Chris Philp
MP for Croydon South · Conservative · United Kingdom
“The Minister mentioned return numbers, but what she did not mention is that the return of 6,000 small-boat migrants in the past two and a bit years amounts to only 8% of illegal immigrants crossing the channel. That is to say, 92% of illegal immigrants crossing get to stay. There is no deterrent whatsoever in that.”
“I cannot give all the many examples, in the interests of time, but they cited one example in which apparently hundreds of Pakistani men claimed to be gay, based on a letter from an individual claiming to be the sexual partner of all of them. That is quite clearly fabricated with the assistance of immigration lawyers.”
“I was on the beaches of northern France just a few weeks ago, waist deep in water as one such dinghy embarked with about 100 illegal immigrants on it, while 10 members of the French gendarmerie nationale, who we pay for—who the Home Secretary pays for—with £660 million of our money, almost all of it unconditional, stood by and did nothing…”
“Numerous rapes have been committed by small-boat illegal immigrants, including the rape of a girl in Nuneaton aged just 12. The Government are using sleight of hand. They are moving illegal immigrants from hotels into apartments, then granting them asylum on an industrial scale.”
“I thank my constituency neighbour, the Minister for Policing and Crime, for advance sight of her statement. I am sure that we all agree that the right to protest is a fundamental part of our democracy, but the right to protest should never be violently exercised or cause serious disruption to other people.”
“Since the general election, over 80,000 illegal immigrants have crossed the channel, all illegally and all unnecessarily, because France is a safe country—nobody is fleeing persecution in France. Almost 20,000 have crossed this year alone, and 625 crossed yesterday, with more coming in the early hours.”
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“The first offence criminalises possession of those devices, and the second criminalises importing, making, adapting, supplying or offering to supply those devices.”
“Criminals do that using various forms of technology that enable them to either pick up the signal from a key fob, or hack into a vehicle’s control system, disable the immobiliser, and activate and unlock the vehicle. They then drive off. Unfortunately, that is relatively prevalent. There are things that constituents can do, such as put their key fob into a so-called Faraday bag—a little bag with an iron mesh around it—but that could be stolen. More modern vehicles, particularly in the past two or three years, have better security measures. Nonetheless, we parliamentarians want to do everything we can to prevent this kind of technology falling into criminal hands. That is why we are providing for two new criminal offences relating to vehicle theft using electronic devices such as signal jammers, but there are others also.”
“I am sure that the Committee will agree that when someone is involved in serious criminal activity, we would want the proceeds of that criminal activity, particularly if it is serious organised crime, to fall into the scope of the POCA regime. I have already mentioned the items included, which are listed in clause 2, and I have also referenced the affirmative statutory instrument process for adding additional items in the future. On clause 3, it is important that we include measures on vehicle theft in the Bill. I am sure that all of us have been contacted by constituents who are concerned about their cars being stolen, particularly from their home address.”
“This creates a power, using an affirmative statutory instrument that is subject to full parliamentary scrutiny, to add additional items as we become aware of them. It is impossible for us sitting here to foresee or anticipate what items criminals may come up with in the future, so it is important to have this power to future-proof against criminal innovation. The practical effect of amendments 40, 44 and 49 is to add these offences to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which means that when a person is found guilty of an offence, they will automatically be considered guilty of having a criminal lifestyle when the court is making a confiscation order.”
“As we have discussed, clauses 1 to 4 introduce new offences to criminalise the importation, manufacture, modification, supply, offer to supply and possession of particular articles used in serious and organised crime. They currently apply to England and Wales only, but after consultation with the devolved Administrations in Scotland and Northern Ireland, the Government tabled amendments 14 to 22 and 41 to extend the criminal offences to the whole of the UK. This follows a request from the devolved Administrations, which we are happy to agree to. Clause 2 contains a delegated power for the Secretary of State to amend the list of items covered by the clause. At the outset, we cover the templates for 3D-printed firearms, pill presses and concealed compartments.”
