YouSaid · the spoken record

Cunningham

lines on the record: 847
first: 2000-02-09
most recent: 2004-06-14
sittings or episodes: 129
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“We have heard Special Representative Kouchner raise this issue on several occasions and we strongly support calls for a special envoy to address the issue.”
2000-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4138 (2000) · source
“By clarifying the difficult issue of property ownership and adopting strong and sustainable macroeconomic policies, UNMIK will help bring prosperity to Kosovo and strengthen its own administrative structure. Economic revitalization will also help reinforce programmes aimed at promoting the return of refugees and displaced persons, an understandable priority for the Kosovar Serb community. I would note my own country's considerable efforts in this area, to which we have devoted significant resources. Finally, we join others in underscoring the importance of resolving the problem of the detainees and missing persons. As the mission discovered, this is an emotional and sensitive issue that is blocking progress on inter-ethnic reconciliation. It needs to be addressed on an urgent basis.”
2000-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4138 (2000) · source
“These elections must go ahead as scheduled this fall and we were pleased to see that the mission observed voter registration under way in Kosovo and pledge our continued support for this project. Recent reports that members of the Serb community in Kosovo are registering for elections, against the wishes of some of their leaders, suggests that UNMIK should redouble its efforts to encourage participation by all groups in these elections. As High Representative Petritsch noted in Tuesday's meeting on Bosnia, economic reform is also crucial. It will support those leaders in Kosovo willing to speak out against violence and to reject the politics of ethnic hatred.”
2000-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4138 (2000) · source
“We are encouraged to see that UNMIK has added new training sites for the Kosovo Police Service and that specialized police units have finally begun to arrive. We were pleased also to see the Mission conclude that "UNMIK Police has significantly enhanced its effectiveness", in part due to close cooperation with the Kosovo Force (KFOR). The report also lays out important further steps UNMIK and Kosovo's leaders must take in order to build a stable political foundation for the future. Kosovo must move expeditiously to the autonomous self-government called for in resolution 1244 (1999) under institutions designed to protect the interests of everyone. Municipal elections are an important first step.”
2000-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4138 (2000) · source
“The sustained attention and ample resources of the international community will be needed in order to implement fully resolution 1244 (1999). It is clear that UNMIK has set the right goals for the immediate future: consolidation of the rule of law and further work on the interim political framework. There unquestionably continues to be a security gap in Kosovo. We believe that the report makes important recommendations in this regard. Additional international judges and resources for the judicial sector will help make fair trials and effective criminal prosecution the rule rather than the exception in all of Kosovo. UNMIK Police has done an impressive job of balancing its law-and-order function with its responsibility to create a local Kosovo Police Service. These efforts must be expedited.”
2000-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4138 (2000) · source
“We were also glad to see the mission's unqualified praise for Special Representative Kouchner, who has done a truly outstanding job of leading UNMIK in the most difficult of circumstances. It was good that members of the Council were able to walk the ground and see firsthand Mr. Kouchner in action and the hard tasks and challenges that UNMIK faces. It was also good that members had a chance to see firsthand the effects of the violence and devastation inflicted by Belgrade in Kosovo and to understand more fully the problems which now exist. We hope that the visit also helps make more apparent the disingenuousness of speaking of Belgrade's interest in cooperation in support of UNMIK's mission. As our Council colleagues witnessed firsthand, the situation in Kosovo, although improving, continues to be extremely difficult.”
2000-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4138 (2000) · source
“We, too, want to join in thanking Ambassador Chowdhury, not only for his report, but also for his excellent service in guiding this important mission. We commend him and all of the members of the mission on a job well done and for helping to improve the Council's understanding of the challenges that the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) faces in Kosovo. I also want to thank Ambassadors Levitte and Eldon for reminding us that the mission observed firsthand that significant progress has been made in the implementation of resolution 1244 (1999) in less than one year. There is lots of work to do, but there is definitely progress registered.”
