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- 2004-06-14
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“It is precisely because of the gravity of events on the ground that we question the appropriateness and effectiveness of any action here in New York. What is required now is not rhetoric, not debate that polarizes an already volatile situation and certainly not an effort to condemn one side with unbalanced charges or to impose unworkable ideas that will not change the reality on the ground. That is not the way for the Council to fulfil its duties. It must not be drawn into an effort that will make lasting peace more difficult. Instead, what should guide action and debate is what can be done practically, working with both sides to end the violence and transform the environment in a way that will permit the resumption of a political process and a return to negotiations.”
2001-08-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4357 (2001) · source
“The United States is deeply concerned by the situation in the Middle East. We approach the tenth anniversary of the Madrid Conference in October against the backdrop of the most serious confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians in a decade. Palestinians and Israelis have been traumatized by almost a year of violence and disruption. There has been great suffering on both sides. We are deeply saddened by the tragic loss of life, including of children. This violence has taken a tremendous toll and seriously undermined the working partnership that began with the signing of the Oslo Declaration of Principles. The United States and others in the international community - including the other co-sponsor, Russia, and our Secretary-General - are working hard to end the violence and to restore some measure of confidence between the parties.”
2001-08-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4357 (2001) · source
“The Programme of Action of the first United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects is just over one week old. Ensuring its success should be a priority; that success depends on the will and effort of Member States. The United States has a history of demonstrated commitment to finding practical and effective ways of curbing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. We look forward to working with other Member States, and with you, Mr. President, to fulfil the Programme of Action.”
2001-08-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4355 (2001) · source
“The paper (S/2001/732, annex) submitted by the Government of Colombia in advance of this meeting very thoughtfully focused on a number of important issues. The issue of the flow of information to the Council is a key theme. Information on the role of small arms and light weapons can be of great value in helping us evaluate specific areas of conflict, including decisions to establish or enforce Security Council arms embargoes. Also, as called for in the Programme of Action, the United States urges Member States to use all appropriate legal and administrative means against violators of Security Council arms embargoes. Thus, while the function of the Security Council in accomplishing the Programme of Action is limited, we have the opportunity, through the leadership of Colombia, to thoughtfully define our role.”
2001-08-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4355 (2001) · source
“We offer bilateral financial and technical assistance to help countries develop national export and import controls, to improve border security, and to secure and destroy illicit stocks of small arms and light weapons in conflict-prone regions. We remain ready to continue that support. My Government believes that the focus of the Conference, as reflected in the Programme of Action, was properly on Member States and on their obligation and their efforts to eliminate the illicit small arms trade. Thus, the Security Council's role is circumscribed. We do not believe that the Security Council should seek a more elaborate role beyond its competence; but it does indeed have an important role to play.”
2001-08-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4355 (2001) · source
“The United States has one of the strongest systems in the world for regulating the export of arms. Small arms and light weapons made in the United States cannot be exported without the approval of the Department of State. Nor can arms of United States origin be re-transferred without the approval of the United States. We rigorously monitor arms transfers and routinely investigate suspicious activities. In the past five years we have interdicted thousands of illicit arms, and we have cut off exports to five countries that failed to comply with United States law. Moreover, all commercial exporters of arms in the United States must be registered as brokers and must submit each transaction for Government licensing approval. The United States has also been active internationally in stemming the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.”
2001-08-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4355 (2001) · source
“I want to join the Secretary-General in commending Ambassador Reyes for his leadership of the Conference. The Conference reached consensus on a comprehensive Programme of Action: a solid foundation for dealing with this issue. The Programme, if diligently carried out by Member States, will engender significant progress towards curbing this illegal and deadly trade. The United States believes that steps to tackle the problem of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons must be practical and effective. The most effective way to prevent small arms and light weapons from getting into the hands of those who would misuse them is through strict export and import controls and strong brokering laws, and through ensuring the security of stockpiles of small arms and light weapons.”
2001-08-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4355 (2001) · source
“I thank the Foreign Minister of Colombia for coming to New York to join us today and to preside over this open meeting of the Security Council. I congratulate him and his colleagues on Colombia's assumption of the presidency of the Council. I want also to acknowledge the presence of the Secretary-General. His attendance and his comments today reinforce the importance of this issue for all of us. All of us in this Chamber today are well aware of the agonizing impact of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, especially in areas of conflict, where the problem is most acute. We commend Colombia for its initiative to convene this meeting, which continues the momentum of the successful United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.”
