YouSaid · the spoken record

Vieira De Mello

lines on the record: 513
first: 1999-01-21
most recent: 2003-07-22
sittings or episodes: 16
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“I am pleased to report that the repatriation of a group of 410 refugees, made up predominantly of what we call the former MILSAS - militarized civil defence elements - and their families, and to which task I have assigned my own Chief of Staff, took place very successfully last week, with excellent cooperation both from the Indonesian authorities and from the East Timorese leadership and local community, into which these returnees were welcomed home. I am hopeful that this example of high-level cooperation, also involving the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and other humanitarian agencies, will encourage an increase in overall returns, both organized and spontaneous. From 6 September to date, there have been over 2,200 spontaneous returns.”
2000-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4236 (2000) · source
“But before I begin my brief proper, I would just like to say a few words of thanks to the Council for sending to East Timor the mission that Ambassador Andjaba led to see at first hand the progress that has been made and the challenges that remain. We all found the visit to be of immense help, stimulating our thinking about the way forward, highlighting areas of priority and reassuring us that we are not alone in our endeavours. As the Security Council mission has reported, the security situation in East Timor is stable. In West Timor, we continue to have concerns about the existence and the impunity of those among the militias who remain incorrigibly committed to a violent path. But there has been some progress in terms of the repatriation of refugees and reconciliation talks.”
2000-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4236 (2000) · source
“Beyond the emergency phase and beyond the start-up of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), we are now well advanced in the transition to independence. Our consultative mechanisms through the cabinet structure and the all- Timorese National Council have become more sophisticated, and we are beginning to see the start of a more avowedly political climate in East Timor. This is a healthy and timely development, allowing us to turn our attention to how best the final march to full independence should be managed and to begin thinking now of what type of international assistance East Timor might need once that independence has been attained.”
2000-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4236 (2000) · source
“Mr. Vieira de Mello: Thank you, Mr. President, for inviting me to address the Council. Since I last briefed the Council, on 29 September, a mission from the Council has visited and reported on the situation in East and West Timor. As that report is barely one week old, I will focus my remarks today on some of the specific issues highlighted therein, relate to members our plans for the donors conference in Brussels next week and update members on discussions we have had concerning the path for political transition in 2001. It is also worthwhile to highlight the critical juncture - positively so, I should add - at which we once more now find ourselves in East Timor.”
2000-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4236 (2000) · source
“We know that this is not an easy task, in particular, in the implementation of the ambitious mandates we are given by the Council nowadays, the new generation of mandates of administration and governance, such as the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). I would like to express to him, on behalf of all my colleagues in UNTAET and on behalf of all the peacekeeping mission staff throughout the world, our warmest gratitude and our abiding friendship. We wish him the best in his new activities. I thank you very much, Mr. President, for having invited me here today, for the opportunity to make this presentation today and for your guidance and support.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“I thank Ambassador Levitte for having given me this opportunity to raise this very urgent problem because, on a daily basis, we discover new needs that are not covered by the first consolidated budget for the fiscal year 2000-2001. I would like to take this opportunity to pay a heartfelt tribute to my friend Bernard Miyet. This afternoon's meeting is, I believe, the last one he will be attending as Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and I would like to tell him that his leadership over the last three and a half years in this very important task was of crucial importance in preserving the role of the Organization in peacekeeping and peacemaking.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“I would like to say in that connection that the budget adopted, less than $60 million, which should have been enough to enable us to govern Timor and supply the Timorese population with the services that it so sorely needs, is one that I have often described as cruel. It is entirely inadequate. But we knew that we had to remain within the limits of the resources that the donor countries were willing to make available to us. The budget will not enable us to fund a number of activities that seem indispensable to us and that we are identifying as we discover the magnitude of the task that the Council has entrusted to us. I am afraid, and I wanted to inform the Council right away, that I will have to approach the donor countries with certain new needs at the donors conference in Brussels in early December.