YouSaid · the spoken record

Vieira De Mello

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513
first
1999-01-21
most recent
2003-07-22
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16
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un-security-council

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  1. In the coming weeks the Commissioners will need to appoint regional commissioners and their own senior staff. Securing further donor support will also be critical to the ability of the Commission to function as intended. The sensitive task of reconciliation between East Timorese on both sides of the border is progressing through a unified reconciliation team on behalf of the second transitional Government, with the full backing of Chief Minister Mari Alkatiri, of Xanana Gusmao, and of my own office. This important process was led, until recently, by my former chief of staff, who has now been replaced by the head of our Political Unit. The justice system is still in a nascent state and needs continued close attention.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  2. In a boost to the reconciliation process, on 21 January I swore into office the seven National Commissioners of the Commission on Reception, Truth and Reconciliation. That was a major achievement - and an arduous one, coming some 18 months after the selection process began. As members know, the Commission has three main functions: to seek the truth about human rights violations in East Timor perpetrated between April 1974 and October 1999; secondly, to facilitate community reconciliation; and thirdly, to report to the Government on its work. It is not a substitute for justice, as serious crimes must continue to be dealt with by the courts. Rather, it will complement that process and avoid unduly burdening a strained court system by dealing with lesser offences through a community reconciliation process.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  3. Nonetheless, hard-line militia elements may still pose a long-term threat and, until there is substantial progress in the establishment of an operational East Timor Defence Force, the presence of an appropriate military component will be necessary. Likewise, until the national police force is fully deployed, United Nations civilian police will need to remain in East Timor to assist in training and in actual enforcement. Long-term peace and stability will depend on the degree to which we can overcome the legacy of the September 1999 violence through progress on the return of the remaining refugees, by fostering and facilitating reconciliation and by the effective prosecution of serious crimes. Those efforts should be viewed as interdependent.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  4. A joint work plan has been agreed upon, and the first joint reconnaissance survey will be undertaken next month. We are also working towards finalizing an arrangement that will permit movement of people across the border for customary and traditional purposes and for trade at markets in the vicinity of the border. I am happy to report that the security situation in East Timor remains stable. The border with Indonesia continues to be secure. There have been few sightings of militia along the Tactical Coordination Line, although unregulated markets are increasingly a problem. Crime rates in East Timor are not increasing, and the East Timor Police Service is growing into its duties admirably.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  5. The trilateral talks will likely discuss regional cooperation, including the possible establishment of a South-West Pacific forum, and regional security arrangements, economic cooperation and development matters. In addition, East Timor has also been invited to participate in a ministerial-level regional conference, co-chaired by Australia and Indonesia, on people smuggling, trafficking in persons and related transnational crime; that conference will involve ministers from up to 40 countries in the region. Key among the outstanding bilateral issues requiring resolution at the Denpasar talks is the need to normalize the land border between East Timor and West Timor. We have already taken the first steps towards delimitation of the border.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  6. Towards the end of February, Indonesia and East Timor will also be holding high-level talks at Denpasar, to be immediately followed by trilateral talks when East Timor's other immediate neighbour, Australia, joins the table. The meeting will review progress made on all bilateral issues that have been the subject of negotiations between UNTAET and the East Timorese leadership on the one hand and the Government of Indonesia on the other over the past two years, and some new issues, such as maritime delimitation, will be discussed. We also hope to Sign a number of arrangements strengthening cooperation between Indonesia and East Timor in areas such as postal services and police cooperation.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  7. East Timorese will head and staff all 13 district electoral offices, assisted by international electoral officers in logistics and other supervisory capacities. A few days ago I issued invitations for international observers to be present throughout the electoral process. On 17 April the results will be announced, and East Timor's new President will be inaugurated just after midnight on 20 May. On the international front, foundations continue to be laid for strong relations between East Timor and Indonesia. As mentioned in the Secretary-General's report, last November for the first time we hosted a meeting of the Joint Border Committee, the third time that body had met. I am sure that my colleague Jose' Ramos-Horta will give the Council more details on that process.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  8. The additional time will also allow the members of the Assembly to undertake a more effective public consultation process. Although the draft constitution is nearing completion, the transfer of power from the United Nations to the East Timorese people requires one final institutional development: the election of the President. On 14 April the people of East Timor will elect their first President in a free and fair election with universal suffrage, in a secret ballot, and on the basis of a single national constituency. This time, the Timorese will be playing a dominant role in implementing the elections. There will be five electoral commissioners, three of them East Timorese and two of them international.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  9. I briefed them on the debate that we will have here today, and on our hopes for its outcome - hopes that I shall go into in some detail in just a moment. It will not surprise the Council to hear that they raised with me their concerns over border security, the future of serious crimes prosecution, the ongoing downsizing of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and our plans for a successor mission. I also approved the Constituent Assembly's request for a further extension of its mandate until 9 March. I wholeheartedly encouraged, welcomed and accepted that suggestion. It is in East Timor's best interest that the members of the Constituent Assembly be given time to absorb the various internal and external submissions they have received from different sources.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  10. The presence here today also of Prime Minister John Howard of Australia is yet a further sign of the depth of support enjoyed by East Timor. On 20 May - independence day - East Timor's dogged and inspiring quest for self-determination will have been completed. Our happiness, however, should be and is tempered by the reality that independence does not mark the end of East Timor's struggles. Far from it. As members know, the Constituent Assembly began its work in September 2001. Today, after 20 weeks of active participation and intense debate, the Assembly has achieved a mammoth task by reviewing and approving most of the draft constitution. Just before I left for New York I was invited to an exchange of views with the Constituent Assembly.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  11. Mr. Vieira de Mello: It is an honour to report to the Council under your presidency this morning, Sir. It is a pleasure to sit before the Council and the Prime Minister, together with my friend and colleague, Jose Ramos-Horta, to provide a briefing on the situation in East Timor as its transition to independence rapidly - indeed, it is now only 110 days away - comes to pass. With the approach of independence comes the end of a quite remarkable chapter in the history of the United Nations, one marked by an extraordinary collaborative effort. That effort reflected is here, and for this I must thank the Permanent Representative of Mauritius and yourself, Mr. Minister, for the Council's decision to devote so much attention today to the situation in East Timor.

