Chris Philp
MP for Croydon South · Conservative · United Kingdom
“The Minister mentioned return numbers, but what she did not mention is that the return of 6,000 small-boat migrants in the past two and a bit years amounts to only 8% of illegal immigrants crossing the channel. That is to say, 92% of illegal immigrants crossing get to stay. There is no deterrent whatsoever in that.”
“I cannot give all the many examples, in the interests of time, but they cited one example in which apparently hundreds of Pakistani men claimed to be gay, based on a letter from an individual claiming to be the sexual partner of all of them. That is quite clearly fabricated with the assistance of immigration lawyers.”
“I was on the beaches of northern France just a few weeks ago, waist deep in water as one such dinghy embarked with about 100 illegal immigrants on it, while 10 members of the French gendarmerie nationale, who we pay for—who the Home Secretary pays for—with £660 million of our money, almost all of it unconditional, stood by and did nothing…”
“Numerous rapes have been committed by small-boat illegal immigrants, including the rape of a girl in Nuneaton aged just 12. The Government are using sleight of hand. They are moving illegal immigrants from hotels into apartments, then granting them asylum on an industrial scale.”
“I thank my constituency neighbour, the Minister for Policing and Crime, for advance sight of her statement. I am sure that we all agree that the right to protest is a fundamental part of our democracy, but the right to protest should never be violently exercised or cause serious disruption to other people.”
“Since the general election, over 80,000 illegal immigrants have crossed the channel, all illegally and all unnecessarily, because France is a safe country—nobody is fleeing persecution in France. Almost 20,000 have crossed this year alone, and 625 crossed yesterday, with more coming in the early hours.”
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“It takes Parliament to step in and get away from this habitual, content-restriction reaction and push us into an open-society-based response to misinformation. William Perrin: Can I just add that it does not say “emergency”? It does not say that at all. It says “reasonable grounds” that “present a threat”—not a big threat—under “special circumstances”. We do not know what any of that means, frankly. With this clause, I get the intent—that it is important for national security, at times, to send messages—but this has not been done in the history of public communication before. If we go back through 50 or 60 years, even 70 years, of Government communication, the Government have bought adverts and put messages transparently in place.”
“We therefore found ridiculous examples, such as police posts warning of fraud around covid being taken down by the internet companies’ automated systems because those systems were set to, essentially, not worry about overreach. That is why we are saying that we need, in the Bill, a modern, open-society approach to misinformation. That starts with it recognising misinformation in the first place. That is vital, of course. It should then go on to create a modern, harms-based media literacy framework, and to prefer content-neutral and free-speech-based interventions over content-restricting interventions. That was not what was happening during the pandemic, and it is not what will happen by default.”
“A significant part of the pandemic response was, essentially, some of the main information platforms in all of our day-to-day lives taking down content in vast numbers and restricting what we can all see and share. We have started to treat that as a normal part of our lives, and, as someone who believes that the best way to inform debate in an open society is freedom of expression, which I know you believe, too, Minister, I am deeply concerned that we have normalised that. In fact, you referred to it in your Times article. I think that the Bill needs to step in and prevent that kind of overreach, as well as the triggering of unneeded reactions. In the pandemic, the political pressure was all on taking down harmful health content; there was no countervailing pressure to ensure that the systems did not overreach.”
“They give the Secretary of State powers, in emergency situations—a public health situation or a national security situation, as set out in clause 146(1)—to address precisely that issue of misinformation in an emergency context. Under that clause, it would happen in a way that was statutory, open and transparent. In that context, is it not a very welcome clause? William Moy: I am sorry to disappoint you, Minister, but no, I do not accept that. The clause basically attaches to Ofcom’s fairly weak media literacy duties, which, as we have already discussed, need to be modernised and made harms-based and safety-based. However, more to the point, the point that I was trying to make is that we have normalised a level of censorship that was unimaginable in previous generations.”