2000-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4138 (2000) · source
“We must send a clear message to all, inside and outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, who would undermine this effort - the extreme nationalists, the indicted war criminals, the promoters of ethnic politics, the underground elements - that the Security Council and the international community will not be diverted and that we will not tolerate continued efforts to undermine the Dayton Agreement and, more broadly, lasting peace. I thank Ambassador Petritsch for reminding us that the price of failure is too high.”
2000-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4136 (2000) · source
“We note also the progress that has been made in reducing defence expenditures. The positive electoral results in Croatia are accelerating this welcome development, which will help strengthen Bosnia's fiscal health and advance key common State institutions. I want to draw special attention to the conclusion of Ambassador Petritsch's report to us today. He suggested that the tide has turned against the forces of nationalism in the Balkans, and that if we can assist the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina to live peacefully with one another again, we can achieve that goal elsewhere in the Balkans. That is a crucial point. Our aim is, and must continue to be, regional stability and peace.”
2000-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4136 (2000) · source
“The Security Council itself must maintain its commitment to the peace process, including continuing our strong support for the efforts of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) to carry out its difficult and dangerous mandate. With the help and support of High Representative Petritsch, Special Representative Klein has made important progress in strengthening Bosnia's police institutions. We welcome that, but we remain concerned about the security situation as the international community continues its more aggressive approach. We applaud High Representative Petritsch's efforts to push the parties on economic reform. This is essential. Progress on this front is the best way to support responsible reformist leaders who have focused on peace and prosperity rather than on rekindling old hatreds.”
2000-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4136 (2000) · source
“We encourage him to continue to draw on the full authority of his office to ensure that the parties live up to their international commitments. In that regard, I would note that for all of our success in working out the New York Declaration last November, implementation remains critical. Some of the important commitments have been carried out, but more needs to be done. It will take the active efforts of Ambassador Petritsch, Special Representative Klein and OSCE representative Robert Barry to ensure that these important commitments are respected. As noted by Ambassador Petritsch in his comments to us today, the international community must maintain its focused attention on priority areas such as economic reform, refugee return and the consolidation of central State institutions.”
2000-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4136 (2000) · source
“I also want to thank High Representative Petritsch for his briefing to us today and to welcome him back here. We applaud the fact that he has been aggressive and effective in addressing some of Dayton's most difficult issues. We note in particular Bosnia's recent municipal elections, which were conducted peacefully despite inflammatory rhetoric from certain quarters. The results reflect some important positive trends. Bosnia is finally beginning to transcend the excessive influence of ethnicity in its political life, and we hope that the Ambassador is correct that the everyday interests of ordinary people are starting to come to the fore. We commend High Representative Petritsch for his strong leadership and for the close and effective relationship he has forged with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).”
2000-05-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4136 (2000) · source
“The United States will be an active and engaged participant in a genuine effort to strengthen and streamline sanctions policy that supports the ability of the United Nations to meet its Charter obligations to enhance international peace and security.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“For down that path lies a more dangerous future for many of the countries represented in this Chamber, a future in which the instruments available to the Council and to the international community are fewer and less credible. The United States is fully committed to supporting the efforts of the Security Council's sanctions working group, the Secretary-General and others in a serious effort to analyse options, develop guiding principles, and monitor and adjust ongoing sanctions efforts. As that important process continues, we also remain firmly committed to ensuring that the Council retains its ability to act swiftly and with determination to counter current and future threats.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“To be effective, sanctions regimes must clearly enunciate the standards by which alterations to that unacceptable behaviour will be measured. The termination of sanctions should be directly and transparently linked to confirmation of the changed behaviour. In some cases, it may be possible and appropriate to link suspension or relaxation of elements of a sanctions regime to progress towards changed behaviour. In all cases, however, once sanctions have been imposed, it is essential to place the burden of proof regarding their suspension or termination where it properly belongs: on the demonstrated behaviour of the sanctioned entity. Just as sanctions must never be lightly entered into, they should not be terminated due to a lack of resolve, a lack of will or a lack of patience.