YouSaid · the spoken record

Araud

lines on the record
1,506
first
2009-09-09
most recent
2014-07-22
sittings or episodes
220
sources
un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

  1. In every forum, France is resolved to work unceasingly with those who share its values - and the meeting in Paris showed that there were many of them - so that the violence perpetrated on the Syrian people can be ended, their legitimate aspirations are realized fairly and swiftly, and the perpetrators of crimes, and their accomplices, are brought to justice. This double veto leaves the Security Council helpless against the violence of the Syrian regime, but France will not leave the Syrian people to face the crimes to which they are victim alone.

    2012-07-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6810 (2012) · source

  2. We have gone as far as the veto in full awareness of the situation. We cannot be complicit in a strategy that combines a mockery of diplomatic action with de facto paralysis. To do that would have been to give short shrift to our responsibility as a permanent member of the Council, short shrift to the credibility of this Chamber, which cannot serve as a fig leaf for impunity, and short shrift to the Syrian people. I now turn to those men and women in Syria who, in the face of unheard-of suffering, continue to carry the torch of their ideal of liberty. France pays homage to them. I will say again what I said on 4 February: no, once again, the double veto will not stop us. We will continue to support the Syrian opposition on its road to a democratic transition in Syria.

    2012-07-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6810 (2012) · source

  3. We cannot simply call for political transition ad infinitum. We must establish a credible momentum for transition. To refuse to grant Mr. Kofi Annan the tools to exert pressure that he has requested in order to implement the road map that we entrusted him with in New York and in Geneva is to undermine his mission itself. We must not shirk our responsibilities. The third veto on Syria means that, for Russia and China, there will be no consequences for the Syrian regime's disregard of its commitments. The crimes will go unpunished; their perpetrators will continue to proceed with their disgusting plans; the people's legitimate aspirations can be disregarded; and the victims are insignificant in number. History will prove them wrong; history willjudge them. It is already doing so right now in Damascus.

    2012-07-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6810 (2012) · source

  4. Our draft resolution (S/2012/538) included only a mere threat of sanctions. It gave the regime 10 days to finally abide by its commitments. Ten days is a long time when a single decision would be enough to immediately halt the use of heavy weapons in civilian neighbourhoods. It is too long, as each day brings 100 new deaths. It was then up to the Council itself to decide whether or not its decisions had been implemented. It was up to the Council to choose the sanctions it deemed necessary to apply. The Council thus remained master of the subsequent steps. It will be said that the veto is the result of disagreement on the way to achieve a common objective. That is wrong. Russia and China have today exercised a veto to all of the laborious work undertaken by the Council in recent months to find a peaceful solution to the crisis.

    2012-07-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6810 (2012) · source

  5. In that time, the civilian population has been crushed by heavy artillery and attacks by combat helicopters. In his report of 6 July (S/2012/523), the Secretary-General can only note the intensification of these attacks on the civilian population. Between bombardments, the regime sends its terrifying militias to cut throats, kidnap, rape and generate inter-communal fear among the civilian population. In response, the Secretary-General and the Joint Special Envoy have called on the Security Council to ensure that its decisions are implemented. That message was echoed by the Secretary General of the League of Arab States here, a month ago, and by the 107 States that met in Paris within the framework of the Group of Friends of Syria on 6 July. That simple message has just come up against the rejection of both Russia and China.

    2012-07-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6810 (2012) · source

  6. It is now clear that Russia merely wants to win time for the Syrian regime to crush the opposition. For 17 months now, and with 17,000 dead, Russia and China have advocated soft pressure and diplomatic contact and have assigned responsibility for implementation of the process to the parties alone. Contacts with President Al-Assad are systematically deemed to be encouraging. The only matter deemed urgent has been the need to wait. And it would appear that one is always too harsh with bloodthirsty dictators. But let us look at the facts. The provisions adopted by the Council have been systematically violated by the Syrian regime, which has not even started to implement the first of its commitments. Since 21 March, the Council has demanded that the Syrian authorities cease the use of heavy weapons and withdraw their troops from the cities.

