YouSaid · the spoken record

DiCarlo

lines on the record
1,676
first
2008-08-08
most recent
2023-12-18
sittings or episodes
218
sources
un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

  1. In 2019, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights recorded 167 civilian casualties — 27 killed and 140 injured — of which 63 per cent were caused by shelling and small arms and light weapons fire and 35 per cent by mines and explosive remnants of war. That represents a 40 per cent decrease from 2018 figures and the lowest annual figures for the entire conflict period. While that decrease is a welcome development, we note that a permanent and comprehensive silencing of weapons — the best way to eliminate civilian casualties — is still not within reach. The United Nations is particularly concerned about people living along the contact line, who remain the most vulnerable. Civilians pay the highest price in the crisis.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  2. At this pivotal time, I hope the Council will encourage all stakeholders to do their utmost to ensure a sustained positive momentum in the negotiations, display the political will and flexibility to reach agreement on key steps forward and focus on the implementation of agreed commitments, including, first and foremost, the commitment to a durable ceasefire. Despite some steps taken to mitigate its impact on civilians, the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine continues to claim lives, cause injuries, severely restrict the freedom of movement and negatively impact basic human rights, including the rights to housing, health, education and an adequate standard of living. The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine has regularly reported on the human rights situation; its most recent report is dated 12 December 2019.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  3. Today’s disturbing reports of major ceasefire violations across the contact line near Zolote, including the alleged use of heavy weapons, are deeply disturbing and a stark reminder that, in the absence of sustained political will, there is a very real risk of backsliding and further violence. Members will hear shortly from the newly appointed Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in- Office in Ukraine, Ambassador Heidi Grau, on the most recent discussions in the Trilateral Contact Group, and from the Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, Ambassador Halit Çevik, on the overall security situation on the ground. It is critical that we support their important efforts.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  4. Many of those I met stressed the need for greater involvement by women in the ongoing peace efforts. I also heard about the need to improve the humanitarian situation for ordinary people living along the contact line and to invest greater attention and political will in enabling and strengthening various dialogue initiatives that could contribute to ensuring sustainable peace. We are pleased that the Normandy Four summit held in Paris was followed by a large-scale exchange of prisoners and progress on discussions of additional disengagement areas. However, those initial encouraging signs remain limited and easily reversible.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  5. The leaders in Paris further referred to the so- called special status for certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as the so-called Steinmeier formula, which was accepted by the sides earlier. The Secretary-General publicly welcomed the outcomes of the meeting and called on all concerned to redouble their efforts to build on recent progress towards a resolution of the conflict. He also reiterated his full support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, within its internationally recognized borders. I used the opportunity of my first visit to Ukraine, from 12 to 13 December 2019, to reiterate the Secretary- General’s support for the ongoing peace efforts and critical reforms in Ukraine. My interlocutors were clear in their desire to see tangible progress in the negotiations.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  6. They also committed to supporting the development and implementation of an updated demining plan, as well as to supporting an agreement within the Trilateral Contact Group on three additional disengagement areas, with the aim of disengaging forces and equipment. They encouraged the Trilateral Contact Group to facilitate the release and exchange of conflict-related detainees and committed to supporting an agreement within the Group on new crossing points along the line of contact, based primarily on humanitarian criteria. Critically, the participants recalled that the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission should have safe and secure access throughout Ukraine in order to fully implement its mandate.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  7. A number of important developments have since then given rise to hope for long-elusive progress in the implementation of the Minsk provisions, including its key security and political aspects. Most notably, on 9 December, after a three-year hiatus, the leaders of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine met in Paris under the so-called Normandy format. The Normandy Four meeting called for immediate measures to stabilize the situation in the conflict area, measures to implement the political provisions of the Minsk agreements and follow-up steps. The leaders committed to a full and comprehensive implementation of the ceasefire, strengthened by the implementation of all the necessary ceasefire support measures.

