YouSaid · the spoken record

Cunningham

lines on the record: 847
first: 2000-02-09
most recent: 2004-06-14
sittings or episodes: 129
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“And if there is more non-govemmental organization activity in the north, it is because non- governmental organizations are welcome to operate in the north, unlike in southern and central Iraq, where the Government is openly hostile to extensive non- governmental organization operations. Therefore, my delegation would like to offer the following proposal: if the Government of Iraq is unable to manage oil-for-food for the maximum benefit, we believe that United Nations agencies active in the north should be empowered to undertake similar programmes in the south and centre. The bottom line is that the oil-for-food programme, while not perfect, works for the Iraqi people, and the Government of Iraq does not. The United Nations works for the Iraqi people. The Government does not. Non- governmental organizations work for the Iraqi people.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“We have heard the theory in this Council that conditions in the north are better than in the Government-controlled areas of the south because the north receives more assistance per capita than the south and more attention from non-governmental organizations. But the three northern governorates, throughout the rule of Saddam Hussein, have been the victims of Government policies ranging from systematic neglect to systematic efforts at genocide. At the close of the Gulf War, a campaign by Saddam Hussein's military forces displaced approximately 1 million citizens in the north. Surely some in this room will recall the horrific ordeal of tens of thousands, including women, children and the infirm, clinging to barren mountainsides in the dead of winter. In short, the north had a long way to go when the United Nations arrived.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“We hope all those expressing concerns about the people of Iraq will join us in pressing the Government of Iraq to provide these critically needed programmes. In the north, full courses of drug treatment are now being provided to those suffering from chronic illness. In the rest of Iraq, citizens with these diseases are not being properly treated because of erratic, uncoordinated arrivals of needed medications. The Government of Iraq should remedy this immediately. In the area of vaccinations, there has just been an overwhelmingly successful polio vaccination campaign in the north. Where the Government of Iraq has been in charge, there is poorer coverage in certain vaccination categories than in 1994.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“Perhaps there are lessons to be learned there. Everyone is familiar with the recent United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) study which found that child mortality was below pre-war levels in the north, while in the rest of Iraq the figures were tragically higher. The Secretary-General's report notes that in the north, the beneficiaries of supplementary feeding programmes have dropped from a quarter of a million to about 80,000, as the result of the effectiveness of that programme. When the UNICEF report was published, Baghdad, stung by criticism of its long-standing refusal to order nutritional supplements, finally relented and ordered them. We are grateful that the Secretary-General has now highlighted Baghdad's refusal to operate supplementary feeding programmes which the United Nations has been advocating for years.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“One billion dollars' worth of health commodities have been approved by the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990), and 90 per cent of the drug needs of hospital patients are being met. Over $1 billion worth of inputs to other sectors have already arrived in Iraq. An additional $1.5 billion worth of goods have been approved by the Committee but have not yet arrived. These numbers will continue to rise. These numbers are, of course, composite figures for the whole country. Although all of Iraq is under the same sanctions regime and uses the same oil-for-food programme, the Secretary-General's report highlights some unfortunate differences in the humanitarian situation in the north and in the rest of Iraq. Where Baghdad is in charge of distribution, the full benefits of oil-for-food are not being achieved.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“We trust Iraq will not wait five years to accept resolution 1284 (1999), with its important means to expand humanitarian support. But there is also little we can do about Iraq's cynical manipulation of its oil exports and its people. Our challenge here in this Council is how to improve the humanitarian situation despite Iraqi obstruction. The oil-for-food programme is the largest humanitarian programme in United Nations history. While there have been growing pains, look at the notable successes in its three years of existence: 13 million tons of food have been delivered to the Iraqi people, and food imports are now nearly reaching pre-war levels, as can be seen in the graph in visual aid 3. Successful veterinary vaccination programmes have controlled livestock epidemics and expanded production of poultry and eggs.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“They are justly recouping a share of their losses through the objective and efficient mechanism of the United Nations Compensation Commission. More than 5 billion dollars has been disbursed to date to claimants in dozens of countries. Let me discuss for a moment the efforts to improve oil-for-food and north versus south. Had the Government of Iraq not waited years to decide to accept the oil-for-food agreement proposed as early as 1991, millions of innocent people would have avoided serious and prolonged suffering. We should recall that the first shipment under oil-for-food did not take place until March of 1997. Even when Baghdad accepted the oil-for-food programme, it cut off the flow of oil on several occasions, taking millions of dollars away from the programme, most recently in December of 1999.