YouSaid · the spoken record

Vieira De Mello

lines on the record: 513
first: 1999-01-21
most recent: 2003-07-22
sittings or episodes: 16
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Talks have taken place in Adelaide, Canberra, Dili and, just last weekend, Darwin. The Australian Government has evinced understanding. They are open-minded and flexible, for which I am grateful to them. I am therefore optimistic about the conclusion of these negotiations before independence day. I thank you, Sir, and all the other members of the Council for this opportunity to address the Council and for your support.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“We are trying to use other means, such as video, town hall meetings - I myself participate in those- and I have recently written to the two bishops of East Timor requesting the help of the Church infrastructure in disseminating information on our activities. (spoke in French) Finally, Mr. President, let me reply to your question about progress with respect to the exploitation of natural resources, especially oil and natural gas. Timorese leaders told us a few months ago that they would like the terms of the agreement on the exploitation of these resources in the deep waters between Timor and Australia, in the cooperation zone defined by the pre-existing treaty between Indonesia and Australia, to be renegotiated by UNTAET - with Timorese participation to be sure- during the transitional phase.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“He is absolutely right: that is one of our greatest weaknesses, which explains some of the frustration expressed by the Timorese population. The problem is that we have no television; the coverage of our own UNTAET radio is very limited. It will take time to repair repeaters, antennas and the generators for those antennas. It will take time to procure radio sets and distribute them to the Timorese population. We are very conscious of this, and we are enthusiastically proceeding with the reconstruction of the telecommunications infrastructure in East Timor, not least for that reason. We also have a fortnightly magazine, which is broadly distributed but which is grossly insufficient as well.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“We have some $4 million from a small-scale World Bank project; yet requests received as of just before I left amounted to more than $30 million. This is very encouraging; it means that there is a great deal of initiative and much interest on the part of Timorese enterprises in setting themselves up. But clearly, the $4 million at hand is not enough. Our plan is to encourage local enterprises that will be working with us to implement major reconstruction plans financed by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and to set up joint ventures involving Timorese in order to create Timorese capacity in the private sector. (spoke in English) I shall conclude by addressing two further questions. The first is from Ambassador Satoh of Japan, on mass information.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“And in order for that to happen, we also need to resolve the question of land and property, which is another of our many nightmares, given the fact that there are no records left in East Timor: East Timor has no memory; there are no archives; there is nothing left. And as can be imagined, we receive many competing claims regarding property. Unless these can be resolved, probably by an independent tribunal, in the near future, very few investors will be prepared to come and risk their money in East Timor. We are very conscious of that. (spoke in French) The President asked where we stood with regard to loans to small and medium-sized enterprises and whether we had sufficient funds. No, they are not sufficient.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“But obviously, we should not look to the public sector to solve the problems of unemployment. Bilateral programmes funded by countries represented in this Chamber, for which I am most thankful, have helped us bridge the gap between the Tokyo conference, the appraisal of reconstruction programmes, and the impending implementation of large-scale reconstruction programmes. But it is these reconstruction programmes in the fields of health, education, infrastructure and agriculture that will provide employment opportunities in sufficient numbers in the months to come. The private sector, though, in the longer term- and you alluded to this, Mr. President- will be the employment-generation sector. Therefore, the promotion of investment in East Timor, from both foreign and smaller local sources, is essential.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“As I said, we would prefer that the most extreme elements among the pro-integration forces - particularly those who were previously members of the militia- be relocated at a safe distance from our border, and preferably away from West Timor, or the province of Nusa Tenggara Timur as it is known in Bahasa Indonesia. Moving now to the last few questions, the representative of Jamaica, supported by Brazil, asked me what measures were being taken to tackle my "nightmare", which is unemployment in East Timor. In addition to, obviously, recruitment of East Timorese by international organizations, be they intergovernmental or non-governmental, recruitment into the new civil service of East Timor - that is, approximately 10,000 new civil servants in the coming fiscal year- should provide employment.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“Our sense is that at least half, if not two thirds, of the refugee population in West Timor would be prepared to return if given the possibility of choosing freely and if a number of conditions were met, some of which I outlined and others of which were alluded to by the representative of Indonesia in his presentation. I will not list those, but this is our rough estimate. The representative of Malaysia asked me whether there had been progress on the proposed relocation of integrationists and their families away from the border. The answer is no; we have not yet had confirmation that this is happening. Incidentally, 20 kilometres away from the border may be an insufficient distance.