YouSaid · the spoken record

GROMYKO

lines on the record: 1,518
first: 1957-09-24
most recent: 1984-09-24
sittings or episodes: 22
sources: un-general-debate

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“The Soviet Union holds this view because it follows from the very nature of its foreign policy, and because the strengthening of the independence of the countries in that area and their complete liberation from the consequences of colonialism are essential for the maintenance and strengthening of peace in that area. 118. The Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent and observe from afar the attempts that are being made to turn the Near and Middle East, an area adjacent to its own territory, into a permanent hotbed of armed conflict. The organizers of these conflicts must understand that the Soviet Union cannot view such a state of affairs impassively, since its own security is affected. 119. We can express nothing but satisfaction at the friendly relations which have been established between the Soviet Union and the Arab countries.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“They see danger in the fact that the USSR is opposed to the subjection of the countries of the Near and Middle East to foreign dictation, that it is opposed to foreign intervention in the affairs of those States and that it is in favour of the development and strengthening of their independence. It would appear, according to Mr. Dulles, that the Arab countries' struggle for liberation from all foreign dependence and their refusal to submit to orders from outside constitute "extreme nationalistic ambitions". We, however, consider not only that there is nothing extreme about this but also that the desire to preserve its national independence is the indisputable and inalienable right of every people and that this desire is in full conformity with the solemn principles of the United Nations. 117.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“That is why they have not laid the matter before the United Nations. 115. The second version is that the Near and Middle East are threatened in some way by the Soviet Union. Yet since there is in reality no such threat, as the inventors of this fantasy are well aware, there is nothing plausible that they can say on that score. It is true that, according to them, individuals who are not acceptable to Washington have been appointed to some public posts in Syria. But why should such questions be decided in Washington rather than in Syria, and what have they to do with the Soviet Union? 116. The organizers of the provocation with regard to Syria are alleging ever more noisily that the Soviet Union has dangerous plans concerning the Near and Middle East.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“The best possible proof - if more were needed - that the Eisenhower- Dulles doctrine is completely at variance with the interests of the peoples of the Middle East is provided by the activities of the United States in relation to Syria. 114. Those responsible for organizing acts of provocation against Syria are trying to throw dust into the eyes of honest people. They have invented two versions of the facts, one more absurd than the other. The first is that Syria is allegedly threatening its neighbours. If that is it, then why have those neighbours or the United States not taken the matter to the United Nations, and referred it to the Security Council with a view to removing the threat? the organizers of the acts of provocation against Syria know that there is no truth to the story.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“The Egyptian gamble failed because the forces of peace proved stronger than the forces of war. By going to Egypt's defence, the United Nations played a role of considerable importance in that affair. 112. Today, as the whole world can see, it is Syria which has been selected as the victim of imperialist intrigues. Crude political and economic pressure is being applied to that country, plots are being hatched against its Government, and it is threatened more and more frequently of late with direct military intervention. 113. Why has all this come about? Because the people and Government of Syria are not willing to submit to foreign dictation and refuse to allow their country to be drawn into aggressive blocs.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“In our opinion, it is the duty of the United Nations to put an end to foreign military intervention in the lives of the peoples of those countries and to protect their legitimate nationa1 rights. The Soviet Union has always condemned the colonial system as utterly unjust and oppressive. 110. The Assembly cannot fail to note that the situation in the Near and Middle East still remains tense. This is largely due to the incessant interference by the NATO Powers in the domestic affairs of the peoples of that area. 111. The facts are a matter of common knowledge. Quite recently, Egypt was the victim of aggression. The attack on that country was a crucial test for all the forces of peace. It might well have led to the outbreak of a widespread military conflict with grave consequences for the nations.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“The peoples of scores of Asian and African countries, who until recently were denied not only national independence but even the essential conditions for a normal existence, are exerting a new and important influence on the international scene. 109. Nevertheless, millions upon millions of people are living in countries which still have the status of colonies. The Governments of certain Powers, being unable to halt the progress of the struggle for national liberation, are resorting to arms in order to maintain or restore their rule over the colonial peoples. At this very moment, while we are sitting here in this hall, the blood is being shed in many parts of the world of people whose only crime is a desire for a free and independent existence.