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“I regret to say that all those funds are now practically exhausted and that all that we have to rely upon is the World Bank- funded community empowerment project, which has taken over the funding of this type of project. This is certainly one of the big lessons of this operation. We should in the future provide missions of this kind, as we have seen in the past, with sufficient funds to launch these kinds of projects across the entire country. I believe I have covered most of the questions that were put to me. (spoke in French) Ambassador Levitte raised a question on behalf of the European Union and the associated countries. He referred to the budget for the first fiscal year, 2000- 2001, which was adopted at the donors conference in Lisbon.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“What improvements might be made? I would say that undoubtedly we should in the next few weeks make the coalition Government more representative than it is at present. We need to see an increasing affirmation of the diversity of the Timorese political force. It remains to be seen what will happen next, Mr. Ambassador. (spoke in English) The representative of Jamaica referred to assistance in the form of quick impact projects. She must have known she was touching on a subject very close to my heart. I can assure that through the UNTAET fund and other, smaller OCHA and UNHCR funds, as well as through bilateral contributions made since late last year, these quick impact projects are the ones that perhaps provided the East Timorese population with the most visible, the most immediate confirmation of international solidarity.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“Much more can still be done, and I can assure the Council that we will continue to consult with our Timorese partners to do as much as we can to implement the mandate that the Council has given us. I keep saying that there is no better way of preparing the East Timorese for self-governance than through self-governance. So I can assure the Council that the Timorization process will continue and in fact be further accelerated. (spoke in French) Ambassador Levitte asked me my evaluation of the coalition Government and what improvements might be made to it. My evaluation is absolutely favourable. I am impressed by the sense of responsibility and commitment shown by the four Timorese members of our cabinet structure, and by the cohesion and harmony that exists among them and between them and us - the international side.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“Let me simply say that the following are significant steps in that direction: the cabinet structure - the fact that we will soon be appointing deputy cabinet members in all the four cabinet pillars, not only in the four that are currently the responsibility of the East Timorese; the appointment of a Timorese inspector general of the Transitional Administration; the appointment in the coming days of a person of East Timorese origin who will be in charge of planning, development, environment and gender issues, also as part of the Transitional Administration; the fact, as I have indicated, that I have just appointed 13 district administrators and deputy district administrators; the fact that we have so far recruited 5,400 civil servants, out of the total of 10,000 approved as part of the first fiscal year, 2000-2001; the fact that I will soon be appointing the 33 members of the new national council, following broad consultations at the central and district level; and the fact that the judiciary is composed, in its vast majority, of Timorese judges, investigating judges, prosecutors and public defendants.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“I wish that my friend and partner, Jose Ramos-Horta - who is present and whose cooperation with us and support for UNTAET I wish to salute and pay tribute to - could respond, because this is a question that the Timorese might be in a better position to answer.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“I repeat that the comprehensive plan of action of the Indonesian Government is viable, and we support it. UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration and other humanitarian agencies can proceed with the registration of the refugees, and with their return or settlement in Indonesia, in close partnership with the Indonesian Government, and UNTAET will fully support that process. In fact, as we all know, the problem could have been solved long ago had the militia been removed from these refugee settlements and had humanitarian agencies been allowed to do their job and determine freely who wishes to return and who wishes to remain. Ambassador van Walsum of the Netherlands asked me how much progress had been achieved in involving the East Timorese, or rather whether the East Timorese felt they had ownership of the process.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“We have several transit centres established, and sufficient goods and facilities are available to care for this fairly large number of people - with the hope that this will never materialize and that we will, on the contrary, be able to carry out the return of these people in accordance with the comprehensive plan of action put forward by Foreign Minister Shihab. No one wishes more than the East Timorese and ourselves to see this question of the refugees resolved- including the local settlement or resettlement in Indonesia of those who wish to remain there, and who are perfectly entitled to make that choice. The international community, as I have stated many times before, must provide Indonesia with the necessary support for that part of the equation to be effectively addressed.