“Q Okay, thank you. I am not sure that I can take anything specific away from that. Perhaps that illustrates the difficulty of legislating. The clause, as drafted, obviously represents the best efforts, thus far, to deal with an obviously difficult and complicated issue. We heard some commentary earlier—I think from Mr Moy—about the need to address misinformation, particularly in the context of a serious situation such as the recent pandemic. I think you were saying that there was a meeting, in March or April 2020, for the then Secretary of State and social media firms to discuss the issue and what steps they might take to deal with it. You said that it was a private meeting and that it should perhaps have happened more transparently. Do you accept that the powers conferred in clause 146, as drafted, do, in fact, address that issue?”
“They restricted it to, I think, six forwards, and then you were not able to forward the message again. That is an example of friction. Twitter has a note whereby if you go to retweet something but you have not clicked on the link, it says, “Do you want to read the article before you share this?” You can still share it, but it creates that moment of pause for people to make a more informed decision.”
“Q Yes. On clause 13(4), the actions listed there are quite wide, given that they include not just “taking down the content”—as set out in clause 13(4)(a) —but also “(b) restricting users’ access to the content; (c) limiting the recommendation or promotion of the content; (d) recommending or promoting the content.” I would suggest that those actions are pretty wide, as drafted. One of the witnesses—I think it was Mr Moy—talked about what were essentially content-agnostic measures to impede virality, and used the word “friction”. Can you elaborate a little bit on what you mean by that in practical terms? William Moy: Yes, I will give a couple of quick examples. WhatsApp put a forwarding limit on WhatsApp messages during the pandemic. We knew that WhatsApp was a vector through which misinformation could spread, because forwarding is so easy.”
“Q Thank you. Would you accept that the level of specificity that you have just outlined there is very difficult, if not impossible, to put in a piece of primary legislation? William Moy: But that is not what I am suggesting you do. I am suggesting you say that this Parliament prefers interventions that are content-neutral or free speech-based, and that inform users and help them make up their own minds, to interventions that restrict what people can see and share.”
“Q But a piece of legislation has to do more than express a preference; it has to create a statutory duty. I am just saying that that is quite challenging in this context. William Moy: I do not think it is any more challenging than most of the risk assessments, codes of practice and so on, but I am willing to spend as many hours as it takes to talk through it with you.”
“I would be very reluctant to take too much on trust. I do not mean on trust from the Government; I mean on trust from the platforms—I saw the Minister look up quickly then. We have confidence in Government; it is the platforms we are little bit wary of. I heard the frustration expressed on Tuesday.”
“Finally, we have suggested a little bit more precision on the things that Ofcom should take into account when dealing with platforms. I have been a regulatory lawyer for nearly 40 years, and I know that regulators often benefit from having that sort of clarity. There is going to be negotiation between Ofcom and the platforms. If Ofcom can refer to a more detailed list of the factors it is supposed to take into account, I think that will speed the process up. One of the reasons we particularly welcomed the structure of the Bill is that there is no wait for detailed codes of conduct because these are duties that we will be executing immediately. I hope Ofcom is working on the guidance already, but the guidance could come out pretty quickly. Then there would be the process of—maybe negotiating is the wrong word—to-and-fro with the platforms.”
“I would really hesitate to describe them as amendments; I see them as shading-in areas—we are not trying to add anything. We think that it would be helpful, for instance, when someone is entitled to be verified, that verification status should also be visible to other users. We think that should be implicit, because it is meant to act as a signal to others as to whether someone is verified. We hope that would be visible, and we have suggested the addition of just a few words into clause 14 on that. We think that the Bill would benefit from a further definition of what it means by “user identity verification”. We have put forward a proposal on that. It is such an important term that I think it would be helpful to have it as a defined term in clause 189.”
“Q Thank you again to the witnesses for joining us this morning. I will start with Stephen Kinsella. You have spoken already about some of the issues to do with anonymity. Can you share with the Committee your view on the amendments made to the Bill, when it was introduced a couple of months ago, to give users choices over self-verification and the content they see? Do you think they are useful and helpful updates to the Bill? Stephen Kinsella: Yes. We think they are extremely helpful. We welcome what we see in clause 14 and clause 57. There is thus a very clear right to be verified, and an ability to screen out interactions with unverified accounts, which is precisely what we asked for. The Committee will be aware that we have put forward some further proposals.”