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“I have already mentioned the concerns addressed by two of the special assessment panels created by the Council early last year, and this is a good time to mention the third - the people of Kuwait. If our humanitarian regard is genuine, we must not forget or neglect the families of those who remain missing since Iraq's invasion and occupation of their country. We must not forget that the Iraqi regime is accountable for those innocent civilians and has failed utterly to meet its obligation to account for them. Similarly, we must not forget that the victims of Iraqi aggression were not only Kuwaitis. Thousands of individuals from Egypt, Jordan, Bangladesh, Pakistan and a score of other nations lost property, savings or livelihood.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“That paragraph outlines specific tasks Iraq must perform to do its part to assuage the suffering of the Iraqi people. My delegation would like more information on what Iraq has or has not done in this regard, since the Secretary-General's report did not detail this needed area of implementation. Let us be clear. Sanctions by themselves are not the problem. The sanctions on Iraq have never targeted the Iraqi people and have not limited the import of food and medicine. Where there has been deprivation in Iraq, the Iraqi regime is responsible, due to both its failure to meet its obligations under Security Council resolutions and its cynical manipulation of civilian suffering in an effort to obtain the lifting of sanctions without compliance.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“In terms of arbitrary arrest, the human rights Rapporteur points out that in Iraq there is no freedom of speech or action, since the mere suggestion that someone is not a supporter of the President carries the prospect of the death penalty. This should be kept in mind when we are confronted in United Nations reports with statistics whose main source is the regime. Finally, Iraq remains the country with the highest number of disappearances reported to the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. Moreover, persons displaced by the regime are deprived of needed humanitarian relief on the grounds that they are "temporary residents" of the places to which they have been banished. The key areas I have just cited are directly mentioned in paragraph 27 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999).”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“The United Nations and others have documented three ongoing Iraqi Government tactics that, to say the least, have a negative impact on the population: the indiscriminate bombardment of civilian settlements and arbitrary killings; the arbitrary arrest and detention of suspected criminals and so-called traitors; and forced displacement. The no-fly zones were established to alleviate the most egregious examples of attacks on the vulnerable population groups in the north and south. While no-fly zone patrols cannot prevent every depredation against Iraqi minorities, their enforcement has prevented wholesale genocide.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“An informal system metes out economic reward and punishment, both inside Iraq and out, to companies and nations in exchange for perceived political support. Iraq is not fulfilling its responsibilities. It is hard to measure the impact of Iraqi obstruction on the broadest scale. For example, the fact that the Government of Iraq refuses to divulge or make transparent financial figures and statistics makes it difficult, if not impossible, to judge the country's general economic situation. Iraq's tendency to keep printing currency to finance its budget deficits fuels the rise in local prices for staple foods.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“The warehousing of supplies, the wilful neglect of specific humanitarian sectors, such as the food basket, the under-ordering of medicines and nutritional supplements, the siphoning off of goods to agents of the regime, the illegal re-exportation of humanitarian supplies, the establishment of front companies, the payment of kickbacks to manipulate and gain from oil-for-food contracts - these and other practices are well documented. Such abuses ebb and flow at the whim of Iraq's leadership. Many of our friends have privately complained about Iraq's subtle and not-so-subtle intimidation of companies that have filed claims with the Compensation Commission. Agents of the regime have pressured them to drop those claims in order to be considered for contracts in the oil-for- food programme.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“While Iraq was asking for needed international drought relief assistance, it obtained the resources needed to drain the southern Amarah and Hammar marshes, causing environmental damage of historic proportions and destroying entire villages. Saddam Hussein was able to build the private lakes around his palaces and build amusement parks for the elite. We have an example in visual aid 2, which is a photograph of the Abu Ghuray'b Presidential Grounds. We can see the water devoted to that particular installation - not to mention the palace itself.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“Sadly, this kind of improvement has occurred only in the north because Iraq has banned - placed a permanent hold on, if you will - United Nations demining activity anywhere else in the country. No one denies that Iraq's poor oilfield management practices and lack of spare parts have resulted in critical circumstances for its oil production capacity. Yet, at the same time, Iraq has converted container ports into oil depots and has brought on line new facilities to export petroleum products in order to steal money Via smuggling, money that otherwise would have been destined to the escrow account and the Iraqi people.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“Chart 1 shows that, despite growing revenues and despite daily caloric values for the Iraqi people of less than the Secretary-General's recommendation of 2,463 kilocalories per person per day, the purchase of food has remained flat. Even when given the opportunity properly to feed the Iraqi population, the Government of Iraq chooses not to do so. In the meantime, the Iraqi regime has found the money and the personnel to sow tens of thousands of landmines within its own borders. Landmines placed by the regime between 1992 and 1997 have caused more than 15,000 casualties, of which 15 per cent were children. The Secretary-General tells us that in areas where the United Nations has been able to conduct demining, significant progress has been made in agriculture and reforestation.