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“I have also taken note of Ambassador Greenstock's comments, which I will share with my colleagues here in the Secretariat, regarding measurable achievements, as well as a greater level of autonomy for UNTAET in the performance of its governance functions. I move now to the question of refugees. The representative of Namibia asked me if we had estimates of how many out of the roughly 120,000 would be prepared to go back and how many would prefer to remain in Indonesia. The long-awaited census of the refugee population in West Timor has not been completed yet. It has been suspended, in fact, as a result of the incidents in the camps around Kupang. Therefore, the total figure of 120,000 is only an estimate.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“The second reason was that we did not, until three weeks ago, have a consolidated budget for East Timor. So it was extremely difficult for us to decide on priorities. We were bombarded, as can be imagined, with requests from different central and district transitional administration services, all of them justified. But it was impossible to prioritize in the absence of a consolidated budget, which we now have and which, as members know, was approved last week in Lisbon. We can now, therefore, begin implementing the budget for East Timor for the fiscal year 2000- 2001, and I can assure members that the rate of disbursements will increase rapidly.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“I indicated in Lisbon last week that we had two main reasons for this pattern of slow disbursement in the first semester of the year 2000. First of all, we did not have a government procurement capacity in Dili. This is one of the lessons we can learn from UNTAET, and I believe also from the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, namely, that when governance-building and nation-building, efforts are deployed by the Security Council, a capacity in different areas for which we do not necessarily have resources in the United Nations system, and in particular procurement for the Government as distinct from the peacekeeping mission as such, should be deployed in the very early stages of the operation. We now have such a capacity with the help of the United Nations Office for Project Services.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“The plan exists, but, as members may be aware, the Falintil commanders do not wish to treat this problem piecemeal and are therefore awaiting a decision on the future security force before they agree to the retirement or demobilization of some of the Falintil subgroups. Finally, Ambassador van Walsum asked me if we had the results of the investigation into the latest grenade attack against the Australian contingent of the peacekeeping force. No, the answer is that I do not have it yet. I know that those who were arrested were being interrogated, and this information could be made available to the Council as soon as it is made available tO me. Moving now to other questions put to me by Ambassador Greenstock, the question of the slow rate of disbursement is one that has preoccupied us, as I said in my presentation.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“As far as the new security force is concerned, as I indicated, we are awaiting the outcome of the Kings College study that will make recommendations and, I hope, will propose different options regarding the configuration, the size and the doctrine of a possible future East Timorese defence force. I have taken note of what Ambassador van Walsum said about the role of Falintil in the creation of this new security force, a role that we recognize. What we need to do after decisions have been made on this future security force is to determine which of the Falintil members can be or should be retrained to form part of that force and which should be demobilized and retrained to occupy their place in East Timor civil society.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“(spoke in English) Regarding a number of questions that were put to me by Ambassador Greenstock and by Ambassador van Walsum, which are related to security, yes, we have been attempting to pay attention to the humanitarian needs of the Falantil, especially of those who are cantoned in Aileu, despite the problems that humanitarian agencies have, as is known, in assisting uniformed and armed personnel. We are trying to find an imaginative solution, and we have noted the interest of some Governments, in particular of Portugal, of providing direct bilateral assistance to them.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“It also seems very important to identify, which should not be very difficult, and transfer from the camps the extremist elements that regularly carry out acts of violence and intimidation directed at the refugees or at the personnel of humanitarian agencies. Finally, it is clear that the acceleration of repatriation- or of reintegration for those refugees wishing to remain in Indonesia- would greatly facilitate things. When I gave my statement, I stated that we intend to take a number of measures with Xanana Gusmao and with Indonesian authorities to overcome obstacles in the current situation.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“We were given the figure of 600 weapons, and were informed that the pro-integrationist militias could no longer be trained at these camps. Of course, we welcome these measures, and they have been confirmed through other sources. Regarding the additional measures that could be taken, I will repeat what some representatives have stated here, which has also been noted on other occasions - that the Timorese elements in the Indonesian armed forces and in the Indonesian police need to be transferred. I know that this process has begun. They need to transferred from the refugee camps and even from the western portion of the island to other Indonesian islands.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“That assembly, once elected, will be able to consider the text of a draft Constitution, to debate it and to adopt it. So that makes me think that independence would not immediately follow the elections. Another question, which I believe was put to me by the Ambassador of the Netherlands, concerns the measures taken or to be taken in order to improve the security situation in the refugee camps and along the border. In my presentation, I said that our cooperation with the Indonesian armed forces has been improving, notwithstanding recent incidents. We were informed by General Kiki Syahrakri, who commands the military district that covers the western portion of the island, that a large number of weapons were confiscated in the refugee camps.