    2012-07-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6810 (2012) · source

  7. We have done all in our power since the double veto in February to ensure that the international community could finally agree on a coordinated approach that would respond to the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people to democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental human rights. We have attempted to rally the international community around the mission of Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan. On the basis ofthose proposals, resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012) were adopted. An observer mission was deployed on the ground. A transition plan was agreed in Geneva on 30 June (S/2012/523, annex), in which we, alongside Russia and China, recognized the right of the Syrian people to a democratic future, with credible, legitimate leaders chosen by the Syrian people themselves.

    2012-07-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6810 (2012) · source

  8. Mr. Araud (France) (spoke in French): I had hoped not to have to go through this ghastly list. By 4 October 2011, repression in Syria had already claimed 3,000 lives and Russia and China vetoed the Council's action for the first time (see S/PV.6627). By 4 February, 6,000 Syrians had been cut down by the regime, and Russia and China exercised their second veto on the Council's action (see S/PV.6711). Today, 19 July, we now count 17,000 men, women and children dead. We mourn their memory alongside the Syrian people, and Russia and China have just exercised their veto of the Council's action for the third time.

    2012-07-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6810 (2012) · source

  9. Having myself served as Chair of the PBC's Organizational Committee, in 2010, I am very well aware of the opportunities, the challenges and the limitations of that unique intergovernmental body. All of us created it together in order to achieve more durable peace and development in countries emerging from conflict. It is therefore also our common responsibility to make it work.

    2012-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6805 (2012) · source

  10. In that connection, we have had fruitful informal exchanges of views on both Burundi and Liberia. We think it could be beneficial to the work of the Council to have more of those informal exchanges of views. The PBC's Organizational Committee can do better in using the advantages of its unique intergovernmental structure. It could potentially serve as an ideal platform to create stronger links between developments that take place outside the United Nations, such as activities of the World Bank, but also such initiatives as the New Deal for International Engagement in Fragile and the peacebuilding agenda of the United Nations. Equally, the PBC could help to link certain processes within the United Nations, such as the post-2015 development agenda, to the peacebuilding agenda.

    2012-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6805 (2012) · source

  11. We encourage both sides to make full use of their potential for future cooperation. It is only through a regular, strong rapport that gaps and overlaps will be identified, be they in resourcing or in civilian capacity-building. Fifthly, we believe that there need to be more interactive and dynamic relations between the PBC and the Council. We welcome the fact that the Chairs of the PBC country configurations are regularly included in briefings to the Security Council. Council members should, in our view, also consider inviting the PBC country configuration Chairs, as appropriate, to closed consultations of the Security Council. Furthermore, we should work on expanding existing informal ways of interaction between the PBC and the Security Council outside the Consultations Room.

    2012-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6805 (2012) · source

  12. The PBC was created as a body composed of members of different United Nations bodies, including seven members of the Security Council, precisely for the reason that those members bring their political weight and experience from other bodies to the PBC's activities. The intergovernmental nature of the PBC needs to be much better used in order to support the countries on its agenda. Fourthly, the PBC needs to maintain stronger and more regular rapport with other key partners in the field, especially with major donors such as the World Bank, active bilateral donors and other relevant international actors. I therefore welcome the presence of Vice-President Von Amsberg of the World Bank at today's meeting. His statement on the improved coordination between the World Bank and the PBC in post-conflict situations is reassuring.

    2012-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6805 (2012) · source

  13. The comparative advantage of the PBC compared with United Nations missions on the ground is its intergovernmental structure, which should allow it to lend the the Secretary-General's representatives additional political weight. Thirdly, the PBC must make better use of the political leverage of its individual members. PBC member States need to become better at assisting the PBC country configuration Chairs in their work. Members of the PBC's Organizational Committee and the PBC country configurations have a responsibility to support the PBC so that it can have a true impact on the ground.

    2012-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6805 (2012) · source

  14. The PBC can only be successful if there is a genuine political commitment by the national Government in question to a political peacebuilding process. Secondly, effective political support of countries on the PBC's agenda can only work if there is close cooperation between the PBC and other key actors on the ground, namely, the executive representatives and Special Representatives of the Secretary-General. The roles and responsibilities of the different actors must be clearly outlined in order to avoid overlap. The first meeting between the PBC country configuration Chairs and the Secretary-General's representatives for countries on the PBC's agenda, which took place in New York in May, was an important step in the right direction. In our view, such a dialogue needs to take place on a much more regular basis.