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“At the same time, we wish to make it absolutely clear that as long as the United States, the United Kingdom and other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization persist in evading an agreement on disarmament and in refusing to outlaw atomic and hydrogen weapons and to discontinue test explosions of atomic and hydrogen bombs, as long as they continue to increase the fighting strength of their armed forces, the Soviet Union, in close co-operation with its allies, Including those which are members of the defensive Warsaw Treaty, will take all the necessary steps to protect its security, 108. Since the end of the Second World War, many nations have freed themselves from a colonial or semi-colonial system of government and have embarked on the road of independent national development.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“This brings to mind the story of the man who replied to complaints about the weather by saying "Better bad weather than no weather at all". But this or that frame of mind is scarcely an adequate criterion for disarmament negotiations. The success of such negotiations must be measured by practical results, and not by the feelings of one or another of the negotiators. The practical results achieved to date are not worth the paper on which the records of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee are printed. 107. The Soviet Government is doing everything in its power to achieve agreement on disarmament issues at the earliest possible date.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“All this does not mean that we underestimate the value of negotiations among a limited number of participants and even of negotiations of a confidential character. We are always in favour of such negotiations when they serve a purpose. But what if this procedure achieves negative rather than positive results? Then a different procedure must obviously be adopted, that of publicity and the participation in the negotiations of a large number of States. 106. It is sometimes said that a more hopeful atmosphere has developed in the Sub-Committee, that Mr. Stassen is in an optimistic frame of mind, that there is no need to hurry, that we should be satisfied with the present atmosphere or climate in the Subcommittee, and so forth.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“Yet, as this issue is in fact of interest to our partners in the negotiations, they periodically raise the question of what is to be done about China, for, they contend, reductions cannot be made in the armaments of the Powers which would not apply to China. 103. Thus, on the one hand they seek to ignore China, and, on the other, they are unwilling to settle the disarmament problem without China. Clearly, the opponents of recognition for the People's Republic of China, who are also the opponents of an end to the armaments race, have become enmeshed in the web which they themselves have spun. 104. We sincerely desire the General Assembly to hold a serious discussion of the question of disarmament in order to facilitate agreement on that problem. 105.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“The confidential nature of the Sub-Committee's work obviously suits the advocates of the "cold war", despite the fact that the settlement of the disarmament problem is a matter of concern to all countries and peoples. 102. The following case illustrates the unenviable position in which the partisans of this method of conducting the disarmament negotiations have placed themselves. As everyone knows, the subject of China, which means the People's Republic of China, is taboo as far as present United States foreign policy is concerned. In defiance of the dictates of common sense, that Government is excluded from the disarmament talks and consequently the question of China's armed forces is not discussed in the Sub-Committee; it cannot be in the absence of representatives of that country.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“In the view of the Soviet Government, it is high time to enlarge the composition of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee by securing the participation of representatives of countries which are opposed to the "cold war" policy, which pursue a policy of peaceful co-existence and which really cherish the goal of disarmament. We are glad that the Government of India takes a similar stand on this matter. 101. The privacy in which the Sub-Committee has been compelled to work and the atmosphere of artificial secrecy surrounding its activities should also be abandoned. The Soviet Union is in favour of conducting the disarmament talks in the full light of publicity.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“The same is true of those who today are gambling recklessly with the fate of tens and hundreds of millions of people by blocking all paths to an agreement on disarmament. 99. One of the factors preventing agreement on disarmament is the narrow and unrepresentative composition of the Sub-Commttte of the Disarmament Commission. Whole continents, such as Asia and Africa, are not represented in that body. How, indeed, can the Sub-Committee’s work be expected to achieve positive results, when four of its five members are representatives of countries belonging to the military bloc of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is the instigator of the armaments race? 100.