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“This is a need that concerns me greatly, and it is possible that the figures I have just given the Council are not definitive. I have taken note of the statements made by the Permanent Representatives of the Netherlands and Canada. I shall convey to the Secretary-General their requests that the Council be given a detailed briefing by our military colleagues before any final decision is taken on the reduction of the military force. I turn now to other issues in the political domain. The Ambassador of the Netherlands asked me if independence will immediately follow the elections. I can only speculate now, but as we see things - and when I say "we", I mean the Timorese leaders, we in UNTAET and I think my colleagues here in New York also - the elections that will take place next year will be elections for a constituent assembly.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“It is only a provisional plan. As I said in my presentation, we shall be reviewing the situation at regular intervals. We are aware of what the Security Council resolution asks us to do, namely, to bring the security situation under control so as to permit a reduction of United Nations military forces in East Timor. Apart from questions of security in the field, we also need to be sure of the capacity of our civilian police to take over the functions of maintaining public order that are now provided in East Timor by military personnel. I would also point out that we have identified some additional needs, particularly in the areas of engineering capacity for road repairs - as I mentioned in my presentation- and patrolling Timorese territorial waters.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“Let me begin with the question concerning reducing the size of the military force of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). I am thinking in particular of the statements made by the representatives of the United States, the Netherlands and Canada, as well as that made by the President. The representative of the United States asked me whether we had a plan, and when the reduction would begin. Yes, we do have a plan, which we presented to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and which we will of course submit to the Secretary-General. Although I would like to emphasize that it has not yet been endorsed, that plan provides for a reduction of 487 troops between now and October, 1,050 between now and February, and 1,405 between now and April. This includes both men and women.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“I would like to express my gratitude for your support, Mr. President, and for the support expressed by all speakers for the efforts we are making in Timor. This is a great source of encouragement to us all. First of all, allow me to express my satisfaction and that of my associates at the unanimous endorsement of the initiatives we have undertaken in recent weeks to expand and deepen the participation of Timorese leaders in the Transitional Administration in East Timor until the time of independence. As the President has suggested, I will now confine my remarks to answering the questions put to me. I have taken very careful notes of all the comments, suggestions, recommendations and advice that has been offered to us in the course of this debate. I can assure the Council that we will take them fully into account.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“Above all, however, they would see up close the enthusiasm of the East Timorese for determining their own future, and they would see how the United Nations is helping them to realize that goal: not perfectly, perhaps - far from it- but in a committed and pragmatic manner.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“This will afford the East Timorese the opportunity to benefit from a period of co-government with UNTAET, just as the civil service is currently benefiting from working side by side with international personnel. It will render the transition to independence less sudden and help the concept of governmental responsibility assert itself in East Timor. In conclusion, may I invite all Council members to visit us in East Timor and see for themselves the unique nature of the task with which the Council has entrusted us. We would be able to benefit from their experience and advice, and they would have the opportunity to appreciate the complexity of our work. I can assure the Council that such a visit would be extraordinarily stimulating for us. Members would see both that which is uplifting and that which is truly depressing.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“There will be 33 members: one from each of the districts, seven from parties within the CNRT, three from other political parties, and one each representing youth and students, local non-governmental organizations, the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church, the Muslim community, the professions, farmers, labour and business. Nothing in this proposal will alter the fundamental tenet of resolution 1272 (1999), namely, that UNTAET is endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor. Indeed, this proposal will further advance one of the priority tasks set by resolution 1272 (1999): to support capacity- building for self-government. The structure has been agreed upon - an organigram has been distributed to you, Mr. President - and it is our hope to implement it as from next month, July.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“Consequently, internal administration, infrastructure, economic affairs and social affairs would be managed by East Timorese appointees, taking into account the dominant role of the CNRT, whereas finance, justice and security and political, constitutional and electoral affairs would remain with UNTAET. Furthermore, a new national legislative council will be constituted to replace the old quasi-cabinet/legislative hybrid National Consultative Council. It will be expanded to render it more representative and will comprise only East Timorese.