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“At the same time, the Iraqi regime's refusal over time to fulfil its responsibilities to care for and feed its own people was also unimagined and still remains hard to comprehend. A country that once spent a billion dollars on education sustains a bloated military-industrial complex instead. Iraq has consistently underspent on education, and has chosen to build palaces over building schools. Even now, seven phases into the programme, Iraq consistently under-orders foodstuffs and has never met the minimum calorie and protein targets set by the Secretary- General, despite record-setting revenues under the oil-for- food programme. My delegation has circulated a set of printed charts to which I would like to refer in the course of my discussion.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“In the meantime, sanctions are the leverage the international community has to get the Government of Iraq to comply with Security Council resolutions. That is the goal. And, as the Secretary-General just told us, that is the solution. But so long as Iraq is not meeting its obligations under Security Council resolutions, sanctions remain essential. I would like to speak now about Iraq's responsibilities. As the Secretary-General's report makes clear, the oil-for-food programme will never supplant the responsibilities of the Government of Iraq to provide for the needs of its people. It was designed to alleviate the impact of sanctions on the Iraqi people. But because Iraq continues to evade its obligations, sanctions have continued for a period unimagined.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“In 1990 and 1991, Iraq attempted to annihilate its neighbour, strip it of its property and resources, and seize its oil. The Security Council and a strong international response prevented Iraq from succeeding. Following the conflict, the international community decided it had to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and ensure that it would not again become a threat to international peace and security. I trust that no one here today will suggest that that goal has been achieved. Iraq remains a threat. Unanswered questions remain in the areas of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and of the missiles to deliver them. And, given the long pattern of unacceptable Iraqi behaviour, including public rejection of resolution 1284 (1999), there will be a need to monitor Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability for some time to come.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“The Council has three goals today: to review the sanctions on Iraq, to examine the state of Iraq's oil production capacity and look to allocations in that field, and to assess progress on the humanitarian sections of resolution 1284 (1999). Taking a comprehensive look at the humanitarian situation to focus improvements even more sharply is also a process envisaged in that resolution. Today my delegation will offer constructive ideas in all of these areas. Given the questions posed in recent weeks about the situation in Iraq, I hope it will be helpful to the Council to review fully how the United States approaches this important subject. To accomplish our first goal - assessing Iraqi sanctions - it would be useful to recall how we got here in the first place.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“I will be brief. I should like to thank Mr. Annabi for his comments on the Judicial System Assessment Programme (J SAP). We understand, of course, the specific functions outlined in the mandate of resolution 1247 (1999) with regard to judicial reform. However, the United States still believes that "inspect, observe and monitor" will not allow adequate implementation of the JSAP reports and recommendations. Therefore we look forward to hearing from Mr. Annabi or from the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) about plans on how the work in this sector could be divided among those involved - that is, UNMIBH and perhaps organizations like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which might enjoy a somewhat broader mandate in this area.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“The solution, however, is not to turn to inflammatory rhetoric, as some leaders have done recently. Ownership does not mean departing or heading for the exit; it means intensifying our support for those in Bosnia - and there are, I am glad to say, more every day - who have shown the courage, strength and commitment to ensure that the hopes of Dayton will be realized. We applaud the efforts in Bosnia of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and of those Bosnian officials who are working to fulfil Dayton's promise. They are committed to establishing the institutions of central government in Bosnia, to returning refugees to urban areas, and to carrying out other critical tasks that will help provide Bosnia with a secure future. We pledge our ongoing support for their difficult but vital work.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“We should not be surprised by the resistance in western Mostar to integration of the Ministry of the Interior and police force there, which the Secretary-General notes in his report. And even as the new democratic Government in Croatia has taken steps to normalize and make transparent its assistance to Bosnian Croats, extreme nationalists in Mostar have only resisted reform even more fiercely. And we continue to see other examples of extremism, including threats to the upcoming municipal elections by radical Serbs in the Republika Srpska. Such continued obstruction by extremists will require a firm and forceful response by the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), the Office of the High Representative and ultimately by the Security Council.