← LEADERSHIP TERMINAL

UK PARLIAMENT · SITTING

David Davis

MP for Goole and Pocklington · Conservative · United Kingdom

IN THEIR OWN WORDS

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. May I start by congratulating my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest West (Sir Desmond Swayne) on putting a Bill in front of the House that has support from literally everybody in the Chamber?

INFANTS, PARENTS AND CARERS BILL · 2026-09-04 · READ IN HANSARD

The Post Office Horizon scandal highlighted the institutional instinct to find a convenient scapegoat. Innocent people paid the price, while the institution sought to protect itself. If the Thirlwall inquiry asks too narrow a set of questions, systemic NHS failures will go unexamined.

THIRLWALL INQUIRY TERMS OF REFERENCE · 2026-07-16 · READ IN HANSARD

Last month’s sentencing of Nicola Sturgeon’s husband exposed the real reasons behind the Scottish Government’s persecution of Alex Salmond. From 2010 to 2022, Peter Murrell abused his position to embezzle almost £500,000 from the SNP to buy luxury items. He used SNP money to buy a £33,000 Volkswagen Golf.

SIR DAVID AMESS SUMMER ADJOURNMENT · 2026-07-16 · READ IN HANSARD

The consultants also reported that in the two months since the change infants have been sick but recovered as expected.” The report highlighted deficiencies in staffing levels, leadership and communication, but, in the trial, it was not shown to the jury—they knew nothing of it.

THIRLWALL INQUIRY TERMS OF REFERENCE · 2026-07-16 · READ IN HANSARD

One of the nurses let go later described it as “the decimation of the Nursing and Midwifery service”, adding that “eight registered nurses...were replaced with nursery nurses...unqualified staff are replacing qualified staff”.

THIRLWALL INQUIRY TERMS OF REFERENCE · 2026-07-16 · READ IN HANSARD

There was little space, cots and incubators were stored in corridors, and mothers struggled to find somewhere to breastfeed their babies. Susan Gilby, the hospital’s chief executive between 2018 and 2022, later described the unit as “dark, dingy and cramped”, providing a “less than ideal” environment to work in.

THIRLWALL INQUIRY TERMS OF REFERENCE · 2026-07-16 · READ IN HANSARD

The complete record

Every one of 5,828 lines we hold for David Davis, in date order, each linked to its source. Free to read, in full, without an account. Page 68 of 117.

  1. The first thing about incentives—we barely need them—is that people will want to be at the centre of the most important historic change that has happened over the last two or three decades. I do not think that will be a problem. Arrangements are being made, precisely because we will disappear when the process is over, to ensure continuity and to ensure that they will go back seamlessly into the Whitehall system. I rather suspect that, at the end, there will be lots more bids for them than that.

    EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION · 2016-09-05 · READ IN HANSARD

  2. That is a good question. I would expect us to be able to ensure that there will be freedoms that are at least as good as those that are in place now. One important aspect—it applies to the EU, but particularly to Britain—is that we are a science superpower. We have a fabulous education system and some of the best universities and the best students in the world. I think that that will be reflected in the outcome that we see in a few years’ time.

    EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION · 2016-09-05 · READ IN HANSARD

  3. How could I say no to meeting a delegation from the Humber? Siemens was one of the companies that said that it would continue investment in the UK, which was something of a change from what appeared to be the case before the referendum. Yes, of course.

    EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION · 2016-09-05 · READ IN HANSARD

  4. That is a good point, and we are on it already. The opportunities side of the spreadsheet, as my hon. Friend puts it, is integral to the process. We have already had reports on some of them, but we are also challenging some of the points that have come back to us because of a degree of special pleading. It takes a little longer than just asking the question, but yes, we are doing what my hon. Friend suggests.

    EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION · 2016-09-05 · READ IN HANSARD

  5. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman was not listening earlier when I said that I was putting into the Library the letter from the Chancellor of the Exchequer about the structural fund—exactly what the hon. Gentleman asks.

    EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION · 2016-09-05 · READ IN HANSARD

  6. I have never experienced so many attempts to seduce me into making promises. As I said earlier, this will be one of the gains from the European Union negotiation, but there may be some internal negotiations within it. If my hon. Friend speaks to his local fishermen, he will see what I mean.

    EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION · 2016-09-05 · READ IN HANSARD

  7. I repeat what I have said already: the information will become available as we work through the process. If the hon. Gentleman somehow imagines that this is a “Lego block” process in which anyone could engage without thinking about it, I suggest that he look at it again.

    EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION · 2016-09-05 · READ IN HANSARD

  8. Before I answer the hon. Gentleman’s question, may I apologise to him for the late response to the letter that he wrote to me earlier in the summer? We did try to give him some facts in it. In respect of the discussions with the Scottish Government and other devolved Administrations, let me say this first up. There is a joint ministerial committee, in which the First Minister, or her nominee—whichever she wishes—has been offered a place, and that will be the process whereby we will look at all proposals. The Prime Minister has said that we will look at all proposals. I have to tell the hon. Gentleman upfront that—as I said to the First Minister when I spoke to her about it—I really cannot see how his proposed arrangement could be made to work, but we will look at it.

    EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION · 2016-09-05 · READ IN HANSARD

  9. All I can say to the hon. Gentleman is this. My task is to bring the control of that process back to the Government and back to Parliament, and it is for the Government and for Parliament to decide how they use it. The simple truth is that I expect us to see a much more even-handed policy in the future than the one that we have now, but I think that we must wait until the negotiation is completed.

    EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION · 2016-09-05 · READ IN HANSARD

  10. I must say that I thought the hon. Lady was going to refer to Ruth Davidson, who won the popularity contest this time round, but let me say something else about the Scottish nationalist approach to this. Our new Prime Minister, before she even carried out her reshuffle, went to Scotland to see the First Minister. How much more respect one politician could pay to another I do not know, but what gratitude do we get for it? What we have just heard.

    EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION · 2016-09-05 · READ IN HANSARD

  11. First, it depends very much on what is agreed in the negotiation. Secondly, the undertaking that was given was to do everything possible to protect all the interests of all the parts of the United Kingdom—and Scotland, of course, is at the front rank of those people. The issue is not about giving powers to politicians; it is about looking after the interests of the people, and that is what will happen. We will look after the interests of everyone in the United Kingdom, including Scotland.

    EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION · 2016-09-05 · READ IN HANSARD

  12. Does my right hon. and learned Friend really think that the Attorney General met all his duties? The report refers to the final question to Tony Blair, which it says was answered perfunctorily, about whether the conditions had been met. Surely he should have been a little more pressing, rather than accepting a perfunctory reply before changing his view.

    REPORT OF THE IRAQ INQUIRY · 2016-07-13 · READ IN HANSARD

  13. The right hon. Lady said that we did not know at the time. However, on 15 March 2002, the JIC said that the intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes was sporadic and patchy. Three weeks later, in Texas, Tony Blair said: “We know he has been developing these weapons. We know that those weapons constitute a threat”. How did we not know at the time, and how is that consistent?

    REPORT OF THE IRAQ INQUIRY · 2016-07-13 · READ IN HANSARD

  14. I think in order to go ahead they needed to make the allegations which they made and which were not sustainable…In substance yes they misrepresented what we did and they did so in order to get the authorisation they shouldn’t have had.” That was Hans Blix’s view of what Tony Blair did in the House of Commons. Mr Blair also misrepresented what Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, had told the allies about the WMD programme.

    REPORT OF THE IRAQ INQUIRY · 2016-07-13 · READ IN HANSARD

  15. When he was asked whether Downing Street deliberately lied about Chirac’s statement, he said yes, it deliberately lied. The next two misrepresentations were quotations from the UN inspectors’ reports. Time is short, so let me read briefly what was said by Hans Blix, the head of the inspectorate. Speaking of the British Government, he said: “If they had gone to the British Parliament in 2003 and said that we have a lot of things unaccounted for here, and we suspect there may be something, and we think it is safer to invade them, would the British Parliament have dreamt of saying yes to such a thing? I don’t think so.