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“The political model would continue the "Timorization" of the civil service but would also share governmental responsibility with the East Timorese. In short, I proposed a coalition Government of sorts, in which several portfolios would be held by East Timorese political figures who would also, for the first time ever, enjoy political responsibility for their decisions. I also pointed out that this would be a mixed blessing, in that the East Timorese leadership would, from then on, have to join UNTAET in a kind of coalition "punching bag" in sharing the blows delivered by our critics for the decisions we take. The CNRT leadership accepted this concept - in fact, it welcomed it enthusiastically - with the portfolios to be shared equally between UNTAET and the East Timorese.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“In short, it has been our thinking in recent weeks- and the subject of widespread discussion- that the East Timorese should not only staff the Administration and Government but also take political responsibility for it. At the end of May, in a former military barracks outside Dili, a week-long conference was held on the reconstruction and development of East Timor. At that gathering, I presented two options as to how UNTAET could proceed: the technocratic and the political. The first was basically a continuation of the current strategy, namely, to steadily "Timorize" the Administration at all levels so that a fully national civil service would be in place at the point of independence when an elected East Timorese Government assumed power.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“Prior to that, the political coalition known as the National Resistance Council of East Timor (CNRT) is likely to recommend the establishment, following its congress in August this year, of a broad-based constitutional commission which will, together with UNTAET, engage in a wide consultative process with the East Timorese on the drafting of a Constitution. Increasingly, we and the East Timorese have come to the realization that the transition will require much more than UNTAET's simply assisting in designing institutions and in recruiting and training administrators. Capacity-building should not be restricted to the technical level but, rather, should also embrace the level of political leadership.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“Following discussions with Xanana Gusmao and other East Timorese political leaders, I feel safe in predicting, as announced at the Lisbon conference last week, that elections- and, possibly, independence - will take place next year, at some point between 30 August and December 2001. The final decision will no doubt largely depend on how fast progress is being made in attaining the key benchmarks to which I have just briefly alluded and which the Secretary-General requested us to develop when he visited Dili last February. The elections will, in all likelihood, be for a constituent assembly.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“Let me conclude by referring to the political transition. An effective political transition has two components. The first is a constitutional process culminating in democratic elections. The second is the development of a culture in which the political leadership makes transparent decisions for which it is willing to take responsibility. The ground rules for both the constitutional process and the elections are simple: the final say in both cases will lie with the East Timorese; human rights must be adequately protected; and the system adopted must be democratic.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“The Civil Service Academy has commenced language training and will soon increase the range of courses on offer, and the United Nations Development Programme presented to donors in Lisbon an ambitious programme, which we fully endorse, to provide training for management positions in the new administration. Finally, it is worth highlighting the considerable amount of on-the-job training that exists within the mission. UNTAET staff work side by side with East Timorese civil servants in all fields, from human resources management personnel to water workers, and from health specialists to payroll officers, with East Timorese representation in the Administration scheduled to increase dramatically through an active recruitment drive that will begin in the next couple of weeks. Training is bearing fruit as independence approaches.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“First, general training requires a functioning educational system, which, while still in its infancy, is rapidly being rebuilt. We hope to resume the normal school calendar from this coming October. Furthermore, bilateral funding is being sought for a human resources development centre which would offer training in a range of skills. UNTAET has also placed considerable emphasis on the training of civil servants. This is a particularly steep challenge as, hitherto, virtually all management positions in the administration had been held by Indonesian officials.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“The Lisbon donor conference, held last week, came as a major fillip to us all, particularly through the clear vote of confidence we received for the East Timor consolidated budget. Once again, I thank all those who attended for recommitting themselves to supporting the ongoing needs of East Timor. Under this budget, quarterly performance information will be provided to the donors. Further, we are moving towards establishing a committee-based process - with full East Timorese participation - which will plan, prioritize and approve development proposals from all sources. Let me now turn to the establishment of an East Timorese administration. In virtually all areas the sheer lack of qualified human resources is acute. To address this problem, capacity-building in East Timor has focused on two areas.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“The people, already traumatized by the violence of last September, of which they bore the brunt, must now also face the reality that even their temporary homes and remaining few possessions have been destroyed, washed away by the floodwaters. We must accelerate our rate of reconstruction, and I will continue to depend on the generosity of the international community in this area while at the same time seeking to develop East Timorese capacity to address the problem. Much of the problem, though, has not been due to a lack of generosity on the part of the donors but rather to a relatively slow rate of disbursement into the World Bank Trust Fund and indeed on our part. I believe that this problem is now being rectified.