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  8. Ms. DiCarlo: On 17 February, five years ago, the Security Council adopted resolution 2202 (2015), which endorsed the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements. Today that package of measures, together with the Minsk protocol and the Minsk memorandum, remains the only agreed framework for a negotiated, peaceful settlement of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. The Secretary-General has consistently expressed the strong backing of the United Nations for the lead role of the Normandy Four, the Trilateral Contact Group and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in finding a peaceful settlement of the conflict in eastern Ukraine and has called for a revitalization of those efforts. I last briefed the Council on Ukraine on 16 July (see S/PV.8575).

    2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source

  9. From youth creating new platforms to increase cultural understanding across religious and national lines, to women demanding a greater role in their Governments’ decision-making, these remarkable individuals continue to serve as an inspiration to all of us to redouble our efforts towards a negotiated solution. I assure the Council that the United Nations remains committed to supporting Palestinians and Israelis as they pursue a peaceful and just future.

    2020-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8706 (2020) · source

  10. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the continued urgency of resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on the basis of relevant United Nations resolutions, international law and bilateral agreements. In the absence of progress towards an agreement that will resolve all final-status issues, the United Nations continues to focus its efforts on establishing an environment conducive to a return to negotiations. Recent events in the region have once again brought to fore the crucial necessity of dialogue and diplomacy in the region. What is more, we need look no further to find living examples of dialogue and coexistence at the community level: despite the political deadlock and tensions, Palestinians and Israelis on the ground continue to work every day to build a more peaceful and secure future.

    2020-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8706 (2020) · source

  11. Following recent tensions in the region, the Special Coordinator for Lebanon and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Head of Mission and Force Commander encouraged parties to shield Lebanon from any potential spillover and to urge calm. The situation in the UNIFIL area of operations, including along the Blue Line, remained stable. While the situation on the Golan had generally remained calm in the past weeks, on 14 January the Syrian armed forces issued a statement informing that the Israel Defense Forces had conducted an airstrike on targets located in Syria. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force engaged both parties in order to prevent an escalation of tensions and reminded them of their obligation to respect the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement.

    2020-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8706 (2020) · source

  12. I reiterate my call on both sides to engage in a constructive manner to ensure compliance with the Paris Protocol on Economic Relations. The United Nations stands ready to assist in that process. Turning to the region, efforts to form a Government in Lebanon have continued since Hassan Diab was nominated Prime Minister-designate on 19 December. The popular protests also continue, against the background of a deteriorating economic situation. The violent incidents that took place in Beirut between protesters and security forces in recent days and incidents of disproportionate use of force raise very serious concerns, particularly as the protests had been largely peaceful until now.

    2020-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8706 (2020) · source

  13. In line with legislation passed in the Knesset in July 2018, on 29 December the Government decided to withhold $43 million in clearance revenues that Israel collects on behalf of the Palestinian Authority, in monthly instalments spread over the course of 2020. The amount was determined by Israeli authorities to be equal to what Palestinian authorities paid Palestinians injured in attacks against Israelis and families of those killed in such attacks. That deduction comes in addition to $139 million already withheld by Israel against stipends paid in 2018 to prisoners convicted or accused of security offences against Israel. I am concerned that this development may strain the tenuous progress made in October 2019, when Israel and the Palestinian Authority reached a partial agreement on transferring clearance revenues.

    2020-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8706 (2020) · source

  14. In other developments during the reporting period, on 20 December, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) released a statement announcing that the ICC’s preliminary examination into the situation in Palestine had concluded with the determination that all the statutory criteria under the Rome Statute for the opening of an investigation had been met. In doing so, she expressed her view that, among other things, war crimes had been or were being committed in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. She also stated her position that the Court’s jurisdiction applies to the occupied Palestinian territory.

    2020-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8706 (2020) · source

  15. Donors are encouraged to continue their support for those interventions to alleviate the suffering of the population and help avoid another deadly escalation. Despite the welcome progress in advancing those projects, it is a fact that humanitarian and economic steps alone will not resolve Gaza’s immense challenges. At their core, Gaza’s problems are political, and they require political solutions. Palestinian leaders must take concrete steps to ensure that Gaza and the West Bank are reunited. At the same time, Israel must significantly improve movement and access for goods and people to and from Gaza, as a step towards the full lifting of the closures, in line with resolution 1860 (2009).