    2002-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4462 (2002) · source

  12. It will contain, as several speakers wished, an elaboration of the post- independence United Nations structure, as well as of the precise needs of the independent Government of East Timor, which could only be presented in a fairly preliminary fashion at this stage in the report before the Council. Finally, may I thank the people and the Government of Ireland, yourself, Mr. Minister, and Permanent Representative Ryan and his colleagues, for your solidarity with the cause of East Timor and the role of the United Nations in that territory. Allow me, Minister Cowen, to express my particular thanks to you for crossing the Atlantic to preside over this meeting, and to attempt to do so in Gaelic, with apologies for my deficient pronunciation: a Aire Gno'thaz' Eachtracha.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403Resumption1 (2001) · source

  13. I also note with satisfaction that no specific questions or particular concerns were expressed to us in the course of this debate, which is indeed very encouraging. We are extremely pleased that the Council is prepared to welcome the date of 20 May 2002 for the independence of East Timor. That will certainly further focus our minds and lead us to redouble our efforts in all the areas that were discussed here today in the run- up to independence. The Secretary-General will of course submit to the Council a sixth-monthly report in January next year, prior to the expiration of UNTAET's current mandate on 31 January.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403Resumption1 (2001) · source

  14. Your endorsement - hopefully through a presidential statement - of the need for the United Nations to remain fully committed through a predictable and dependable source of funding for the post- independence requirements of East Timor - which perhaps more than any other country will be the child of the United Nations and of this Council - will send a powerful, reassuring message to the people and to the Second Transitional Government, which has a huge challenge before it in the months ahead, as well as to the Constituent Assembly of East Timor. We have taken note, with great care, of your advice and comments, which we shall keep very much in mind in the weeks and months to come.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403Resumption1 (2001) · source

  15. Mr. Vieira de Mello: Let me thank you, Mr. President, and all today's speakers, for the kind words addressed to my East Timorese colleagues, to the staff of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and to myself. May I also express our gratitude - the gratitude of Timorese and internationals alike - for the strong support expressed by all the members and non- members who took the floor today for the set of recommendations contained in the Secretary-General's report, particularly with regard to the post-UNTAET/ post-independence phase, with a view to consolidating the achievements of the Transitional Administration.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403Resumption1 (2001) · source