2001-08-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4355 (2001) · source
“At this crucial juncture, all sides, including the Government of Macedonia, must exercise restraint and respect the ceasefire agreements. The only solution is a political solution. All will lose, the region will lose, if war is the choice instead of peace. The United States is urging the Macedonian Government and the party leaders to continue negotiations and to reach an agreement that addresses the concerns of all sides, respects the rights of all the people of Macedonia and preserves Macedonia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. We believe that such an agreement is possible, and it is certainly necessary.”
2001-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4350 (2001) · source
“I think this is yet another area where we can see progress and commend the efforts of UNMIK and the Yugoslav authorities to continue a dialogue on how to move forward. As Jean-Marie Guehenno did, I cannot finish my statement without moving slightly off-theme to mention the situation in the neighbouring former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Recent violence there is of great concern to my country. The ceasefire is an open-ended commitment and is crucial to providing the atmosphere for a political dialogue. The use by armed extremists of the ceasefire to improve their military positions is reprehensible and unacceptable. We applaud efforts by UNMIK and KFOR to improve control of movement across the border between Kosovo and Macedonia.”
2001-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4350 (2001) · source
“I think we all understood and stressed that a multi-ethnic Kosovo will be possible only if all communities can and do participate in the process. So we are particularly gratified to have word that four Kosovo Serb political parties have registered for the elections. That is an important positive step, and we hope that other elements of the Serb community will take that step as well, and that they will participate. Another major focus is how to support the rights of minorities in a multi-ethnic Kosovo, which includes the questions of Serb returns, adequate security, infrastructure and minority communities. We also wanted to promote the development of good working relationships with the Yugoslav authorities by UNMIK and the Kosovo Force (KFOR), which is an important element in realizing those goals. That cooperation is important.”
2001-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4350 (2001) · source
“Guehenno's briefing that progress is being made in this regard, and we welcome that. I also want to stress my Government's strong support for the recent decision by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to extend the executive hold on the three suspects captured in relation to the Nis Express bus bombing. This is a topic that President Bush raised with Special Representative Haekkerup, and we urge UNMIK to form a special panel of international judges to review the available evidence - if that is the legally correct way to ensure that those suspected of such a shameful act do not walk free. The Council mission also supported the political process, autonomous self-government, the legal framework, elections and, most specifically, Serb participation in that process and in those elections.”
2001-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4350 (2001) · source
“I want to thank the Under-Secretary-General for the briefing. It is good to have an update and to check on the progress being made since our trip to Kosovo last month. Indeed, it is clear that while there is still much work to be done, there is progress being made, and we are gratified to hear that. When we went to Kosovo, the most important message that the Council wanted to send was of the importance of the full implementation of resolution 1244 (1999). That is still the most important message, and I think we can see that progress is being made in all areas. We also talked a lot during our trip about measures to reduce violence, including getting the new pillar I off the ground, the new security regulations and urging local leaders to publicly condemn the use of violence. I think we can see from Mr.”
