YouSaid · the spoken record

Ramirez Carrefio

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2015-01-19
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2017-10-31
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un-security-council

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  1. The Committee is currently considering a draft guidance note for implementing resolutions in order to provide guidance and operational recommendations to Member States, the Somali Government and other relevant institutions to implement the measures of the arms embargo more efficiently. The draft guidance note summarizes existing restrictions imposed by the arms embargo on Somalia and Eritrea, describes exemptions to the measures, and clarifies problems that have been encountered by Member States and the Somali Government, in particular in applying the arms embargo. The Committee is expected to approve the draft guidance note and make it public in early March.

    2016-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7626 (2016) · source

  2. In the first update in writing that the Committee received this year, the Monitoring Group stated that it continued to work with the diplomatic community, the United Nations system in Nairobi and key stakeholders in the Horn of Africa in order to actively identify new areas of research and to expand the network of contacts in order to fulfil its new mandate. It is expected that, on 22 April, the coordinator of the Monitoring Group shall provide the Committee with the mid-term update on the Group's investigations and activities that the Council has requested with a view to having the final report ready on 15 October 2016.

    2016-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7626 (2016) · source

  3. After the Council adopted resolution 2244 (2015), the Secretary-General appointed to the Monitoring Group eight experts knowledgeable in weapons, armed groups, finance, humanitarian affairs, maritime affairs and transportation, natural resources and regional issues. Between 11 and 15 January, eight experts of the Monitoring Group, visiting New York to participate in an orientation programme and the planning of its mandate, held bilateral meetings with key delegations, including myself as Chairman of the Sanctions Committee on Somalia and Eritrea, as well as the Permanent Representative of Eritrea.

    2016-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7626 (2016) · source

  4. The Group reported that it had spoken with the Eritrean Government on several occasions, but that the authorities of that country had shown little willingness to cooperate. The Group also noted the lack of progress in resolving the border dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea. The Committee hopes that the Qatari mediation efforts will contribute to resolving this matter. The outbreak of the crisis in Yemen was a new development. The Group received unconfirmed reports of the presence of Eritrean soldiers in Yemen, fighting alongside the Arab coalition. If these reports are confirmed, the Group has said that this participation could constitute a violation of paragraph 6 of the same resolution.

    2016-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7626 (2016) · source

  5. At the same time, the Group expressed concern about the lack of precision of the information provided on the composition and arrangement of the security forces. In this regard, the Committee decided to address a note verbale to all Member States, asking them to support the comprehensive security sector reform programme announced by the Office of the President of the Federal Government of Somalia on 9 September 2015, in order to ensure the timely delivery of technical and financial assistance to the security sector. Let me now turn to the Monitoring Group's report on Eritrea. The Group found no evidence that the Government of Eritrea had provided support to Al-Shabaab. However, it reported that Eritrea was supporting armed groups in Ethiopia, in contravention of paragraph 16 of resolution 1907 (2009).

    2016-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7626 (2016) · source

  6. With respect to charcoal, the Monitoring Group reported that the implementation of its ban had improved since Al-Shabaab was displaced from locations where it is shipped for export. However, because the use of forged documents is widespread among carriers, Somali charcoal continued to be exported. In that regard, the Monitoring Group suggested that the Somali authorities, Member States, AMISOM. and troop- contributing countries seek to better coordinate their efforts to ensure the existence of a comprehensive and efficient mechanism against the illegal trade in Somali charcoal. The Monitoring Group noted the substantive progress made by the Federal Government with regard to the quality and timeliness of its notifications to the Committee concerning imported weapons.

    2016-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7626 (2016) · source

  7. The Monitoring Group reported that the Federal Government of Somalia and provisional regional administrations had trouble controlling the territories liberated from Al-Shabaab, which has led to the resurgence of tensions and conflicts among communities. With regard to humanitarian access, the Monitoring Group reported that it remained extremely fragile, especially in areas where Al-Shabaab had established blockades of humanitarian supplies and trade by arresting and killing civilians and destroying their property. Foreign and domestic forces active in Somalia continued to attack civilians, either as a deliberate tactic of war or through the disproportionate use of force.

