YouSaid · the spoken record

DiCarlo

lines on the record: 1,676
first: 2008-08-08
most recent: 2023-12-18
sittings or episodes: 218
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Other resolutions require that Member States ensure that their implementation measures comply with their obligations under international law, including humanitarian and human rights laws, as applicable. It is extremely important to recall those provisions at every opportunity. Member States can further minimize the burden of additional due-diligence and reporting requirements on humanitarian actors by keeping their domestic legislation as close as possible to Security Council language. In addition, the continued monitoring by sanctions committees of the possible humanitarian impact of sanctions is vital. Their Groups of Experts may assist by gathering information about the possible unintended impact of sanctions on humanitarian activities, as appropriate.”
2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source
“In trying to abide by a wide range of applicable measures, such actors sometimes adopt an overly broad interpretation of what is required by sanctions regimes, often in contradiction with the interpretation of humanitarian actors. More can be done to reduce the possible adverse consequences of sanctions. The humanitarian community, and much of the world, warmly welcomed resolution 2615 (2021), which carves out a humanitarian exemption to the sanctions regime on Afghanistan. Similar standing exemptions in other sanctions regimes could go a long way to respond to the critical needs of civilian populations. Various Council resolutions make it clear that sanctions are, “not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian populations”.”
2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source
“De-risking policies and over-compliance are probably two of the most important problems facing humanitarian actors. Financial actors and other service providers may impose additional conditions, increase their costs or simply refuse to provide the requested goods and services, thereby inhibiting the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The continued difficulty in reviving the banking channel for humanitarian transfers to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea since its collapse in 2017 is a prime example of such challenges. Such difficulties can be compounded when financial actors and other service providers are obliged to comply with multiple sanctions regimes as well as counter-terrorism and anti-money-laundering regulations across the globe.”
2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source
“They include Sultan Zabin, the director of the criminal investigation department in Sana’a for torture and sexual violence in conflict, and Ahmed Ag Albachar, self-proclaimed president of the humanitarian commission of the Kidal region in Mali, for obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The imposition of sanctions solely for such acts is a relatively recent and welcome step. Its use sends an unmistakeable signal about the Council’s commitment to ensure accountability for violations and abuses of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The evolution from comprehensive to targeted sanctions has marked a sea change in this area of the Council’s work, but some concerns remain about unintended consequences and adverse effects of Council sanctions.”
2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source
“Almost all the sanctions regimes supporting conflict resolution now include designation, or listing, criteria intended to uphold international humanitarian law and international human rights law. They have served as leverage to bring about positive outcomes for people at risk. For example, the prospect of sanctions has opened the space for child-protection actors to negotiate the release of children by armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Importantly, more than 50 individuals and entities have been designated or put on sanctions lists by the Council or its committees for involvement in conflict- related sexual violence, the use of children in armed conflict, migrant trafficking, attacks on humanitarian workers and obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian assistance, among other international humanitarian law criteria.”
2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source
“Sanctions are continually adjusted in response to changes on the ground, with due regard for their impact on civilian populations. In recent years, the Council terminated the Eritrea sanctions and significantly narrowed down the scope of the arms embargo on the Central African Republic. On the other hand, in response to a new serious threat to peace and security in Somalia, in 2019 the Council imposed a ban on improvised explosive device components. I should also note that, in the past decade, only one Member State has reported facing special economic problems arising from Council sanctions. The past decade has also shown that sanctions can do more than limit the influx of arms and ammunition or the financing of armed groups in conflict-based situations.”
2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source
“The Committee has also granted multiple timeline extensions in recognition of the logistical challenges created by the coronavirus disease pandemic. In recent years, the Council and its sanctions committees have increasingly sought to obtain first- hand information on possible adverse consequences for civilian populations and third States. They have done so through regular briefings by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and by the Secretary-General’s Special Representatives for Children and Armed Conflict and on Sexual Violence in Conflict. Sanctions committee Chairs also regularly travel to countries under sanctions, and the committees frequently meet with country as well as neighbouring officials.”
2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source
“In the case of arms embargoes, exemptions are routinely granted for the import of non-lethal equipment necessary for humanitarian actors to operate in conflict zones. In the case of travel bans, exemptions are routinely provided for medical or religious reasons or to participate in peace processes. Exemptions to assets freezes allow payment for food, utilities and medicines. Moreover, the Security Council has instituted standing humanitarian exemptions in the Somalia and Afghanistan regimes, as well as case-by-case humanitarian exemption systems in the Libya, Yemen and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea regimes. The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), which oversees sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, has approved 85 of the 100 exemption requests received since 2017.”
2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source
“They curb the illicit exploitation of natural resources that funds the activities of armed groups in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia. They constrain the proliferation activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the terrorist threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Al-Qaida and their affiliates. United Nations sanctions are no longer the blunt instrument they once were. Since the 1990s, they have undergone considerable changes to minimize their possible adverse consequences on civilian populations and third States. The most-applied targeted measures include standardized humanitarian and other exemptions.”