    REPORT OF THE IRAQ INQUIRY · 2016-07-13 · READ IN HANSARD

  16. Many other countries, including France and Russia, viewed the inspection process as incomplete—and, of course, it was. The UN vote was then lost by 11 to four, so when Blair returned to the UK, he had to win a debate and vote in the House of Commons. He made what some people think was the greatest speech of his life, but in order to persuade us, he had to say five things that were a clear misrepresentation. Mr Blair accused France of saying that it would never vote for war. That was simply not true, and he knew it was not true. I refer to an interview given on Radio 4 in the last year by Sir Stephen Wall. As a Foreign Office adviser in No. 10, he was privy to what was going on and clarified what was really said, which was that, effectively, “As of now, France will vote against”.

    REPORT OF THE IRAQ INQUIRY · 2016-07-13 · READ IN HANSARD

  17. The result was UN resolution 1441, the thrust of which was that it was the final opportunity for Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations. The vote was 15:0 in favour. As the right hon. Member for Derby South said, it did not include a deliberate trigger to war; it required a further resolution. The UN inspectorate went in and did 700 inspections of over 500 sites. Interestingly, it went to three dozen sites given to it by the CIA and MI6, who thought that was where the weapons were located. The inspectorate found not a thing—over three and a half months, it found nothing whatsoever. Then the American President set a timetable, creating a real problem over and above the United Nations—war by March. That is why Chilcot said that going to war was not the last resort. It was not. It gave Mr Blair a problem. What should he do?

    REPORT OF THE IRAQ INQUIRY · 2016-07-13 · READ IN HANSARD

  18. They do not recognise the international laws that render it otherwise, so for them regime change is a perfectly legitimate casus belli. From comments made and the items to which the right hon. Member for Gordon (Alex Salmond) referred, it seems that Tony Blair agreed, but he had a problem, because our law and international law did not allow it. He therefore saw his role as building a coalition to support the Americans. There was nothing dishonourable in that, if Tony Blair believed the aim, but to do it he had to achieve a number of things. He had to create a casus belli under international law, and for that he needed proof of weapons of mass destruction and of a terrorist threat, and a UN resolution and thereby proof of legality.

    REPORT OF THE IRAQ INQUIRY · 2016-07-13 · READ IN HANSARD

  19. I am quite sure that that intelligence was shared with Mr Blair, who, not knowing the source, would have found it persuasive, as something told to the Americans by an al-Qaeda commander. It seems from the Chilcot report that, at some point between December 2001 and possibly March 2002 but certainly by July 2002, Mr Blair effectively signed Britain up to the American military effort. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) said, the issue was not our soldiers but our reputation. It was our involvement that legitimised the American action. This, however, produced a problem for our Prime Minister. Under American law, to go to war on the basis of regime change is entirely legal.

    REPORT OF THE IRAQ INQUIRY · 2016-07-13 · READ IN HANSARD

  20. There was understandable paranoia that something like it might happen again, either here or somewhere else, but then there came a dangerous and simplistic conflation of the real, present and continuing threat from al-Qaeda and Iraq—the axis of evil nonsense that President Bush generated at the time. This fiction was reinforced in February 2002, when the Americans rendered to Egypt somebody called Sheikh al-Libi, who was tortured on the question of whether there was a chemical and biological weapons relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Essentially, he was tortured until he said yes, and that was the evidence that Colin Powell cited at the United Nations—the House might remember—when he talked about having “substantial evidence”. Of course, it was a fiction obtained under torture.

    REPORT OF THE IRAQ INQUIRY · 2016-07-13 · READ IN HANSARD

  21. Indeed, Carne Ross, the middle east specialist among our delegation to the UN, said that when he first took the job he was briefed: “Basically we don’t think there’s anything there. We are justifying sanctions on the basis that Iraq has not answered questions about its past stocks”. Since then, all the JIC, SIS and GCHQ reports have corroborated that. It was considered a moderate and controllable threat at that point. Then what happened? We had 9/11, which, quite properly, shocked the world: 3,000 deaths in a hideous terrorist spectacular. Of course, Tony Blair justifies his actions on that basis, but I have to say to him that this was a reason for getting it right, not an excuse for getting it wrong.

