YouSaid · the spoken record

GROMYKO

lines on the record: 1,518
first: 1957-09-24
most recent: 1984-09-24
sittings or episodes: 22
sources: un-general-debate

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Much is being said about that in the General Assembly and in the Press, including the French Press. From time to time the French Government enters into negotiations with the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. But unfortunately these negotiations produce no results, because the French side breaks them off as soon as they have started. The reason for this is that the French Government, while paying lip-service to the Algerian people's right to self-determination, is still trying to suppress the embattled people of Algeria by force of arms. The United Nations must not reconcile itself to this situation, but must raise its voice in defence of the Algerian people. 144.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“The imperialists are making a suspicious fuss about the Congo and we do not want to be present at another performance by the colonizers to cover up an imperialist deal to share out the riches of Katanga. True, the colonizers are quite happy to trip each other up in the Congo, but the danger of the country being stifled by a new agreement between them still remains. 142. The liberation movement is dealing colonialism some crushing blows but the colonial system is not yet completely demolished. At the beginning of 1962, territories with a population of more than 70 million will still be under colonial domination. 143. Look at what is happening in Africa. In Algeria a criminal colonial war continues. There is no need to go through the list of the colonizers' misdeeds in that country.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“In December of this year Tanganyika, and in January 1962 Western Samoa, will be declared independent. 141. In Algeria and Angola, in Kenya and Uganda, in Rhodesia, Nyasaland and West Irian, the peoples' struggle to free themselves is constantly gaining momentum. It is because of the self-sacrificing struggle of the Congolese people, supported by its many friends throughout the world, that it has been possible to thwart the original schemes of the colonizers and their associates. In the Congo there has been set up a national Government which is recognized by the overwhelming majority of the world's States. However, the situation in the Congo is disturbing — the colonizers do not want to leave the country, they are hatching plans to dismember the Republic of the Congo and to detach from it the rich province of Katanga.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“A year ago the General Assembly , on the initiative of the Soviet Union, adopted a resolution containing the Declaration on the Ranting of independence in colonial countries and peoples [1514 (XV)]. You will well remember the long and impassioned discussion in the United Nations, and throughout the world, which preceded the adoption of this Declaration. Nobody will deny that the United Nations Declaration struck a heavy blow at the colonial system of government and at colonialism as a whole. Naturally, the Declaration did not please the colonizers. 139. The question arises: what has been done, and what remains to be done, to implement the Declaration ? 140. Over the past year, the former United Kingdom colony of Sierra Leone has become independent and United Kingdom trusteeship over the territory of the Cameroon has come to an end.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“In a number of cases the disposition of these troops and bases on foreign territory constitutes direct military occupation, aggression, pregnant with the danger of serious international complications. Surely it is obvious, for instance, that there can be no talk of a lasting peace in the Far East so long as part of the basic territory of China — the island of Taiwan — continues to be occupied by American troops. 137. The Soviet Government would like to express its confidence that the General Assembly, having considered the disarmament problem and measures designed to reduce international tension, will b| able to take decisions which will open a new chapter in the peoples1 struggle to translate into fact mankind's centuries old dream — the creation of a world without weapons, a world without war. 138.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Detailed proposals on these questions are set out in the special memorandum which the Soviet Government is putting before the General Assembly. 135. I repeat, the implementation of these measures must not be made dependent on an agreement On dip-armament questions, and the achievement of a disarmament agreement must not be made conditional on a decision to take the steps that I have indicated. 136. In this connexion, particular attention should be paid to the importance of withdrawing troops from foreign territories within the national boundaries of States. As you know, there still exist foreign troops, and numerous foreign military bases, on the territories of many States.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“The position of the USSR in the matter of nuclear weapons tests is set forth in detail in a memorandum on this subject [A/4893] which the Soviet Government is submitting to the General Assembly. 134. The Soviet Government, as it has repeatedly stated, considers it desirable that, pari passu with negotiations on general and complete disarmament, an agreement should be reached to carry out a number of measures designed to reduce international tension, to strengthen trust between States and, by this means, to facilitate solution of the disarmament problem. Amongst such measures we envisage the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact countries, the creation of atom-free zones, the withdrawal of foreign troops from territories, and other steps.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Of course, the most careful international control will be needed during general and complete disarmament, and the control bodies must be granted free access into every nook and cranny, without a veto or restrictions of any kind. 132 . At the present time the question of the cessation of all nuclear tests can be resolved only on the basis of general and complete disarmament, since the conclusion of a separate agreement on the cessation of tests would not solve the main problem of removing the threat of nuclear war and could be used by certain circles to achieve their aggressive aims. General and complete disarmament would not only preserve the health of mankind; it would save its very life, and deliver it from the threat of bombardment by destructive, death-dealing nuclear weapons. 