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“Simply this: that the Powers possessing nuclear weapons and rocket devices will build up stockpiles of increasingly destructive armaments. One does not need the imagination of an H.G. Wells to visualize the world a few years hence if the armaments race is not halted. Only those who have lost touch with reality or who irresponsibly gamble with the fate of nations can fail to appreciate the gravity of such a situation. 98. Hindenburg, the Commander-in-Chief of the German imperial forces in the First World War, once said that, in the final period of that conflict, when soldiers were being switched from one front to another by the million, he felt as if he was playing a game of chess. He did not see the human beings and the countless casualties behind the numbers.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“The absence of an agreement even on partial measures of disarmament means that the arms race, particularly the production of weapons of mass destruction, will continue. Still more atomic and hydrogen bombs an rocket devices will be produced and this will modify our former ideas even of atomic and hydrogen warfare, for the problem of delivering weapons of mass destruction to any point on the globe has now been solved. 97. I do not think that anyone will suspect the Soviet delegation of trying to exaggerate or cause undue alarm. All of us here are well aware that military technology is developing along precisely these lines. What will the consequence of all this be, if the problem of disarmament is not solved?”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“There has been a reduction in the strength of the armed forces of certain States, but that has been a unilateral action taken by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. 95. It is difficult, therefore, to escape the conclusion that the negotiations are being used as a screen to conceal the continuing armaments race. We know in advance that our partners in the negotiations will dispute that conclusion. The Russian saying that the truth is unpalatable has much to recommend it. Nevertheless, our conclusion is based on the facts. 96. Whatever views the various Members of the General Assembly may have about the causes of the deadlock on disarmament, we must all soberly consider what the consequences of the present situation may be if no solution is found.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“The General Assembly, for its part, should use its authority to urge the immediate discontinuance of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons. 94. The situation which has developed as a result of the disarmament talks may be summed up by saying that the negotiations that have been in progress in the United Nations for over ten year shave proved fruitless and that the United Nations Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee are patently failing to carry out the tasks assigned to them. Is there actually one less atomic bomb in the world today as a result of their labour? No; we are all fully aware that such weapons are constantly Increasing in number and in destructive power. Were any international agreements concluded which have given the world one less division, one less regiment, or one less soldier? No; no such agreement as yet exists.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“Few people, however, can be so naive as seriously to believe that one of the Powers possessing nuclear weapons would agree to take such a step unilaterally, thereby placing itself at a disadvantage in relation to the others. 92. It is obvious that the Soviet Union cannot take the risk of endangering its security. We want the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom to discontinue all atomic weapons testing at one and the same time. In our view, this is the only fair and reasonable proposal. After all, no one would have anything to lose from the discontinuance of nuclear tests except those who are unwilling to halt the nuclear armaments race and are deliberately trying to bring about an atomic war. 93. We should like to hope that the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom will change their position on this matter.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“It was obvious even at the time that this demand was primarily a pretext for delaying agreement, since explosions of atomic and hydrogen bombs are easily detected even in existing circumstances, when there are no special international control posts for the purpose. But now that a proposal to establish such posts has been made, it might have been thought that this objection had been met and that an obstacle to agreement on the question of tests had thus been removed. In reality, however, this is far from true. Further excuses for avoiding agreement are now being sought. 91. It would, of course, be quite acceptable in certain quarters if the Soviet Union alone discontinued nuclear testing, while others continued to conduct them.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“Thus one unsettled problem is tied to other unsettled problems, on which, furthermore, there is at present no prospect of agreement on account of the Western Powers’ refusal to agree to the prohibition of nuclear weapons. All this goes to show that the United States and the United Kingdom simply do not wish to reach agreement on outlawing nuclear weapons testing. This was also apparent from yesterday’s statement by Mr. Dulles, which was in effect a defence of the need to continue the testing and further development of such weapons. 90. It should be noted in passing that until we submitted the proposal on control posts I have just mentioned, we were usually asked how an agreement to outlaw nuclear weapons testing could be accepted when no provision was envisaged for verifying compliance with this agreement.