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“Axworthy, and of Ambassador Fowler, has stimulated innovative techniques in this regard, and we commend them for this. The Secretary-General and many others have made very valuable recommendations for improving sanctions implementation, and we look forward very much to working with them. At the same time, the commitment of national authorities to sanctions enforcement is obviously critical. Action by those authorities to address activities by sanctions violators within their borders should have high priority. Thirdly, as we seek improvements to effectiveness and as we seek to minimize unintended impact, we should keep in mind that sanctions are designed to force an end to behaviours or policies judged to be unacceptable. The goal is compliance, and the requirements should be clear.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“First, we agree, is the need to anticipate and minimize the unintended impacts of sanctions on elements of the population of the targeted State, on neighbouring States and even on other, far-removed, entities. The complete elimination of unintended impact is an impossible goal and hence not an aspiration that can be met. But the design and implementation of effective sanctions should consider the minimization, management and mitigation of unintended impacts, especially on vulnerable sectors of the population, while acknowledging that they cannot be eliminated entirely. Next is the need to improve the capacity of the United Nations - especially the Security Council - and its Member States to implement sanctions regimes once they are imposed. The Canadian delegation, under the leadership of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“Sanctions imposed for principally symbolic reasons are unlikely to change the behaviour of the sanctioned entity and may indeed undermine the overall viability of sanctions as an alternative to military force. Today's discussion and our continuing work will be valuable if they promote agreement that can guide subsequent efforts to design and implement sanctions regimes that address the unique nature of specific threats to international security as they exist in reality. Any overly precise one-size-fits-all structure is destined to fail and will waste valuable resources. To be effective, sanctions regimes must be carefully tailored to the particular situation in which they are to be applied. That said, we can certainly identify a number of principles that will have relevance to any potential application of sanctions.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“Members of the Security Council have a unique responsibility to promote peace and security. It remains an unfortunate and tragic characteristic of our time that some States, or elements within States, engage in activities that must be countered promptly and aggressively to protect those who are threatened or those who are unable to protect themselves. We all agree, I think, that sanctions are not an end in themselves. They are a means, recognized in the Charter, of expressing the will of the international community to end unacceptable behaviour. To be effective in forcing behavioural change, sanctions must be credible and enforceable.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“My Government heartily welcomes this discussion of sanctions policy. Our shared objective should be the design and implementation of effective sanctions regimes that promote desired results. It is our hope that the informal working group on sanctions, which we are establishing today, will help us go in that direction. Sanctions effectively designed and implemented offer an important instrument for the international community to use to counter threats to international order. They represent an alternative to even more coercive instruments, including military force. We should recognize without apology that sanctions themselves are clearly coercive measures. Neither military intervention nor the application of sanctions are undertaken lightly, nor should they be.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“This is the first time such a massive programme has been undertaken by the United Nations and the successes of the programme to date are an enormous tribute to the hard-working men and women of the United Nations, whose vision, determination and dedication have made the programme the success it is today. We look forward to an even better programme as resolution 1284 (1999) is implemented.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“Iraq should also establish efficient distribution networks for targeted nutrition and supplementary feeding programmes; ensure adequate funding for basic public health care; and improve delivery and administration of drugs for chronic illnesses. With regard to the Secretary-General's recommendations for the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), we welcome further discussion on contract payment mechanisms and oil overseers. As I noted earlier, we are working to make our contract review procedures more rapid and transparent. We believe that resolution 1284 (1999) holds the key to realizing more fully the potential of the oil-for-food programme.