“As many of the articles that we are talking about can be used only for criminal purposes, it is reasonable to construct the clause this way. Members of the Committee will recall that we took evidence on this issue from a number of people in law enforcement, including Graeme Biggar, the director general of the National Crime Agency. Law enforcement—both territorial policing and the NCA—strongly welcomes these measures as strengthening the police’s armoury in the fight against organised crime. Through this regulation-making power, Ministers and Parliament will be able to keep up with changes in technology, which is extremely important given how fast technology is moving these days.”
“I thank the hon. Lady for that very good question. These two offences require a reasonable suspicion that the device will be used in connection with vehicle theft. The judge or the jury, depending on whether we are talking about magistrates court or the Crown court, have to be satisfied there is a reasonable suspicion that that is what the device will be used for. It is important that the police have the powers to arrest and prosecute people involved in this kind of activity. The offences should help a great deal in stopping these electronic devices getting into criminal hands. We have talked a little bit about the evidential burden of proof in clause 4, and I will not rehearse those points at great length, in the interests of Committee members’ patience and time.”
“Amendment 21, in clause 3, page 3, line 16, after “conviction” insert “in England and Wales” See the statement for amendment 20. Amendment 22, in clause 3, page 3, line 17, at end insert— “(aa) on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both); (ab) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);”— (Chris Philp.) See the statement for amendment 20. Clause 3, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 5 Possession of a SIM farm Question proposed , That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“Clause 2, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 3 Electronic devices for use in vehicle theft Amendments made: 20, in clause 3, page 3, line 10, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert— “(a) in England and Wales— (i) an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968 of theft of a conveyance (as defined by section 12 of that Act) or anything in a conveyance, or (ii) an offence under section 12 of that Act (taking vehicle or other conveyance without authority); (b) in Scotland— (i) theft of a vehicle, vessel or aircraft constructed or adapted for use for transporting one or more persons or of anything in such a vehicle, vessel or aircraft, or (ii) an offence under section 178 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (taking motor vehicle without authority); (c) in Northern Ireland— (i) an offence under section 1 of the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969 of theft of a conveyance (as defined by section 12 of that Act) or anything in a conveyance, or (ii) an offence under section 12 of that Act (taking vehicle or other conveyance without authority).” This amendment and amendments 21 and 22 extend the offence under this clause to Scotland and Northern Ireland.”
“Clause 1, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 2 Section 1: meaning of “relevant article” Amendments made: 18, in clause 2, page 2, line 17, after “1968” insert “or, in Northern Ireland, Article 2(2) of the Firearms (Northern Ireland) Order 2004 (S.I. 2004/702 (N.I. 3))”. See the statement for amendment 14. Amendment 19, in clause 2, page 2, line 30, leave out “subsection).” and insert “subsection or subsection (4)). (4) Before making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must consult— (a) the Scottish Ministers, and (b) the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland. — (Chris Philp.) This amendment requires the Secretary of State to consult the Scottish Ministers and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland before making regulations under this clause.”
“Amendments made: 15, in clause 1, page 2, line 2, at end insert— “(b) in Scotland, an offence specified or described in Part 1A of that Schedule; (c) in Northern Ireland, an offence specified or described in Part 2 of that Schedule.” See the statement for amendment 14. Amendment 16, in clause 1, page 2, line 4, after “conviction” insert “in England and Wales”. See the statement for amendment 14. Amendment 17, in clause 1, page 2, line 5, at end insert— “(aa) on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both); (ab) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);”.— (Chris Philp.) See the statement for amendment 14.”
“I expect us to stay very closely in touch with the law enforcement community, particularly the National Crime Agency, but also the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for serious and organised crime, and the regional organised crime units, who would rapidly identify new bits of technology used by criminals, so that we could very quickly add them. There is not a statutory duty to consult—other than, of course, with Scotland and Northern Ireland’s devolved Administrations—but we did consult on these provisions. It would be our intention, unless there was an emergency situation, to consult prior to adding any new items, lest there were unintended consequences. I hope that addresses the points raised, and I commend the four clauses to the Committee. Amendment 14 agreed to.”