  16. We need to ensure that our combined and truly inspiring investment in East Timor to date is fully realized as a fitting and deserved reward for both the East Timorese - for the courage and determination they have shown over the years - and for our Organization, the United Nations, for the commitment it has shown to this most noble task.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  17. Minister, it is a premature verdict, and certainly not one for me to make, save that we stand a much greater chance of ensuring that this is the case if - paraphrasing a recent Council debate - we allow UNTAET to exit with a strategy. That strategy is, I would strongly suggest, what has been presented to you by the Secretary- General. In other words, while the current phase on which we are embarked may be nearing completion with the approach of independence, the job we have all set out to do is not yet done.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  18. I appreciate that elements of the successor mission are unprecedented, but this is natural, given the fact that so much of UNTAET's mandate was unprecedented. In conclusion, we are well advanced in the planning for the successor mission. We will continue to keep you closely informed of our progress in finalizing and adding detail to these plans, a process that I am confident will gather steam in the coming weeks as the Second Transitional Government - which, you will recall, is only just over one month old - fully establishes itself. It is said in some quarters that UNTAET stands on the verge of being a United Nations success. While it is flattering to hear this, Mr. President, Mr.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  19. I can assure the Council that the Timorese do not want a needlessly protracted dependence on international support. Equally, I can confidently say that UNTAET, the East Timorese leadership, the civil service, United Nations agencies, the World Bank and others are all unanimously convinced of the serious risks accompanying a precipitous withdrawal of critical international support. I therefore believe that it is a fair and - in relative terms - modest proposal that is made by the Secretary-General. A civilian support group of 100 or so experts out of the up to 300 that I mentioned earlier is all that has been requested to ensure a minimum degree of expertise in the critical areas I have just enumerated. The civilian support group would have within its mission plan the task to also train and hand over to Timorese staff as soon as possible.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  20. A series of studies - the latest being the UNDP human resources assessment report just released - have made it clear that government stability will depend upon international expertise in the following areas: finance, legal and justice systems, essential infrastructural services and basic regulatory, administrative and central logistical and procurement systems. They are akin to the vital functions upon which the corpus of government depends. Any resulting failure of the public administration would, I believe, be the failure of the United Nations. These may be strong words, but it could not have been expected that a self-sustaining government could be established from the ground up in just two years. Let us therefore finish the job.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  21. We are currently working with the Second Transitional Government to identify its human resource needs across all ministries, with the assistance of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). While the comprehensive results are not yet available, it is clear that up to 300 positions in total would be needed, with the majority in areas related to human development and poverty reduction, which will be funded through voluntary - either multilateral or bilateral - sources. However, some areas of the administration are critical to the viability and political stability of the Government as a whole, and we must ensure that they are supported for a specific period of time through the assessed budget. As the Council knows, we have been studying this question since last March.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  22. It does indeed bear repeating that UNTAET's mandate to establish a national civil administration, assist in the development of civil social services and support capacity-building was both unprecedented in scope and began following the near total destruction of East Timor. The two years since have seen much progress. However, the limited human resource base available and the fact that provincial East Timor under Indonesian rule lacked the institutions of a full-fledged State meant that it was impossible to create self- sufficient government structures in just two years. In my last briefing to the Council, I mentioned that we could not simply walk away from the nascent government administration and put at risk the investment that, the Member States have made so far.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  23. New territory in jurisprudence is being explored with the first ever indictment for the crime of extermination being issued for crimes committed in the enclave of Oecussi. In other words, real progress can be made. The first indictments were issued much faster and at significantly less cost than was the case in either The Hague or Arusha. We should ensure that the process can be further cemented, and thus we have proposed this restructuring for a continued, assured presence in dealing with serious crimes, but at a reduced level and for a time-limited period. Let me now turn to the proposed civilian support group.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  24. Likewise, these concerns were reflected in the exhortation to deal effectively with this matter contained in Security Council resolution 1338 (2001). We have taken these concerns seriously. Consequently, we are seeking to restructure our approach, bringing our handling of serious crimes more directly within the purview of my office. We are doing this not simply to ensure that this area is dealt with as effectively and efficiently as possible, but also to reflect the distinctive international nature of the responsibility to deal with this matter. To be sure, progress in this area has been made. As the Secretary-General's report indicates, 32 indictments have been issued, charging 62 individuals with crimes against humanity.