    2012-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6805 (2012) · source

  15. It seems that the PBC's success has often been measured only by its capacity to mobilize resources. Resource mobilization, including by mobilizing non-traditional donors, is indeed a key role of the PBC. But it needs to be clear that that is not its only role. Supporting countries politically as they emerge from conflict and fostering coherence among international actors are other core tasks outlined in the PBC's founding resolutions. Eligibility for funding by the Peacebuilding Fund is therefore also linked to a country's national commitment to a political peacebuilding process. To marshal resources is not an isolated task but has to go hand in hand with a credible and nationally owned political process.

    2012-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6805 (2012) · source

  16. We are here today not only to discuss the latest annual report of the PBC (S/2012/70), but also to speak in more general terms about how we can enhance the role of the Commission within the United Nations system, and in particular the impact that it has in the field. In our view, the PBC has not yet entirely realized its full potential. What can be done better? The concept paper prepared by the Colombian presidency raises important questions. The PBC's engagement with a country needs to be flexible and has to evolve on the basis ofa continuous assessment. Our approaches must be context-specific; there is no single approach that will fit all situations. However, there are a few overarching points and principles that seem important to us. First, we need to clarify what the role of the PBC is and set realistic expectations.

    2012-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6805 (2012) · source

  17. Wittig (Germany) Madam President, let me begin by thanking you, Ambassador Nestor Osorio and your whole delegation for today's important and timely initiative and for preparing an excellent concept note for our debate (S/2012/511, annex). Let me also thank the Secretary-General for his briefing, as well as the current and former Chairs of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and Vice-President Von Amsberg of the World Bank for their insightful statements. Let me also commend Assistant Secretary-General Judy Cheng-Hopkins for her important work at the helm of the Peacebuilding Support Office. Germany aligns itself with the statement to be delivered by the observer of the European Union later on in today's debate.

    2012-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6805 (2012) · source

  18. Initiatives aimed at promoting the recovery of a viable economic fabric must be especially encouraged. The joint informal event of the Economic and Social Council and the Peacebuilding Commission in June on partnerships for youthjob creation in States emerging from conflict was useful. That approach should also be reflected on the ground in each State on the PBC's agenda. I will conclude by underscoring that to bring a coordinated response to post-conflict situations and to make sustainable any return to peace and stability, the Commission must work as a flexible and responsive mechanism, one bringing all players together in a joint action plan. It therefore behoves us to be especially vigilant with regard to the risks of bureaucratization of this young institution. Mr.

    2012-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6805 (2012) · source

  19. To ensure the sustainability of the international community's commitment, various efforts aimed at reviewing the topic have been launched, such as, inter alia, the review of civilian capacities. The issue of partnership development lies at the very heart of that review. We believe that that approach provides us with the best hope for a long-term commitment. The international community must not create conditions of dependence where a State is kept on life support, but rather conditions for recovery. An excellent option is the drawing up of contracts such as the New Deal for International Engagement in Fragile States developed at the 2011 Forum on Aid Effectiveness, in Busan, which involved defining a State's commitment and so involves it in the project.

    2012-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6805 (2012) · source

  20. The signing of mutual commitments or peacebuilding plans with a State is not in itself enough to guarantee that they will in fact be implemented. For example, the peacebuilding plan for South Sudan is blocked for now as a result of budgetary austerity. In a number of situations, States do not possess the means to cover and fully participate in all projects under way. It is therefore essential to establish priorities and to be realistic. Finally, the key element of the role of the Peacebuilding Commission is coordination. The PBC was designed as a platform for contact between the various members of the international community, including the international financial institutions, which play a decisive role in this regard. Partnerships with them must be developed. Coordination is a long-term endeavour.