133.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“If States carry out general and complete disarmament under effective international control, if all forms of weapons, including nuclear ones, are destroyed and the armies disbanded, the Incentive to perfect nuclear weapons will disappear, and hence the incentive to test them, There will then no longer be any sense in testing nuclear weapons on the ground, underground, in the atmosphere or in outer space; theree will in fact be nothing to test, since all nuclear weapons will have been destroyed. In this way, the difficulties which have arisen in negotiations over the question of control, including control of the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, will also disappear.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“The conclusion of a separate agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests whilst the Western Powers continue the arms race can only create the illusion that something is being done to avert nuclear war, whereas in fact the Western Powers are heading straight towards it. The conclusion of an agreement 11 on the cessation of nuclear testing, in such circumstances and outside a programme of general and complete disarmament, could only give the peoples a false sense of security, acting as a kind of opiate to lessen their vigilance for the preservation of peace. 131.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Meanwhile, the amounts of nuclear weapons already in existence are such that their use in war would entail the most terrible results for the world. In the case of States with comparatively small territories and a high population density, the consequences would be catastrophic. These are facts, cold facts. 129. Moreover, if the Soviet Union had not resumed nuclear weapons testing, that would have greatly increased the danger of war. Yes, increased; since the aggressive forces might have been tempted to embark upon adventures and to overstep the boundary beyond which yawns the abyss of nuclear war. 130.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“We understand the attitude of those States which do not possess nuclear weapons and sincerely desire that the testing of such weapons should be completely and universally prohibited. But in this connexion we must emphasize, with all the firmness at our command, that the cessation of nuclear weapons tests alones with the international situation as it is now — I repeat, with the international situation as it is now — would not reduce the danger of a nuclear and rocket war. 128. For it is well known that, in the absence of an agreement on general and complete disarmament, the arms race — including the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons — would continue and that the stockpiling of these weapons would consequently also continue, quite apart from the fact that the existing stocks would remain intact.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“The Soviet Government did everything possible to facilitate the reaching of an agreement with the Western Powers. But these Powers responded by making their policy increasingly aggressive and by intensifying their military preparations to the point of direct provocation. They responded with treachery, continuing nuclear tests when the Soviet Union had engaged in no such tests over a long period. 126. What is the way out of the situation which has arisen over the question ot nuclear weapons tests? There is a way out, and the Soviet Government is proposing it. It consists of reaching agreement on the questions raised by general and complete disarmament. Such an agreement will also mean the solving of the question of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. 127.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“The Soviet Union is being forced to all this by the actions of the NATO Powers. The position will change, if these Powers renounce their aggressive policy and tread the path of general and complete disarmament. 124. We do not propose to make questions of the Soviet Union's security the subject of imperialistic-arbitration on the part of NATO. We do not propose to allow them to be decided by those who are forging weapons of war day in day out, who have established dozens and dozens of military bases in areas adjacent to the Soviet Union. 125. The Soviet Government was not lacking in patience when we negotiated with the Western Powers on disarmament questions as a whole and on the question of prohibiting nuclear weapons tests in particular.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Pushing things to a nuclear war, whose flames would consume whole States and incalculable material and cultural resources — that is considered a normal procedure; but nuclear weapons tests by the Soviet Union for the purpose of raising a new barrier in the path of war that is abnormal. It is clear that the Western Powers' position on the question of nuclear tests contains not a grain of genuine concern for the future of humanity. It is theatrical and false in character. 123. Yes, the Soviet Government is conducting nuclear weapons tests, is constructing new types of nuclear weapons, is showing and will continue to show concern for strengthening the defensive capacity of the Soviet Union and of our allies who, together with the Soviet Union, are pursuing a policy of peace and, like us, advocate general and complete disarmament.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Why were they not concerned about the pollution of the atmosphere and the poisoning of surface water by radio-active deposits, when for a period of several years explosions of American and British nuclear bombs were resounding over the expanses of the Pacific Ocean and in the United States itself? After all, the Western Powers have detonated many more nuclear explosions, all told, than the Soviet Union has. 122. What is most surprising is that this ostentatious concern for humanity is being displayed by the very people whose actions and policies are pushing the world towards the disaster of nuclear war.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Then they proposed the legalization of so-called nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, although it is well known that in explosions for peaceful purposes the nuclear devices used are the same as those employed in explosions for military purposes. 120. No, gentlemen — we say to the Governments of the Western Powers — if you want honest co-operation with us, do not try to cheat and put the Soviet Union in a position of inequality. 