“On the affirmative regulation-making power, I am grateful to the shadow Minister for breaking his habit and supporting it. He is quite right to say that this is technically a Henry VIII power, in that it is a statutory instrument that can amend primary legislation—under clause 2(3), the statutory instrument can amend the clause—but it has very limited scope, because only this clause can be amended. The only purpose for which the power can be used is specifying additional types of technology, because that is all that the clause does. While this is a Henry VIII power, it has very limited and specific applicability. As for adding future items, there is nothing immediately on the list.”
“I will briefly respond to one or two of the points the shadow Minister raised. We engaged with the devolved Administrations both at an official level and through correspondence. I am glad to say that they were pretty keen to ensure that the new offences applied in Scotland and Northern Ireland. As the shadow Minister said, it is very important to ensure that serious criminals have no part of the United Kingdom in which they can operate. I am glad to observe generally that despite political differences, particularly with the nationalists in Scotland, we have a relatively good relationship on law enforcement co-operation. Generally, we work quite constructively together in a non-confrontational, non-politicised way, as I guess our constituents, the public, and the whole House would expect.”
“Very often, these scam texts can be traced back to so-called “SIM farms”, which are electronic devices that sometimes hold hundreds of physical SIM cards that can be used to send out thousands and thousands of scam text messages in a matter of seconds. These devices are relatively easy to buy and—until this Bill passes into law—they are legal to buy online, enabling criminals to commit large-scale fraud by abusing our telecommunications network. In the fraud strategy, we committed to stopping that, which is why we are legislating. We consulted on these proposals in May 2023 and received broad support for these measures. There were some concerns about the definitions being too broad, such that they would inadvertently criminalise some legitimate activity, but we have worked to develop the legislation in order to address those concerns.”
“As Members will be aware, criminals often use telecommunications networks to target people to try and defraud them, for example with scam texts and scam calls. In fact, the secretary of my local residents association in Coulsdon, in my constituency of Croydon South, sent me a message just this morning with an example of a scam text that she had just received, purporting to come from the Royal Mail and inviting her to click on a link and fill in her details. This is clearly a problem. I am sure that we have all heard such examples; indeed, we have probably received messages ourselves. Although most people can identify them as scams trying to elicit fraud, unfortunately some people who receive them are taken in, because the messages can often be quite realistic, and often they end up losing significant amounts of money.”
“I will seek to satisfy myself that that is not the case, but if he has identified a problem or potential loophole, I will happily come back to the Committee. I will take that away as a point to double check. We can probably rely on juries, or magistrates in a magistrates court trial, to apply common sense to those defences, but it is good that he raised the question and I will certainly look into it.”
“The hon. Member raises a concern that inventive criminals might exploit the defences we set out in clause 5(3), on lines 37 to 40 at the bottom of page 3, which he was quoting from. He is concerned that criminals might find a way of pretending or purporting to offer, for example, legitimate broadcasting services when in fact they do not. I think that a court would take a view on legitimate broadcasting services. If there was a prosecution and a criminal advanced that defence, it would be up to the jury to decide whether the broadcasting services really were legitimate. Since the hon. Member has raised the point, I will happily take it away and see whether there are any concerns that the clause might inadvertently provide a loophole for ingenious or inventive criminals.”
“It is a technical amendment, making sure that it applies to everybody undertaking those searches to hopefully find and prosecute criminals who are using SIM farms. On that basis, I commend these provisions to the Committee.”
“We have talked a bit about the legitimate use issue already, and there are some examples provided in clause 5, as we have discussed. I will turn to amendment 47 to schedule 1. Schedule 1 confers powers of entry, search and seizure in relation to these offences. There is an offence of intentionally obstructing a constable when they are carrying out a search—the search is to be unimpeded, obviously . That offence also needs to apply in the case of people who are exercising the power of a constable, such as designated National Crime Agency officers, who are not necessarily constables. Amendment 47 to schedule 1 is a technical amendment that makes sure that all the relevant people can exercise this power of search: not just constables, but any person who is exercising the power of a constable.”
“Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat), is very aware of the issue because it falls into his portfolio rather than mine. Perhaps I could ask his officials to write to the hon. Lady to update her on the work he is doing with law enforcement on that point, because this clause just does not address it. Turning back to the group of clauses, it is worth saying that these offences will make it difficult—I hope impossible—for criminals to access and use SIM farms for the purposes of fraud, and the police will be given the tools that they need to disrupt them. Clauses 5 and 6 ban the possession and supply of a SIM farm. However, as I have already said in response to the hon. Member for Bootle, if a person has good reason or lawful authority, obviously that is not criminalised.”