    REPORT OF THE IRAQ INQUIRY · 2016-07-13 · READ IN HANSARD

  22. As far as we could tell from inspections and our intelligence, it did not have WMD or a workable WMD programme but was deliberately trying to create confusion about that, by not co-operating from time to time, by moving trucks from one site to another before inspectors arrived, and so on. It was probably doing that to keep Iran convinced that it had a WMD programme. That was what it was worried about—not us, but its next-door neighbour against which it had fought a massive war shortly before. That explains some of the strange behaviour of the regime. At that time and—I guess—up until just before 2001, the general belief was that this was a moderate and controllable threat.

    REPORT OF THE IRAQ INQUIRY · 2016-07-13 · READ IN HANSARD

  23. That is where its high command comes from, so let us not put that to one side either. There has been a significantly increased terrorist threat worldwide, something that was known and warned about before we took this action. That is what we are talking about. That is what the worst foreign policy mistake in our modern history means for many, many innocent people in the world. In the 1990s, before that happened, I had responsibility for counter-proliferation in the Conservative Government of the time. I accept that the behaviour of the Saddam Hussein regime was peculiar to say the least.

    REPORT OF THE IRAQ INQUIRY · 2016-07-13 · READ IN HANSARD

  24. It is a privilege to follow the right hon. Member for Derby South (Margaret Beckett), although I felt that at the end she destroyed her own argument by attributing to other people views that nobody holds: that somehow IS is allowed off the hook of blame because of the weaknesses and failures of the British Government. Let us be clear what those failures are: 150,000 deaths by violence, a large majority of them innocent civilians; over 1 million deaths, on medical estimates, as a result of this war; and a destroyed country. Iraq was a nasty dictatorship, but containment—sanctions, inspections when they were allowed, and no-fly zones—was broadly working. There was damage to the stability of the middle east. Of course it is not the entire story, but let us not forget that IS started in an American prisoner-of-war camp in Iraq.

    REPORT OF THE IRAQ INQUIRY · 2016-07-13 · READ IN HANSARD

  25. On five counts, then, Mr Blair misrepresented to this House the substantive aspects of the argument for the war. If this House is to contribute to decisions on war in the future, it must be able to rely on being told the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth by our Prime Minister.

    REPORT OF THE IRAQ INQUIRY · 2016-07-13 · READ IN HANSARD

  26. That is exactly right. That should have been the stance that Mr Blair took, but he did not. He chose instead to come to Parliament to misrepresent the case. Mr Blair also misrepresented the line put forward by Mr Hussein Kamel, who was later killed by Saddam Hussein, to claim that the WMD programme was continuing. What was, in fact, said in an interview with the inspectorate, was that the WMD had all been destroyed by 1991. Finally, Mr Blair was asked by Tam Dalyell about the risks of terrorism arising from the war, but the Prime Minister did not give him an answer—despite having been told by the JIC and by MI5 that it would increase both the international and domestic risk of terrorism and would destabilise the states in the area.

    REPORT OF THE IRAQ INQUIRY · 2016-07-13 · READ IN HANSARD

  27. The Prime Minister referred to the cause or aim of the war as being weapons of mass destruction. I draw his attention back to the document sent from Tony Blair to the American President. After it says “I will be with you, whatever”, it goes on to say that the reason is that getting rid of Saddam Hussein is “the right thing to do.” The aim was regime change, not WMDs. That fact, and the fact that, as Sir John Chilcot says, Blair’s commitment made it very difficult for the UK to withdraw support for military action, amount to a deception and a misleading of this House of Commons. It is not the only one. Sir John has been very careful about avoiding accusing the former Prime Minister of lying to the House, but a lot of the evidence suggests that he did. What action can this House take to deal with that?