    2016-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7626 (2016) · source

  8. With respect to the mineral resources sector in Somalia, the Monitoring Group said that tensions between the Federal Government of Somalia and regional administrations were on the rise as both continued to sign agreements with international oil and gas companies. With regard to the threat posed by Al-Shabaab to Somalia and the region, the Group reported that it persisted despite the fact that several of its leaders had been killed. Al-Shabaab took advantage of the fact that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the Somali National Army and allied forces are at the limit of their capacities, making their bases increasingly vulnerable to possible attacks. The Monitoring Group also found that Al-Shabaab is seeking to maintain communications with Yemen and Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.

    2016-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7626 (2016) · source

  9. With respect to the arms embargo imposed on Somalia, since the beginning ofthis year, the Committee has received one notification under paragraph 10 (g) of resolution 2111 (2013). The Committee has also received two notifications in accordance with paragraph 11 (a) of resolution 2011 (2013). At its informal consultations on 9 October 2015, the Committee reviewed the final reports of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, and discussed their recommendations. The Monitoring Group reported that international interest in the rich marine resources and minerals of Somalia had grown. That interest, however, had not yet been accompanied by adequate efforts to manage these resources. The Monitoring Group considered that this constituted a potential threat to peace, security and stability in Somalia.

    2016-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7626 (2016) · source

  10. In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of Somalia to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009). I am honoured to have convened today's Security Council briefing on the activities of the Somalia and Eritrea Sanctions Committee. My statement today will focus on recent developments and the latest findings of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group. Today's briefing is being conducted in accordance with sub-paragraph 11 (g) of resolution 1844 (2008).

    2016-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7626 (2016) · source

  11. 1 thank Ambassador Yoshikawa for his briefing. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 3.25 pm.

    2016-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7625 (2016) · source

  12. 1 thank Mr. Ould Cheikh Ahmed for his briefing. I now call on Ambassador Yoshikawa, Permanent Representative of Japan, in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014).

    2016-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7625 (2016) · source

  13. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by Mr. Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, and Ambassador Motohide Yoshikawa, Permanent Representative of Japan, in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014). I now give the floor to Mr. Ould Cheikh Ahmed.

    2016-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7625 (2016) · source

  14. I thank Ambassador De Patriota for his informative briefing. I now give the floor to the representative of Guinea- Bissau.

    2016-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7624 (2016) · source

  15. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2016/l4l, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau. I now give the floor to Mr. Trovoada.

    2016-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7624 (2016) · source

  16. In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of Guinea-Bissau and Timor-Leste to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Miguel Trovoada, Special Representative of the Secretary- General and Head of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, and His Excellency Mr. Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission and Permanent Representative of Brazil. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda.

    2016-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7624 (2016) · source

  17. I thank the representative of Iraq for his statement. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on this subject. The meeting rose at 3.35 pm.

    2016-02-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7623 (2016) · source

  18. I thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for his informative briefing. I now give the floor to the representative of Iraq.

    2016-02-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7623 (2016) · source

  19. In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of Iraq to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Jan Kubis, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2016/77, which contains the second report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 2233 (2015), as well as to document S/2016/87, which contains the ninth report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 2107 (2013). I now give the floor to Mr. Kubis.

    2016-02-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7623 (2016) · source

  20. I thank Mr. O'Brien for his briefing. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at10.25 a.m.

    2016-02-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7622 (2016) · source

  21. I should like to advise the Security Council that we have been informed that former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has passed away. I now invite Council members to rise to observe a minute of silence in tribute to the memory of His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The members of the Security Council observed a minute ofsilence. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East The President (spoke in Spanish): In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Stephen O'Brien, Under- Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I now give the floor to Mr. O'Brien.

    2016-02-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7622 (2016) · source

  22. The work of the sanctions committees should not be compartmentalized, given the fact that many regional conflicts must be seen, in a cross-cutting manner, to have problems similar to those in countries of the same region. We have made a number of recommendations and look forward to receiving the support of all members for a draft document reflecting the important contributions expressed here today. We feel very strongly that the work of the sanctions committees must reflect more accurately the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Sanctions should not be punitive, but an instrument to address and prevent threats to international peace and security. I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council. I give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

    2016-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7620 (2016) · source

  23. The panels often engage in their own interpretation of the provisions and mandate of the relevant resolution, and it can be very difficult to change such assessments. Ultimately, the panels of experts play a lead role in sanctions committees, and may even have powers that carry more political weight than those of the chair. We believe that the sanctions committees need to be more accountable. It should be an open mechanism; we do not wish to see more bureaucracy. Those who are responsible for the respective sanctions committees need to be accountable to the Security Council for their work; they must respect the committees' political objectives and be able to express their views concerning the lifting or modification of sanctions and the committee's goals.