2001-07-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4350 (2001) · source
“If a Great Lakes conference dedicated to those issues can advance those goals, then perhaps the time has come to take that long- standing proposal off the back burner and see if it can help improve the lives of the people of the region.”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“We are glad to see that the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has resumed work on this important issue, and we look forward to the addendum to its original report. For there to be peace in the region, three things, at a minimum, must happen: all foreign forces must withdraw from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the inter-Congolese dialogue must begin the process of giving the Congolese people their first accountable Government; and the long-standing practice of regional governments entering into alliances with non-State actors must end. Good governance, democratic accountability and security are fundamental requirements for regional peace.”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“In that connection, I also want to emphasize the need for the relevant parties to carry through with their investigation of the murder of six personnel of the International Committee of the Red Cross in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and to bring the guilty to justice. The exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to benefit warlords, arms producers and corrupt officials. Clearly, that practice must halt. The natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are the patrimony of the Congolese nation, and we are concerned when those resources are not used to advance the welfare of the Congolese people.”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“If the United Nations is to assist the parties in this area, the JMC must produce a credible plan that reflects an unambiguous regional commitment to address the issue. This should be done immediately. We are troubled at the failure of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to accept the appointment of the new United Nations humanitarian coordinator. The individual nominated by the Secretariat is an outstanding candidate, and we urge the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to revise its position. The lack of a humanitarian coordinator makes it even harder to raise the money needed to meet the humanitarian needs of the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the appointment will facilitate a more effective response to the growing humanitarian crisis.”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“It should be obvious to all that the Governments of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have common security interests that can also be addressed through a policy of cooperation and dialogue. The lack of progress on disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement is one of the reasons we have not seen broader progress on peace in the region. The remedy is not for the United Nations to assume a greater role; the remedy is for the parties to recognize their common interests and to make this a reality. As in all other areas of the peace process, the role of the United Nations in disarmament and reintegration will expand or contract in direct proportion to the quality of political will displayed by the parties.”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“As long as negative forces such as the ex-FAR, Interahamwe and the Mayi-Mayi are being armed by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and some of its allies, there will be no disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement, and, we believe, no solution to the Great Lakes crisis. We therefore call on the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo immediately to cease support, be it through arms, training, money or other forms of assistance, to all such forces. We are pleased to note that regional leaders, including Presidents Kabila and Kagame, whom we View as the critical players on this issue, continue to meet.”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“We note recent reports that some members of those groups have been brought into camps within the territory under the control of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and we hope that MONUC will act quickly on the Government's offer to allow Visits to those sites. I wish also to underscore the importance of including representatives from United Nations humanitarian agencies to ensure the proper focus on reintegration and resettlement issues. But the first step of a disarmament process is the cessation of arming, something that, unfortunately, has yet to materialize.”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“While MONUC cannot assume the burden of administering Kisangani, it can work with local authorities to provide support and assistance. The first step is an RCD-Goma acceptance of the principle of a demilitarized Kisangani. Once that is forthcoming, we will look to the Political Committee and the Joint Military Commission (JMC), in consultation with MONUC, for ideas on the nature of civilian administration in the area. For all the talk of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement or repatriation of the former Rwandan Army forces (ex-FAR), Interahamwe and other negative forces, there has not been enough progress.”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“The demilitarization of Kisangani is a demand of the Security Council, as others have noted, and the Council expects this to be accomplished. We do not accept the argument of the RCD-Goma that the military presence is necessary to secure the human rights of citizens there. Moreover, we have serious concerns about the RCD-Goma's own human rights record in the areas under its control. Under the disengagement sub-plans, the RCD- Goma would maintain administrative control of Kisangani pending the establishment of new national institutions. We understand and accept that a demilitarized Kisangani would require a strengthened MONUC contingent, and we continue to subscribe to the conclusions and recommendations of the Security Council mission in this regard.”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“I, too, wish to second the warm comments made by my colleagues around the table about Ambassador Morjane. I will not repeat them, but I do want to pay tribute to the outstanding work of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) under his leadership, which has helped the Democratic Republic of the Congo find a chance for peace. He has my country's gratitude and appreciation for his service and best wishes for his future. My Government fully subscribes to the presidential statement that will be issued at the conclusion of today's meeting, but, as we look to the future, we also thought it would be useful to review briefly the key issues that are still before us in the peace process.”
2001-07-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4348 (2001) · source
“Our strongest weapon is Council unity, and this rollover provides more time for those who agree with our approach to help us build support to achieve that goal.”
2001-07-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4344 (2001) · source
“The biggest losers in the failure to move forward are not the United Kingdom, the United States or the majority of Council members that favour the new approach. The ones who have lost the most are in fact the Iraqi people. The revisions we propose would facilitate trade and accelerate commerce, and they would improve the lot of Iraq's people. We will use the time before the next rollover to press ahead with our approach. We have made considerable progress, and have come too close to agreement to concede the field to Baghdad. My delegation began this effort seeking to restore a Council consensus that would help Iraq's people and would stand firm against Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbours.”
2001-07-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4344 (2001) · source
“It is now apparent that agreement in the Council to change radically our approach to Iraq is not only desirable but achievable. It would have been adopted today save for the threat of a veto. But a veto would bring our work to a halt and thus would be a victory for Iraq. Therefore, my delegation agreed to this rollover of the oil-for-food programme while we consolidate and build on the success we have achieved thus far. Our reluctance stems not from lack of commitment or belief in the oil-for-food programme or in the remarkable work of the United Nations in carrying that programme out, which we believe represents both high ideals and world-class performance by the programme Director and his colleagues. Rather, our disappointment stems from the opportunity that we, the Council, have lost for the time being.”