121. The hypocrisy of the cry raised in Western capitals about the harmful effects of nuclear tests on human health is obviously a mile off. It is amazing that they made that "discovery" there precisely after the decision to conduct nuclear weapons tests had been taken by the Soviet Union. Where were they before, these people who are now carried away by this studied compassion for human beings?”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“It must also be stressed that the United States and the United kingdom have never agreed to a complete cessation of all nuclear weapons tests. They have always tried, and still are trying, to leave themselves loopholes to legalize the perfection of nuclear weapons. First they proposed — and they are now again proposing — that this agreement should not cover underground test explosions of nuclear weapons; that is, precisely those explosions which they had long since prepared for the purpose of designing new types of nuclear weapons, as has now been confirmed by the latest American underground tests.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Let everyone in this hall put himself in the Soviet Union's position and answer how he would have acted if one of the Members of the NATO military bloc, systematically ignoring the Soviet Union's pledge regarding the conduct of tests, had proceeded to make a nuclear test. 118. We warned the Americans, the English and, of course, the French that if France continued nuclear weapons tests the Soviet Union would also be obliged to resume such testing. What answer was given to the Soviet Government's warnings? It was announced that the tests were continuing and would continue. If there were no other reason, but merely this reason of nuclear tests by France, that alone would fully justify the resumption of nuclear weapons testing by the Soviet Union. 119.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“You also know that the NATO military bloc was systematically — I repeat, systematically — conducting nuclear weapons tests, as though nothing were amiss, during the whole period when the Soviet Union was not conducting such tests — the period which is often called the "moratorium". The fact that these tests were conducted by the French does not alter the position in the least. It is of no real significance to the Soviet Union which of the NATO Powers it is that acquires new information as a result of experiments with nuclear weapons. The nuclear tests by France were part of an over-all programme for the strengthening of NATO's military potential. In consequence, that bloc and the States belonging to it gained a definite military advantage in relation to the Soviet Union, which since 1958 had carried out no nuclear weapons tests. 117.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“There is plenty of demagogy in them, but no proper evaluation of the position and of the reasons which compelled the Soviet Union to take this decision. 115. The Soviet Government has clearly stated that it took the step in question with a heavy heart. It did so in the face of hard facts, in reply to direct threats by the United States and its NATO allies to use force if a German peace treaty should be signed. Given the Western Powers' massive military preparations directed against our country and other socialist countries, the Government of the USSR had no choice but to take steps to strengthen the defensive capacity of the Soviet Union. 116.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“The Soviet Government insists that the disarmament negotiating body include representatives, with full powers, from the main groups of States, without whose participation there can be no constructive negotiations on disarmament. 113. The need for reaching the earliest possible agreement on disarmament would not be stated completely if no reference were made to the question of the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. This is all the more necessary in that attempts have recently been made, in connexion with the Soviet Government's decision to conduct experimental nuclear explosions in the USSR, to distort the true picture and to depart from the course which really leads to a solution of this problem. 114. Many Western statesmen have spoken on this subject recently. But their statements miss the mark and avoid the real issue.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“The questions of disarmament, on whose solution the maintenance of world peace depends affect the vital interests of all States. 111. And if this is so, then countries belonging to all three groups should participate in the disarmament negotiations. It goes without saying that the neutralist countries must have, in the disarmament negotiating body, rights equal to those of the other members of that body, and not — as proposed by the Western Powers — attend its meetings as private individuals, with second-class rights. 112. The Soviet Government fully supports the demand by the participants in the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries that these countries should be represented in all future disarmament negotiations.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“It is well known that the composition of the Ten-Nation Committee, on which five socialist countries and five Western Powers were represented, did not reflect realities, did not reflect the actual distribution of forces in the world and in the United Nations. The neutralist countries, constituting the third major group of States in the world, were not represented in the Ten-Nation Committee. But questions of disarmament cannot be solved without the neutralist countries, whose population represents one third of mankind and whose contribution to the strengthening of peace is by no means small. Of this the Soviet Government is convinced. 110. It might, of course, be said that the neutralist States lack powerful armed forces. That is perfectly true. But it does not follow that questions of disarmament are of no concern to them.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“We regret that, in this matter as well, our partners in the talks take up a different position. This can only complicate consideration of the disarmament question. 107. The Soviet Government, which put forward the idea of general and complete disarmament, will do everything in its power to give effect to it. 108. The Soviet Government would like to call the attention of the General Assembly to one problem which, though it has to do with organization, is important and has not yet been solved. I refer to the composition of the body which should prepare the treaty on general and complete disarmament. 109.