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“The military component of UNTAET, our police, as well as other civilian components of the Transitional Administration and, needless to say, the East Timorese partners are represented in that mechanism, which is now prepared for an influx of up to 100,000 refugees. Council members know that our estimates vary. The United Nations believes that there remain about 100,000 to 120,000 refugees; the Indonesian Government believes that the figures is 130,000. In fact, nobody really knows, because we were never able to carry out a thorough registration of the refugee population. But we are ready on the East Timorese side to receive as many as 100,000, although we do not believe that many are likely to voluntarily go back.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“We have established a joint operation centre at the headquarters of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Dili. I visited this centre last Saturday and was briefed about the concept of operations, as it were, in the event that we were to be faced with a large-scale influx. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) - the Office for which I am responsible here in New York - will be entrusted, as is normal, with the coordination of the humanitarian agencies, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, which will have an important role to play should such an influx occur.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“In response to Ambassador Hasmy's question on the downsizing of the military component of UNTAET I was a strong supporter of the gradual downsizing of our military component. But I have recommended that the downsizing be suspended - and the Secretary- General agrees with that recommendation - until the security situation improves, until it is clear to the Council and to us that the downsizing can resume without putting in danger all that we are trying to achieve on the basis of the mandate that the Council entrusted to us. The representative of Namibia asked me whether there was a contingency plan for the possible sudden influx of refugees from West Timor, and Ambassador Durrant of Jamaica noted that such a contingency plan was in place.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“It is something on which I also briefed the Coordinating Minister for Political, Social and Security Affairs of Indonesia on Monday of last week in Djakarta. So I think the future of the FALINTIL is clear in everybody's minds. I am afraid that that is not yet the case as regards the militia. I also take note of the remark by Ambassador van Walsum and his reference to the likely need for an international force to remain in place and continue to provide for East Timor's security until the Timorese are able to fend for themselves. I would add that this will be necessary not just in the security area, but in a number of other capacity-building areas where obviously we shall not have attained a benchmark by the time East Timor accedes to full independence.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“I thank Council members also for the expressions of concrete support from several speakers in preparation for that meeting. Let me also state, commenting on something that Ambassador Wibisono just said, that I do not believe it is possible to establish a symmetry between the FALINTIL and the militia. I have briefed the Council on the future of the FALINTIL. This was at the core of the problem we faced earlier this year - the problem that led the United Kingdom to propose an independent study, which was carried out by the Centre for Defence Studies of King's College in London. That study, as we know, focused not only on the future defence force for East Timor, but also on the role that the FALINTIL could play in the creation of that defence force. I have alluded to this in the past. I alluded to it again this afternoon.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“I have been waiting every since for that call, and, believe me, I have tried to provoke that call by requesting my colleagues to re-establish contact with him and telling him that we were waiting for his proposals, as was the presidency of the CNRT. This is only one of the many examples that I could give here, but I do not want to bore the Council with a detailed catalogue of those initiatives. Regarding the Defence Force, I am grateful for the broad support that I have heard from those who addressed this question for the proposed course of action and for the convening of a meeting of interested countries, which, with the support of the Council and that of the Secretary-General, I now intend to convene later in the month of October or in early November.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“I have given the example of a meeting to which I invited the leader of UNTAS, Mr. Domingo Soares. He chairs that umbrella organization of pro-autonomy movements. I invited him to my hotel in Jakarta in late March and handed over to him my personal response to a letter he had addressed to me raising many questions about the electoral process last year, the process that led to the popular consultation. We had a very constructive, in fact very cordial, meeting with him and with seven of his senior colleagues. He promised that he would share the contents of my letter with other UNTAS leaders who were not present in Jakarta and that he would come back to me with proposals on the next steps for this dialogue leading to lasting reconciliation between the East Timorese.