2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source
“Ms. DiCarlo: I thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to address the Security Council on this important issue. Sanctions remain a vital Charter of the United Nations-based tool available to the Council to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security. As stressed when the Council last met to discuss this topic (see S/PV.8018), they are not an end in themselves. To be effective, sanctions should be a part of a comprehensive political strategy, working in tandem with political dialogue, mediation, peacekeeping and special political missions. There are currently 14 Council sanctions regimes. They support conflict resolution in Libya, Mali, South Sudan and Yemen. They aim to deter unconstitutional changes of Government in Guinea-Bissau.”
2022-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8962 (2022) · source
“Whatever one’s position may be regarding the current situation or the status quo in eastern Ukraine, this should be inconceivable. The fact that it is not should give us pause. The principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act and multiple other commitments to safeguarding regional and international peace and security are crystal clear. Any escalation or new conflict would deal another serious blow to the architecture so painstakingly built up over the past 75 years to maintain international peace and security just when we need it most. Once again, I would like to stress the Secretary- General’s appeal to all concerned to take immediate steps to de-escalate tensions and continue on the diplomatic path. The United Nations stands ready to support all efforts to that end.”
2022-01-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8960 (2022) · source
“Safe, unimpeded humanitarian access must be respected under any circumstances to provide support to the 2.9 million people in need of assistance, the majority of whom are in non-Government controlled areas. In this regard, I encourage Member States to contribute to the humanitarian response plan. Further, the Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine continues to document civilian casualties in the conflict area. No one is watching the current diplomatic efforts more than the people of Ukraine. They have endured a conflict that has taken over 14,000 lives since 2014 and that, tragically, is still far from resolution. It is painfully obvious that any new escalation in or around Ukraine would mean more needless killing and destruction.”
2022-01-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8960 (2022) · source
“It is important, especially at this time, for the international community to intensify its support for the efforts of the Normandy Four and of the Trilateral Contact Group, led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to ensure the implementation of the Minsk agreements endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 2202 (2015). We welcome the recent meeting of the Normandy Four advisers in Paris and their agreement to reconvene shortly in Berlin as another sign that diplomacy can work. We commend these efforts and those of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. Likewise, United Nations agencies in Ukraine are committed to continue delivering on their mandates in accordance with the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, humanity and independence.”
2022-01-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8960 (2022) · source
“We further urge all actors to refrain from provocative rhetoric and actions, to maximize the chance for diplomacy to succeed. Achieving mutual understanding and lasting mutually acceptable arrangements is the best way to safeguard regional and international peace and security in the interests of all. Let me repeat the full commitment of the United Nations to the sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, in accordance with relevant General Assembly resolutions.”
2022-01-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8960 (2022) · source
“The Secretary-General has made clear that there can be no alternative to diplomacy and dialogue to deal with the complex long-standing security concerns and threat perceptions that have been raised. He has expressed his strong belief that there should not be any military intervention in this context and that diplomacy should prevail. He has been equally explicit that any such intervention by one country in another would be against international law and the Charter of the United Nations. His expectation is that we all contribute to avoiding confrontation and creating conditions for diplomatic solution to end the crisis. We therefore welcome the steps taken so far by all involved to maintain dialogue. We urge and expect all actors to build on those efforts and remain focused on pursuing diplomatic solutions by engaging in good faith.”
2022-01-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8960 (2022) · source
“It is reported that more than 100,000 troops and heavy weaponry from the Russian Federation are positioned along the border with Ukraine. Unspecified numbers of Russian troops and weaponry were also reportedly being deployed to Belarus ahead of large-scale joint military exercises in February on the borders with Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic States. NATO members are reportedly planning additional deployments in Eastern European member States, and NATO has advised that 8,500 troops are currently on high alert. Accusations and recriminations among the various actors involved in the ongoing discussions have created uncertainty and apprehension for many that a military confrontation is impending.”
2022-01-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8960 (2022) · source
“Ms. DiCarlo: The United Nations is closely following the ongoing diplomatic discussions on the future of the European peace and security architecture among representatives of the Russian Federation, the United States, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. We hope that the outcome of those talks will strengthen peace and security in Europe, including for Ukraine. Although not an active participant in those exchanges, in all his contacts, the Secretary-General has unequivocally supported the ongoing diplomatic efforts at all levels. Still, we remain greatly concerned that, even as those efforts continue, tensions continue escalating in a dangerous military build-up in the heart of Europe.”
2022-01-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8960 (2022) · source
“We welcome and support the positive developments taking place across the three intra-Libyan dialogue tracks and recognize the challenges that must be overcome. We need to collectively nurture those positive steps. It is critical that the international community remain united in its support for elections, guided by the aspirations of the Libyan people, to be governed by elected institutions. As so many Libyans have told us, the way forward towards a stable and united Libya is through the ballot box, not the gun. We must stand with them.”