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“While there has been movement on a single passport, progress has been overshadowed by unhelpful public statements and obstacles which are likely to lead to more delays. There is no doubt that we will need to continue to insist that Bosnia's leaders accept their responsibilities and make the difficult choices. This is not at all to reject the concept of ownership espoused by the High Representative, Mr. Petritsch; on the contrary, we need to be realistic and determined in its application. Progress cannot disguise that there are many in Bosnia and elsewhere in the region who do not support a unified multi-ethnic Bosnia. There are extreme nationalists who have not given up their efforts to undermine Dayton and what it stands for; there are criminals who seek to preserve and protect illicit profits.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“Here again, we can welcome recent reports of progress made in implementing their commitments and can acknowledge their efforts, for instance, in establishing a secretariat for the Joint Presidency, organizing a multi-ethnic Bosnian police contingent for deployment to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), and seeking additional funding for the Council of Ministers. This is all to the good, but unfortunately it is only half the story. There is still powerful resistance in Bosnia to making the reforms that are called for in the New York Declaration. For instance, while there is a law establishing the State Border Service, it had to be imposed by the Office of the High Representative.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“Once the final reports are completed later this year, we understand that the Programme will end, as was agreed initially, but we also agree on the need to see that this progress is continued and that its recommendations are implemented. To ensure that JSAP's reports are acted upon, my Government has been working with officials of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other organizations and with the donor community to create a new judicial reform programme that we hope will have sufficient resources and the mandate it needs from the Peace Implementation Conference. I want also to recall that last November the Bosnian Joint Presidency appeared before us in a historic meeting and announced a series of commitments known as the New York Declaration.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“I, too, want to thank Assistant Secretary-General Annabi for his briefing today and welcome those who have been invited to speak here. All of us have been heavily involved in the international effort in Bosnia. We welcome Special Representative Klein's determined efforts to carry out the Council mandate in resolution 1247 (1999). Those efforts appear to be achieving results. There clearly has been progress, as the Secretary-General has noted in his report, in several critical areas, such as police restructuring, review of the judicial system and the establishment of the Breko unified police force. Like Ambassador Greenstock, I think that the work of the Judicial System Assessment Programme (JSAP) merits special mention. This programme has made an invaluable contribution in the area of judicial monitoring.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“In closing, I would note that the UNTAET Trust Fund currently has only a small portion of the money pledged to it in Tokyo and that donor pledges are only slowly being converted into real assistance to address East Timor's burning needs. We would certainly echo the call of the Secretary-General upon his return from East Timor in urging donors to get aid into East Timor quickly. The United Nations has put an enormous amount of resources into trying to help the people of East Timor, and unless we give the international community the resources to complete that job and provide the resources to the people of East Timor, we will not be able to meet the expectations that we in this body have created.”
2000-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4114 (2000) · source
“These include coffee-growing projects and a variety of quick- impact projects that we believe will help generate significant employment opportunities. These and other programmes will help address East T imor's urgent needs for forensic human rights training, private sector projects and those programmes that will focus on civil society and the institutions critical to democratic government. As we heard today, internal security is another immediate priority in East Timor, and the United States will increase its civil contingent in support of UNTAET and, consistent with our laws and regulations, help establish local police capabilities.”
2000-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4114 (2000) · source
“The United States is supporting the multilateral effort in East Timor, with contributions to the UNTAET Trust Fund and to the World Bank reconstruction trust fund totalling $4.5 million. We believe that the UNTAET Trust Fund is vital to ensuring that basic public services are fully restored in East Timor and that the East Timorese develop the skills to provide those services on a continuing basis. We also believe that the World Bank, with its trust fund and its coordinating role, will play a vital part in building East Timor's long-term, self-sustaining economy. The United States will also spend about $20 million this fiscal year in expanding United States Agency for International Development projects in East Timor.”
2000-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4114 (2000) · source
“But we also urge Indonesia to meet its stated deadlines for ending support to the East Timorese refugees currently in West Timor and for closing the camps by the end of June. The United States has done its part in trying to help East T imor. We have provided contributions for a wide range of needs, including humanitarian needs and the needs of displaced persons. This has been our first priority. We spent over $20 million in 1999 on relevant humanitarian assistance. This year, we expect an additional $49 million in multilateral and bilateral humanitarian assistance, including aid to East Timorese refugees still in the camps in East Timor. I think we all need to heed the calls we heard this morning to provide adequately for refugees, and I would encourage all Member States to do their fair share, as well.”