“That sort of interception and insertion is not addressed by this clause, which is about SIM farms and the almost industrial-scale transmission of thousands of messages. What the hon. Lady is describing is a little different. It can happen to emails as well. For example, if someone is about to buy a house, they may be corresponding with their solicitor. When the solicitor tells them to transfer the funds to X bank account, a criminal can insert themselves into the email chain, pretending to be the solicitor, and put in a message telling the client to send the funds to their own bank instead of the solicitor’s client account. Inserting messages into an email chain happens quite a bit, but that is not what this clause is designed to address. The Security Minister, my right hon.”
“When we talk about a 56% reduction in crime since 2010 to on a like-for-like basis, which I am sure I will be referring to once or twice in the next year, it excludes fraud and computer misuse only because they were not in that series of figures.”
“I was one of the Ministers through whose hands the Online Safety Act 2023 passed during its extremely lengthy gestation. It will have a significant effect by requiring the large social media platforms to proactively take steps to prevent fraud. Some of them have already done that voluntarily, and there have been big reductions in the amount of online-originated fraud, so this is a huge priority. The simple reason we do not include fraud when comparing the overall crime figures to 2010 is that it got picked up by the crime survey for England and Wales, alongside computer misuse, only in about 2016. If the figures going back to 2010 existed, we would obviously include them.”
“Let me respond to one or two of the issues that the shadow Minister quite reasonably raised. Fraud makes up about 40% of all criminal offences—the figure I have in my mind is 41%. The hon. Gentleman is right that it is incredibly serious, and I have certainly never suggested anything to the contrary. It can devastate people’s lives. People who have worked hard over a lifetime building up their life savings to fund their retirement or their children’s education can suddenly have them taken from them in very distressing circumstances, so there is no question but that fraud is an extremely serious crime. The Government take it extremely seriously, which is why there is a fraud action plan, backed with investment—we recently provided over £100 million of extra money.”
“I will in a moment. When we compare the crime figures since 2016, we see that overall crime has fallen. For example, overall crime including fraud and computer misuse has fallen by 10% in the last year, which I am sure the shadow Minister is about to stand up and welcome.”
“It is not reliant on that. It is simply that the data does not exist. The chief inspector of constabulary Andy Cooke said in his state of policing report last June that we are arguably safer than we have ever been before. If we look at the crime types for which we do have continuous data going back to 2010 and before—such as burglary, robbery, the vehicle theft figures that the shadow Minister himself quoted recently, violent and seriously violent crime—we see that all of those individual crime types have fallen dramatically.”
“In a moment. Bicycle theft is down by 39%, vehicle crime by about 50%, and violent crime by around 50%. It is not the case that some sort of artifice going on and that if we added fraud, that would paint a different picture. Whichever crime type we look at, we see that it is going down according to the crime survey. We all know why police reported crime sometimes shows different trends. It is because the police are being driven by—we are getting a bit off topic here, so I am probably going to get told off in a minute.”
“Yes. There is probably another time to debate this point, and perhaps now is a good moment to give way to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley.”
“Clause 8 Fraud facilitated by electronic communications: possession or supply of other articles Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“There are various jurisdictions that tend to originate more of this fraud—Russia, for example—and the Security Minister in particular and the Home Secretary are working very closely on that. In order to avoid any further disapproval, Dame Angela, I think I have answered the questions. Question put and agreed to. Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause s 6 and 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 1 Possession or supply of Sim farms: powers of entry etc Amendment made: 47, in schedule 1, page 75, line 15, after “includes” insert “— (a) a person who has the powers of a constable; (b)” . — (Chris Philp.) This amendment provides that the offence in this paragraph applies in respect of persons who have the powers of a constable. Schedule 1, as amended, agreed to.”