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“It is true that we were told recently in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission that the United States and the United Kingdom would be willing to suspend tests for an initial period of twelve months. That proposal is rather ironic, as this period is approximately the time required to prepare for a new test. Yet so many conditions are attached to their acceptance even of this measure that it is deprived of any significance. The Western Powers contend that the question of discontinuing nuclear weapons testing cannot be considered independently at all, but must form an integral part of a general agreement on disarmament. 89.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“All that is needed to bring about the suspension of atomic and hydrogen weapons testing is a willingness on the part of each of the three Powers possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons, that is, the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom, to discontinue such testing. Furthermore, the present state of scientific knowledge rules out breaches of such an agreement, since any explosion of an atomic or hydrogen bomb, in whatever part of the world it might occur, would immediately be detected and recorded. 88. How were our proposals on this matter received by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom? Verbally they acknowledge the need to discontinue nuclear testing, but in practice they are obstructing agreement.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“Secondly, it would slow down the atomic and hydrogen weapons production race and prevent the development of new, even more terrible and destructive types of weapons, which is the specific purpose of test explosions. Thirdly, and this is particularly important, the renunciation of test explosions would be a first practical step towards the main goal - the absolute and unconditional prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Finally, who can deny that if the great Powers succeeded in reaching an agreement to discontinue nuclear weapons testing, that fact in itself would do much to bring about a general relaxation of the international political atmosphere and would facilitate agreement on other disarmament issues? 87.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“An international commission, which shall submit reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly, shall be established to observe whether States fulfil their obligations to suspend tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons; “3. Under the direction of the aforementioned international commission, check points shall be established by mutual agreement in the territory of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and its possessions and in the Pacific Ocean area, including Australia." 86. Why is it important that an agreement for the cessation of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons should be concluded as early as possible? First, it would make it possible to remove the danger of injury to human health due to radioactive fallout and atomic radiation.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“The Soviet Government fully associates itself with the demands voiced in the parliaments of many countries, including India, Japan, Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon, and Yugoslavia, with the resolution adopted by the World Peace Council at Colombo, with the recent decision taken by the British Trades Union Congress, and with the opinion of prominent physicists, chemists and biologists in many countries, that test explosions of atomic and hydrogen bombs should be discontinued immediately. The Soviet Government proposes that the question of discontinuing such tests should be considered a separate item and that an agreement should be concluded without delay on the basis of the following provisions [A/3674]: “1. Tests shall be suspended as of 1 January 1958 for a period of two to three years; “2.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“If a broad agreement on the problem of disarmament has not been concluded by the end of that period, the matter can then be reconsidered. 84. The extent to which the international atmosphere would improve if agreement were reached in this matter can readily be appreciated. It would greatly facilitate the solution of other disarmament problems relating to atomic and conventional armaments. The Soviet Government believes that this question should be considered separately and that its solution should not be made contingent upon that of other disarmament questions. Given a genuine desire for progress in disarmament, initial agreement on at least some issues should be possible. 85. The question of discontinuing tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons calls for special attention.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“To negotiate in that way is to doom the talks to failure from the outset. 83. The Soviet delegation submits for the General Assembly’s consideration a memorandum [A/C.1/793] by the Soviet Government on partial measures in the field of disarmament, which sets out the Soviet Union’s main proposals on this problem. Moreover, our delegation is submitting a new proposal [A/3674] to which the Government of the Soviet Union considers it necessary to draw the General Assembly’s attention. In view of the fact that the Western Powers are not at present prepared to agree to the complete renunciation of the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the Soviet Government proposes that the Powers possessing such weapons should assume a solemn undertaking not to use these weapons, say, for a period of five years.