    2020-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8706 (2020) · source

  16. The cash-for-work programmes specifically target women and young people, as they are underrepresented in the labour force and require specialized assistance to gain access to employment opportunities. Several thousand more jobs are expected to be created this year. The increased funding would allow United Nations agencies the capacity to significantly scale up and improve those job opportunities, as well as implement other programmes to support the economy and address unemployment in the longer term. Qatari-funded fuel supplies for the Gaza power plant also continued, allowing for increased and more stable electricity supplies in Gaza. Meanwhile, many AHLC projects remain unfunded or in deficit. Critical health interventions identified in the package are still in deficit of $4 million.

    2020-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8706 (2020) · source

  17. Progress was made during the reporting period on the implementation of the package of urgent humanitarian and economic interventions for Gaza endorsed in September 2018 by the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee for the Coordination of International Assistance to Palestinians (AHLC). I take this opportunity to thank those in the international community that have contributed to the implementation of the AHLC plan, and call on all to increase their support to United Nations programmes on the ground. By the end of 2019, 37,000 temporary jobs had been created by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank.

    2020-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8706 (2020) · source

  18. During the reporting period, Palestinian militants fired some 20 projectiles from the Gaza Strip towards Israeli communities, a significant decrease as compared to previous months. The rockets fell short, fell in open areas or were intercepted and did not cause any damage or injuries. In response to the rocket attacks, the IDF conducted several strikes against what it said were Hamas targets in Gaza. No injuries were reported. Assistant Secretary-General Mueller will elaborate in further detail on the humanitarian situation in the occupied territory. Despite ongoing efforts, the socioeconomic situation in Gaza remains very difficult.

    2020-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8706 (2020) · source

  19. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) responded with riot dispersal means and live fire, injuring some 140 Palestinians, including some 75 women and children. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, (OCHA), the number of injuries recorded during the Gaza protests during the reporting period was the lowest since the protests began, in March 2018. One Palestinian died of injuries sustained during a protest in May 2018. It is concerning and regrettable, however, that there has been a resurgence in the past few days of incidents of incendiary balloons and kites being launched from Gaza towards Israel. Those actions are a risk to the civilian population.

    2020-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8706 (2020) · source

  20. While the situation remains extremely fragile, there has been a notable and welcome reduction in violence in and around Gaza, as the understandings brokered by the United Nations and Egypt continue to be broadly upheld. On 26 December, the organizers of the ongoing protests along the Gaza perimeter fence announced that the weekly demonstrations would be on hold until the end of March. Following the announcement, a relative calm has prevailed along the fence. The limited demonstrations that took place prior to the announcement remained relatively peaceful, although some protesters engaged in violent activities, including approaching the fence and throwing Molotov cocktails and explosive devices towards Israeli forces.

    2020-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8706 (2020) · source

  21. Meanwhile, sporadic violence in the occupied West Bank, including Jerusalem, and Gaza continued throughout the reporting period. Two hundred and twenty Palestinians, including 80 children, were injured in various incidents, including during clashes, protests, search-and-arrest operations and settler- related violence. Of those, 50 were injured by tear-gas inhalation. In addition, six Israelis, including one child, were injured during the reporting period. Developments in the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of Al-Issawiya are a significant and growing concern. The area continues to be the focal point of ongoing clashes and numerous arrests, including of minors. The United Nations continues to monitor the situation closely.

    2020-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8706 (2020) · source

  22. On 15 January, following a ruling by Israel’s High Court of Justice, Israeli authorities demolished two houses in the outpost of Kumi Ori, in Area B of the West Bank. Also on 15 January, Israel’s Defence Ministry announced it was advancing the declaration of seven new nature reserves in Area C and the expansion of 12 existing ones. If implemented, those declarations would be the first of their kind since the start of the Oslo process. I reiterate that all settlements are illegal under international law and remain an obstacle to peace. The annexation of some or all of Area C, if implemented, would deal a devastating blow to the potential for reviving negotiations, advancing regional peace and the essence of the two-State solution.