    2012-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6805 (2012) · source

  21. The country-specific configuration of the Commission must be in close contact with these offices, and their exchanges must be fluid. That dialogue will be effective only if links with the field are strengthened. As was demonstrated by the Security Council's visit to western Africa, the PBC is sometimes lacking in visibility in States in the region, in particular Sierra Leone. Once the work to identify needs has been completed, it is important for the PBC to be able to play its political supporting role. On the one hand, an important element of the tasks entrusted to the Peacebuilding Commission is that of advocacy, especially for resource mobilization. On the other hand, the PBC should open a dialogue with the authorities of countries on its agenda in order to ask them to take specific commitments and follow up with results on the ground.

    2012-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6805 (2012) · source

  22. First, the primary role of the PBC is to identify, together with the States concerned, the needs on the ground and the stakeholders who are already involved. Contact with those in the field offers a picture of the needs on the ground. The work carried out in the case of Guinea is an example of this. The mapping exercise carried out by Luxembourg and Japan provides us with a precise, quantifiable picture of the existing shortcomings and projects needed to remedy them. This exercise deserves to be repeated in other country-specific configurations of the PBC. The identification ofthe most pressing areas should be the result of an in-depth dialogue with the relevant State. To facilitate this dialogue, there are integrated peacebuilding offices in a number of post-conflict countries, such as Burundi and the Central African Republic.

    2012-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6805 (2012) · source

  23. Mr. Araud (France) (spoke in French): I would like to thank you, Madam President, for your presence among us here today, and Colombia for having organized this open debate on peacebuilding. I would also like to thank the Secretary-General; the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh; his predecessor, the Permanent Representative of Rwanda; and the representative of the World Bank. France associates itself with the statement to be made on behalf of the European Union. We note today that, despite the 2010 review, the role of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is still being defined. I would therefore like to make three comments concerning this matter.

    2012-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6805 (2012) · source

  24. In that regard, the sentences passed on Charles Taylor, by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and Thomas Lubanga, by the International Criminal Court (ICC), for war crimes and crimes against humanity are milestones of international criminal justice. The results of these proceedings demonstrate that no Head of State, minister or high military official - and this message must be understood in Syria - can hope to commit such crimes with complete impunity. We will not forget. It is now essential that Bosco Ntaganda, Thomas Lubanga's co-defendant, be arrested as soon as possible and brought before the ICC to answer for the crimes of which he is accused, along with all those for whom the Court has issued arrest warrants.

    2012-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6790 (2012) · source

  25. It is the Council's responsibility to support those initiatives with policy. In every area of conflict, the situation ofjournalists also remains worrying. In the almost six years since the Council adopted resolution 1738 (2006), 300journalists and media professionals have lost their lives on the job, and more have been threatened, abducted or tortured. The rate of impunity for those who perpetrate violence againstjournalists is estimated to be 90 per cent, which is unacceptable. France supports UNESCO's Plan of Action for the Safety of Journalists. The Security Council should continue to focus on the issue. I will conclude by recalling that the protection of civilians also involves combating impunity for those responsible for atrocities. I have mentioned this in the context of Syria.

    2012-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6790 (2012) · source

  26. To that end, the efforts undertaken to reform the security forces, including adopting the necessary legislative frameworks, are a step in the right direction and should be pursued and implemented. Finally we turn to Mali, where civilian populations are hostage to the seizure of control in the north by rebel groups linked to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. Tens of thousands of refugees and displaced persons have been forced to flee the region in order to escape the violence. The international community cannot stand idly by in the face of such a situation. The Economic Community of West African States, the African Union and the countries of the region are working on a strategy designed both to restore constitutional order in the capital and to preserve Mali's territorial integrity.

    2012-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6790 (2012) · source

  27. It is now more essential than ever for the Council to send a firm message to the Syrian authorities on the need to respect their commitments and the consequences they face if they continue to violate them. Those responsible for the atrocities, Bashar Al-Assad first among them, will one day answer in court for their actions. Turning to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the challenges to the protection of civilians there are still immense. In the short term, the innovative steps that MONUSCO has taken, such as recruiting community liaison assistants and establishing early warning networks, are essential and should continue to be expanded. In the medium and long terms, ensuring the protection of civilians demands a full-on commitment on the part of the Congolese authorities.