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“Confidence, and more confidence, the cessation of war propaganda and the establishment of normal economic relations among States, which the Chairman of the Japanese delegation aptly discussed yesterday [680th meeting] and without which confidence is inconceivable - these are more essential now than ever before. If these conditions were fulfilled, there would be room for control. I would particularly stress the importance of economic relations among Stages, which have been disrupted on vitiated. 82. It became quite evident during the discussion of disarmament in the Sub-Committee that the Governments of the Western Powers were taking a wrong approach to the problem. They are seeking a disarmament agreement which would be to their advantage but detrimental to the security of others.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“Many examples could be given to illustrate the degree of mistrust and suspicion prevailing in relations among States. The United States, for instance, has literally cordoned itself off in order to keep representatives of Soviet economic, cultural and scientific organizations out of its territory. Moreover, not every American can obtain permission to visit the Soviet Union, not to mention China, which even United States correspondents, who are well-known for their energy and resourcefulness, find it difficult to visit with the State Department's blessing. Similar examples could be given with respect to the United Kingdom and a number of other countries. 81.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“If one party to the disarmament negotiations prepares to attack the other, continues to stockpile nuclear weapons, objects to their prohibition and elimination and even to the suspension of nuclear weapons testing, if normal economic relations do not exist among nations, how can the problem be solved by any form of control, particularly one on which no reliance could be placed? 79. How can we speak of any sort of comprehensive control, of carrying out flights and aerial photography over the entire territory of retain countries, when the NATO military leaders make no attempt to conceal the fact that the forces of the bloc are preparing for war and that their headquarters needs fuller information about the territories of the socialist States, particularly the Soviet Union? 80.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“We are opposed to control and the execution of measures to prevent surprise attack being used as a pretext for increasing suspicion and mistrust in international relations We are against substituting talk of control for the settlement of the disarmament problem, and that is precisely what the Western Powers are doing. It can scarcely be regarded as fortuitous that, in the statement he made yesterday, the Secretary of States of the United States spoke more in terms of a limitation of armaments than of disarmament. 77. All that I have said about the Western Powers' attitude to disarmament issues fully bears out the conclusion that their proposals, which Mr. Dulles praised so highly here, cannot provide a basis for agreement. 78. A modicum of confidence is required for any progress in disarmament.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“However, we feel that those who incessantly discuss control, obscuring with their talk the substance of the problem of ending the armaments race, do not themselves believe that control, as they understand it, is really the heart of the matter. How can control be enforced in territories extending over millions of square kilometres and how can concealed weapons be detected there even with the aid of aerial photography? It cannot be done. To claim that such control can be exercised is absurd. 76. We are not in the least opposed to control, but we want it to be effective and practicable. We are opposed to the utter hypocrisy of the Western Powers’ position on the question of control.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“We put the following question to the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France: has the time not come to abandon the method of negotiation in which one begins by saying that the proposal is sound in principle, and then goes on to link it with other questions still in dispute and hedge it about with a series of unacceptable preliminary conditions, thus reducing its significance to nil? That is precisely the procedure that has been followed in regard to the proposal on control posts, on atomic weapons testing and many others. 75. Asa rule, this position is camouflaged by demands for the proper control of disarmament.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“In this connexion, the Soviet delegation would like to recall the USSR Government's proposals for the establishment of control posts at railway stations, at ports, on highways and at airfields. We submitted a specific proposal on this subject to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. However, the other members of the Sub-Committee took a negative attitude towards our proposal, resorting here again to their favourite method: they told us that the proposal, while sound in principle, would be acceptable only if certain conditions were fulfilled. From the discussion it became clear that the proposal was in fact being rejected, since its acceptance was made contingent upon the acceptance by the Soviet Union of other disarmament proposals made by the Western Powers which would certainly not lead to agreement. 74.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“They responded by proposing alternative zones of aerial inspection, which would place the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty allies at a disadvantage vis à vis the members of NATO and which were, therefore, unacceptable. 72. Thus, neither the Soviet Union's acceptance of the proposal for agreement on partial disarmament measures, nor its agreement to the use of aerial photography, prompted the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada to make concessions and come to terms, if only on individual aspects of disarmament. 