2000-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4114 (2000) · source
“In order to resolve the refugee problem once and for all and to put a stop to incursions across the border, Indonesia must disarm and disband the hard-core militias and move them, especially their leaders, away from Timor. The Government must also reassign remaining East Timorese members of the TNI to other parts of Indonesia and end any TNI collaboration with the militias. These are not new ideas. Ambassador Holbrooke made these very points upon returning from Indonesia in November of last year and repeated them during the 3 February briefing to the Council by the Special Representative, Mr. Vieira de Mello. More than enough time has elapsed for the Council to see concrete action. There is some positive news. We welcome the recent rise in return numbers.”
2000-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4114 (2000) · source
“I think this is obviously of deep concern to Council members. It is obviously unacceptable. It should be strongly condemned. I think that it would be useful for the Council to address this particular issue in another session in the very near future and see what steps we could take to try to address this very serious situation. We, the United States, and, obviously, other members of the Council have repeatedly urged the Indonesian Government to disarm and disband the militia groups. We have been given assurances that these steps would be taken; yet we have yet to see decisive action. We are deeply disturbed by the increase in militia attacks against United Nations peacekeepers. We call on the Indonesian Government to fulfil its responsibility and put an end to all militia activity along the East Timor border.”
2000-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4114 (2000) · source
“I think it is important to shine light repeatedly and openly on the problems that are occurring in East Timor and to continually discuss how we as the body that has given UNTAET the job that it is struggling to do can assist UNTAET in this effort. We are certainly deeply disturbed by the reports that we have heard this morning, as well as others, of the Indonesian military's continued support for the militias operating in West Timor refugee camps and along the East-West border. I think we have to realize that the Indonesian military as an institution has done little to address the recent militia attacks against United Nations personnel and East Timorese civilians. We understand that there is evidence that elements of the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) may be supplying arms and equipment to the militias as well.”
2000-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4114 (2000) · source
“I want to thank Assistant Secretary-General Annabi for his very sobering briefing. It is a reminder to all of us that even though East Timor is not on the front pages, as it was last summer, I think it continues to be a very difficult mission, and I think Mr. Annabi's briefing underscores the need to remind ourselves of the difficult job we have given the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and of the need to commend the members of UNTAET, and in particular Special Representative Vieira de Mello for his leadership and his determination to ensure that UNTAET is successful. It is obviously a very difficult situation and needs the continued involvement of this body and the Security Council. So I commend the President for holding this open meeting.”
2000-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4114 (2000) · source
“At this point, we strongly urge the leaderships of those parties cited in the report to re-examine their policies vis-a-vis UNITA and to commit themselves to comply fully with all Council measures in effect.”
2000-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4113 (2000) · source
“UNITA sanctions have always been targeted at the leaders of the organization who have remained outside the Lusaka process and at its military capacity, not at those leaders who have participated in the institutions established by the Lusaka Protocol, and not at the overwhelming majority of UNITA's supporters, whom we believe to be in favour of peace. The revelations and recommendations of the Expert Panel require careful consideration, and we look forward to a discussion in the Council on next steps. For now, however, the report paints a picture - one which is largely corroborated by our own information - of continued international support for UNITA's military leadership.”
2000-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4113 (2000) · source
“Sanctions remain a tool to be used in pursuit of the goals of the Lusaka Protocol, still the most viable blueprint for peace, continued democratization and national reconciliation. The international community's expectation of UN ITA is its full demilitarization, the full extension of State administration and its full participation in the democratic political life of the country. The Security Council's sanctions must remain in effect until all elements of UNITA have taken full, irreversible and verifiable steps to completely implement the Lusaka Protocol.”
2000-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4113 (2000) · source
“It is very difficult to speculate on UNITA's present military capacity. However, the information available to us indicates that the renewed vigour that Ambassador Fowler and the Expert Panel brought to the implementation of Security Council resolutions 864 (1993), 1127 (1997) and 1173 (1998) has had a positive impact. In addition to making a contribution to the search for peace in Angola, the sanctions Committee and Expert Panel have also done pioneering work, under challenging circumstances, on the difficult question of applying sanctions regimes to non-State actors. The Security Council has long maintained the position that the primary cause of the continued conflict in Angola is the failure of UNITA to abide by its commitments under the Lusaka Protocol.”