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“It is essential to secure an answer to this question. We declare again, with all determination, that the Soviet Union will never agree to the establishment of control over armaments. 106. Let us now turn to the question of international armed forces in circumstances of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government agrees that such forces should be established in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Their administration — and the Head of the Soviet Government, N. S. Khrushchev, has said this more than once — must be truly international; that is to say, it must be in the hands of representatives of the three principal groups of States — such representatives having equal rights — and not in the hands of some servitor of the NATO military bloc.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Khrushchev, stated in this hall that the Soviet Union was ready to accept any proposals for control of disarmament that might be made by the Western Powers, provided that those Powers accepted the proposals of the Soviet Union for general and complete disarmament. So far, no answer to this statement has been received from the Western Powers. I draw the attention of everyone present to this fact: so far, up to this moment, we have received no answer to this declaration by. the Head of the Soviet Government. We received no such answer yesterday, when the position of the United States Government on the question of disarmament was set forth. 105. How do matters in fact stand? Do the Western Powers agree to accept our proposals for general and complete disarmament, if we accept their proposals for control of disarmament?”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Consequently the States' armaments would still remain unknown, but with the substantial difference that a considerable part of the armament would have been liquidated and in that matter effective control would have been established. With the achievement of general and complete disarmament, permanent and all-embracing control would be established — I emphasize, permanent and all-embracing control. 103. If the partisans of control over armaments do not abandon their position — if they do not recede from the position stated from this rostrum by Mr. Eisenhower, the former President of the United States — it will mean that future disarmament negotiations are likewise doomed to failure. 104. Last year the Head of the Soviet Government, N. S.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“In an attempt to justify their proposals in this matter, the representatives of the United States of America advance the argument that, unless all the existing armaments of States were subjected to control, the quantities which they still retained after the reduction in armaments and armed forces at any given stage had been implemented would be unknown. Such an argument, however, is completely unfounded. Even now, no one knows what armaments and armed forces are at the disposal of States, simply because, for understandable reasons, States do not disclose such information. And this is entirely natural. The same situation would persist even after implementation of the disarmament measures envisaged for any given stage prior to the completion of general and complete disarmament.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“It would, of course, play into the hands of certain circles in the West — into the hands of the military staffs of the NATO military bloc. But no peace-loving State valuing the interests of the peoples' security, the interests of the maintenance of peace, and its own interests, could or would accept the establishment of control over armaments. 101. Such conclusions are substantiated by the fact that our partners in the talks indicate no time-limits for the implementation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament, and that, consequently, the opponents of disarmament could at any time advance some contrived, artificial pretext for obstructing disarmament, having in the meantime secured intelligence regarding the States' armed forces. 102.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“If this demand is translated into ordinary human language, if everything is reduced to its simplest terms, then it would appear that States could reduce their armed forces and armaments by a negligible amounts — say 5 per cent — but at the same time would have to open all their doors to international control — in other words, to foreign investigation. But what would result from acceptance of this demand, a demand which is in no way dictated by the interests of disarmament ? The only result would be to give a potential aggressor information about the armed forces and armaments of the States in which he was interested. That might, precisely, serve the purposes of aggression — purposes, that is, diametrically opposed to those of disarmament.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“But the representatives of the United States of America added, at the same time, that it would also be necessary to place under control — forthwith, beginning at the very first stage — that part of the armed forces and armaments of States which, under the treaty, was to remain at the States' disposal. Confirmation of this position of the United States of America is also contained in a letter received by us from the United States side at the bilateral disarmament talks after agreement had been reached on the basic principles. 100. How is all this to be understood?”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“98. The Soviet Government deems it impossible to pass over in silence the inability of the parties, during the talks, to settle the fundamental dispute as to whether the subject of discussion should be disarmament and control of disarmament — I repeat, control of disarmament, of general and complete disarmament — or control of armaments. There is no possibility of escaping this question. 99. During the bilateral negotiations, the United States of America, or, mor6 precisely, its representatives, declared — as was only natural and proper — that the armed forces and armaments of States which under the treaty became subject to reduction or abolition at the relevant stage of general and complete disarmament should be placed under strict control.