“This is not an open-ended provision—it is very specific and precisely defined in law as someone who already has the powers as a constable. We are not creating any new powers in the Bill, other than that those people who have the powers of a constable can conduct these searches. The shadow Minister also asked about international co-operation, which is extremely important. My colleague the Security Minister works very closely with international partners—in fact, he is almost constantly travelling. There will be an international summit chaired by the Home Secretary later this year on the very topic of combating fraud, working closely with the Five Eyes and engaging bilaterally with the European Union and other key countries.”
“Thank you, Dame Angela; you were extremely tolerant, but I could sense the frostiness beginning to build without even looking at you. The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Nottingham North, asked two more questions on this group, which I will answer very briefly. He asked for assurance that this technical amendment was not a smokescreen for some nefarious Government plot. The wording of Government amendment 47 is very clear, in that it just inserts the words, “a person who has the powers of a constable”. Therefore, it extends the powers of search only where that person has the powers of a constable, which of course is set out in legislation. I gave as an example certain employees of the National Crime Agency.”
“There is therefore a statutory obligation to consult here, which I hope provides the shadow Minister with the assurance that he is probably about to ask for.”
“For example, the offences created using these regulation-making powers can only create summary offences of possessing or supplying technology to be used in connection with fraud facilitated by electronic communication. It is very specific and very narrow. The shadow Minister previously asked about consultation. I said that there was no statutory requirement to consult on those extensions—outside of the devolved Administrations, of course—but that the broad intention was to do so, unless there was a very good reason otherwise, such as an emergency. Here, however, we do have a statutory duty to consult. Members will find it in clause 8(5), which states that “the Secretary of State must consult such persons appearing…to be likely to be affected by the regulations”.”
“We have already discussed that technological change can be very rapid, and that criminals, including fraudsters, are quite technologically literate and very often embrace emerging tech capabilities to attempt to defraud the public. Just as we previously discussed in relation to articles used for serious and organised crime, so here, in clause 8, we are proposing to create a power by regulations for the Secretary of State to make a list of new items that might be prohibited where they can be used for the purposes of committing crime by way of electronic communications. As the shadow Minister has said, one has to be a little cautious about conferring regulation-making powers too freely, so there are constraints on this.”
“I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his question. I point to the way the clause is constructed. Clause 8(2) is narrowly defined, in that is says: “An article may be specified only if the Secretary of State considers that there is a significant risk of the article being used for a purpose connected with fraud that is perpetrated by means of— (a) an electronic communication network, or (b) an electronic communication service.” Clearly the Secretary of State’s decision would be amenable to judicial review if it were unreasonably exercised. The scope of the ability to create a new criminal offence is highly circumscribed and it has to fit within that narrow box in the Bill.”
“In addition to the protection afforded by the statutory obligation to consult, there is also the fact that this can only be a summary offence, which severely limits the maximum penalty that may be applied.”
“That is only part of the circumscription, because prior to that the clause says, “being used for a purpose connected with fraud”. If we think about that as a Venn diagram, the shadow Minister is right to say that electronic communication networks and services represent an enormous field. However, that is not where the power is created. It is created in the intersection between that bit of the Venn diagram and the bit where the article or technology is being used for a purpose connected with fraud, and that intersection is a lot smaller. I do not think that any member of this Committee or any Member of Parliament, of either party, would object to criminalising technology being used for a particular fraudulent purpose.”
“I hope that the assurance I have given, which will be in Hansard , combined with the narrow nature of this, the narrow scope of the ability to create offences, the statutory duty to consult, and the fact that it is a summary offence, meaning that the maximum term is six months at the moment—all those things taken together—will give the shadow Minister assurance on the questions that he is raising. Question put and agreed to. Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 9 Possession of weapon with intent to use unlawful violence etc”
“I can certainly confirm that where someone possesses technology for a good and legitimate reason, by definition it would not be getting used for a purpose connected with fraud. I can also confirm that where someone possesses communications technology for a legitimate purpose and not for use in connection with fraud, we would not expect that to ever be criminalised, either through offences created via this clause or in any other way. I hope that assures the shadow Minister. Subsection 4 says: “The regulations may— (a) contain exceptions or defences” of exactly the kind that we have created in clauses 1 to 4 already.”