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“Jean Cady, met with all of the components of UNTAET yesterday and will be meeting soon with East Timor political and church leaders to ensure that the message of tolerance frequently expressed in public statements becomes more than a rhetorical refrain. The area of reconstruction is the most exasperating one for us all. The process has begun, but I am as frustrated as the East Timorese are over its slow pace. More, much more, remains to be done in the raw task of physical reconstruction. I visited Suai, a southern district, in the wake of the heavy flooding which took place there at the end of May. What I saw was truly depressing. The district is now cut off from Dili by land and is likely to remain so for at least six more months.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“The targeting of these communities often appears to be less religious or racial than political or economic, and it focuses on perceptions that these minorities were unduly close to the Indonesian authorities. One Chinese woman my colleagues spoke to has been accused of supporting Indonesian military intelligence. She told us that many Chinese were caught in the middle under Indonesian rule and had to make regular contributions to both sides. This woman's dilemma was not unique, but rather was a product of the tumultuous times which East Timor has recently experienced. It highlights the need for mature thinking on how to deal with the wounds of the past. UNTAET is working with local communities, and, in fact, my Deputy for Governance, Mr.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“In April, together with Attorney-General Marzuki Darusman of Indonesia, I signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation on legal, judicial and human rights-related matters. This is a far-reaching document which will allow both East Timor and Indonesia to move forward in seeking legal redress for the crimes of the past. We are expecting a visit from the Attorney-General's office in early July in pursuit of this aim. Finally, efforts are under way to develop a national reconciliation commission to help heal the wounds of the recent past. While the law and order situation remains relatively calm, I am concerned by attacks on minority communities, namely the Muslims, the ethnic Chinese and the Protestants.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“The international community will have to - and I said this in Luxembourg on the occasion of the most recent meeting of the General Affairs Council of the European Union - the international community will have to help Indonesia appropriately to resettle the refugees who wish to stay in Indonesia. (spoke in English) The broader humanitarian question is perhaps the area in which most progress has been made to date. Having completed the emergency phase of its work, UNTAET's humanitarian pillar will merge with the governance pillar by the end of this year. Moving now to the justice system, court hearings are beginning even as the courts themselves are being rebuilt. The recruitment and training of judges, prosecutors and defenders continues, and the Police Training College is proceeding with the moulding of an East Timorese police force.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“I hope that these ongoing contacts will enable us to overcome the remaining obstacles and persuade the refugees and the remaining integrationist leaders in West Timor that their future lies in East Timor. The violence faced by officials of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees some days ago in a refugee camp in Kupang- the capital of West Timor- is intolerable, and once again we appeal to the Indonesian authorities to neutralize, once and for all, the extremist elements that remain in those camps. Upon my return to Dili, it is my intention to examine, together with Xanana Gusmao and the National Consultative Council, the question of refugees in all of its aspects - political, security and humanitarian - in order to rethink it and to find the best ways of speedily resolving this problem.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“It is important to resolve the question of pensions in order to encourage the return of remaining refugees. In this respect, we are continuing to encourage increased contacts between East and West Timor. Recently the Governor of West Timor went to Dili, and the Bishop of Baucau this month visited West Timor. Furthermore, recently we had a visit from a former high official of the militia so that he could see for himself the situation in East Timor, and the head of my Office last week went to West Timor to meet with the Governor, the military commander and other Indonesian officials of that province, following the fruitful visit of the Governor to Dili.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“Xanana Gusmao and I travelled to Indonesia on several occasions, and on 29 February, also in Dili, I signed a communique regarding a diverse range of questions jointly with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Shihab. Nonetheless, a great deal does remain to be done, especially to follow up on the key provisions of this communique. Towards that end, I travelled to Jakarta at the end of last month to meet with President Wahid and Mr. Shihab. In particular, I encouraged them to move forward in creating a transit corridor between the Oecusse enclave and the rest of East Timor, and to seek ways of allowing those Timorese who were part of the Indonesian civil service to obtain their pensions and of creating favourable conditions for Timorese students in Indonesian universities.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“We hope that their visit will make it possible for us better to determine the means of arranging for effective security after the transition. To do this, we need to begin to prepare as of now. While the Armed Forces for the Liberation of East Timor are remaining remarkably disciplined, it is nonetheless undeniable that they are showing signs of growing agitation and impatience, undoubtedly due to the fact that they are idle and uncertain about their future. We are considering provisional measures that could be taken to improve the situation in the short term. On the diplomatic front, remarkable overall progress has been made to resolve pending questions with Indonesia. Jakarta has opened a diplomatic mission in Dili. President Wahid made an extremely fruitful visit to East Timor on 29 February last.