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Thus, as a result of the bilateral exchange of views, there has been presented to the General Assembly a document that may serve as a directive for the purpose of subsequent negotiations for the preparation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament, 97. But is it possible to say that the "green light" has been given and the road for disarmament negotiations is now clear? No, such optimism would today be excessive. It is, of course, a welcome development that the two States — the United States of America and the Soviet Union — which bear the main burden of armaments in the world of today have been able to agree on a common platform for the resumption of disarmament negotiations. But there is a real danger that attempts may be made so to interpret these provisions as to inject into them matter extraneous to genuine disarmament.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“We allude to those provisions of the Joint Statement relating to: the disbanding of the armed forces of States; the dismantling of military bases; the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction, the cessation of the production of such weapons, and the elimination of all means of delivering them; the elimination of other forms of armament, and the cessation of their production; the closing of all military training institutions, and the abolition of all institutions designed to organize the military effort of States; and the discontinuance of military expenditures. The Soviet Government has always considered that the combination of these measures should constitute general and complete disarmament. The Agreed Statement of Principles also contains other useful provisions. 96.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“This is yet another indication that the idea of general and complete disarmament is steadily making headway, in the present international situation, while the forces whose policy is linked with the arms race are finding it ever harder to maintain their positions. 95. If the Joint Statement of Principles is compared with the Soviet disarmament plan, it will easily be seen that the statement contains a number of provisions advocated by the Soviet Government ever since it first came forward with the programme of general and complete disarmament.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Despite considerable difficulties and despite differences of opinion on many important aspects of the disarmament problem, it proved possible to work out a Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations [A/4879], The results of the Soviet-American talks on disarmament were well received in the Soviet Union. We have no doubt that they were received with satisfaction in other countries as well. 94. The Joint Statement of Principles, together with the communication of the Soviet Government on the course of the Soviet-American talks has already been circulated to all States Members of the United Nations. If you read the text of the Soviet-American statement, you will see that it expresses, first and foremost, recognition of the need to achieve agreement on a programme of general and complete disarmament.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“But even at its next, its fifteenth, session the General Assembly was unable to move the disarmament problem off dead centre. More specifically, it proved unable to adopt clear and unambiguous directives for the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Consideration of the disarmament question had to be postponed, because the new Government of the United States had requested time in which to study it. Simultaneously it was agreed that the Soviet Union and the United States of America should engage in bilateral talks on disarmament — an idea which was approved by the General Assembly. 93. This bilateral exchange of views yielded certain positive results.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Everyone knows why the work on the implementation of this resolution proved fruitless and why the activities of the Ten-Nation Committee, charged by the General Assembly to consider the programme of general and complete disarmament, ceased to be meaningful. The primary reason was that the opponents of disarmament did not intend to give way. They did everything possible to obstruct an agreement on general and complete disarmament and to prevent the negotiations, even on that occasion, from breaking out of the cycle of empty talk. 92. What course remained open to a protagonist of disarmament? There was only one — to submit the whole question once more to the General Assembly for consideration. And that was what the Soviet Government did.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Many of those present at today's meeting of the General Assembly must surely still remember the day when from this rostrum the Head of the Soviet Government, N. S. Khrushchev, submitted for the consideration of the United Nations a programming of general and complete disarmament. That programme gave hope to all sincere supporters of disarmament. We are entitled to say that the fourteenth session of the General Assembly fulfilled its duty to the peoples by unanimously adopting a resolution which proclaimed general and complete disarmament to be the most important question facing the world of the day and called upon all countries to make every effort to solve it in the shortest possible time. 91.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Such is the position of the Soviet Government — and, we are happy to declare from this rostrum, such is also the position of our allies — on the subject of a German peace treaty. 88. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, one of the central problems that should be considered at the General Assembly's present session is the problem of disarmament. 89. A good many years have passed since, after the most destructive war that ever descended upon mankind, the States embarked on disarmament negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations. Even today, however, that problem is far from solution, while weapons of ever more lethal form continue to be created and the arsenals bulge with their stockpiles. 90. Two years ago there was an event which breathed new life into the search for ways of stopping the arms race.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Favouring as we do the immediate conclusion of a peace treaty, we advocate the speediest possible calling of a peace conference, open to participation by all States which, with their armed forces, took part in the war against Hitlerite Germany. 86. The conclusion of a German peace treaty involves more than the question of liquidating the problems left over from the last War. It involves the whole question of the fate of the world — the question whether there is to be war or peace. To such a question no single State, no single responsible Government, no single responsible statesman can remain indifferent. No State can be neutral on this issue, just as the United Nations as a whole cannot and should not be a neutral, disinterested observer. 