2000-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4113 (2000) · source
“While we believe that the overall impact of sanctions has been beneficial to the search for peace, this report clearly demonstrates a need for continued strengthening of such measures, particularly in the areas of diamond sales, arms purchases and foreign travel. We note that the cumulative impact of the three sets of United Nations sanctions has been to gradually erode UNITA's ability to resupply its forces and to capitalize on its external links. However, the key elements of the report are its recommendations for future action. We look forward to working with the Council and others to turn this highly informative document into a reinvigorated plan of action. The Expert Panel and the Committee have, in our assessment, increased the cost and difficulty of UNITA's continued military campaign.”
2000-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4113 (2000) · source
“We recognize the creative and energetic work of Ambassador Fowler as Chairman of the sanctions Committee, believing that his commitment to the implementation of sanctions served as an important catalyst for this report. Sanctions remain a key tool in the international community's efforts on behalf of peace in Angola. The report of the Expert Panel has highlighted in stark and dramatic fashion a systematic pattern of violations by the UNITA leadership and with the collusion of foreign actors. Whether the foreign actors are motivated by greed or by political conviction, their support for UNITA's military machine has prolonged the suffering of the Angolan people.”
2000-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4113 (2000) · source
“Today I am speaking as coordinator of the troika of observer States to the Lusaka Protocol: the United States, Portugal and the Russian Federation. We are grateful to Minister for External Relations Miranda for attending this meeting and look forward to his contributions to this discussion. We also welcome the arrival of Ambassador Jose Patricio, who will soon present his credentials to the Secretary-General. We welcome the report of the Expert Panel and commend Chairman Mollander and his Panel members for their sustained efforts. The work of the Panel has enhanced the role of the international community in the search for lasting peace in Angola, and it has also focused new attention on the link between the illegal exploitation of Angola's natural resources and the continuation of the conflict.”
2000-03-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4113 (2000) · source
“For example, the United States supports sanctions targeted to deter and contain those who violate international humanitarian and human rights law, as well as those parties to conflicts who continually defy Security Council resolutions. We look forward to continuing the important work that we are noting today and we thank Argentina for giving its attention to this very important subject.”
2000-02-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4100 (2000) · source
“The Security Council, along with the Secretary- General and other concerned organs of the United Nations, must continue efforts to bolster security and to force protection for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The Secretariat should develop comprehensive security plans for all missions and we welcome the Deputy Secretary-Generals comments today on the plans to enhance security. It is imperative that all concerned parties cooperate fully with the United Nations so as to facilitate the timely, effective and secure deployment of humanitarian and peacekeeping missions. We further welcome the Security Council's decision to avail itself of all of the tools appropriate for protecting United Nations and associated and humanitarian personnel.”
2000-02-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4100 (2000) · source
“We also share a responsibility to protect United Nations and associated personnel, humanitarian workers and members of multinational forces working for peace and stability. Under all circumstances, United Nations and associated personnel have a right to protect themselves. Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon host States and other actors to create environments in which they can safely carry out their missions. The primary responsibility for the safety and security of humanitarian and United Nations personnel rests with the authorities of the host Government, but we must also do our best to ensure that concrete steps are taken to protect those who serve and to punish those who violate their safety.”
2000-02-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4100 (2000) · source
“These disturbing numbers do not include the numerous humanitarian personnel working for non-governmental organizations who have been murdered, kidnapped, shot or otherwise harmed. We pay tribute to these unarmed civilians, who all too often are the targets of unprovoked attacks which must be condemned. The Security Council's decision to again address this issue reinforces the seriousness of the matter. We hope it will also inspire all Governments and non-State actors to commit themselves to protecting those working for peace and humanitarian relief. As Ms. Bertini noted eloquently, the United Nations flag must not become a target rather than a shield. As a community of nations, we share a moral and political obligation to take action to prevent the onset of Violence and, when this fails, to mitigate conflict.”
2000-02-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4100 (2000) · source
“I want to applaud the excellent and thought-provoking statements made by the Deputy Secretary-General and by Ms. Bertini. I also want to join in welcoming you, Sir, to New York and to the Council. I applaud your presence here today to address this important subject. With the need for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations growing, the United States appreciates the focus Argentina brings this month to the protection of United Nations and associated personnel. Events in Kosovo, East Timor, Burundi, Sudan, Sierra Leone and all too many other places have illustrated the dangers to which these personnel are exposed. Nearly 100 United Nations staff have been murdered in recent years; another 80 have been killed in the line of duty.”
2000-02-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4100 (2000) · source