    2020-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8706 (2020) · source

  23. On 5 January, an inter-ministerial committee tasked with discussing annexation plans for the Jordan Valley held its first meeting. On 9 January, the Office of the Minister of Defence announced the appointment of the director of a new task force to tackle so-called “illegal Palestinian construction” in Area C of the West Bank. Also in January, the Jerusalem District Planning Committee advanced a new 150-unit compound to be built in the East Jerusalem neighbourhood of Beit Hanina, on land owned jointly by Israelis and Palestinians. The construction rights are expected to be split between the Israeli and Palestinian owners of the land, although the Palestinian owners had previously submitted objections to that plan.

    2020-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8706 (2020) · source

  24. The Secretary-General and the Special Coordinator remain hopeful that elections will be scheduled soon in line with previous practice. With the political process deadlocked, negative developments continue to undermine the prospects for a two-State solution. The beginning of 2020 witnessed the continued expansion of settlement activity and the threat of annexation of parts of the West Bank. On 4 and 5 January, Israeli authorities advanced plans for some 1,900 residential units in settlements in Area C. The plans include the retroactive regularization under Israeli law of an outpost and the advancement of plans in two other locations that were regularized in 2019. In addition, tenders were announced for some 2,200 units in Area C and East Jerusalem.

    2020-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8706 (2020) · source

  25. During the past few weeks, the United Nations has continued its engagement with all Palestinian factions to stress the need for, and the prospect of, holding long- overdue legislative and presidential elections. Political parties have confirmed they would include more women candidates than the law requires. Discussions also continue regarding potentially amending the electoral law and raising the quota of women candidates on a list from 20 to 30 per cent. Despite broad internal political agreement and a series of compromises by all factions, to date President Abbas has not issued the decree needed to schedule elections. In the past month, he has stated that he would not set dates until Israel agrees that elections can take place in East Jerusalem. Plans to organize the vote are now grinding to a halt.

    2020-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8706 (2020) · source

  26. It is, sadly, not a surprise that a recent survey of millennials by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) found that almost two thirds — 65 per cent — of Israeli millennials thought the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would never end, making them the least optimistic of people surveyed in countries affected by war. Palestinians were also pessimistic, although slightly less so, with 52 per cent believing that the conflict would never end. The international community bears a responsibility to help build a different future for those young Israelis and Palestinians, one that promises hope, reconciliation and peaceful coexistence rather than perpetual occupation and conflict.

    2020-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8706 (2020) · source

  27. Ms. DiCarlo: I brief the Security Council today amid heightened regional tensions that threaten to destabilize further an already volatile political and security environment. The Secretary-General has been clear in calling on all leaders to exercise maximum restraint and has emphasized that the world cannot afford another conflict. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not immune to the tensions in the region. At the same time, the effects of its persistence are felt far beyond Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory. The United Nations has consistently stated that we cannot hope to bring sustainable peace to the Middle East without taking firm action to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and achieve a two-State solution based on international law, relevant United Nations resolutions and prior agreements.

    2020-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8706 (2020) · source

  28. The Secretary-General therefore calls on Member States to avoid confrontational actions and explore avenues for dialogue and cooperation in the interest of international peace and security. Let me conclude by acknowledging the leadership of His Excellency Mr. Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve in his role as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and to assure him once again of our full support. I would also like to thank the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for our continued cooperation.

    2019-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8695 (2019) · source

  29. Finally, we were informed of additional travel allegedly undertaken by the Commander of the Al-Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Major General Qasem Soleimani, to Iraq in October 2019. We also were informed of alleged cooperation between a Member State's academic institution with an entity on the 2231 list, as well as several ongoing cooperation agreements in the construction sector between foreign entities and other entities on the list. The Secretariat has requested clarification from Member States and will report back to the Council. The Secretary-General considers the full implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) by all Member States as an integral component of our collective prevention efforts. That has assumed greater importance in the context of current tensions in the Gulf.