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“Having listened to the representative of Indonesia a while ago, I fear that the message I tried to convey earlier has not been fully apprehended - that is, that the militia must be clearly separated, in theory and in practice, from well-meaning pro-integration political leaders, with whom we have always been open to discussions and with whom we shall remain open to re-establish dialogue. I provided the Coordinating Minister, in our meetings in Jakarta and in Denpasar - the President of the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), Xanana Gusmao, was present at one of those meetings - with a long list of examples of efforts made by the CNRT leadership, by the FALINTIL commander and by us - including your obedient servant - in order to establish a constructive dialogue with those political leaders, to no avail so far.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“I am also very happy that there has been unanimous recognition here that dealing with the question of militias, including, I must underline once again, the arrest of their criminal commanders, is the central issue before us. I have also pointed out to Coordinating Minister Yudhoyono that, as far as disarmament is concerned, we are particularly interested in the confiscation and destruction - preferably public destruction - of weapons such as G3s, SKS rifles, M-16s, rocket launchers, grenades and ammunition for these, rather than homemade weapons.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“It covers not only security but a number of other trade and cross- border types of contacts between the Indonesian Government and UNTAET; the exploitation of natural resources, including water, on both sides of the border; veterinary concerns; and so on. It is an all- encompassing document which, I am sure, will lead to substantial improvement in the relations between East Timor and West Timor in particular. Our philosophy, I want to reassure Ambassador Hasmy, has not changed and cannot change. Relations of confidence, partnership and cooperation are vital in the long term for East Timor, and I know that President Wahid of Indonesia and his Government share that view.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“Those negotiations continue and, I must say, have made a great deal of progress in a number of important areas in terms of creating the framework for future relations between East Timor and its main partner, Indonesia. The joint border agreement that we signed in Denpasar on 14 September is one such example. In fact, the suggestion for the establishment of a Joint Border Committee came from us in March, in discussions both in Kupang and later in Jakarta with the then Minister of Defence, Juwono Sudarsono, as well as the Commander of the ninth military region, General Kiki Syahnakri. I am delighted that the document is signed, because it is very broad.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“Mr. Vieira de Mello: First of all, allow me to thank all those who took the floor for their strong expressions of support, not just for the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) but for the East Timorese at large in this difficult transition to independence. The representative of Malaysia, Ambassador Hasmy, encouraged us to forge more bilateral ties and arrangements with the Republic of Indonesia. He is right, and, as he knows, in the very early stages we launched a process of bilateral negotiations with Indonesia, which was reinforced, during the visit of President Wahid to Dili on 29 February, by the signing of a joint communique between Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab and myself which charted the future of those bilateral negotiations.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“We seek the Council's continued strong support to address this issue in an urgent manner. As we approach the first anniversary of the adoption of Security Council resolution 1272 (1999), allow me to reiterate today the invitation I made in late June for the Council to visit East Timor and assess first-hand our achievements as well as our shortcomings. By your presence and concern, you would provide the East Timorese and ourselves in UNTAET with strong encouragement at a particularly critical juncture of the transition we are conducting on your behalf.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“A draft regulation on the establishment of political parties is being given wide circulation for consultative purposes as I speak. Let me now conclude. While I believe UNTAET has made demonstrable progress in administering East Timor in a strengthened partnership with the East Timorese leading to what you tasked us to achieve, namely capacity for self-governance, there are growing, serious concerns regarding the security situation, particularly in the western part of the island. East Timor's future security is to a large extent dependent on the stability of its relations across the border with Indonesia. So long as West Timor houses those who wish East Timor nothing but harm and who have such a large number of refugees as captive constituents, then East Timor's already considerable struggles will be rendered that bit more arduous.