“My position has always been that that is a good thing. The extent and the nature of the content that is harmful to adults on such platforms—you mentioned BitChute but there are plenty of others—require an additional level of regulatory burden and closer proximity to the regulator. Those platforms should have to account for it and say, “We are the platforms; we are happy that this harm is on our platform and”—as the Bill says—“we are promoting it.” You are right that it is captured to some degree; I think it could be captured further.”
“Q Yes, and thank you for the work that you have done on this issue, together with Siobhan Baillie, my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud, which the Government adopted. Some of the areas that you have referred to could be dealt with in subsequent Ofcom codes of practice, but we are certainly happy to look at your submissions. Thank you for the work that you have done in this area. Danny, we have had some fairly extensive discussions on the question of small but toxic platforms such as 4chan and BitChute—thank you for coming to the Department to discuss them. I heard your earlier response to the shadow Minister, but do you accept that those platforms should be subject to duties in the Bill in relation to content that is illegal and content that is already harmful to children? Danny Stone: Yes, that is accurate.”
“If, with some of the better-faith actors in the social media space, we have successfully taken down huge reams of the most harmful content and moved it away from where millions of people can see it to where only tens of thousands can see it, we do not want in any way the potential to open up the risk that hundreds of people could argue that they should be back on platforms when they are currently not there.”
“Finally, as we heard on Tuesday, social media platforms—I am not sure I would agree with much of what they would say about the Bill, but I think this is true—do not really understand what they are meant to do with these clauses. Some of them are talking about flowcharts and whether this is a point-scoring system that says, “You get plus one for being a journalist, but minus two for being a racist.” I am not entirely sure that platforms will exercise the same level of regard.”
“If we have a situation in which there is an expediated process for complaints to be made, and for journalistic content to remain on the platform for an announced time until the platform is able take it down, that could move far outside the realms of that journalistic or democratically important content. Again, using the earlier examples, it does not take long for content such as a livestream of a terrorist attack to be up on the Sun or the Daily Mirror websites and for lots of people to modify that video and bypass content, which can then be shared and used to recruit new terrorists and allow copycat attacks to happen, and can go into the worst sewers of the internet. Any friction that is placed on stopping platforms being able to take down some of that harm is definitely of particular concern to us.”
“That is not an absolute protection; it is simply a requirement to take into account and perform a proportionate and reasonable balancing exercise. Is that not reasonable? Liron Velleman: I have a couple of things to say on that. First, we and others in civil society have spent a decade trying to de-platform some of the most harmful actors from mainstream social media companies. What we do not want to see after the Bill becomes an Act are massive test cases where we do not know which way they will go and where it will be up to either the courts or social media companies to make their own decisions on how much regard they place in those exemptions at the same time as all the other clauses. Secondly, one of our main concerns is the time it takes for some of that content to be removed.”
“Q I understand; thank you. Liron, in an earlier answer, you referred to the protections for content of democratic importance and journalistic content, which are set out in clauses 15 and 16. You suggested and were concerned that they could act as a bar to hateful, prohibited or even illegal speech being properly enforced against. Do you accept that clauses 15 and 16 do not provide an absolute protection for content of democratic importance or journalistic content, and that they do not exempt such content from the Bill’s provisions? They simply say that in discharging duties under the Bill, operators must use “proportionate systems and processes…to ensure that…content of democratic”— or journalistic— “importance is taken into account”.”
“We need to think about those overlapping harms when it comes to human rights—not just free speech but freedom from discrimination. We need to be thinking about free speech in its widest context.”
“As a user, you get to determine how harmful a platform you wish to engage with—that is ultimately what it does. I do not think that it enforces content take-downs, except in relation to illegal material. It is about systems, and in some places, as you have heard today, it should be more about systems, introducing friction, risk-assessing and showing the extent to which harm is served up to people. That has its problems. The only other thing on free speech is that we sometimes take too narrow a view of it. People are crowded out of spaces, particularly minority groups. If I, as a Jewish person, want to go on 4chan, it is highly unlikely that I will get a fair hearing there. I will be threatened or bullied out of that space. Free speech has to apply across the piece; it is not limited.”