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  25. Finally, and most importantly, I wish to address the matter of what we - the East Timorese and the United Nations - hope will be the civilian elements of the successor mission. It will include the standard offices, such as political affairs and human rights that support the Special Representative of the Secretary- General in traditional operations and mission administration elements. Let me, however, focus specifically on an area that may require more explanation than other components: our proposed structure for dealing with serious crimes committed in the course of the violence of 1999. The report of the Security Council Mission to East Timor and Indonesia, of November 2000, rightly pointed out the significant difficulties we were facing in dealing with serious crimes.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  26. The Commission will facilitate healing by allowing human rights victims, perpetrators and witnesses to give their personal accounts, which will be compiled into a report. The other main goal will be to offer perpetrators of less serious crimes the opportunity to enter into community-based plea-bargaining mechanisms, rather than the formal justice system. These procedures will not, obviously, apply to murder, rape and other serious crimes, which will remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court system. The Commission will have a mandate of two years. It will cover the whole period from 25 April 1974 to 25 October 1999, and will be totally funded through voluntary contributions.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  27. In order to reinforce current peace and stability, it is essential that both the demands for justice and the need for reconciliation are addressed in a mutually supportive manner. Together with Timorese partners, we continue to work on a variety of programmes focused on reconciliation, and early interventions designed to prevent past differences developing into communal violence. To date, violence flowing from the 1999 abuses has been remarkably minimal, although challenges may increase with the return of a more difficult refugee caseload in the coming months. After broad consultations, a regulation establishing the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation was promulgated in July, and it is expected that the selection of regional and national Commissioners will be finalized by the first week in December.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  28. October saw the highest monthly return - 3,233 refugees - since March 2000, bringing to 188,646 the total number of returns since September 1999. A number of factors perhaps contributed to this welcome development, among them the peaceful holding of the elections, greater cooperation with the Indonesian authorities and the reconciliation process being driven by the East Timor leadership, with our full support, in particular through the sustained involvement of my own Chief of Staff. We anticipate further returns before the full onset of the rains and the Christmas period, and must continue in our efforts to find a quick solution to the far too prolonged misery of the many thousands of refugees who continue to live in fear and poverty in West Timor.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  29. There are still far too many outstanding issues affecting both sides of the border that require resolution. These include, to name but a few, cooperation in the investigation and bringing to justice perpetrators of serious crimes in East Timor; cross-border issues, including the formal demarcation of the border; bringing closure to the question of pensions for former Indonesian civil servants, on which significant progress has been achieved; and ensuring adequate land access between contiguous East Timor and the enclave of Oecussi. We need to use the coming 200 days to push for answers to as many of these as possible prior to independence. Progress has also been made in encouraging refugee returns and working to isolate the unrepentant, permanently embittered militia hardcore.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  30. While the new Attorney-General has responded favourably to our proposal for monthly working-level meetings, with a view to moving forward the many outstanding and complicated cases of serious crimes involving both Indonesia and East Timor - including by judicial cooperation and the support we will continue to extend to the new ad hoc human rights tribunal that President Megawati has decided to establish, with a view to taking to court the first group of suspects identified last year by the then Attorney-General - much still needs to be achieved in this area. The events that I have described are positive developments that I warmly welcome. However, if we are to prove the cynics wrong, let us be clear that real progress can only come with concrete action.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  31. This should be cemented in the coming weeks and months with a series of meetings on a broad range of issues of mutual interest. We are also working towards holding a further high-level discussion next January, at which it is our hope to clear the books of a number of these issues. Nearly two weeks ago, in follow-up to the meeting with the Indonesian President, my Deputy visited Jakarta for discussions focusing exclusively on justice issues.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  32. While a competent military force is one means of providing a degree of security, more effective still is the realization of sensible bilateral relations based on mutual respect and an identification of common interests. This is what the East Timorese leadership, with the assistance of UNTAET, has been seeking with Indonesia. On 12 September Mari Alkatiri, Jose Ramos-Horta, Xanana Gusmao and I met with the new President of Indonesia, Ms. Megawati Soekarnoputri, as well as with her Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs and her Foreign Minister. The meeting set the tone for what I hope will be a reinvigorated and increasingly harmonious period in the development of relations between the two neighbours.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  33. The first East Timor Defence Force battalion will be deployed to the eastern sector of East Timor early next year once the area has been vacated by United Nations peacekeepers, and will be ready for operational tasking in June. Under the current schedule, the second battalion will not be operational until late 2003, while the whole force will not be free-standing until mid- 2004. Donors thus may wish to consider accelerating their capital funding of this exercise to allow for a quicker final withdrawal of international military forces from East Timor. I am acutely aware that military costs present the most sizeable portion of the expenses of any United Nations mission.