concern in the context of United Nations peace-keeping. First, the vast majority of peace-keeping missions launched since the end of the cold war have been in response to intra-State conflicts, and it is in precisely those conflicts that land-mine emplacement is particularly widespread. Secondly, in those peace-keeping missions, uncleared land-mines often prevent peace-keepers from fulfilling their mandate. Clearly, land-mines endanger peace- keepers, just as they do the local population.

    1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source

  31. First, any comprehensive effort to solve the problem must eventually address the supply side of the equation, including through restrictions on production, export and modifications in design, such as the inclusion of self- neutralizing timers. The Republic of Korea has played a part in this effort, announcing a unilateral year-long moratorium on land-mine exports last year. The large number of land-mine producers, however, and the divergence of views on the efficacy of production and export controls, means that a consensus on supply-side issues will not come easily. Secondly, in the meantime, there is a pressing need for the international community to focus on the end-user side of the equation, such as through demining and restrictions on the use of land-mines.

    1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source

  32. If we combine these factors with the painstakingly slow, dangerous and expensive process of mine removal, the conundrum we face is clear. The average anti-personnel mine costs as little as $3 to produce, and yet costs up to $1,000 to remove. Demining methods, meanwhile, have advanced little since the Second World War. The net result is that land- mines are being laid far faster than they can be cleared. We now face more than 100 million mines in 65 different countries worldwide, and the figure is increasing by up to 1 million new mines per year. My delegation believes that coping with the land- mine scourge will require the international community to make concerted efforts from two directions.

    1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source

  33. Land-mines pose a global challenge to the international community, less because of their explosive power than because of the indiscriminate and inhumane manner in which they have been used. Brutal anti-personnel mines have been deployed with appalling frequency against civilians, maiming or killing 25,000 people per year. Moreover, mines laid during a conflict remain armed and dangerous long after the guns fall silent, threatening reconciliation efforts and undermining economic recovery. Land-mines truly are, as one commentator has called them, "weapons of mass destruction in slow motion". The ready availability of land-mines only exacerbates the problem. Easy to produce, and with an ample number of suppliers, land-mines are very inexpensive. Not only are land-mines easy to acquire, but they are also easy to emplace.

    1996-08-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3689 (1996) · source

  34. In the light of all these considerations, my delegation will be pleased to support the Secretary-General's recommendation to extend the mandate of UNOMIG until 31 January 1997 by voting in favour of the draft resolution before us. Finally, we would also like to express our sincere gratitude to Ambassador Brunner, the Secretary-General's Special Envoy, and to Mr. Bota, his resident Deputy, as well as to all the personnel under their command for their determined efforts under trying conditions.

    1996-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3680 (1996) · source

  35. We hope to receive the Secretary-General's detailed and timely report on arrangements for the establishment of a human rights office in Sukhumi so that the office can be opened as soon as possible. On another important matter, land mines appear to pose the greatest obstacle, especially in the sense that they constrain the free movement of the personnel of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). In this vein, as a troop contributor to this peace-keeping operation, my delegation is especially pleased to note that UNOMIG personnel will be provided with both mine- protected vehicles and some engineering support for road- clearing. We also hope that the close and continued cooperation between UNOMIG and the Commonwealth of Independent States peace-keeping force will serve to enhance the safety of UNOMIG personnel.

    1996-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3680 (1996) · source

  36. Regrettably, the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Abkhazia continues to be obstructed by the Abkhaz side. A reduction is needed in the ongoing criminality and violence that are also deterring the return of refugees and displaced persons, especially in the Gali region. In this regard, we must emphasize that any attempt to tie the return of refugees to the question of Abkhazia's political status is wholly unacceptable. On the other hand, we are pleased to support the programme for the protection and promotion of human rights in Abkhazia to be implemented by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

    1996-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3680 (1996) · source

  37. In this regard, my delegation is of the view that the Georgian Government's proposal to grant Abkhazia far-reaching autonomy within the framework of a unified Georgian State, as outlined in President Shevardnadze's letter dated 6 July 1996, presents a solid foundation upon which to build a comprehensive political settlement. We also join the other members of the Council in calling upon the Abkhaz side in particular to end the current standstill in the political process and to embrace a more pragmatic and flexible approach to reaching a solution based on the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized boundaries. Paralysis in the political process has also been accompanied by serious humanitarian conditions.

    1996-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3680 (1996) · source

  38. Like most of the other intra-State conflicts that have erupted in the wake of the cold war, the current situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, involves an interplay of political, humanitarian and military factors. We believe that the political process is the fundamental determining factor in this conflict and should thus be accorded the highest priority in the quest for a resolution. In this context, we appreciate and support the efforts made by the Secretary-General, the group of "Friends of Georgia" and, in particular, the Russian Federation as facilitator to promote a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict. We must agree with the Secretary-General, however, that the international community can only help the parties reach a solution if they are willing to resolve their differences in a spirit of compromise.

    1996-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3680 (1996) · source

  39. The presence of a large number of demobilized ex-combatants in an economically precarious country such as Angola will most likely generate additional social tension, hindering the consolidation of hard-won peace. Hence the urgent need for professional training and the creation of employment opportunities, which go hand in hand with economic reconstruction and development. While the Angolan Government is to play a central role, we emphasize the support of international financial institutions as well as the generosity of major donor countries. It is in this light that we view the merit of paragraphs 11 and 22 of the draft resolution. Finally, we support the extension of the UNAVEM. III mandate for three months, as recommended by the Secretary-General.