“I hope that addresses both the hon. Gentleman’s amendment and the substantive provisions in clause 9.”
“For complete clarity, I repeat the point that the possession of any bladed article, including swords and even kitchen knives, in a public place without good reason is already a criminal offence with a maximum sentence of two years. When a knife is possessed with intent, as in the attack on Ronan—the two youths obviously intended to go and kill someone, although it was someone else—the clause increases the maximum sentence from two years to four years. In that case the youths clearly committed homicide, which obviously has life as a maximum sentence. I hope that I have provided clarity about the purpose of the clause and explained why the change is necessary, because it is included already, and that in secondary legislation we are altering the law on completely prohibited weapons. That will happen in a small number of weeks.”
“I thank the shadow Minister for mentioning the case raised by his right hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden). I have also met Ronan’s family, who were brought into Parliament by the right hon. Member. We obviously both heard the same account of their story. It was extremely moving and tragic that such a young life was lost. I think it was a case of mistaken identity—as the shadow Minister said, Ronan was attacked from behind. I add my tribute to the family, and to Ronan’s mum and sister in particular, who have recounted the terrible, traumatic event to try to improve law enforcement in this area. We are mindful of that case, and I look forward to debating what is on and off the list when we come to it.”
“The measures we announced in the Bill will simply increase the list of things on the completely prohibited list. For example, a loophole in the 2019 Act meant that threatening words on the blade were required for the zombie knife to be illegal. We are removing that provision, so that any zombie knife, even with nothing on the blade, will still be illegal—common sense, really. Those changes—widening the range of knives that will be completely illegal—will be made not through the Bill, but through secondary legislation that will be laid before the House in the near future, by which I mean a small number of weeks. I do not wish to provoke the ire of the Chair, so I should say that the place to debate what should be in and out of that list is probably in the Delegated Legislation Committee that will come soon, in a small number of weeks.”
“Member for Nottingham North was actually talking about a different set of provisions, which were included in our consultation and our response: banning certain kinds of knives. When a knife is banned, it cannot be sold, imported or possessed even in private. Something such as a zombie knife was covered in the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, where it has threatening writing on the blade. Such knives cannot even be held in someone’s home. Having banned knives at home or selling them to anyone is an offence; a kitchen knife can of course be sold and had at home, but even a kitchen knife cannot be carried down the street without a good reason. In our consultation, we were talking about the knives that people cannot even possess privately at home; they cannot be sold or imported, and they are completely prohibited.”
“For a second possession offence, the mandatory minimum is six months in prison, absent exceptional circumstances—we tightened that up in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. That is the law for possessing blades in public. The clause states that when someone possesses any bladed article—including a legal kitchen knife—with intent to cause damage, the maximum sentence will not be two years, as currently, but four years, if that person intends to cause harm. For example, they might put a video on TikTok saying, “I’m going to stab X”. If there is intention to cause harm, that doubles the maximum sentence. That is what the clause does. The amendment to include swords is not necessary, because every bladed article, including swords, is already included. The hon.”
“It may be helpful to clarify the two different kinds of provisions that apply; the shadow Minister was conflating the two slightly. The first area, the one that we are debating, is to do with the existing offence of possessing any bladed article in a public place without good reason. That can include a legal kitchen knife. That carrying is a criminal offence under section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1998. That applies to every bladed article, even ones that are legal, such as a kitchen knife or anything else. It also applies to swords, including ninja swords, because they are bladed articles with a sharp point. At the moment, the possession of any such knives, including so-called legal knives, carries a maximum sentence of up to two years if someone is caught in possession.”
“On a point of order, Ms Bardell. First, it is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship. Secondly, for the record, I just clarify that the maximum sentence for a possession offence under section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 is four years. This morning, I inadvertently said two years.”
“In addition, the provisions of the Online Safety Act, which will be commenced into full force once the various codes of practice are published by Ofcom, will place duties on things such as online marketplaces, which historically have not been regulated. Online marketplaces have been facilitating, for example, the sale of knives to young people or the sale of illegal knives—the kind of knives that we are banning. Those online marketplaces will fall into the remit of the Online Safety Act, so the online space will get clamped down on a great deal.”