73. Does this mean that an agreement cannot be reached here and now on effective and practicable measures to prevent surprise attack and on the execution of initial measures to reduce conventional armament and prohibit atomic weapons? No, it does not.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“It is equally clear that aerial photography alone is completely and utterly incapable of solving the disarmament problem, and no cheap propaganda by the enthusiastic advocates of the method can conceal this fact. 70. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union, being desirous of overcoming the new obstacle to a disarmament agreement raised by the Western Powers, expressed its willingness to give the aerial photography method a practical trial at the time other partial disarmament measures were carried into effect. We proposed that, as a first step, agreement should be reached on aerial inspection in a specific zone in Europe where the principal armed forces of the opposing military groups are deployed, and also in the Far East. 71. However, these proposals were not accepted by the Governments of the Western Powers.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“I would remind representatives that is was fully defined by Mr. Khrushchev in a conversation with the President of the United States on the very day Mr. Eisenhower submitted his proposal on aerial photography to the Geneva conference. 69. Aerial photography can neither ensure control of disarmament nor prevent aggression. Flights by aircraft of one State over the territory of another cannot prevent a surprise attack by an aggressor. With world conditions as they are, would people feel more secure if military aircraft belonging to a foreign State were to fly continuously overhead and over their country's vital centres in order to gather reconnaissance data? They obviously would not.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“The Soviet Government further considers that the States parties to the agreement on partial disarmament measures should undertake to make every effort to reach agreement on the total prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, their elimination from the armaments of States and the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons. 67. The Soviet Government took another step to meet the views of the Governments of the Western Powers in regard to the use of aerial photography. 68. Since the 1955 Geneva Conference of the Heads of Government of the USSR, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, the Western Powers have made agreement on disarmament conditional upon the adoption of a scheme for aerial inspection by means of aerial photography. The Soviet Government has repeatedly stated its position on this question.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“Fourthly, consideration should be given to the question of abolishing military bases on foreign soil with a view to reaching agreement in the first instance on the bases which can be abolished during the first stage of disarmament. 64. Fifthly, an agreement should be concluded on the reduction of the armed forces of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France stationed in the territory of Germany, as well as on the reduction of United States, British and French forces stationed in the territories of States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and of Soviet forces stationed in the territory of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. 65. Sixthly, the States parties to the agreement should adopt appropriate measures to end war propaganda. 66.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“Secondly, conventional armaments should be reduced by 15 per cent or, as proposed by the United States Government, by means of the reciprocal submission of specific lists of armaments to be reduced. There would be a reduction of military budgets by 15 per cent in the first stage. 62. Thirdly, States should give a solemn undertaking to renounce the use of all types of atomic and hydrogen weapons, including aerial bombs, rockets with atomic and hydrogen warheads, whatever their effective range, and atomic artillery. Such an undertaking would be a first step towards the total prohibition of nuclear weapons and would come into effect during the first stage of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. 63.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“Having regard to the position taken by the Western Powers, and being desirous of ending the deadlock on the disarmament problem, the Soviet Government submitted a proposal on partial disarmament measures. The Soviet Government proposes that an agreement on such measures should provide for the following. 60. First, armed forces should be reduced in three stages, as proposed by the United States Government, to the following levels: for the United States and the Soviet Union, to 2,500,000 men at the first stage, 2,100,000 at the second stage and l,700,000 at the third stage; for the United Kingdom and France, 750,000 men at the first stage, 700,000 at the second stage and 650,000 at the third stage. 61.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“The Soviet Union favours a radical solution of the disarmament problem. We desire a substantial reduction of armed forces, armaments and military expenditure. We favour a complete and unconditional prohibition of the use and production of atomic and hydrogen weapons and the destruction of existing stocks of these weapons. 