    2019-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8695 (2019) · source

  30. At the invitation of the United States, the Secretariat travelled to examine arms and related materiel alleged to be of Iranian origin, which the United States seized in international waters off the coast of Yemen on 25 November 2019. The seized items included anti-tank guided missiles, surface-to-air missiles, as well as parts ofcruise missiles and anti-ship missiles. The anti-tank guided missiles that we saw had production dates as recent as 2018. Their container- launch units also had characteristics consistent with the Iranian-produced Dehlavieh anti-tank guided missile. We had made a similar observation of other anti-tank guided missile container-launch units seized in Yemen in our sixth report (S/2018/1089) to the Council. The Secretariat is still reviewing the information and will report back to the Council with additional details.

    2019-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8695 (2019) · source

  31. Parts of the UAVs were also produced and transferred between Member States after 16 January 2016, and as recently as 2018. Based on our preliminary assessment, the Secretary- General is also unable to independently corroborate that the UAVs, or the recovered components we examined, are of Iranian origin. As with the cruise missiles, the Secretariat is still actively reviewing the components and subcomponents recovered, as well as collecting and analysing additional information on those UAVs. The Secretary-General intends to report back on our further findings. In addition, I would like to bring to everyone's attention to the arms-related information that had become available since the publication of the Secretary- General's report.

    2019-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8695 (2019) · source

  32. I would like to stress, however, that that is our preliminary finding. We are still very much in the process of reviewing the components and subcomponents recovered, as well as collecting and analysing additional information on those cruise missiles. For example, we recently received confirmation that some of the cruise missile components were in fact not made by the identified manufacturers, but could have been copies. The Secretary-General intends to report back to the Security Council on our further findings. Regarding the UAVs, the Houthis in Yemen are not known to be in possession of the specific delta wing-type UAVs used in those attacks. The UAVs were found to be equipped with a type of vertical gyroscope that had been observed on an Iranian UAV reportedly recovered in Afghanistan in 2016.

    2019-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8695 (2019) · source

  33. The Houthis claimed that the attacks involved 10 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). However, the number of impact points observed by the Secretariat shows that the attacks involved a larger number, and different types, of weapons systems - which is consistent with the information provided by Saudi authorities. According to them, the attacks involved at least 18 UAVs and seven cruise missiles. In addition, since the publication of the report, the United States has shared additional information with us regarding the debris of one of the UAVs, which indicated that that UAV traversed a location about 200 kilometres north-west of Abqaiq shortly before the strike. At this time, we are unable to independently corroborate that the cruise missiles, or the recovered components we inspected, are ofIranian origin.

    2019-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8695 (2019) · source

  34. We had already indicated in our previous report (S/2019/492) that the grenade launchers found in that seizure had characteristics similar to the Iranian- produced RPG-7-type launchers, such as markings and heat shields. Further on the arms restrictive measures, the Secretariat - at the invitation of Saudi authorities - examined the debris of the weapons system used in the 14 May attack on the oil facility in Afif, the 12 June and 10 August attacks on the Abha international airport and the 14 September attack on the Saudi Aramco oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais. Although the Houthis claimed responsibility for the attacks on Abqaiq and Khurais, their announcements on the number and type of weapons systems used do not correspond to the information that we have seen.

    2019-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8695 (2019) · source

  35. Related to ballistic missiles activities, the Secretariat also received information from the United States that several shipments of hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene, a substance that can be used in solid missile fuel, were transferred to Iran in July and August 2017. We are examining that information and will update the Council accordingly. Thirdly, regarding arms-related restrictions, the Secretariat confirmed that 23 optical sights for RPG-7- type rocket propelled grenade launchers, part of a larger consignment seized in Aden in December 2018, were delivered to end-users in Iran in 2016. That suggests that those optical sights may have been transferred from Iran to Yemen after 16 January 2016, which would be inconsistent with Iran's obligations under resolution 2231 (2015).