    REPORT OF THE IRAQ INQUIRY · 2016-07-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  28. T9. The Royal Free London NHS Foundation Trust recently signed an agreement to share 1.6 million patient records with Google’s DeepMind subsidiary. The data include medical history, HIV status, past drug overdoses, abortions, and all pathology, radiology and visit records. It is claimed that the data are anonymised, which is impossible given the nature of the data, and no permission was obtained from patients. It is also claimed that the agreement was made under the Secretary of State’s guidelines. Will he tell the House what he is doing to protect the privacy of such information?

    TOPICAL QUESTIONS · 2016-07-05 · READ IN HANSARD

  29. I was not intending to be discourteous, Mr Deputy Speaker. The hon. and learned Gentleman said that it was not possible to screen out the correspondence of the various privileged groups he described. The issue arose at the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in respect of one of the Wilson doctrine cases, and that was the assertion made by the Government barrister at the time. However, I consulted a number of experts, including Ross Anderson at Cambridge, and they said that it was perfectly possible. A great deal of screening is already done to take out dross—issues such as pornography—and it is perfectly possible to screen out targeted groups as well.

    INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL · 2016-06-07 · READ IN HANSARD

  30. The powers mostly already exist and this is an avowal of existing powers, so in some sense the question of the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) is different from what it would normally be. We have powers and may not change them as result of the delay, but there is an implication for how soon we review the whole package and how soon we come back and re-legislate. It has long seemed to me that this is a piece of legislation that lends itself to almost annual review, renewal and reform. The way to deal with the problem may be to ensure that we get a relatively rapid review and reform of the legislation in another part of this business.

    INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL · 2016-06-07 · READ IN HANSARD

  31. I think the Minister said that any wrongdoing would be dealt with, but the problem is that much of this was, I suspect, legal. That places a moral responsibility on every Government over the last few decades who have allowed such action to be legal. The actions of Philip Green, his family and his companies, in taking out more than £500 million in dividends from a company that cost them £200 million, can be described as little else than asset stripping. What matters now, however, is that those employees dependent on the pension scheme are set to lose 10% of their pensions, if the scheme goes into the Pension Protection Fund. Many Government Members think that the minimum that needs to happen is for Philip Green to pay back enough to save them from that.

    BHS · 2016-06-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  32. The whole House is glad to hear that there has been constructive engagement on this matter, as it is incredibly important to get it right. Will the hon. and learned Gentleman ensure that those letters are put in the Library today so that the rest of the House is aware of what is going on, as this is fundamental to the Bill?

    INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL · 2016-06-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  33. There were two reasons for concern. First, the House should seek certainty in the law, rather than any notion that the law would alter depending on the judge. The Minister is one of those who wants certainty in the law and less law-making by judges, so he should accept that point. Secondly, the Home Secretary reviews approximately 2,500 warrants a year—10 a day. The ability to do so is dependent to a very large extent on the data presented and the time available. The reason we wanted a reasons-based judgment was the feeling that an hour on any given warrant was simply not enough time. At this point, I do not know whether this provision will meet that requirement, but that is the test in my mind.

    INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL · 2016-06-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  34. I thank the hon. and learned Gentleman for his patience in giving way so many times. Frankly, I favour his version and the reason is this. It rather bounces off something he said earlier, when he was talking about the protection of trade unionists. Of course, he is right: historically, there have been cases, 20 years ago or so, of what one might call foolish interference in trade union actions by the agencies. Today, one of the problems is interference in what might be thought of as legitimate demonstrations, by environmental groups and so on, that have become public scandals. When he was talking about trade unionists, I was trying to think how we generalise that. It seems to me that his new clause is the right way to protect those engaged in legitimate democratic activity from improper intervention.

    INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL · 2016-06-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  35. I have not read the individual amendments, so I am flying blind here. However, there is no doubt that this power is the most intrusive power in the Government’s armoury. One of the problems historically has been that the sheer volume of work being conducted means that scrutiny and oversight can sometimes slip. Would my right hon. and learned Friend’s amendment actually require the investigation of every single bulk intervention?

    INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL · 2016-06-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  36. Bluntly, I ask my hon. and learned Friend to ensure that proposals come forward whether or not the Law Society comes up with any. The erosion of legal professional privilege without any recourse to this House is the single biggest erosion of liberty in this country over the past decade and a half. If the Bill is to meet its requirements, it is vital that such reforms are found.

    INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL · 2016-06-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  37. Unfortunately, I am afraid that I can give my hon. and learned Friend evidence of his account of accountability not working. When the case of the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas), who is a past, and no doubt future, leader of the Green party, went to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, the Government lawyer’s stance was that it was not a legally binding constraint on the agencies. When I put that point to the Prime Minister, he was unable to answer. It is normally the case with the Wilson doctrine that the answer comes many years later, so an argument about accountability does not stand up here.

    INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL · 2016-06-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  38. This point has just occurred to me, looking at the exchange of letters between Front-Bench spokespeople on bulk collection. What the right hon. Gentleman has been saying about privilege, whether legal, parliamentary or journalistic, applies only to targeted interception, but a great deal of bulk interception is shared with our allies, the National Security Agency, and there is no carve-out for any of the protections that he has discussed. I can think of circumstances in which lawyers might be targeted by the NSA because their clients are suspects—or, indeed, irritating Members of Parliament might be targeted; I am thinking of the right hon. Gentleman. In the discussions between the Front-Bench spokespeople, when the bulk collection inquiry is progressed, that should be picked up, so that the issue is dealt with.

    INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL · 2016-06-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  39. Surely one key point is that there would be an inhibition on a Secretary of State or a Prime Minister in the process of approaching the Speaker. They may not be inhibited about talking to each other about an uncomfortable Opposition Member, or indeed an uncomfortable Government Member, but they would be inhibited about approaching the Speaker. That is not separate to what goes on in the House. The one case that we have had was that of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashford (Damian Green), when there was an approach to the Speaker of the day, which I am afraid ended in tears.

    INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL · 2016-06-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  40. I am entirely in agreement with my hon. Friend on this. He says that it might not involve hacking a whole street, but it could easily involve hacking two layers of contacts. If I call 100 people, and then the people called by those 100 people are investigated, that would be a very typical intelligence exercise, pursuing the two rings of contacts. That could involve 100,000 people, most of whom have nothing to hide but could become under permanent surveillance by the state.

    INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL · 2016-06-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  41. Those include legal privilege, which as I say I think is the most important corrosion that is going on. We have heard about the Wilson doctrine, and about journalists and trade unions. It is now a wider issue. One thing that has come up in the past few years has been the misbehaviour of police forces and agencies with respect to demonstrators—the legitimate, proper and democratic operations of the Green movement, for example; there is also the blacklisting that the right hon. Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham) referred to. All those things need to be dealt with, and if the privacy guidance and clauses that are effectively built into the Bill do not do that, we must find a way to ensure that we do not just solve the problems of history, but that we solve problems for the future.

    INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL · 2016-06-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  42. That might cut 2,500 down to 2,000, and make things a little more practical. The simple truth is it would be a better way in any well-designed system. My amendments aim to improve the Bill in that regard. The Government have come up with a manuscript amendment that the former DPP, the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer), says he thinks is acceptable. Until I have taken advice I cannot make a judgment on that, but for that reason, I will not press my amendments today. But I say to Members on the Front Bench that if their arguments on this issue do not stand up they will either collapse in the Lords or they will collapse in the law courts—one or the other. That is pretty certain. A number of other issues have been raised today.

    INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL · 2016-06-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  43. The current members of that Committee include some of my oldest and dearest political friends, but I have to tell the House that I would not trust a Committee that had to be nominated by the Prime Minister, that met in secret and whose reports were redacted to hold the Executive to account. I could go into the history. It missed the dodgy dossier, the torture and the mass surveillance, and got 7/7 wrong. It is not a Committee we can rely on for accountability until it has proved itself over many more years. A politician should not sign these warrants off. We are not going to win that argument today, so what is the next best step? It is that a judicial process, based on the evidence—always, not optionally—be the check on the issue of these warrants. My preference is that that should happen before the Home Secretary sees them, not after.

    INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL · 2016-06-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  44. I see no argument whatever, other than the vestiges of royal prerogative, why Ministers should make judgments about warrants brought against citizens of this country. I can see nothing that justifies that. Our greatest ally, America, views it with horror. It causes us problems with American companies when those warrants are presented. America uses a solely legal process, which would be my preference. The arguments on accountability are frankly laughable. I know of no Minister who has stood at that Dispatch Box and defended the issue or non-issue of a warrant—not one—and it is arguably not legal. The argument put in Committee, I think by the Minister of State, was that Ministers are accountable to the Intelligence and Security Committee.

    INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL · 2016-06-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  45. I was shadow Home Secretary for five years and faced four different Home Secretaries—one and a half years apiece, roughly. What are we looking at, then? We will have someone who has typically been in office for a year or so making really serious judgments in a real hurry. That is not the way to make the sort of balanced judgments that we expect when we are balancing the privacy of our citizens on the one hand and their life and security on the other. The second reason is one of principle. I take the view, as did David Anderson, that it is perfectly proper for Ministers of the Crown to approve anything that would involve a foreign intercept, let us say, that would create a political problem for the country.

    INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL · 2016-06-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  46. The practical reason is that the Home Secretary has admitted to authorising about 2,500 of these things a year. That is 10 a day—not at most, but on average. On Second Reading, I asked her to tell us how long she took over any of them, but she refused and sidestepped the question. When this situation became public, after the Anderson report, I had letters from policemen who were involved in the creation of warrants who said that it was simply impossible and that 10 a day could not be done—a judge could not do 10 a day. That is the first problem. The second problem is that we take our judgment from the current Home Secretary. She is very unusual. She has been in office for six years. That is incredibly unusual, and a great reflection on her. But a typical Home Secretary is not there for six years.

    INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL · 2016-06-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  47. Before I go into that matter, I should tell the House that I take the view that the whole interception strategy used by this country is, in any event, flawed. We are virtually the only serious country in the world that does not use intercept evidence in court. The arguments made by the Government and the agencies are ones that could equally be made anywhere in the world. No other authority follows that. The fact that interception evidence is not used in court is one of the reasons why rather sloppy legal disciplines apply to the use of interception, particularly relying on the Home Secretary to authorise interceptions. Now, there are practical, principled and political reasons, as well as reasons of accountability, for that being wrong, full stop.

    INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL · 2016-06-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  48. Listening to most of the speeches on this group of amendments, I agreed with virtually all of them, particularly the points about modification. The right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) and my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) made a very good point—whatever the mechanism—about the flaws in the current Wilson doctrine, as now laid down in the Bill. There are therefore many changes yet to come, and I imagine they will come in the Lords, or indeed in the law courts. In the next few minutes, I will focus on the amendments in my name, principally amendments 208 to 211, which deal with the issue of the so-called double lock. Until the change proposed today, it was more like a double latchkey because it was not really as strong as it was represented to be.

    INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL · 2016-06-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  49. It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael). The Bill is undoubtedly necessary, in that it was preceded by interception and surveillance based on something like 66 different legal bases, and that was incomprehensible to almost anybody. I had hoped that the Bill would cover all the previous legal bases, but it does not do so. There are still matters that are not covered by the Bill. For example, the Intelligence Services Act 1994 is still avowed in the Bill, and is used as a mechanism for which it was not intended. I know that because I took that Bill through the House. I know what it was intended to do, and it was nothing like what it is now used for. Since I have a very limited time, I will press on, but let me say this.

    INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL · 2016-06-06 · READ IN HANSARD

  50. On Monday this week, I wrote to the Prime Minister asking him to correct this, and, to be fair, there was an apology and correction issued by a spokesman of 10 Downing Street yesterday. Of course, that did not have the same prominence as the original allegation and, in many ways just as importantly, does not correct the original allegation in the official record, which can still be published by others under qualified privilege—perhaps people who do not follow our affairs quite so closely. I am very concerned about the consequences of that, and I want to ask you, Mr Speaker, what can be done by the House or by the Government to protect people such as Mr Gani from the further consequence of a serious calumny—no matter how unintentional—against his reputation.

    POINTS OF ORDER · 2016-05-12 · READ IN HANSARD