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  34. The first battalion has been formally raised, following the completion of its basic training, and is on its way to operational tasking. In a significant, though little noted, development, I ordered that a small contingent of East Timorese soldiers be on active duty throughout the country through the final weeks of election campaigning and for the day of the elections. Though the men were small in number, the impact of the sight of them provided a significant reassurance to the people of East Timor. They were a source of pride on that day, as well as of optimism that East Timor would have at its disposal a small but effective apolitical armed force.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  35. By independence we also propose that the United Nations military component should number some 5,000 personnel, a reduction of roughly 44 per cent from the current authorized strength. Their purpose will be to continue to ensure effective border security pending the full establishment and training of the East Timor Defence Force and while there continues to be growing illegal trading and other forms of criminality on the border and grounds for believing that residue armed militia in West Timor retain the determination to cross into East Timor and inflict harm - despite, as I mentioned earlier, a welcome increase in Indonesian enforcement action. The East Timor Defence Force has now been moved to its new training centre, which has been fully functional since last June.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  36. Secondly, as indicated in the report, it is possible that the current target of a 3,000-strong East Timor Police Service is overly generous. If this is the case, and if it is decided through consultation with the Council of Ministers to reduce the overall ultimate size of the East Timor Police Service, it would obviously have beneficial consequences in terms of cost and speed of full deployment. Until the East Timorese can assume full responsibility for the maintenance of their internal security through a non-corrupt and effective police force, it will be very difficult for the international community to abdicate its responsibilities in this area. However time consuming and expensive our obligation in this regard, it would be the most false of economies to prematurely call the job done.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  37. We are planning a reduction in the authorized strength of the civilian police component of some 25 per cent - that is, 400 police officers - between now and independence, for a total of 1,240 on that day. These will then be reduced in a phased manner as the East Timor Police Service acquires ever more operational capacity. I shall confine my comments on the policing of independent East Timor to just two. First - and this is another of my hobby horses - we need to get absolutely right our approach to the deployment of international police officers so as to ensure that this most important of institutions is built on solid foundations. It is vital to the success of this element of the mission that we deploy only those officers who have the most appropriate qualifications.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  38. As far as national crime rates are concerned, they would, I suspect, be the envy of many Governments. On independence, maintaining internal security will continue to be the primary responsibility of international civilian police, though with the increasing involvement of the national Police Service that we are creating. More so than was the case with the Defence Force, the East Timorese police were at the forefront of ensuring security on polling day. They performed their potentially difficult duties in an outstanding manner, and their high visibility, good nature and professionalism - qualities not always found in more mature forces - lent lustre to an already brilliant day.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  39. I have noted before that one of the primary lessons for the United Nations to learn from a mission such as UNTAET is that we need to be able to select and recruit, more effectively and rapidly than is currently the case, individuals not only with the requisite skills for the jobs at hand, but also with the ability to transfer those skills to local capacity. As proposed, the successor mission to UNTAET would focus on the security of the new nation. In the most basic sense of the word, security continues to provide little cause for concern. Border infiltrations have not occurred during this year's dry season - which, incidentally, is coming to an end - as a result of our robust response to last year's significant and murderous threat, while the Indonesian armed forces now provide more resolute action against hardcore militia in West Timor.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  40. Three factors are critical in the management of this process. First, we need to avoid an unduly precipitous reduction in the calibre of delivery of Government services. Secondly, a minimum degree of continued support is required to ensure that the new Government does not falter. I will come to this in more detail later. Finally, we need a clear indication from the Council as to its concurrence on the nature of the successor mission that we are proposing. Obtaining that will allow us to commence, in good time, the selection of personnel to help perform key functions. This will clearly be critical.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  41. Our aim, in the time remaining before independence, is to minimize this negative impact and at the same time seek to ensure that those aspects of administration that are critical to the viability of the Government and stability of the new State are sufficiently ensured after the UNTAET mandate comes to an end, while also making certain that we are well placed to continue the critical tasks of assisting the East Timorese gradually to take over all line functions. A key component of our work in the time remaining is managing an organized, rational drawdown of UNTAET personnel in positions of public administration, in line with the figures presented in July by the Secretary-General in his last report to the Council. The 35 per cent target set for this October has been achieved, and that of 75 per cent will be attained by independence.