    2019-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8695 (2019) · source

  36. Paragraph 3 of annex B calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology. France, Germany, Israel, the United Kingdom and the United States viewed the missiles reportedly launched by Iran to be category I systems under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and are therefore designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. By contrast, Iran and the Russian Federation stressed the lack of any reference to the MTCR regime in paragraph 3 of annex B. They further stated that Iran's ballistic missile activities were not inconsistent with paragraph 3, as those missiles were not designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

    2019-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8695 (2019) · source

  37. In that connection, we recall the 3 May 2018 announcement by the United States that involvement in certain nuclear-related activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B may be exposed to its national sanctions. We also note the announcement by the United States that, effective 15 December, it will terminate the sanctions waiver related to the nuclear facility at Fordow. Exemption provisions in resolution 2231 (2015) allow for the transfer of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology required for the nuclear activities of Iran under the plan, subject to the relevant notification requirements. Secondly, several Member States have provided divergent views on Iran's test-firing of ballistic missiles during the reporting period, as well as a reportedly failed launch of a space-launch vehicle in August.

    2019-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8695 (2019) · source

  38. The Secretary-General continues to call on Member States to exercise maximum restraint and prevent further escalation amid heightened tensions. I will now turn to the measures set out in annex B to the resolution, as outlined in the Secretary-General's eighth report (S/20l9/934) on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) and subsequent information obtained during the reporting period. First, on the implementation of the nuclear- related provisions, we have not received new reports on the supply, sale or transfer to Iran of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items contrary to paragraph 2 of annex B. It is vital that the procurement channel work effectively and efficiently to promote increased international engagement with Iran. All Member States and the private sector are encouraged to fully utilize and support that channel.

    2019-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8695 (2019) · source

  39. The Secretary-General encourages Member States and others to work with JCPOA participants to achieve those important goals. At the same time, Iran should carefully consider and address the concerns expressed by Member States about its activities in relation to the restrictive measures set out in annex B to the resolution. Over the course of this year, tensions in the region have, worryingly, escalated. We witnessed attacks against oil tankers, strikes against a civilian airport and a highly sophisticated and synchronized attack against oil facilities in Saudi Arabia. Combined with acrimonious rhetoric, those developments have brought the region dangerously close to a serious confrontation. Such an eventuality would be devastating and must be prevented at all costs.

    2019-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8695 (2019) · source

  40. It has taken steps related to centrifuge research and development, and commenced injecting uranium hexafluoride gas into the centrifuges at the Fordow facility. Iran has stated that all those steps are reversible and that it intends to remain in the plan. It is important that Iran return to full implementation of the plan and refrain from further steps to reduce its commitments. We welcome the initiatives of the other participants in the JCPOA, which should be given full effect as a matter of priority. In that regard, the recent decisions by Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway to join the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges are positive developments. Those actions can contribute to the goals of facilitating legitimate business with Iran and the preservation of the plan.

    2019-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8695 (2019) · source

  41. We therefore regret the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA, in May 2018, and the recent steps taken by Iran to reduce its nuclear-related commitments under the plan. Certain actions taken by the United States since its withdrawal from the plan are contrary to the goals of the plan. The reimposition of its national sanctions, lifted under the plan, as well as its decision not to extend waivers for the trade in oil with Iran and certain non-proliferation projects, may also impede the ability of Iran and other Member States to implement the plan and resolution 2231 (2015). Since July, under the monitoring of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has surpassed JCPOA-stipulated limits on its uranium enrichment level, as well as limits on its stockpiles of heavy water and low-enriched uranium.

    2019-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8695 (2019) · source

  42. Ms. DiCarlo: I thank you, Madam President, for convening today's meeting on non-proliferation, which remains a cornerstone of international peace and security and a top priority for the international community. In that regard, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA,) on the Iranian nuclear issue, and resolution 2231 (2015) are crucial to nuclear non-proliferation as well as regional and international security. We are encouraged by the broad international support for the Plan and the resolution. Their full and effective implementation is key to ensuring the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme and to securing tangible economic benefits for the Iranian people.

    2019-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8695 (2019) · source

  43. Lastly, they should provide, without delay, and through appropriate channels, a list of all places in which persons are being detained and arrange for immediate access to such locations by a neutral third party. Accountability for serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights is central to achieving and maintaining durable peace in Syria. In that regard, all parties to the conflict must cooperate fully with the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 and the Commission of Inquiry. Finally, I reiterate the Secretary-General's call for the situation in Syria to be referred to the International Criminal Court.