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“The Government of Iraq must immediately use a project-based approach to contracts; share baseline data or collaborate with the Office of the Iraq Programme to collect it where none is available; share data on the northern electrical grid; consider employing pre-shipment inspection agents and use better suppliers; strengthen cooperation with monitors; ensure regular distribution of a full food basket; implement a supplementary feeding programme; and, until it can be surpassed, meet the target calories per day. The last chart we have distributed clearly demonstrates the positive impact of the oil-for-food programme on improving the food basket. It also shows that Iraq, right now, could - though it has chosen not to - put together a food basket that would dramatically improve the nutritional status of the Iraqi people.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“I also note that we have no information that Iraq has dropped the requirement that the involuntarily displaced establish six months' residence before receiving assistance. We would welcome reporting on this matter. Finally, my delegation would like to know what the prospect is for initiating de-mining in other parts of Iraq. To sum up, we hope that all of our constructive suggestions can and will be put into effect. We call on Iraq to implement the recommendations made by the Secretary- General in his report.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“These reports continue to show that critical oil-for-food inputs are not being distributed in a timely manner. We request that the new head of the United Nations Programme in Iraq, as one of his or her first tasks, be charged with drafting a comprehensive plan for eliminating backlogs in distribution across all sectors, just as we are doing on holds. We support the efforts of the Secretary-General to ensure that contracts are submitted by Iraq at a smooth pace, not bunched together at the end of a phase. We would also support more clarity in the distribution plan. I would also ask the Secretariat to inform the Council of the date it should expect to receive the prioritized list of humanitarian applications called for in resolution 1284 (1999).”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“We are constantly told by Baghdad that oil-for-food is not doing enough, but what has the regime done? Another task for the new head of the United Nations programme should be to draw up a plan for assisting vulnerable groups, perhaps in consultation with the International Committee of the Red Cross. This plan should include an invitation to humanitarian organizations to describe projects they would be willing to undertake in southern and central Iraq. In northern Iraq, United Nations agencies and non- governmental organizations are improving the lives of ordinary Iraqis. There is no reason Iraqis throughout the country should not have access to such assistance. Reporting on distribution of supplies by sector is greatly appreciated.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“In concluding this long review, it cannot be overemphasized that the Government of Iraq bears the primary responsibility for the welfare of its people. I must frankly state my disappointment that the Secretary-General, in his reports, has not reported in detail on Iraqi progress in meeting its obligations under paragraph 27 of resolution 1284 (1999). I would like to ask the Secretary-General and whomever he will appoint to head United Nations programmes in Iraq - an appointment which we hope is coming soon - to be much more vigorous in reminding the Government of Iraq of its obligations and to report regularly to the Council. We would now like to see what the Government of Iraq is contributing to the education of its children and to the better health of its citizens.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“The sanctions Committee has also made substantial progress on implementation of paragraph 18, which would set up a panel of oil experts. We expect this paragraph to be operational very soon. What is ironic about this discussion is that, while the Council and the sanctions Committee have worked diligently, the Government of Iraq has done nothing but speak of rejection and non-cooperation. While today's discussion is about the humanitarian situation, we must also note that there are other critical aspects of resolution 1284 (1999) that are also humanitarian in nature, including disarmament and the issues of Kuwaiti prisoners of war and property. The Council must remain united in its efforts to persuade Iraq to accept all aspects of resolution 1284 (1999).”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“We view resolution 1284 (1999) as a vehicle for a robust improvement of the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and we want to see all aspects of it implemented as rapidly as possible. All of the humanitarian provisions requiring action by the Council or Committee have been completed or are in progress. I note in particular that the sanctions Committee and the Office of the Iraq Programme have completed work on the initial lists of pre-approved items for food, food handling, health supplies, education and agriculture. We expect these lists to be dynamic, not static, as new items are added. Furthermore, as called for in paragraph 26 of the resolution, the Council approved a plan to allow Iraqi pilgrims to perform the Hajj. Baghdad's refusal to accept this plan was inexplicable and extremely disappointing.