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“As things currently stand, our plan is to hold national elections in the second half of next year, with a view to establishing the constituent assembly. This assembly will be tasked with drafting the constitution, choosing the members of the new transitional government and serving as an interim legislature. Upon completion of the constitution, the assembly would become the new national assembly of an independent East Timor. The preconditions required for this exercise are a civic education campaign, approval of a law on political parties and the creation of a legal framework in which to hold elections. We have already begun the process in all these areas. We are now commencing with the training of trainers for a nationwide civic education programme.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“Once this plan is available as a draft, we intend to convene a meeting in Dili to bring together those States that are likely to want to contribute, either through the provision of training, cash or in-kind contributions, to the development of the defence force. At this meeting we would seek concrete commitments that would, we hope, allow training to be initiated before the end of this year. I should stress that we have presently no resources available for this purpose in the consolidated budget of East Timor and would therefore very much- in fact, entirely - be relying on fresh contributions. Finally, before I conclude, a word on the political transition and the constitutional process. The major elements of political transition are clear, and I have already alluded to those in my last presentation, in late June.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“The favoured model calls for a force with a professional regular corps of 1,500, supported by 1,500 volunteer reservists, the core of which would be formed by re-trained fighters of the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor, with the remainder to be broadly and professionally recruited. It is important that we proceed swiftly with this plan. The creation of an East Timor defence force will be undertaken within the provisions of resolution 1272 (1999) for capacity-building and the creation of an effective administration. Building on the King's College study, and with the support of expertise from Australia and Portugal, we are currently working on an elaborated budget and development plan for the future defence force.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“Consultations are also well advanced for the selection, through an independent committee, of 33 members of the new, all-Timorese National Council, which will replace the present National Consultative Council, whom I intend to appoint in the course of the month of October. I wish to say a word now on the future defence force. Importantly, the cabinet has also expressed its support for establishing a defence force for East Timor following the release of the King's College study, with which members of the Council are familiar. This decision was the result of intensive discussions, both within East Timor and elsewhere, in which there was broad agreement that East Timor required its own defence capacity.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“The cabinet has also endorsed a comprehensive joint-border arrangement between Indonesia and the Transitional Administration, later signed with Coordinating Minister Yudhoyono - at that time Acting Foreign Minister, since Minister Shihab was here in New York - in Denpasar on 14 September. The cabinet has also approved our negotiating position in formal talks with Australia on the future of Timor Gap petroleum, which are scheduled to commence on 9 October. In another important step towards "Timorizing" the Administration, last Monday I appointed Timorese District or Deputy District Administrators in all 13 districts of the country.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“As to other key developments, since mid-July, as Council members know, we have had a new cabinet structure, with eight cabinet portfolios held by four Timorese and four international UNTAET staff. The cabinet sets policy and oversees its implementation on behalf of the Transitional Administration. Thus far, it has deliberated on a wide range of policies and, inter alia, agreed to a framework for taxation, a criminal procedure code, a public-buildings reconstruction plan, the reopening of the University of East Timor, a one- hour shift in time zone for East Timor and a plan to develop legislation for the transport sector. It is currently working out procedures to resolve land- ownership and property disputes and is engaged in a comprehensive budget review.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“The Congress also spawned the birth of a new Timorese party, the Social Democratic Party, headed by Mario Carrascalao. This has led to an intensification of political activity and discord among East Timorese political leaders, which I personally find quite normal, predictable and desirable in the transition to multi-party democracy. There is some sense, however - and we will have to see how the situation develops - that this may lead to a break- up of the umbrella organization and the commencement of party politics proper. I have been attempting to impress upon the FRETILIN leadership that open political party activity is not incompatible with continued membership in the pro-independence coalition.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“Turning now to political developments, the major political event of the reporting period was the CNRT Congress, held in Dili in late August. The Congress focused on the future vision of the national unity body, its relationship with its composite political parties and a range of national policy issues in the economic, social, security and political spheres. It also re-elected Xanana Gusmao as its President and Jose Ramos-Horta and Mario Carrascalao as its Vice-Presidents. What also emerged during the Congress, and which has developed in the days since, has been friction between the main party, the East Timor National Liberation Front (FRETILIN), and the smaller Timorese Democratic Union, on the one hand, and the CNRT leadership on the other.