2001-07-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4344 (2001) · source
“Iraq, however, clearly wishes that approach blocked and prefers the status quo with the humanitarian programme and across the board. There is broad support within the Council for an effort by the United States and the United Kingdom to implement that proposal, and we will continue. Last week, after a month of detailed discussions, we produced the goods-review list which is central to the new approach. That list is supported by four of the five permanent members, and it merits the support of all Council members, including Russia. It is the vital step forward in providing the basis for the adoption of the United Kingdom draft resolution. That draft resolution remains under active consideration, and the Council should adopt it as soon as possible.”
2001-07-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4344 (2001) · source
“The United States worked hard to adopt a different sort of draft resolution today, one that would have benefited the Iraqi people and the Gulf region. We could have, and the Council should have, done better, and we all know why that was not possible. Our proposal is simple: lift the controls on purely civilian trade while maintaining the focus on the military items and technologies which must be controlled so that Iraq cannot restore its weapons of mass destruction programmes or threaten its neighbours. We have achieved considerable success. Resolution 1352 (2001) registered Council consensus on the main elements of a new approach, one that would serve as a bridge between the current situation and that day when Iraq implements resolution 1284 (1999) and all other relevant Council resolutions.”
2001-07-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4344 (2001) · source
“Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration are not, in the end, the responsibility of the Security Council, and we question whether assessed contributions are the best means of meeting the need that exists. We note that the donors' conference in Paris sent encouraging signals. We join others in strongly urging that donors come forward with clear pledges to the trust fund to get this effort on a secure footing. I have outlined a few areas of concern to my Government, but I did so in the belief that a policy that is working needs to be fine tuned. I commend the Secretary-General, Mr. Adeniji and the Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Opande, along with the men and women of UNAMSIL, for their dedication to peace in Sierra Leone, and I assure them of our continued support.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“But we think that there is no conflict between the pursuit of peace and the pursuit of justice; indeed, they must go together. To imply that we must set aside a call for justice in the interest of the desire for peace would, we feel, he to repeat the mistakes of the past. The Secretary-General has raised serious concerns about the lack of resources for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. He has also implied that, should voluntary funding not be forthcoming, he will seek assessed funding. Certainly, proceeding with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is an essential element of the process; indeed, the situation we now confront has been outlined by Mr. Adeniji and is, as he said, an indication of success. That has created a problem.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“The International Crisis Group's report, which I commend to my colleagues, tells us that we must avoid the mistakes made there as we establish the Sierra Leone Special Court. Ambassadors Greenstock and Ryan, and others, have talked about the importance of establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, but also about the need for it to be brought into being along with the Special Court. We agree: both elements of the process ofjustice need to be created. They both equally need to be brought into being. The Special Court is an element that we consider to be of particular importance. We have heard some reservations about the wisdom of moving forward with the Special Court, given the stated commitment of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to the peace process.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“My Government urges all of our partners, and all those interested in justice, to join us in contributing to the fund for the Court so that we can bring it into being. The next step must be for the Court to state whom it intends to prosecute. In our View, this should begin immediately with one person we know to be in detention and who, we all agree, should be brought to justice: Foday Sankoh. Our deliberations on the Special Court and the difficulties in bringing it into being have taken place against the backdrop of a new report on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. That report, by the International Crisis Group, tells us that a staff of almost 800 people, working for seven years, at a cost of $90 million a year, has produced nine convictions, with 43 suspects still awaiting trial and a number of key suspects still at large.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“Ten months ago, the Council decided that it wanted those most responsible for the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Sierra Leone to be brought to justice. That means a narrowly defined group of ringleaders whose actions have disqualified them from participation in the political life of the country. It means a finite process that will hold a small number of leaders accountable while allowing the rest of Sierra Leone to proceed with the political life of the country. We regret that this vital project has turned into an extremely complex, time-consuming, expensive and inconclusive affair. We need to get on with this. Now, we finally have before us, under consideration, a new, more sustainable approach at a reasonable cost. The Secretary-General has recently renewed his appeal for funding.