“Q Okay, thank you. My last question touches on those issues and is for each of the panel in turn. Some people have claimed—I think wrongly—that the provisions in the Bill in some way threaten free speech. As you will have seen in the article I wrote in The Times earlier this week, I do not think, for a number of reasons, that that is remotely true, but I would be interested in hearing the views of each of the panel members on whether there is any risk to freedom of speech in the work that the Bill does in terms of protecting people from illegal content, harm to children and content that is potentially harmful to adults. Danny Stone: My take on this—I think people have misunderstood the Bill—is that it ultimately creates a regulated marketplace of harm.”
“They also play a disproportionate role in disseminating abuse, and I think you may have a separate session with Kick It Out and the other football bodies. They have some very good research that shows the extent to which abusive language is from unverified or anonymous accounts. So, no, we do not have any free speech concerns at Clean up the Internet.”
“Q Thank you. You made a very important point: there is nothing in the Bill that requires censorship or prohibition of content that is legal and harmless to children. That is a really important point. Stephen Kinsella: I agree entirely with what Danny was saying. Of course, we would say that our proposals have no implications for free speech. What we are talking about is the freedom not to be shouted at—that is really what we are introducing. On disinformation, we did some research in the early days of our campaign that showed that a vast amount of the misinformation and disinformation around the 5G covid conspiracy was spread and amplified by anonymous or unverified accounts, so they play a disproportionate role in disseminating that.”
“On children, the Bill should not be about limiting freedom of speech, but a large amount of our work covers the growth of youth radicalisation, particularly in the far right, which exists primarily online and which can then lead to offline consequences. You just have to look at the number of arrests of teenagers for far-right terrorism, and so much of that comes from the internet. Part of the Bill is about moderating online content, but it definitely serves to protect against some of the offline consequences of what exists on the platform. We would hope that if people are looking to strengthen freedom of speech, that is a universalist principle in the Bill, and not for some groups but not others.”
“Q Good. Thank you, Stephen. Liron? Liron Velleman: We are satisfied that the Bill adequately protects freedom of speech. Our key view is that, if people are worried that it does not, beefing up the universal protections for freedom of speech should be the priority, instead of what we believe are potentially harmful exemptions in the Bill. We think that freedom of speech for all should be protected, and we very much agree with what Danny said—that the Bill should be about enhancing freedom of speech. There are so many communities that do not use social media platforms because of the harm that exists currently on platforms.”
“That might put a smile on the faces of some Department for Education officials, who looked so sad during some of the consultation process—trying to ensure that there is proper funding. If you are going to roll this out across the country and make it fit for purpose, it is going to cost a lot of money.”
“There are lots of conversations about how children understand use of the internet, but what we have seen, especially during the pandemic, is the proliferation of things like community Facebook groups, which used to be about bins and a fair that is going on this weekend, becoming about the worst excesses of harmful content. People have seen conspiracy theories, and that is where we have seen some of the big changes to how the far-right and other hateful groups operate, in terms of being able to use some of those platforms. That is because of a lack of media literacy not just among children, but among the adult population. I definitely would encourage that being in the Bill, as well as anywhere else, so that we can remove some of those harms. Danny Stone: I think it will need further funding, beyond what has already been announced.”
“Do those three things—including, critically, Ofcom’s own updated guidance last December—give the panel comfort and confidence that media literacy is being well addressed? Liron Velleman: If the Bill is seeking to make the UK the safest place to be on the internet, it seems to be the obvious place to put in something about media literacy. I completely agree with what Danny said earlier: we would also want to specifically ensure—although I am sure this already exists in some other parts of Ofcom and Government business—that there is much greater media literacy for adults as well as children.”
“Q The shadow Minister’s question is related to the removal of what was clause 103 in the old draft of the Bill. As she said, that related to media literacy. Does the panel draw any comfort from three facts? First, there is already a media literacy duty on Ofcom under section 11 of the Communications Act 2003—the now deleted clause 103 simply provided clarification on an existing duty. Secondly, last December, after the Joint Committee’s deliberations, but before the updated Bill was published, Ofcom published its own updated approach to online media literacy, which laid out the fact that it was going to expand its media literacy programme beyond what used to be in the former clause 103. Finally, the Government also have their own media literacy strategy, which is being funded and rolled out.”