    1996-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3679 (1996) · source

  40. Savimbi is central to the commitment and political will of the parties. In this respect, we attach great importance to arriving at a clear understanding between the two leaders regarding their respective roles and the nature of the posts to be allocated to UNITA leaders in the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation. Problems of this nature can best be resolved in a meeting between the two leaders. We view the relevance of paragraph 14 of the draft resolution in this context. One daunting challenge that comes with the progress of the peace process is the demobilization and social reintegration of ex-combatants. Much has been said about the inseparable linkage between peace and development.

    1996-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3679 (1996) · source

  41. The three key tasks of the Lusaka Protocol - the quartering of UNITA troops, the formation of the unified armed forces, and the establishment of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation - should be completed in the coming days or weeks. The peace process will remain incomplete unless these crucial tasks are successfully achieved in good time. The draft resolution on which the Council is about to vote correctly outlines, in paragraphs 6, 8, 12 and 13, the nature of these tasks and specific steps to be taken by the Angolan parties. We urge the Angolan parties to implement their commitments without further delay. In overcoming the remaining obstacles to the peace process, there is no substitute for the political will of the parties themselves. Mutual trust between President dos Santos and Mr.

    1996-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3679 (1996) · source

  42. Although overall progress to date has been positive enough to warrant cautious optimism for the future, my delegation shares disappointment at the slow pace at which the peace process has been moving forward. The unsatisfactory quantity and quality of UNITA weapons handed over to UNAVEM. III also remains a matter of concern. It must be recalled that the quartering process will not be complete until all UNITA troops are quartered in a credible and verifiable manner and all UNITA weapons, in particular heavy weapons, are handed over to UNAVEM. III. The Angolan peace process is now moving into its most critical stage.

    1996-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3679 (1996) · source

  43. We welcome in particular the impressive progress in the quartering of troops of the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), with more than 20,000 additional UNITA soldiers registered in the quartering areas. We are also gratified to note the completion of the quartering of the rapid reaction police; the adoption of the framework agreement on military matters, which made possible the beginning of the long- awaited process of incorporating UNITA military personnel into the Angolan Armed Forces; the promulgation of the Amnesty Law; and the start of talks between the Angolan Government and UNITA on constitutional amendments necessary for the formation of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation.

    1996-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3679 (1996) · source

  44. Mr. Park (Republic of Korea) (interpretation from French): I congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of July. I pledge the full support and close cooperation of my delegation as you carry out your important responsibilities. I also pay warm tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Elaraby of Egypt, for the effective way in which he guided the work of the Council last month. (spoke in English) Since the last extension of the mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM. III) two months ago, there have been encouraging developments in the Angolan peace process.

    1996-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3679 (1996) · source

  45. We will therefore join the Council's consensus and vote in favor of the draft resolution, which we believe marks another milestone in Haiti's path to democracy and prosperity.

    1996-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3676 (1996) · source

  46. Finally, the current situation in Haiti, as in many other areas of conflict, demonstrates the crucial link between peace and development. As noted in the preamble of the draft resolution, long-term peace and stability cannot come to pass without progress in economic, social and institutional development. It is in this spirit that we strongly encourage the development activities which are being conducted by various agencies and the international financial institutions. In closing, my delegation would like to stress once again that the people of Haiti bear the ultimate responsibility for their own destiny. We therefore applaud the Government and the people of Haiti for their firm commitment to the rule of law, democracy and development. We find the draft resolution before us encompasses all the core elements that we have just mentioned.

    1996-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3676 (1996) · source

  47. We note with satisfaction that the difficult financial situation of the United Nations has been duly addressed in the draft resolution, through a substantial reduction in the troop strength of the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) from the level recommended by the Secretary-General. In this connection, we welcome the willingness of the Governments of the United States and Canada to provide generous voluntary support to UNSMIH. My delegation has held the view that the assistance and commitment of the countries in the region are not only desirable but also indispensable for the activities of the United Nations. We are pleased that the cooperation of the Organization of American States with this world body in consolidating peace and democracy in Haiti has been duly taken note of in the draft resolution.

    1996-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3676 (1996) · source

  48. It is in this context that we agree with the Secretary- General's View that complete withdrawal of the United Nations presence is inappropriate at this time. The case before us represents a challenge from the perspective of United Nations peace-keeping operations as well. UNMIH was a model of success in combining a traditional peace-keeping operation with post-conflict peace-building efforts. We believe that a continued United Nations presence should contribute to a smooth transition from the peace-keeping to the peace-building stage. In this regard, we are pleased that the mandate of the new Mission is geared further towards the promotion of institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation in Haiti.

    1996-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3676 (1996) · source

  49. The fledgling police force is still faced with the same old problems and in need of sustained assistance from the international community before it becomes a fully functioning force. We believe that in the longer term, the emphasis of the United Nations role in Haiti should be reoriented and the focus should shift from the current peace-keeping operations to enhanced socio-economic development activities. However, at a time when the nascent democracy is still quite frail and the National Police are not fully prepared to independently ensure the kind of stable and secure environment required for the consolidation of democracy and sustainable economic development, we believe that the security concern should remain a priority.

    1996-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3676 (1996) · source

  50. Since the historic transfer of power which took place last February, the Government and the people of Haiti have made considerable progress in their quest for democracy and stability under the leadership of President Preval. Unfortunately, however, despite the tremendous progress achieved to date, the overall security environment still remains unstable, as the Secretary-General's report indicates. The potential for instability that might be created by the premature departure of the United Nations is particularly worrisome in the light of the signs of growing popular discontent over the difficult economic situation. Furthermore, the inability of the incipient Haitian National Police to maintain law and order on its own is a serious cause for concern.

    1996-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3676 (1996) · source