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  42. Crafting a budget of some $65 million in a country with as many competing demands as East Timor has forced on us the cruellest of decisions. These will become ever more apparent as the process of drawing down the number of international personnel in the East Timor Public Administration - a process that is already under way - begins to bite. This should not be surprising when we face an imminent situation in which the support provided by the current mission, with its budget roughly 10 times that of East Timor's national budget, will simply not be sustained after independence. Adjustments will be inevitable.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  43. In other words, should the Council agree to this date, East Timor's long quest will be attained exactly 200 days from now. How these 200 days are used, both in preparing for that momentous occasion and also in preparing for what takes place afterwards, will have the most marked impact on how we remember the previous 24 months since the Council created UNTAET. I mentioned a moment ago that with the devolution of power onto East Timorese institutions came the inevitable increase in responsibility as well. One of the more onerous aspects of this will be fitting the activities of the new Government within its limited means. As the Council knows, this has been a complicated and, yes, a frustrating and unpleasant task.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  44. This is in line with our stated goal of using the period from the election to independence to have a trial run, so to speak, in which effective responsibility lies with a national Government that will hopefully maintain its composition after independence, but with UNTAET continuing to provide the closest possible support, guidance and partnership. The Secretary-General, in the letter he addressed to the President yesterday, informed the Council that, on 19 October, the Constituent Assembly voted overwhelmingly to recommend to the Secretary- General 20 May 2002 as the date of independence for East Timor. This date, if approved by the Council, would see the end of the transitional administration and the transfer of executive, legislative and judicial authority to the constitutionally mandated institutions of East Timor.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  45. The creation of a democratically elected Constituent Assembly and the formation of an executive branch that, by and large, reflects the vote is an event of enormous significance for East Timor. Never before has East Timor been afforded this most basic of rights: the ability of its people to select for themselves who should govern them. This marks the most decisive move yet forward towards full independence. At this stage, UNTAET is, quite clearly, a mission in support of the Government. Within the parameters laid out in resolutions 1272 (1999) and 1338 (2001), and the powers assigned therein to UNTAET, all administrative decisions are now taken by the East Timorese themselves.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  46. Fernando de Araujo, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and leader of the Partido Democratico, which came in second in the ballot. Contrary to the views of the many naysayers, the election campaign and polling day, as well as the days leading up to the announcement of the results, proceeded as we knew they would: in a remarkably peaceful and dignified fashion. It was a process widely praised by outside observers, including by this Council. As the Council knows, on 15 September the 88- member Constituent Assembly was sworn in, while on 20 September the new all-East Timorese Cabinet, now called the Council of Ministers, was formally established.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  47. Thank you, Minister, for honouring East Timor and UNTAET through your presence here today. Finally, I would like to introduce several of my close partners who have been integral in bringing us to where we are today. Sitting beside me is Mr. Mari Alkatiri, who, as members know, is Chief Minister of the Council of Ministers of the Second Transitional Government of East Timor. He is also the Secretary- General of FRETILIN, which won the largest number of votes in the election of 30 August. Mr. Alkatiri is a busy man; his other portfolios include Economy and Development, as well as Timor Sea petroleum issues, in addition to his responsibilities as a member of the Constituent Assembly. Also with us is Ms. Fernanda Borges, the new Minister for Finance and an independent member of Government, as well as Mr.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  48. In particular, I intend to devote some time to the outline of our plans for a successor mission to UNTAET, which we consider necessary to ensure that East Timor's full independence is more of a political reality and not, in effect, a merely ceremonial event. Needless to say, it is our hope that the Council will agree with us that what we put forward today and what members have read in the Secretary-General's report do indeed constitute the best possible approach: modest, focused, practical and, above all, necessary. Before I begin my briefing proper, allow me to say how truly pleased we are that today's meeting is being presided over by such a distinguished President, Foreign Minister Cowen of the Republic of Ireland, a nation whose people and Government have been particularly stalwart friends of East Timor over the years.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  49. Mr. Vieira de Mello: Though it is only three months since I last had the opportunity of briefing the Council, I do so now against the backdrop of a radically different situation in East Timor. These past weeks have witnessed the most exciting qualitative leap forward in the process that the Council tasked the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) - exactly two years ago - with performing: devolving authority onto what will ultimately be the fully independent State of East Timor. My briefing today will not repeat the contents of the Secretary-General's report but, rather, provide some more intimate commentary to the recommendations made therein.

    2001-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4403 (2001) · source

  50. That is the most reassuring development in recent months in East Timor. The East Timorese may not know precisely what democracy is, but they certainly know what democracy is not. They reject violence in any form. They have been calling on leaders of political parties to abide strictly and scrupulously by the pact of national unity. I think political leaders have heard that call and will heed it. Let me once again thank you very sincerely, Mr. President, for giving this opportunity to Mr. Ramos-Horta and me to brief the Council and thank you again for your very strong support.

    2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351Resumption1 (2001) · source