    2012-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6790 (2012) · source

  28. Such policies could be developed and extended to other missions so as to help identify the harm done to civilians and to enable the Security Council to respond appropriately. The Secretary-General's report also reminds us of the challenges we continue to face in the protection of civilians. How can we avoid mentioning Syria? So far, the international community has failed to protect that country's civilian population. After 15 months of repression, resulting in almost 15,000 deaths, the majority of them civilian, Bashar Al-Assad's regime continues to violate its commitments and threaten international peace and security. The massacres in Houla and Al-Qubayr, following those in Homs and Idlib, have proved that this regime knows no bounds. Deploying a United Nations observation mission has done nothing to change its murderous behaviour.

    2012-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6790 (2012) · source

  29. In that context, two recent initiatives deserve highlighting: first, the policy of reasonable due diligence in matters of human rights established by the Secretary-General. The policy makes it possible to ensure that national security forces suspected of serious violations of human rights do not receive United Nations support. It has been implemented by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, and the policy should now be extended to other United Nations missions. We also welcome the establishment within the African Union Mission in Somalia and the International Security Assistance Force of cells tasked with tallying and identifying civilian victims.

    2012-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6790 (2012) · source

  30. Mr. Araud (France) (spoke in French): I thank the Secretary-General for introducing his report (S/2012/376), as well as the various speakers for their briefings. France subscribes to the statement to be made by the observer of the European Union. The past year has seen significant developments in the area of the protection of civilians. The Council has been able to react urgently and based upon clear principles in order to protect civilians. I would like to note the Libyan example and resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011). We remember the thanks that the Libyan Prime Minister personally extended to the Council for having avoided the deaths of thousands of civilians. France also welcomes the fact that the protection of civilians remains at the heart of the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

    2012-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6790 (2012) · source

  31. However, such efforts will be futile in the absence of a strong commitment on the part of the host country. Here I wish to stress the need for cooperation with the host country, which needs to work both ways: we must, of course, cooperate with the host country, but that country must also respond to our appeals and offer its own perspective on the problem. I will conclude by paying high tribute to the commitment ofpeacekeepers ofallnationalities-which sometimes costs them their lives, as in the case of the seven Nigerian Blue Helmets - to the cause of peace.

    2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source

  32. Every time I have visited missions in francophone countries, I have found that most mission staff, especially at a higher level, did not speak French. I find this deeply regrettable, and I wish to stress once again to the Secretariat the need to put an end to this practice and for recruitment boards on the ground to give priority to French over English, especially in French-speaking areas. I know that what I said was a waste of breath and that the Secretariat will do nothing, but sometimes it is good to say what we think. We would like to reiterate that the success of a peacekeeping mission is the result ofjoint efforts by the States members of the Council, the countries that contribute financially, the TCCs and PCCs, and the Secretariat.

    2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source

  33. During the three years that I have been in the Organization, I have been trying to make the point that it is more important for staff to be able to speak French in a francophone country than to be able to write a report in English for transmittal to New York. Too often we recruit staff on the basis of their ability to write a report for New York, while completely ignoring the issue of whether they will be able to converse in French in a francophone country. I could give you many such examples, including for staff who are at a very average level. I think that this leads to inefficiency. Once again, I am not speaking of the status of French within the Organization, but of the effectiveness of our resources.

    2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source

  34. There is a need also to take into account as soon as possible cross-cutting threats such as the traffic in drugs and human beings, organized crime and corruption, which have strong destabilizing potential in fragile countries. Allow me here to touch on the issue of multilingualism, as raised by my Moroccan colleague. When I refer to multilingualism, I am not talking about the status of languages in the United Nations but to the basic need for United Nations missions to be able to communicate with the peoples of the countries where they are deployed. I believe that the Secretariat's efforts in that respect are greatly lacking. The French-speaking capacity of many missions in francophone countries is very limited, owing in particular to recruitment modalities.

    2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source

  35. Thirdly, we need to create crisis exit strategies that guarantee a lasting return to peace. We need to draw operational conclusions from the absence of division between peacekeeping and peacebuilding so that each stage of a United Nations mission can better prepare for the following stage in order to better anticipate and foresee exit strategies. In that respect, it is crucial for peacekeeping operations to cooperate closely with United Nations country team agencies so that peacekeeping and peacebuilding functions are properly distributed and duplication is avoided. We look to the Peacebuilding Commission to provide better coherence to the action of the international community in post-conflict phases.