“I think that is what you are seeing in practice in some of the work we have done jointly—for example, around the implementation of the children’s code alongside Ofcom’s implementation of the video-sharing platform regime. A joined-up approach to questions about, for example, how you assure the age of children online is really important. That gives me real confidence in reassuring the Committee that the ICO, Ofcom and other digital regulators will be able to take a very joined-up approach to regulating in the context of the new online safety regime.”
“It is a voluntary, not statutory, forum that brings together ourselves, Ofcom, the Competition and Markets Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority—some of the regulators with the greatest interest in digital regulation—to make sure that we have a coherent approach to the regulation of digital services in the interests of the public and indeed the economy. We are brought together through our common interest. We do not require a series of duties or statutory frameworks to make us co-operate, because the case for co-operation is very, very clear. We will deliver better outcomes by working together and by joining up where our powers align.”
“Q Mr Almond, welcome to the Committee. Thank you for joining us this afternoon. Can I start with co-operation? You mentioned a moment ago in answer to Maria Miller that co-operation between regulators, particularly in this context the ICO and Ofcom, was going to be very important. Would you describe the co-operative work that is happening already and that you will be undertaking in the future, and comment on the role that the Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum has in facilitating that? Stephen Almond: Thank you very much. I will start by explaining the Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum.”
“Q Thank you very much. That is extremely helpful. From the perspective of privacy, how satisfied are you that the Bill as constructed gives the appropriate protections to users’ privacy? Stephen Almond: In our view, the Bill strikes an appropriate balance between privacy and online safety. The duties in the Bill should leave service providers in no doubt that they must comply with data protection law, and that they should guard against unwarranted intrusion of privacy. In my discourse with firms, I am very clear that this is not a trade-off between online safety and privacy: it is both. We are firmly expecting that companies take that forward and work out how they are going to adopt both a “privacy by design” and a “safety by design” approach to the delivery of their services. They must deliver both.”
“Q Thank you. My final question is this: do you feel the Bill has been constructed in such a way that it works consistently with the data protection provisions, such as UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018? Stephen Almond: In brief, yes. We feel that the Bill has been designed to work alongside data protection law, for which we remain the statutory regulator, but with appropriate mechanisms for co-operation with the ICO—so, with this series of consultation duties where codes of practice or guidance that could be issued by Ofcom may have an impact on privacy. We think that is the best way of assuring regulatory coherence in this area.”
“That is certainly something that organisations, large charities in the sector and those responsible for representing the rights of children and young people would welcome. On some of these issues, we work in coalition to make representations on behalf of children and young people, as well as of parents and carers, who also raise some concerns. The ability to do that and to strengthen the response is something that would be welcomed.”
“Q Picking up that last point about representation for particular groups of users including children, Ms Perry, do you agree that the ability to designate organisations that can make super-complaints might be an extremely valuable avenue, in particular for organisations that represent user groups such as children? Organisations such as yours could get designated and then speak on behalf of children in a formal context. You could raise super-complaints with the regulator on behalf of the children you speak for. Is that something to welcome? Would it address the point made by my colleague, Kim Leadbetter, a moment ago? Lynn Perry: We would welcome provision to be able to bring particularly significant evidence of concern.”
“The harm-based offence—communications sent to cause harm without reasonable excuse—will likely cover things such as malicious tagging and other forms of trolling. I have already talked about the identification, verification and anonymity provisions. I think that the Bill will go a substantial way. I am still interested in what fits into that residual category of content harmful to adults, but rather than enter into an arid philosophical and theoretical debate, I will take the spirit of the Bill and try to tag it to real content.”
“In Europe, that has a long history. The definition of harm being in the manner of dissemination will pick up pile-ons and some forms of trolling that we see a lot of. Hate crime being designated as priority illegal content is a big one for us, because it puts the proactive duty on the platforms. That too will take away quite a lot of content, we think. The new threatening communications offence we have talked about will deal with rape and death threats. Often the focus is on, quite rightly, the experience of black professional footballers, but there are also other people who play, watch and work in the game, including our female pundits and our LGBT fan groups, who also get loads of this abuse online.”