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“In addition to being concerned about the number of monitors, we are concerned about technical expertise and a better balance between technical experts and humanitarian workers in the monitoring staff. A third area of concern is reporting back to the Committee. Again, we call attention to the Saybolt model. The Committee should receive more information on a regular basis. The United States is already consulting with the Office of the Iraq Programme on the measures outlined above, and we ask others in the Council to lend support. If there were more monitors, with stronger technical qualifications, reporting more frequently and in greater detail to the Committee, the United States would be placing fewer holds on items because it would have greater assurance concerning the proper monitoring of oil- for-food inputs. So let us do this quickly.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“While food and medicine generally do not raise dual-use concerns, these other sectors may. Despite this enormous growth, the number of United Nations monitors in Iraq has remained the same, with the exception of Saybolt and Cotecna monitors, since the programme began. We applaud the diligence of the monitors in Iraq, but increased United Nations monitoring clearly is essential to keep pace with programme growth. While we welcome any suggestions in this regard, we point to the Saybolt model as one which bears examining. The United Nations has contracted with Saybolt to do assessments of the Iraqi oil sector and to provide monitors with sectoral expertise. We think this model could be used in other sectors, such as electricity, and we want to explore this possibility with the Office of the Iraq Programme and other Member States.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“The best way to reduce the number of holds is to provide some sort of guarantee that contracted goods go to approved purposes, and the best way to achieve this is through better monitoring arrangements, building on arrangements already in place. Of course, the absence of UNMOVIC and IAEA monitors significantly complicates the monitoring picture. But let us for a moment focus on other aspects of United Nations monitoring. When the oil-for-food programme began, revenue per phase was about $2 billion and most purchases were of food and medicine. During the most recent six-month phase, revenues were over $7 billion, and most likely they will be still higher in the current phase. The growth in oil- for-food purchases has not been in food and medicine but in sectors such as electricity, water and sanitation and oil production.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“The Council anticipated Iraqi attempts to abuse the humanitarian programme, and it wisely mandated a rigorous review process. A relatively small number of problematic contracts have not been implemented, but the vast majority have been approved. As the Secretariat reported in its analysis of holds, in most sectors, holds have caused relatively minor shortages. In reviewing oil-for-food contracts, the United States has acted, and will continue to act, strictly and objectively in accordance with the arms-control policies defined by the Council in its resolutions. Our holds are not politically motivated, nor are they driven by calculations of commercial prospect or gain. Not all critics of our holds policy can say the same. I should like to say a word about United Nations monitoring and reporting.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“We have 166 contracts on hold because they are linked to companies that have operated or are operating in Violation of sanctions. Some of these companies are Iraqi fronts, operating illegally, which funnel oil-for-food programme revenues directly to the highest levels of the Iraqi regime. Information about our concerns is provided to the country capitals submitting these contracts. We ask submitting States to make every effort to ensure that all companies submitting contracts to the Committee established under resolution 661 (1990) are abiding by sanctions. Finally, a small number of contracts - 16 of them - with irregular financial terms have been placed on hold. We regret that, to date, the sanctions Committee has been unable to reach consensus on the appropriateness of these terms.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“When there are so many urgent needs in Iraq, it is unconscionable for the Government of Iraq to divert precious resources to a facility which the Council has not decided that Iraq may use. We have repeatedly urged the Office of the Iraq Programme to withdraw these contracts in order to release funds for needed oil spare parts and equipment. We are also holding 55 contracts for goods destined for the Basrah refinery, from which Iraq produces gas oil which it smuggles out of Iraq in violation of sanctions. The profits from this illicit trade are used by the Government of Iraq to procure items prohibited by sanctions, including luxuries for members of Saddam's inner circle. The Multinational Interception Force reported yesterday to the Committee the facts on Gulf smuggling.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“Of these, about 70 will be taken off hold today. This is a large percentage of the contracts for which complete information is available and resolution 1051 (1996) items are not involved. While I must admit that we began this process by looking at holds which we found the most questionable under our current standards, and that future meetings may not yield such a high percentage of holds removed, we are re-evaluating our holds in the light of current circumstances. I will be talking more later about monitoring of oil-for-food goods, and how this can also help reduce holds. There are other categories of holds, too. We have on hold 14 oil-for-food contracts containing items destined for the unauthorized export facility at Khor al-Amaya.