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“We have launched an operation - called Operation Cobra - in Manufahi, the district with the most significant militia presence. It is aimed at inducing surrender, capturing or eliminating the militias. This is not an easy task, given the suitability of the terrain for insurgency activities and the limited number of specialized troops we can dedicate to the operation. Nevertheless, on 11 September, six militia members surrendered and the active presence of the peacekeeping forces is making it very difficult for the remaining militias to continue to infiltrate and gain a foothold in East Timor. This was evidenced by the killing of one heavily-armed militia member three days ago near the border in the New Zealand battalion area.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“We look forward to appropriate action being taken against all those listed, as well as to the investigation's bringing its focus to bear not just on the perpetrators of the violence, but also on the commanders and architects who designed and ordered the destruction of East Timor in the wake of the popular consultation. I turn now to the issue of security in East Timor. We believe that there are between 80 to 150 armed militias in up to 10 groups presently operating inside the territory of East Timor. Their aim appears to be to gather information relating to our military component, to establish themselves and to attempt to gain the loyalty of the local population in villages that are believed to have voted for integration. The presence of militias has caused the displacement of over 3,000 persons in recent weeks.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“I have appealed to the Indonesian Government to help us urgently draw this clear distinction between well-meaning pro-autonomy representatives and thugs, such as Eurico Guterres, who should be behind bars instead of being invited to attend meetings with high-level Indonesian officials, as was the case in Denpasar on 14 September. With regard to the investigations into the September 1999 abuses, the 1 September announcement by Attorney-General Marzuki Darusman of Indonesia of his first list of persons suspected of perpetrating human rights violations in East Timor last year was a very positive step. We are fully supportive of his efforts, and I pass up no opportunity to meet with him when I visit Jakarta.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“Further, time and again, we have organized what we call "look and see" visits by pro- autonomy leaders to visit East Timor and assess the situation at first hand. Again, the response to these gestures has been poor, at best. UNTAET and the CNRT will continue to persevere in efforts for political dialogue and for reconciliation. Nonetheless, the Council will appreciate that a prerequisite to any talks is that our interlocutors issue a public renunciation of the use of violence to pursue political ends and condemn the recent murders of United Nations staff. A line needs to be clearly drawn between those political leaders with whom there can be dialogue and the murderers for whom there must be justice.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“There has, however, been some suggestion that neither UNTAET nor the National Resistance Council of East Timor (CNRT) has been working sufficiently hard to encourage political dialogue with pro-integrationists. This is inaccurate: I have made repeated efforts to engage in discussion with the political leadership of the pro-integration umbrella group, Uni Timor Aswain. From the start, the National Consultative Council in East Timor had three seats reserved for those parties that voted against independence - one more than their percentage of the vote strictly required - but only two of these have ever been filled. Neither I, Xanana Gusmao nor any other senior East Timorese leader has received any reply to our overtures to engage in genuine talks.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“The threat faced is that of militias, operating with impunity in West Timor, that are able freely to launch armed interventions across an international boundary into East Timor. Nor does the solution lie with having joint patrols of United Nations peacekeeping forces and TNI on the border, as has been suggested on numerous occasions by Indonesia, including in this room, because the problem does not lie along the border. The problem is not on the border but, as I have said time and again, deep inside West Timor. We have agreed, however, to coordinate our and TNI patrols on each side of the border. In his 19 September address to the Security Council, Coordinating Minister Yudhoyono also emphasized that reconciliation was a key requirement to a lasting peace. I obviously agree with this.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“What is required is a coordinated, integrated and comprehensive strategy on the part of the Indonesian security forces, together with the necessary will, to hunt down and break up the militias and bring their leaders to justice. And for that we are still waiting. This self-evident reality - that the militias are the problem - has, I regret to say, on occasion been lost in some of our discussions on the situation in Timor. The problem does not lie with the refugees, as is sometimes said, for they are a product, not a cause, of the crisis, nor is this in some sense a civil war between East Timorese, as some in Indonesia increasingly attempt to paint the problem. There have been no crossings by armed elements from East Timor into the west, as was last week asserted before this Council.