“Q I am glad you welcome that. I have a question for both witnesses, briefly. You have commented in some detail on various aspects of the Bill, but do you feel that the Bill as a whole represents a substantial step forward in protecting children, in your case, Ms Perry, and those you speak for, Sanjay? Sanjay Bhandari: Our beneficiaries are under-represented or minority communities in sports. I agree, I think that the Bill goes a substantial way to protecting them and to dealing with some of the issues that we saw most acutely after the Euro 2020 finals. We have to look at the Bill in context. This is revolutionary legislation, which we are not seeing anywhere else in the world. We are going first. The basic sanctions framework and the 10% fines I have seen working in other areas—anti-trust in particular.”
“Can I have it?” I have lost count of the number of times that I have asked for that data. Now I want Ofcom to ask them for it.”
“Q Before I turn to Ms Perry with the same question about the Bill’s general effect, Sanjay, you mentioned the terrible incidence of abuse that the three England footballers got after the penalties last summer. Do you think the social media firms’ response to that incident was adequate, or anywhere close to adequate? If not, does that underline the need for this legislation? Sanjay Bhandari: I do not think it was adequate because we still see stuff coming through. They have the greatest power to stop it. One thing we are interested in is improving transparency reporting. I have asked them a number of times, “Someone does not become a troll overnight, in the same way that someone does not become a heroin addict overnight, or commit an extremist act of terrorism overnight. There is a pathway where people start off, and you have that data.”
“There are some very important provisions that we welcome, not least on age verification, the ability to raise issues through super-complaints, which you have asked me about, and the accountability in various places throughout the Bill.”
“Q Yes. There are strong powers in the Bill for Ofcom to do precisely that. Ms Perry, may I ask you same general question? Do you feel that the Bill represents a very substantial step forward in protecting children? Lynn Perry: We do. Barnardo’s really welcomes the Bill. We think it is a unique and once-in-a-generation opportunity to achieve some really long-term changes to protect children from a range of online harms. There are some areas in which the Bill could go further, which we have talked about today. The opportunity that we see here is to make the UK the safest place in the world for children to be online.”
“It is really about the balancing exercise, and I think this is a sensible, pragmatic balancing exercise.”
“Q Thank you, Ms Perry. Finally, Mr Bhandari, some people have raised concerns about free speech. I do not share those concerns—in fact, I rebutted them a Times article earlier this week—but does the Bill cause you any concern from a free-speech perspective? Sanjay Bhandari: As I said earlier, there are no absolute rights. There is no absolute right to freedom of speech— I cannot shout “Fire!” here—and there is no absolute right to privacy; I cannot use my anonymity as a cloak for criminality. It is question of drawing an appropriate balance. In my opinion, the Bill draws an appropriate balance between the right to freedom of speech and the right to privacy. I believe in both, but in the same way that I believe in motherhood and apple pie: of course I believe in them.”
“This was not even them going out proactively to find the content and not doing anything with it; it was raised for their attention, using their systems.”
“Q Thank you for joining us this afternoon and for giving us your evidence so far. At the beginning of your testimony, Ms Hartshorn-Sanders, I think you mentioned—I want to ensure I heard correctly—that you believe, or have evidence, that Instagram is still, even today, failing to take down 90% of inappropriate content that is flagged to it. Eva Hartshorn-Sanders: Our “Hidden Hate” report was on DMs—direct messages—that were shared by the participants in the study. One in 15 of those broke the terms and conditions that Instagram had set out related to misogynist abuse—sexual abuse. That was in the wake of the World cup, so after Instagram had done a big promotion about how great it was going to be in having policies on these issues going forward. We found that 90% of that content was not acted on when we reported it.”
“We are doing research at the moment on data that is shared personally, or is publicly available through the different tools that we have. So it is strengthening access to that data. There is this information asymmetry that happens at the moment, where big tech is able to see patterns of abuse. In some cases, as in the misogyny report, you have situations where a woman might be subject to abuse from one person over and over again. The way that is treated in the EU is that Instagram will go back and look at the last 30 historically to see the pattern of abuse that exists. They are not applying that same type of rigorousness to other jurisdictions. So it is having access to it in the audits that are able to happen. Everyone should be safe online, so this should be a safety-by-design feature that the companies have.”