    2016-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7620 (2016) · source

  24. That can sometimes prove difficult, but no panel should demonstate political prejudice towards the country to which they are assigned. The information gathered by panels of experts is noted by the national capitals of neighbouring countries, which have an interest in whether sanctions are maintained against a particular country. The panels' reports sometimes contain information that may be difficult to source or verify. Such information may be reported by civil society or non-governmental organizations and there is no way to verify it. The work of the panels of experts is very important, and along with their reports serve as the bases for the sanctions committees discussions.

    2016-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7620 (2016) · source

  25. In that regard, we believe that the chairs of the sanctions committees should at the very least be able to express their views about the functioning of the committees and how they can adjust to political situations that are often fluid, as is the case in the Horn of Africa and in Libya in North Africa. These are evolving situations and committees need to adapt on the basis of discussions held in the Security Council concerning the need to lift or reduce sanctions or to take any decision against a given country. With regard to the panels of experts, we believe that the experts are technically capable and skilled individuals, whom we thank for their work, which they frequently undertake in truly adverse circumstances. We call on the panels of experts to be truly independent in their assessments.

    2016-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7620 (2016) · source

  26. Each report prepared by chairs for the Security Council is extensively revised by the panels of experts and the representatives of various countries. When we wish to have a political discussion in the Security Council, we find ourselves seated behind the same ambassadors and experts who impose their own criteria on sanctions committees. This lack of flexibility does not allow a member country holding the chairmanship or its ambassador to be innovative or make a contribution that would assist in meeting the objectives of the sanctions committees.

    2016-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7620 (2016) · source

  27. At times, we have thought that this position was given to elected members because chairs of sanctions committees are politically innocuous. We believe that it is important for elected members to chair committees because they have no conflicts of interest. In other words, it does not make sense for a member of the permanent five to be a penholder or a committee chair when there is an obvious conflict of interest, since they have appointed themselves and have not vetoed their own membership of sanctions committees in an effort to impose sanctions on a specific country. However, we believe that committee chairs should exploit their position to share their own opinions, thoughts and recommendations.

    2016-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7620 (2016) · source

  28. That is imperative because it is not uncommon for some countries to exploit the ambiguous wording of texts drafted 10 or 15 years ago in an effort to continue punishing countries that are an inconvenience to them. With regard to chairs of sanctions committees, we maintain that they should be appointed through a transparent, balanced, inclusive and timely process in which all members of the Security Council, and not just the permanent five, take part, as is currently the case. As soon as they are appointed, they can begin the process of thoroughly preparing and standardizing working methods. With regard to committee functions, as the Ambassador of New Zealand noted, it seems that committee chairs are simply spokespersons for members, conveying information provided by the panels of experts.

    2016-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7620 (2016) · source

  29. Of the 16 sanctions committees, 62.5 per cent concern African countries. The Security Council takes an unusual interest in imposing sanctions on Africa. Nine of the committees have been in place for more than 10 years. The average life of committees that have ended in recent years was 11 years. There are at least five committees that no longer exist, which demonstrates the challenge of ending sanctions regimes once established and the prevailing injustice that often prevents sanctions from being lifted. That is why clear and comprehensible procedures and criteria for the lifting of sanctions should be communicated openly to affected States.

    2016-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7620 (2016) · source

  30. Many are established without clear steps or criteria to be met by the sanctioned countries in order for sanctions to be lifted. No one knows. A country is sanctioned but has no idea how sanctions can be lifted. Very often, the reasons for establishing a sanctions committee vanish but are then promptly replaced by a completely different set of reasons. This clearly demonstrates that very often sanctions imposed by the Security Council, under pressure from some of its permanent members, are merely a way to punish some countries and not others. That is why some sanctions regimes have been in place for such a long time with no clarity about why they have been extended. The oldest committees are those concerning Iraq, which has lasted 26 years, and Somalia and Liberia, each lasting 24 years.

    2016-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7620 (2016) · source

  31. The guarantee of due process in sanctions committees does not currently reach the minimum legal threshold established in national or international legislation. It is similar to an inquisitorial court. There is no way to determine how a person or entity may end up subject to a sanctions regime, other than through information provided by or a proposal from one of the penholders to the various committees. By way of example, more than 50 per cent of sanctions appeals in courts in the European Union have had successful outcomes. In other words, this issue must be addressed with transparency, in the absence of clear andjust procedures to determine the persons or entities subject to sanctions regimes. In addition, we must carefully study and resolve the issue of the duration of sanctions regimes.