    2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source

  36. Moreover, it is vital for the chain of command of operations to be respected. Peacekeepers must establish a safe environment conducive to the resumption of political process, which requires the implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, including for children affected by conflict, security sector reform programmes, and programmes that strengthen the rule of law. As my colleague from the United States said, women are one of the main levers for reforming a society. It is vital to enhance their participation in decision-making. The integration of women into the police force and the army helps us to better combat sexual and sexist violence and to promote human rights within those institutions. Advisers for the protection of women and children must play an increasingly significant role in missions.

    2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source

  37. It must be encouraged and even rendered systematic both to pool capacities - particularly of scarce air assets, such as helicopters, and of logistical support structures, which allows substantial rationalization of mission support - and to share situation analysis and assessment, particularly when missions find themselves on either side of a border. In those three areas, there is still much room for improvement. Cooperation must be facilitated while respecting mandates assigned by the Security Council to each mission and ensuring good coordination with the troop-contributing countries. Secondly, civilian protection must remain one of the main goals of peacekeeping operation mandates. Peacekeepers must be trained to that end and conduct themselves impeccably on the ground.

    2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source

  38. When unforeseen events threaten the stability of a country, inter-mission cooperation between missions is an adaptive, effective response that can swiftly strengthen missions in need in terms ofmanpower and equipment. That cooperation has proven its worth in West Africa, where cooperation between the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire and the United Nations Mission in Liberia was vital in pooling the use of helicopters in the context of the crisis in C6te d'Ivoire. It has also been useful in East Africa, where helicopters from the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were temporarily deployed to South Sudan. Inter-mission cooperation allows economies of scale to be achieved in response to the need for good management and budgetary constraints, which are more present than ever.

    2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source

  39. Since the Franco-British initiative of 2009 on operational follow-up, we have continued to advocate for enhanced military expertise, improved cooperation of the Council with troop- and police-contributing countries, and better budgeting for peacekeeping operations. While many recommendations from the Brahimi report (S/2000/809), published over 10 years ago, remain valid, I should like to highlight three vital elements: inter-mission cooperation, the protection of civilians and establishing strategies for transitioning between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. First, inter-mission cooperation allows the optimization of the use of resources devoted to peacekeeping operations by facilitating the sharing of resources, equipment or units belonging to neighbouring missions.

    2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source

  40. My country participates in nine of the 16 peacekeeping operations and contributes to peacekeeping operations under United Nations auspices through the European Union, NATO or in its national capacity. France is present in numerous foreign theatres, including Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and cote d'Ivoire. It actively supports the participation of African States in peacekeeping operations through the African Capacity-Building for Peace Operations programme. It has created national schools with a regional outlook in order to provide technical and operational know-how adapted to the needs of African armies.

    2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source

  41. Mr. Araud (France) (spoke in French): I thank you, Sir, for your initiative to convene today's important debate on peacekeeping, a pillar ofthe work ofthe United Nations. I also thank the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and the Force Commanders for giving us a direct insight into their work on the ground. In recent years, peacekeeping operations have changed greatly. Their deployment level is unprecedented, and mandates are broad. Sixteen operations are currently under way; some, such as the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, are multidimensional. I would like first to reiterate the deep and long-standing commitment of France to enhancing United Nations peacekeeping capacities.

    2012-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6789 (2012) · source

  42. In that regard, we welcome the holding of the upcoming Istanbul conference, which we hope will be an opportunity to breathe new life into those issues.

    2012-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6770 (2012) · source

  43. A restructuring of Government forces and strengthening of the chain of command will still be necessary to make those forces more effective. As the transition period is nearing its end, of course we have to strengthen our efforts for the development of Somalia, but it is also up to the Somali authorities and to the people themselves to do their share and chart their path. One of the challenges in the coming months will be the development of a new administration, both national and local, that will be able to provide basic services to the population, in particular in the zones freed from Al-Shabaab control, in order to establish the legitimacy of Somali authorities. It is up to the Transitional Federal Government to do its duty, as well as to meet the expectations of the Somali people.