58. The Governments of the aforementioned Western Powers state that they are not prepared to enter into such an agreement on disarmament and, in particular, that they cannot agree to prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Consider the statement made from this rostrum yesterday by Mr. Dulles [680th meeting]. Instead of associating his country with those who are demanding the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, he waxed almost lyrical in his praise of some types of these weapons. 59.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“The Soviet Government considers that the situation which has arisen in the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission is altogether abnormal. The Sub-Committee is at present the only body in which disarmament problems are being considered, and if no progress is being made there, none is being made anywhere. 56. What important developments have occurred in the disarmament talks during the past few months? There will probably be wide agreement that the most striking feature of that period was the fact that the Soviet Government, in an attempt to reach an agreement acceptable to all concerned, made significant concessions on a number of controversial issues to the other members of the Sub-Committee - the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada. 57.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“But the problem of disarmament has never been so vital and so urgent as in our day, when the explosion of a single hydrogen bomb can destroy all life over a radius of hundreds of kilometres, when rockets can carry atomic warheads to any part of the globe. All this shows how vigilant the peoples should be, if they do not wish to be plunged into the maelstrom of atomic war. 54. As far back as its first session, in 1946, the General Assembly expressed itself in favour of a general reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons [resolution 41 (1)]; it has repeatedly reaffirmed that decision. But those Member States upon which agreement on disarmament primarily depends have so far failed to achieve any practical results. Far from slowing down, the armaments race is gaining momentum and is becoming increasingly dangerous. 55.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“The adoption toy the General Assembly of a declaration containing these or similar provisions, and its application, would undoubtedly be an important contribution to the strengthening of universal peace. 52. Perhaps the most important question before the Assembly at this session is the disarmament problem, 53. The problem of disarmament as a means of averting war has faced mankind for several decades now. In many countries of the world, disarmament has been one of the most important planks in the platform of the political parties closest to the people. The call for disarmament was taken up by the great masses of the people, when the experience of two world wars showed them the outcome of armaments races.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“To broaden international co-operation still further and to reduce international tension, the Soviet delegation is placing before the General Assembly a draft declaration [A/3673] concerning the principles of the peaceful coexistence of States. It is proposed in this declaration that the General Assembly should call upon States to base their mutual relations on the following principles: "(a) Mutual respect for one another’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; "(b) Non-aggression; "(c) Non-intervention in one another's domestic affairs on any economic, political or ideological grounds whatsoever; "(d) Equality and mutual benefit; and "(e) Peaceful coexistence." 51.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“I should also like to cite, as a not unworthy example, the way in which the principles of peaceful coexistence are being applied in the relations between the Soviet Union and such countries as India, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, Finland, Switzerland, Austria and a number of others, which have chosen the road of peaceful development and refuse to participate in military blocs. With these States the Soviet Union has good, friendly relations on the sound basis of genuine mutual respect and strict non-intervention in each other’s domestic affairs. The Soviet Government is ready to develop such relations with all States pursuing the same objectives. 50.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“Whatever hostile propaganda may say about us abroad, we, the Soviet people, assume that in the present circumstances war is not inevitable. That position was substantiated at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Despite all the efforts of those advocating the "negotiation from strength" policy, the principles of peaceful cooperation are being increasingly applied in relations between States. At the Bandung Conference, twenty-nine Asian and African countries proclaimed their adherence to such principles. These principles are fully endorsed by the Soviet Union, whose foreign policy is based on them. 49.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)
“This letter said: "The fact that Russia is a Communist State and Britain and the United States are not, and do not intend to be, is not any obstacle to our making a good plan for our mutual safety and rightful interests." It is difficult not to agree with this judicious appraisal of the situation. It is commonly known that such a great United States leader as the late President Roosevelt took the same view on relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. 47. The choice now before mankind is this: either stable peace and co-operation among all States, irrespective of their social systems and ideologies, or atomic war, or, at best, an anguished wait for the outbreak of such a war and ruinous rearmament, absorbing an ever greater share of humanity’s wealth and toil. 48.”
1957-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 12 (1957)