    2016-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7620 (2016) · source

  32. We maintain that for most developing countries, one of their only sources of income is natural resources; restricting countries in the management of their own resources will therefore serve only to exacerbate the economic and humanitarian situation in the countries concerned. Another issue of concern to us is the lack of due process with regard to imposing sanctions on countries and individuals. Although we acknowledge that the Security Council has acted to address the issue of due process, in particular as related to the Al-Qaida sanctions regime, with the introduction of the post of Ombudsperson, we believe that such a post should be evaluated and extended to all committees, as we propose in our concept note (S/2016/102,annex).

    2016-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7620 (2016) · source

  33. In our View, the criteria for efficacy in sanctions committees should be clearly defined. What is it that makes a sanctions committee effective or not? It should indisputably be linked to political objectives. Sanctions cannot be imposed permanently on countries. They should have an objective that has been agreed in the highest political organ of the Organization - the Security Council. There are other issues of concern to us, such as sanctions imposed on natural resource management. We maintain that this violates the sovereignty of States and their right to manage their own resources, in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions, as mentioned yesterday, and in particular resolution 1803 (XVII) on the inalienable right of countries to manage their own resources.

    2016-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7620 (2016) · source

  34. However, sanctions regimes, in particular managed andsectoralregimes,stillhaveunintendedconsequences, including an adverse humanitarian impact on civilians, high economic costs for neighbouring countries and the criminalization of economic activities. One issue that we believe remains unresolved is that of the discretionary imposition of sanctions. What countries should be subject to sanctions and how is it decided? There are sanctions that may prevent threats to the national sovereignty of some countries and there are others that threaten global security but are not subject to sanctions because they are supported by the veto in the Security Council. Some issues require sanctions. There is much that can be done to ensure that sanctions regimes work and are more in line with the provisions of Article 48.

    2016-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7620 (2016) · source

  35. In 1994, the Security Council imposed an economic embargo on Haiti; those sanctions destroyed the country's already weak economy and its social structure. Long before the terrible earthquake of 2010, sanctions imposed by the United Nations had already severely jeopardized the future of the Haitian people for generations to come. However, those two examples have enabled the Security Council to change its approach to sanctions, shifting from comprehensive to targeted sanctions and from countries to individuals and entities, seeking to reduce the negative impact of sanctions on the populations of the affected countries.

    2016-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7620 (2016) · source

  36. We are all aware of the fact that sanctions regimes can have unintended consequences and that in certain cases they have led to greater destabilization and suffering, the very thing they supposedly had sought to alleviate. Let me give two concrete examples. During the 1990s, Iraq was subject to the most extensive sanctions regime in the history of the United Nations. Iraq depended on oil exports for its revenues and for practically all other needs of its society, and sanctions blocked all of those exports. The human cost ofthe sanctions imposed on Iraq between 1991 and 1998 involved more than 1 million people in that country. Something similar occurred in Latin America and the Caribbean.

    2016-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7620 (2016) · source

  37. We should recall that the sanctions imposed by the Security Council on the Government of South Africa played a very important role, together with the struggle waged by the people of South Africa and the wars of liberation on the continent that led to the defeat and end of the apartheid regime, which was a source of shame to humankind. We should also emphasize that while Article 41 establishes the Security Council as the guarantor of international peace and security, my country rejects as illegitimate and contrary to international law any unilateral sanctions imposed by certain countries on others to achieve political solutions or punish regimes that they deem inconvenient. The fact that the sanctions imposed by the United Nations are legal does not, of course, mean that they are perfect.

    2016-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7620 (2016) · source

  38. Our intention here is, of course, constructive, and our objective relates primarily to sanctions committees on specific countries, not committees on terrorism or other committees whose work is of a completely different nature. We are speaking of committees that involve entire countries and peoples. In this respect, the Charter of the United Nations indeed stipulates that certain actions may be taken before any military action to avert threats to international peace and security; it does not mention sanctions, as Ambassador Yoshikawa said, only a set of measures as set out in Article 41. Venezuela, as a country that respects the norms of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, therefore embraces the provisions of Article 41.