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“Prior to the ceremony, my colleagues were informed by a senior TNI officer that all the required arrests had been made in the case of the 5 September killing of the militia leader Olivio Mendonca, also known as Olivio Moruk - a murder that occurred in the middle of the night in a remote village. The same officer informed my colleagues that there were still no suspects in the case of the killing the following day of the three UNHCR staff members - murders that happened in broad daylight in the presence of 10 Indonesian police officers. Nor, for that matter, has any one of the suspects been arrested for the killing of the United Nations soldiers. There could hardly be a more eloquent demonstration of Indonesia's current inability to deal effectively with the problem. This is impunity running rampant.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“On the departure of the Vice-President and her delegation, the well-known suspect Eurico Guterres appeared in the midst of the police compound in which the ceremony had been held. He proceeded to incite his followers and several militia members reclaimed some of the very weapons that formed the raison d'etre of the ceremony, unimpeded by the very large TNI and police presence. Subsequently, he and several hundred of his followers agitated in and outside the station, while my colleagues were hidden under armed protection of the Indonesian police in a room at the police station for their own safety.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“Nonetheless, the repercussions are likely to be more unrest and loss of innocent lives in West and East Timor unless the root of the problem is recognized and eradicated. Regrettably, I remain sceptical that current activities will achieve this goal. Where resolution and a certain degree of ruthlessness would seem to be required, we are witnessing hesitation and prevarication. As many here are aware, at the request of the Indonesian authorities I sent a small UNTAET delegation to attend a disarmament ceremony in Atambua on Sunday, 24 September, attended by Vice- President Megawati Sukarnoputri, Minister Yudhoyono and many senior Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) and police officers.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“I have pledged our complete support to Foreign Minister Shihab's comprehensive plan of action to bring about an end to the refugee crisis, but the plan cannot succeed until the militias holding the refugees through threats and misinformation are removed. And how should we resolve the problem posed by the militias? I must be frank and state that, first of all, the Indonesian authorities have to acknowledge and confront the fact that it is their responsibility to address this threat. We all realize that the militias are not the creation of the administration of President Wahid and that they do not act on instructions from the Government in Jakarta. We sympathize with the dreadful legacy with which the authorities have been left by previous policies towards East Timor.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“I stressed, as I had on several occasions prior to this latest crisis, that the militias presented a serious threat not only to East Timor, but also to the very integrity of Indonesia. I repeatedly called not just for their disarming, but also for the arrest of their leaders and their disbanding and relocation. As a starting point, I believe it is essential to recognize that the root cause of our and Jakarta's problems on Timor island is the militias. Only when this problem has been effectively addressed will we be able to resolve the plight of the remaining East Timorese refugees and focus on developing friendly cooperation between East Timor and Indonesia, to which we are committed.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“On the other hand, and more encouragingly, there has been much progress in the reconstruction being carried out by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in all spheres and in the establishment of those institutions which will prove critical to the viability of the future independent country of East Timor. In my presentation, I shall also be summarizing some of what has been achieved in this regard. In order to enable me to focus on essential developments in this presentation, a note containing other salient information is being distributed, as has been done in the past. Let me start by referring to security in West Timor. Since 6 September, I have met twice with the Coordinating Minister for Political, Security and Social Affairs of the Government of Indonesia, Mr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source
“Mr. Vieira de Mello: Since I last briefed the Security Council on 27 June, we have witnessed two opposing developments. On the one hand, there has been a significant deterioration in security and an escalation of violence in Nusa Tenggara Timur - West Timor - most tragically highlighted by the murders in Atambua on 6 September of three staff members of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Security, and the measures required to restore it, will thus prominently feature in this briefing, which I very much regret. I had much rather talk of something else.”
2000-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4203 (2000) · source