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“This category is constantly in flux, as holds are cleared out on the basis of additional information and new contracts are placed on hold because of inadequate information. Our staffing of these reviews has not kept pace with the recent sharp increase in the number of contracts presented and the new requirement to review contracts within a target of two days. We admit that it is inappropriate to keep contractors waiting for lengthy periods for responses to their additional information, and we are tightening our procedures with a goal of much quicker response times. We are also examining our review criteria with the goal of concentrating our holds on the items of most serious concern. We began a process this week to re- examine contracts on hold against these criteria. About 90 contracts were reviewed.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“We would appreciate an explanation from other members, particularly those most critical of our holds on dual-use goods, providing information about their own criteria for reviewing and approving contracts on resolution 1051 (1996) items and other dual-use items - items which could enhance the Government of Iraq's ability to obtain, make or utilize weapons of mass destruction. We are surprised that the Secretary-General's report did not comment favourably on the Council's decision that weapons inspectors monitor resolution 1051 (1996) items. Where we can improve? At the moment, the United States has 339 contracts on hold because we have not reviewed additional information that we have received. For these, the ball is clearly in our court.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“Until the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are able to resume their responsibilities in Iraq, including monitoring of such goods, it would be inappropriate and, indeed, dangerous to approve contracts for most such goods. We believe that every member of the Council should hold on such goods, particularly now that contracts are being marked as containing resolution 1051 (1996) items. The Council agreed that items on the resolution 1051 (1996) list were serious enough inputs into weapons of mass destruction to require monitoring by the United Nations Special Committee (UNSCOM) or the IAEA if exported to Iraq. Yet some members are not only approving these contracts, but complaining about United States holds on such items.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“Therefore, it would expedite the process and be much easier for everyone if we had the information in the original contract submission. So let us put those holds - more than one third of the total - off to the side. There are nearly 400 holds on contracts which pose resolution 1051 (1996) or other dual-use concerns. On dual-use items that do not fall under the provisions of that resolution, many times the concerns of our experts can be satisfied through additional information or monitoring arrangements. But we are not prepared to act imprudently in providing items related to weapons of mass destruction, particularly in the absence of monitoring and disarmament in Iraq. We place a heavy emphasis on ensuring that dual- use items, such as those on the resolution 1051 (1996) list, are not permitted into Iraq.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“We ask all Member States that are presenting contracts to the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to ensure that contract information is as complete as possible when the contract is originally submitted. For example, if one of your firms wants to sell pumps to Iraq, you should be aware that some pumps are on the list stemming from resolution 1051 (1996) - that is, the Security Council's agreed list of dual-use products. We have to know the materials used in their construction to determine whether they are dual-use. If that information is not in the contract, we have to put the contract on hold while the question is being answered. Vague terms, such as "spare parts and accessories" or "laboratory equipment" will again draw questions.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“Let us take a clear look at the holds the United States has. We have about 1,000 contracts on hold out of the more than 10,000 contracts received by the Secretariat. For more than one third of these contracts, we are awaiting requested information from the supplier about either the goods, the end use or the end user. As the Executive Director of the Office of the Iraq Programme noted in its recent paper on holds, "some 50 per cent of holds could either be avoided entirely, or the amount of time involved substantially reduced, if all concerned put more effort into the provision of appropriate and timely information." These are called "US holds", but they are really holds caused by the failure to prepare an adequate submission.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“Maintaining a judicious balance between these two objectives is a very serious responsibility from which the United States will not shrink. In fact, the great preponderance of all goods requested has been approved since the oil-for-food programme began. Complaints about United States holds are focused on a small percentage of contracts presented to the sanctions Committee. Our responsibility to the Security Council and to the region lead us to take this process very seriously. Decisions on contract holds and releases of holds by the United States are taken after careful, technical scrutiny. Political priorities play no role. While we recognize that not all Member States have the resources to assess thoroughly all contracts, it is clear, I regret to say, that some Member States that could do a thorough review have not.