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“That is a genuine success: a success for the Council, for the United Nations, for the leaders of UNAMSIL and for the troop contributors. As UNAMSIL reaches its authorized ceiling, it is important that the United Nations continue to expand its area of operation, and that the Government of Sierra Leone come in behind UNAMSIL with credible restoration of State authority, coupled with increased international humanitarian and human rights activity. As the author of the resolution envisaging the Special Court, resolution 1315 (2000), I want to say a special word about that, because it was not mentioned very prominently in the briefing, although others have referred to it.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“Others have recalled that it was only a year ago that United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was almost driven out of Sierra Leone and that the Government was almost driven from power by Liberian-backed rebels, and that it was less than a year ago that the departure of some contingents generated concern that UNAMSIL could never be staffed and indeed that it might collapse entirely. Today, UNAMSIL has recovered. It is achieving the results that the Council wants. One year ago, the people of Sierra Leone looked helpless in the face of one of the world's most violent insurgencies, but today they can look to the future with at least a degree of cautious optimism, as the Secretary- General's report said.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“It is especially good to see the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Adeniji, and Lieutenant- General Opande here, and to do so in a context where, as others have said, there is real reason to be encouraged. It is also good to see that the Secretariat, as set out in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2001/627) and in Mr. Adeniji's very good briefing, is embarking on strategic planning for the way ahead: a plan to extend the authority of the Government of Sierra Leone throughout the national territory; conducting free and fair elections; and restoring to the people of Sierra Leone the mineral wealth to which they are entitled. Those are all certainly critical to consolidating peace.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“Instead of tearing up the Council's longstanding approach, this proposal ensures its survival, expands vastly the range of goods available to the civilian population and promotes future implementation by showing the Government of Iraq that it has no alternative to cooperation with the United Nations. Perhaps that is why, indeed, the Government of Iraq prefers the status quo. The United States of America urges all members of the Council who want something better for the Iraqi people to join us in taking the next step toward the creation of a better - not perfect - but better system than the one that now exists. The draft resolution now being considered by the members of the Council, which moves far beyond the status quo, is that next step.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“A number of these have been under discussion for some time in this Council, and if we were able to agree on this package, it would be an important step forward in that regard as well. Some have suggested this new approach to be an abandonment of resolution 1284 (1999) and a move away from implementing the other applicable Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq. That assertion is fundamentally misleading. The introduction of this new approach to Iraq is in fact a bridge between the current situation and the existing framework of Security Council resolutions. The Council will still need to be certain that the region no longer faces a threat from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“Importantly, the current draft resolution asks nothing of the States neighbouring Iraq, except to continue consultations with the Secretary-General. Neither we, nor, I am sure, any other member of the Council, would seek to impose any particular set of rules on these countries against their will and without their cooperation. Instead, we suggest that we would use the next six months at least to explore what arrangements might be beneficial in assuring the promotion of legitimate trade by which the Iraq regime does not acquire unauthorized items or illicit cash. There are a number of other issues being considered as well in this draft resolution. These include international civil aviation and different forms of economic interaction that would open prospects for the Iraqi people.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“This is a historically significant change in the way the United Nations does business with Iraq, and it is directly responsive to concerns raised in this Chamber repeatedly in the past, and contrary to assertions about "vague procedures", we are in fact negotiating agreed procedures that will provide the desired clarity, at least to almost all of the members of the Security Council. We share concern that Iraq's neighbours might be damaged economically if Iraq responds to the changed system by ending trade arrangements with them. But there is no way to be certain about anything the Baghdad regime might do, and Iraq has its own interests in these trade arrangements. But it has, however, resorted to threats.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“Almost every item that Iraq could need or want for its civilian development will not be subject to review by the sanctions Committee. Goods could flow rapidly to where they are needed most under a simplified procedure. Even items subject to control would go to Iraq once there is confidence that they would not be used to rebuild Iraq's weapons of mass destruction or improve its military capabilities. Some continue to confuse the proposed review list with a denial list, so let me address this once again, because it is at the heart of the proposal. The items on the goods review list now under negotiation will be subject to review by the sanctions Committee. If it is clear that the goods will only be used for civilian purposes, those goods will be approved for export.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“We, on the other hand, want to change the system now so as to allow purchases of the civilian goods needed to develop Iraq's economy. Under the current system, to which we will revert if the new system cannot be brought into being, all exports to Iraq are forbidden unless specifically permitted by Security Council resolution or a specific decision of the sanctions Committee. Under the proposed system, everything is permitted unless it is contained on a list of military or dual-use goods, in which case it will be reviewed, not denied. Iraq will be able to acquire everything it needs to improve the lives of its people and to provide for the country's development. The Iraqi regime will be prevented only from acquiring the few items critical to increasing its ability to threaten international peace and security.