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“A range of proposals in this respect will be presented to the Council in the July report of the Secretary-General. In the meantime, we continue to review the composition of our military component, and additional proposals in keeping with the conditions on the ground will be presented on a regular basis. Furthermore, it should be possible to devote the savings that would result for the United Nations budget to concrete projects that would have tangible benefits for East Timor- for example, providing patrols to fight against contraband or repairing some of the road damage that has been done by the intensive circulation of heavy military vehicles. As for future defence needs, we are awaiting the arrival of an assessment team from King's College in London, which I visited last week.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“Nonetheless, good relations have been established between our forces and the Indonesian armed forces - especially following the signing, on 11 April, of a memorandum of understanding between our Force Commander and General Syahnakri. In addition, talks aimed at improving cooperation in the framework of investigations of border incidents and of putting an end to infiltration are under way. Taking into consideration the security situation on the ground and the capacity of our civilian police to establish law and order, the reduction of the military force has already begun, and proposals for further reductions have already been submitted to the Secretary-General. Nonetheless, these proposals concern only the infantry in the eastern sector. At the same time, we have identified a need for specialists and logistical experts.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“As regards security, it is remarkable that so soon after last year's violence, East Timor is now a country at peace. The internal security situation is normal. While security conditions on the whole are improving, serious incidents are continuing to occur here and there, including a grenade attack that was launched against a border post at the end of May, in which an Australian soldier was wounded. I also regret to have to inform the Council that on the morning of 21 June six grenades were launched against quarters where seven Australian soldiers were being lodged. Light- weapon fire followed this attack. Fortunately, no one was wounded. I note that all these incidents occurred along the border.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“These are ensuring security during the transition period and facilitating the establishment of the mechanism that will be needed to maintain security after independence; remedying the poverty of refugees in West Timor and helping them be repatriated in a free and orderly fashion; establishing a credible judiciary system that respects basic human rights and that can appropriately maintain law and order; ensuring sufficient reconstruction so that the public services can function; establishing a financially viable administration under the direction of the Timorese; and ensuring the political transition to independence, by the adoption of a Constitution and fully democratic elections. The first four points, on which I will quickly provide the Council some information, are prerequisites for the last two.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“The tasks that resolution 1299 (1999) assigns to UNTAET are not impossible, although they will require a great deal of effort, but we can carry them out effectively only if our administration procedures can be adapted so that we have the necessary resources. Let us now take up the heart of the subject. In recent weeks UNTAET has endeavoured to take stock of the situation and determine the minimum criteria that we need to fulfil in order to move successfully to independence. It is not a question of drawing up an exhaustive list, but rather of pointing out the essential objectives to be attained before independence.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“Something is certainly not right in a budget that does not provide for border and customs services, nor for operating either the airport, prisons or courts. It is hard for us to accept that the budget does not allow for the purchase of a boat or two to fight contraband at a time when we are being asked to increase income. Rather than going over grievances, my intention today is to draw the Council's attention to the real problems that we need to deal with every day on the ground. May I also emphasize that we need to be given the authorization to use the regular budget as flexibly and pragmatically as possible.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“If I may be frank, let me say that it is yet more striking how the scope of UNTAET's mandate has revealed weaknesses in our administrative rules and procedures that considerably reduce our ability to respond flexibly to the needs of the Timorese in the framework of resolution 1272 (1999). Something is clearly not right if UNTAET can cost $692 million, whereas the entire budget of East Timor comes to a bit over $59 million. Can it therefore come as a surprise that there is so much criticism of United Nations extravagances, while the Timorese continue to suffer? The criticism will continue as long as our administrative rules prevent United Nations engineers from dealing with public buildings that are not used by United Nations officials but rather by Timorese officials.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source
“The need for speed comes up against the need for consultation; the need for sound financial management comes up against demonstrations opposing increases in gasoline prices and unemployment; the need to recruit locals comes up against the reality that there is almost a complete dearth of qualified candidates; accusations that the United Nations staff is too comfortable comes up against the fact that more UNTAET staff have fallen ill than those of any other United Nations mission. We are beginning to confront the realities of governance, but I must admit that it has taken us a good deal of time to accomplish this.”
2000-06-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4165 (2000) · source