    2012-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6770 (2012) · source

  44. The strengthening is made possible by greater support from the United Nations, but also support from the European Union, which, we must remember, has been financing for several years the entire salary of AMISOM troops, amounting to approximately $200 million per year. No other country in the world benefits from such support. I would like to urge States that would like to increase their support for security stabilization in Somalia to provide financial support for AMISOM soldiers alongside the European Union. In the long-term, Somalia's security can only be ensured by Somalis themselves. The training of Somali national forces must be a priority. The European Union is fully engaged along this path in the framework of the European Union Training Mission for Somalia.

    2012-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6770 (2012) · source

  45. Those who continue to undermine the political process will be subject to sanctions from States in the region and from the United Nations. At the security level, much remains to be done. Mogadishu continues to be subject to sporadic attacks and a large part of the territory of Somalia is still not under the control of the Transitional Federal Government. But progress has been considerable. Thanks to the efforts of the AMISOM. soldiers, Al-Shabaab has lost ground and life has resumed in the Somali capital. We must pay tribute to the Ugandan and Burundian contingents and to the action taken by Ethiopia. We support their efforts. Thanks to the adoption of resolution 2036 (2012), AMISOM's means are being transformed. The force will finally have an airlift capacity and its troops will be significantly strengthened.

    2012-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6770 (2012) · source

  46. The drafting experts must complete their work, bearing in mind two elements: first, this is a provisional text that could be subject to further improvement later on and, secondly, the text must respect human rights in accordance with Somalia's international commitments. Of course, the end of the transition period is not to everyone's liking. Some seem to be interested in continuing the current instability in order to preserve political influence or to derive financial benefit. To those who want to prevent their compatriots from living in peace, the international community is today ready to say that they can no longer conspire with impunity. The joint letter from the United Nations, the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, which was issued a few days ago by Mr. Mahiga, is very clear.

    2012-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6770 (2012) · source

  47. Unfortunately, even in that single area, certain timelines that were set by the international community and the Somalis themselves have not been met and the political process is now delayed by several weeks. We therefore need a new impetus, and that impetus begins with appointing members of a Somali Constituent Assembly. The clan leaders, currently meeting in Mogadishu, must move forward and put national interests before their own in order to appoint without delay Somalis who would represent all categories of society, in particular women, who will be part of the Assembly in charge of reviewing the draft constitution. That impetus would also involve finalizing the text of the draft constitution.

    2012-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6770 (2012) · source

  48. Those stages have signalled an unprecedented support by the international community for Somalia with a view to altering the destiny of that country. The international community has done its duty. It has the right to maintain high expectations from Somali political officials. Without their involvement, about which we can still wonder, nothing is possible. Today, almost a year after Kampala and three months from the end of the transition period, where do we stand? At the political level, we are concerned. The road map had four main tasks, accompanied by specific timelines, which the Transitional Federal Institutions signed on to. Today, three of those four tasks have been set aside in order to focus all efforts on adopting a constitution and on reforming current institutions, thus putting an end to the transition period that began in 2004.

    2012-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6770 (2012) · source

  49. Mr. Araud (France) (spoke in French): I would like to welcome the President of the Transitional Federal Government of the Somali Republic, Mr. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. I would also like to thank the Secretary- General and his Special Representative Augustine Mahiga for their briefings and for their personal commitment to stabilization in Somalia. The Kampala Accord of 9 June 2011, the Mogadishu road map of 6 September 2011, the reinforcement of support for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) decided in September 2011, and the thorough reconfiguration of AMISOM decided in February by the Security Council were all decisive stages aimed at a single objective, namely, stabilizing the political and security situation in Somalia.

    2012-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6770 (2012) · source

  50. The report of the Secretary-General (S/2012/275) contains in its annex information on the work of the Special Investigative Task Force. That effort at communication must continue so that the Security Council will be informed, as it has requested, while respecting investigative secrecy and applicable elementary rules of confidentiality.

    2012-05-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6769 (2012) · source