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“We find it harder to understand, however, why others would join in playing that game when the status quo is clearly not satisfactory. Let us be clear about what we are trying to accomplish with the United Kingdom draft resolution. Far from "freezing the present situation", if we agree to something like it in its current form, we will have done nothing less than lift the sanctions on regular civilian commercial trade with the Iraqi people. It is the height of irony that, at the very moment my Government and others are prepared to undertake this radical shift of direction, we find ourselves under attack by others who have long pressed for change to the system. These States, like the Government of Iraq, seek to perpetuate the status quo instead of looking ahead.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“Iraq has made much of the fact that its financial liquidity will allow it to defy the international community for several months. It has been clear for some time that we, the international community, care more for the Iraqi people than the regime does. As a result, Baghdad is making clear that despite all its protests it actually prefers the status quo to our proposal to change the oil-for-food programme so as to allow the Iraqi people the broadest possible contact with the rest of the world, especially through civilian commercial trade, and to significantly improve the humanitarian situation in Iraq. My Government is accustomed by now to Iraq's cynicism towards its own people and to its bluster and threatening policies.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“It is equally a measure of the programme's success that Iraq's development, by some standards, actually exceeds that of some of its regional neighbours. During these past six years, the nature of the oil- for-food programme has changed, even though the name has not. But a better name today would be "oil for development", because such a term would more accurately reflect the fact that even today the Iraqi regime could redevelop the country using the oil-for- food programme, if it chose to do so. Instead, Iraq is using money and oil as a weapon against the international community. Iraq has not sold oil since the adoption of resolution 1352 (2001); that has cost the humanitarian programme more than half a billion dollars, on top of the several billion dollars that Iraq lost by shutting off oil some months ago.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“The Security Council has assumed a special role in maintaining security in the Gulf region; Iraq continues to pose a clear threat to that security; and it must be the Council's purpose to ensure that that threat remains contained. But it is clear that the Iraqi people have borne the burden of the regime's policies. The oil-for-food programme has grown into the largest humanitarian programme ever run by the international community. It is a reflection of the regime's lack of cooperation and of its disregard for its own population that, despite the billions of dollars that have gone into Iraq under the programme, Iraq's development levels have not met the potential of the oil-for-food process.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“Ten years after the Iraqi regime invaded, occupied and brutalized Kuwait, it is useful for the Council to remind itself of how we got to where we are now and of what we can do together to change an unsatisfactory situation. On 2 August 1990 and for the six months it took for the United Nations to remove invading Iraqi troops, the Iraq regime attempted the unthinkable: to extinguish the existence of another United Nations Member State. Once the international community defeated that attempt, the Security Council focused on ensuring that the regime which carried out the invasion and which remains unrepentant to this day would not have the ability to wage war on its neighbours or to threaten them with weapons of mass destruction ever again. To this point we have been successful.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“Haekkerup and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), including on the importance of moving to elections and improving security in the region. It was very clear that they have ambitious plans in that regard, and we support that wholeheartedly. I also want to repeat, very simply, that the United States, as we go through this process, will support all those who favour dialogue in the political process and will oppose those who continue to incite violence, and we condemn violence from whatever quarter it comes.”
2001-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4335 (2001) · source
“I will keep my remarks very brief, because I think the report of the Council mission basically says it all. As Under-Secretary-General Guehenno noted in his comments, the mission sent clear messages to its interlocutors. In my view, and in the view of my authorities, it was very useful. I want to commend you also, Mr. President, on your leadership and your effort to get so much into such a short period of time. It really was quite useful. It was particularly useful, I think, that we had the occasion to meet with Presidents Putin and Kostunica during the visit, because it I think it helped all of us understand better the context that we are working in. I just wanted to emphasize a couple of key points from the United States point of view. We strongly support the efforts of Mr.”
2001-06-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4335 (2001) · source
“Our hope is that we will be able to use it to devise better means to prevent conflicts and build on the progress that we are already making. Our goal is for us to need fewer interventions, peacekeeping missions or massive humanitarian relief efforts in future. We are making progress, but I want to note again the need for leadership and will to act before crisis instead of afterwards.”
2001-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4334 (2001) · source