87.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“It has been said here that there is a possibility of a peaceful solution which would take into account the rightful interests of the peoples in the establishment of European security. Yes, we too favour such a solution. But what, in present circumstances, is meant by safeguarding the interests of European security? It means, first of all, concluding a German peace treaty which would establish the position that has developed in Europe and Germany in consequence of the Second World War, and calling, for that purpose, a peace conference in the very near future. 85. It is two years since our draft of a German peace treaty was communicated to the Governments concerned, and published. There has been ample time in which to study the Soviet proposals and convene a peace conference.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“The upshot is, that when the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France conclude a peace treaty with Japan without our participation it is perfectly right and proper, but that when, after repeated appeals to the Governments of those same three Western Powers, their refusal to act jointly with us compels us to conclude a peace treaty without them, such procedure on our part becomes inequitable and improper. So singular an approach to the problem of distinguishing what is lawful and what is unlawful is possible only when the facts are weighed in the imperialist balance. But today, in international affairs, such a balance has no place. 84.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“If the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France do not proceed to the joint conclusion of a German peace treaty, as the Soviet Government urges them to do, the Soviet Union and the other countries concerned will have no alternative but to conclude a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic and to settle the question of West Berlin on that basis. In that event, no one will be able to reproach us with not having tried to persuade those who were formerly our allies, in the war against Hitler's Germany, to remain our allies in the reaching of a German peace settlement. 83. We should not like to act towards them as they acted towards the Soviet Union when, without its participation, they concluded a peace treaty with Japan. But we are entitled to draw the appropriate conclusions from that circumstance.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“I can remind you of the words of the Head of the Soviet Government who stressed that ft in response to peace, in response to a peace treaty, force is used — that is, if aggression Is committed — the Soviet Union will be compelled to stand-up for its just cause, for its security and for the security of its allies, together with whom it is endeavouring to do away with the vestiges of the Second World War through the conclusion of a German peace treaty. 81. There is one other important point which the Soviet delegation would like, most emphatically, to stress. The Soviet Government, as it has more than once declared, will conclude a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic alone only if, despite all our efforts, no agreement with the Western Powers is reached. 82.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“But the question arises as to whether those bold words are weighed carefully enough, .whether it is sufficiently borne in mind that there is a great difference between a declaration of readiness to use force and the use of force itself, if it be considered what such use of force would mean, what consequences it would entail for Europe, for the world and, last but not least, for those States which, for some unknown reason, so often and so vociferously proclaim their readiness to resort to force as an answer to the signing of a German peace treaty. 80. What is there to add in reply to such declarations?”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Instead of coming to a peace conference table and considering the Soviet proposals in a business-like manner, or putting forward their own proposals, the Western Powers have begun to intensify their military preparations and have gone so far as to threaten, point-blank, the use of force as a response to the conclusion of a peace treaty. We will not enumerate those military measures to which the NATO Powers have resorted in the last few months and which have, so to speak, brought the international situation to boiling-point. 79. The leading politicians of some Western Powers often declare that those Powers will not shrink from a test of strength in answer to the conclusion of a German peace treaty — will not shrink; in other words, from replying with war to the peace which is proposed by the Soviet Government.”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“Whose were these invading aircraft that used the air corridors, temporarily made available for the transit of unarmed transport aircraft of the three Western occupying powers, for an incursion deep into the territory of the German Democratic Republic? They were fighter-bombers of the West German "Bundeswehr". 77. The Soviet Government has warned the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, and also the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, that in future any invading military aircraft will, in such circumstances, be destroyed by any available means, including rockets. 78. How do the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France respond to the Soviet Union's proposal for the elaboration of a German peace treaty?”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)
“The solution proposed can inconvenience only those whose hatred for peace and socialism clouds their vision and who do not see where the policy of preserving the remnants of the last war in Germany is leading. The Soviet proposals can fail to suit only the narrow-minded strategists from the military staffs of NATO or these statesmen who consider West Berlin to be necessary to that military bloc as a springboard for a drive to the East. They much prefer the situation as it is, when every day sees the accumulation of more inflammable material owing to the absence of a German peace treaty. Is there not evidence of this in the recent very dangerous provocation committed against the German Democratic Republic, when its air space was invaded by two military jet aircraft equipped for carrying nuclear bombs?”
1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)