    2016-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7620 (2016) · source

  39. I have to say that only a few countries are part of the problem involving certain members of the Council bringing pressure to bear on others, and we deem it very important to hear some of the experiences of sanctions committees and the views of the countries concerned. When we speak of transparency, we believe that meetings such as this are very important. I think that this is the first time that we will all be hearing the views of the countries affected by sanctions. We deem it very important that the rest of the diplomatic community at the United Nations hear from such countries, as it will be possible for them to publicly air their views on the sanctions, and to hear the national position of each member of the Security Council on the very important issue of sanctions committees.

    2016-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7620 (2016) · source

  40. I shall now make a statement in my national capacity as representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. At the outset, I should like to express my gratitude to the Permanent Representative of Sweden, Mr. Olof Skoog, and to the Deputy Permanent Representative of Chile, my dear friend Carlos Olguin Cigarroa, for their respective briefings. I should like also to thank all members of the Council for their statements, which have made a very important contribution to the discussion on this issue. I would also note the presence here today, under rule 37, of the countries concerned by the various sanctions committees.

    2016-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7620 (2016) · source

  41. In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representatives of the Central African Republic, Chile, Cote d'Ivoire, Eritrea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Libya, the Sudan and Sweden to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2016/102, which contains the text of a letter dated 2 February 2016 from the Permanent Representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary- General. At this meeting, the Security Council will hear briefings by His Excellency Mr. Olof Skoog, Permanent Representative of Sweden, and His Excellency Mr. Carlos Olguin Cigarroa, Deputy Permanent Representative of Chile.

    2016-02-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7620 (2016) · source

  42. We believe that the Security Council - much less a sanctions committee - should have no say whatsoever in the ability of countries to enjoy their right to profit from the management of their own natural resources, which we hope will always be to the benefit of their peoples. I now resume my functions as President of the Security Council. I give the floor to the representative of the Sudan.

    2016-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7619 (2016) · source

  43. Tomorrow, when we shall hold a debate on working methods, we will express our opinions on this subject, but I wish to explain that our main observation about the document initially proposed by the penholder on this subject concerns the sovereign right of countries to manage their own natural resources. We wish to invoke and stress the validity of General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 1962, in which the United Nations recognized the sovereign right of countries to manage their natural resources. Like many other developing countries, my country is a major producer of natural resources, which are a fundamental factor in maintaining the stability of our economy.

    2016-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7619 (2016) · source

  44. We believe that the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur creates a framework that should serve as the basis for negotiations among the parties to the conflict, complemented by such initiatives as the national dialogue convened by the Government in Khartoum and the internal consultations in Darfur. We also believe that the efforts made by the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel, led by former President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and the Joint Chief Mediator, are essential to ending the conflict. With regard to the working methods of the Security Council with respect to the sanctions committees, Venezuela also has serious reservations concerning the functioning of the committees.

    2016-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7619 (2016) · source

  45. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela voted in favour of resolution 2265 (2016), renewing for one year the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan, because we are convinced of the need to preserve the unity of the Security Council in addressing this important issue, and because the Council plays a positive role in promoting a negotiated political solution to the prolonged conflict in that kindred African country, especially in the Darfur region.

    2016-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7619 (2016) · source

  46. In favour: Angola, China, Egypt, France, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Russian Federation, Senegal, Spain, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) The President (spoke in Spanish): The draft resolution received 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted as resolution 2265 (2016). I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

    2016-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7619 (2016) · source

  47. In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Sudan to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them document S/20l6/l23, which contains the text ofa draft resolution submitted by the United States of America. The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now. A vote was taken by show ofhands.

    2016-02-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7619 (2016) · source

  48. I thank Mr. Feltman for his informative briefing. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 10.20 am.

    2016-02-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7618 (2016) · source

  49. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under- Secretary-General for Political Affairs, to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of Council members to document S/2016/92, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat. I now give the floor to Mr. Feltman.

    2016-02-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7618 (2016) · source

  50. Members of the Council have before them document S/2016/52, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by France. The Council is ready to proceed to a vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now. A vote was taken by Show ofhands. In favour: Angola, China, Egypt, France, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Russian Federation, Senegal, Spain, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) The President (spoke in Spanish): The draft resolution received 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 2264 (2016). The meeting rose at 10.10 am.

    2016-02-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7617 (2016) · source