    2019-08-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8593 (2019) · source

  44. These calls must be heeded especially by those with influence on the Syrian parties. The United Nations stands ready to provide all necessary support. The parties must fulfil their obligations under international law to unilaterally release all the arbitrarily detained or abducted, and most urgently, women, children, the sick and the elderly. They must collect, protect, and manage all relevant data and documents on detainees, abductees and missing persons, and establish a mechanism with the ICRC to manage this information in coordination with the Office of the Special Envoy. Furthermore, they must provide families with information, identify the dead and return remains, wherever possible, to their relatives.

    2019-08-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8593 (2019) · source

  45. The releases of detainees so far, while welcome, are insufficient in scale and nowhere near commensurate with the magnitude of the problem. Only 109 have been released so far. We stress the need for the parties to move beyond one-for-one exchanges. All sides should engage in unilateral releases in the true spirit of resolution 2254 (2015). Furthermore, meetings of the working group should occur regularly and with more frequency. I urge the working group to also adopt the procedures on missing persons that have been submitted by the United Nations, and I reiterate the invitation of the United Nations to host the next meeting of the working group in Geneva. In its resolutions 2139 (2014), 2254 (2015) and 2165 (2014), the Council called for the release of those arbitrarily detained, particularly women and children.

    2019-08-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8593 (2019) · source

  46. We call on Member States to ensure that their nationals are repatriated for the purposes ofprosecution, rehabilitation or reintegration, as appropriate, and in line with international law and standards. Special Envoy Pedersen has prioritized the case of detainees, abductees and the missing. Meaningful action on this file would build confidence and move the political process forward. The Special Envoy continues to seek progress within the working group on this issue, in which the United Nations is a member, together with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an observer. Since it was established in December 2017, the working group has facilitated four exchange operations, including one last week.

    2019-08-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8593 (2019) · source

  47. The Syrian Democratic Forces have also conducted arbitrary detentions, including the arrest of men attempting to evade forced conscription. The Government of Syria claims that the number of those detained by armed groups is estimated at 16,000. However, without access to all detention centres in Syria, the United Nations cannot verify the accuracy ofthis information. Justice and accountability for those abuses must be ensured, regardless of the perpetrators. The United Nations is also concerned that thousands of foreign nationals - many women and children who are family members of alleged ISIL members - are currently being detained in the Al-Hol camp.

    2019-08-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8593 (2019) · source

  48. According to the Commission of Inquiry, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, both designated by the Council as terrorist organizations, have committed heinous abuses. Armed groups affiliated with the opposition have also committed serious abuses. They have allegedly established makeshift places of detention in different areas under their control where captured Government soldiers, suspected collaborators with the Government or members of opposing armed groups were held and sometimes executed. Reporting from human rights organizations indicates that armed opposition factions currently controlling Afrin have conducted arbitrary detention, torture and the abduction of civilians.

    2019-08-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8593 (2019) · source

  49. Those photos show nearly 7,000 dead bodies bearing marks of torture. Following the Government's reassertion of control in some areas previously held by armed groups, the United Nations has continued to receive reports of civilians arbitrarily detained or disappeared, including in areas subject to so-called reconciliation agreements. Human rights organizations have reported cases of detention and enforced disappearance of refugees who return to Syria or internally displaced persons who return to their places of origin. Surveys by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees indicate that fear of detention is among the factors preventing refugees from return. Those abuses are not limited to the Government forces.

    2019-08-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8593 (2019) · source

  50. Many women under those circumstances carry the heavy burden of sustaining their entire families. For refugees and the internally displaced, those challenges are multiplied. In paragraph 12 of its report, entitled Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic: A Way Forward, the Commission of Inquiry has documented since 2011 how the Syrian Government has, "[p]erpetrated the crimes of extermination, murder, rape or other forms of sexual violence, torture, and imprisonment in the context of its widespread and systematic detentions of dissidents, as well as those perceived to be sympathetic to armed groups". Perhaps the most prominent evidence of torture and ill-treatment of detainees in Government detention centres is the more than 50,000 photos smuggled out of Syria by a military defector and made public in 2014.

    2019-08-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8593 (2019) · source