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“I want to thank the Office of the Iraq Programme for the work it has done both to improve the quality of contract submissions and to highlight holds of particular concern, as was done during the drought and with regard to foot-and- mouth disease. As a result, the United States released a number of holds in both areas. In his report the Secretary-General called for the removal of a hold on a critical dredging contract for the port of Umm Qasr; and we have done so. I want to describe our policy on reviewing and approving oil-for-food contracts. The United States review of contracts is guided by two principles that are fundamental to the Security Council's consideration of Iraq: preventing Iraq from acquiring the means to again threaten regional stability and improving the Iraqi people's humanitarian situation.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“The United States was the original sponsor of the oil-for-food programme, just as we were an early supporter what was then called "the comprehensive resolution", which became resolution 1284 (1999). Even as we insist on compliance, we continue to support oil-for-food and have played a key role in its implementation since its inception. The oil-for-food programme works, and works admirably, despite manipulation by the Iraqi regime. The great majority of goods requested - about 90 percent over the life of the programme so far - are approved. There is always room for improvement, however. We will work in the Security Council and the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) to put into action what works best. We have a number of ideas on which we are already working, and some we will suggest today.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“We propose that Al Faw, an export facility in the Gulf about to become operational, and Abu Flus, a facility currently used for smuggling oil and capable of exporting at least 100,000 barrels of oil per day, be designated for United Nations-monitored export of refined product. Such a step would have the additional value of restricting any potential use of these facilities for smuggling. As we have consistently proposed in the past, it is time to bring all of Iraq's petroleum and petroleum product revenues under the oil-for-food programme so that the full potential of the programme can be realized. Another $500 million to $800 million annually added to the escrow account would provide an even more robust programme in all sectors. Now I would like to say a few words about holds.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“As the United States State Department spokesman will detail later today, the Government of Iraq has constructed a new headquarters in Iraq for the terrorist group, the Mujahedin-e Khalq. No one has seen evidence that any of this money has been spent for humanitarian relief. Quite the contrary, smuggling steals money from the oil-for-food programme and puts it to illicit purposes. If Council members will look at visual aid 5, they will find a chart that demonstrates the dramatic rise in illegal Iraqi oil exports since September. Smuggling is at historic levels. We believe the Council should act to designate authorized routes for refined product.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“I have another brief observation relating to the oil sector: clearly Baghdad does not want the embarrassing facts of the extent of its gas oil smuggling laid bare. A simple Saybolt analysis of refinery production, which Iraq refuses, would show the extent to which Iraq is keeping revenues from the oil-for-food programme. As Council delegations heard in the Multinational Interception Force briefing to the sanctions Committee yesterday, hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of gas oil are being smuggled out of Iraq, with the proceeds going not for oil-for-food humanitarian imports but to the regime and its cronies. The regime is also spending the revenue under its control to fund terrorist activities.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“The Office of the Iraq Programme, Saybolt and the Council should recognize that effort as a job well done. We should not lose sight of the fact that Iraqi oil exports are at about the pre-war level, a tremendous increase from where they were less than a year ago. If Council members will look at Visual aid 4 they will see that trend - how export revenues have essentially returned to pre-war levels. Unfortunately, a comprehensive plan for the future is not outlined in the current report. The report does recommend, however, an additional $300 million allocation for the oil sector in phases VI and VII, and we support that recommendation. In fact, the United States today introduced a draft resolution that would do just that, and we look forward to its early enactment.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“The Government does not. I would like now to address for a moment the oil sector. I would like to comment on the findings of the Secretary-General. The Council is responsible for balancing the needs of the Iraqi oil sector against the needs in other sectors, such as food and medicine. We observe with some disappointment that the Secretary-General's report did not follow more closely the pattern laid out in his February 1998 report, which outlined needs across various sectors and the funding necessary to meet these needs. On the basis of such an approach, the Council asked the Secretary-General to instruct Saybolt to lay out a comprehensive, multi-phase plan for attaining needed revenues. The plan more than succeeded in the last phase of oil-for-food, when the $5.2 billion cap was exceeded.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source