2022-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8952 (2022) · source
“The United Nations recorded a 30 per cent decrease in the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance, from 1.3 million at the start of 2021 to 803,000 by the year’s end. Of the 278,000 Libyans internally displaced one year ago, about 100,000 returned home in 2021. However, challenges persist in finding durable solutions for those still displaced and for returnee communities that lack basic services. Political and institutional divisions in the absence of an approved national budget resulted in limited improvements in basic infrastructure and service delivery in 2021. The humanitarian response plan for Libya, extended through May 2022, is supporting the most vulnerable and refugee and migrant populations but requires additional funding. Libya is at a delicate and fragile juncture on its path to unity and stability.”
2022-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8952 (2022) · source
“A joint UNSMIL-Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights report published in November documents the fact that hundreds of foreign nationals were expelled in recent months to the Sudan and Chad from Libya’s eastern and southern borders, without due process. In many instances, the expelled individuals were placed in extremely vulnerable situations across remote stretches of the Sahara Desert, without sufficient food, water, safety or medical care. The United Nations remains ready to work with the Libyan authorities on a long-term national response to migration and refugee management, in line with international law, to include addressing human rights concerns. I am, however, pleased to report improvements in the overall humanitarian situation in 2021.”
2022-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8952 (2022) · source
“Arbitrary detention in facilities operated by State and non-State actors continues across the country, with many detainees subjected to serious human rights abuses. According to statistics provided by the Libyan authorities, more than 12,000 detainees are being held in 27 prisons and places of detention across Libya. Thousands of additional detainees, including children, do not appear in official statistics and are held illegally, often in inhumane conditions. The situation of migrants and refugees in Libya remains highly concerning. Large numbers of migrants and refugees attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea and returned to Libya continue to be detained in inhumane and degrading conditions, with restricted humanitarian assistance. Thousands are unaccounted for.”
2022-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8952 (2022) · source
“Over the reporting period, UNSMIL documented incidents of election-related violence and attacks based on political affiliation, as well as threats and violence against members of the judiciary involved in proceedings on the eligibility of electoral candidates, and attacks against journalists, activists and individuals expressing political views. Such incidents are an obstacle to creating a conducive environment for free, fair, peaceful and credible elections. We are particularly concerned at the fact that women and men working to protect and promote women’s rights continue to be targeted by hate speech, defamation and incitement to violence. Some of the disturbing social media posts that posed a threat to the safety and security of those persons were removed after UNSMIL brought them to the attention of social media platforms.”
2022-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8952 (2022) · source
“Those welcome steps build on similar mechanisms already established with Chad, the Niger and the Sudan, which were discussed with the African Union. Meanwhile, the second group of international monitors from the UNSMIL ceasefire monitoring component deployed to Tripoli in December to replace the first group, deployed in October. Despite serious logistical and security challenges. UNSMIL continues working on the establishment of the ceasefire monitoring hub in Sirte. In that regard, we look forward to the approval by the Government of National Unity to proceed with the needed work on accommodation and office facilities in Sirte. The human rights situation in Libya remains very worrying.”
2022-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8952 (2022) · source
“Similarly, unfulfilled demands made to the Government of National Unity by the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) in western Libya recently resulted in the shutdown of oil production, causing the National Oil Corporation to declare force majeure on 20 December. Oil production was restored on 9 January following negotiations between the PFG and the Government of National Unity. As part of the efforts to implement the ceasefire agreement, the 5+5 Joint Military Commission travelled to Ankara and Moscow in December to discuss the implementation of their action plan for the withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries with Turkish and Russian authorities, including the establishment of communication and information-sharing mechanisms.”
2022-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8952 (2022) · source
“We also welcome the renewed efforts, particularly by the Presidency Council, to advance national reconciliation based on the principles of transitional justice. Together with the African Union, we remain committed to supporting a rights-based reconciliation process that should advance in parallel to the ongoing Libyan-owned and Libya-led dialogue tracks. The ceasefire has continued to hold; however, political uncertainty in the run-up to the elections negatively impacted the overall security situation, resulting in shifting alliances among armed groups affiliated with certain presidential candidates.”
2022-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8952 (2022) · source
“On the security track, there been meetings among various armed groups. The Chief of General Staff of the western military forces under the Government of National Unity and the acting General Commander of the Libyan National Army also met in Sirte, where they were joined by military chiefs and heads of military departments from both sides. On the economic track, further steps were taken towards reunification of the Central Bank of Libya based on the recommendations of the independent financial audit and of the bank completed in July last year. The Governor and Deputy Governor of the bank shared with the economic working group of the Berlin Process their agreed overview of the way forward on reunification. Those are welcome developments.”
2022-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8952 (2022) · source
“Earlier this month, the Special Adviser held talks with the authorities in Tunisia, Turkey, Egypt and the Russian Federation. She also had exchanges with the African Union, the European Union, the League of Arab States and many other international stakeholders. The Special Adviser stressed that it was critical for the international community to remain united in its support for the timely holding of presidential and parliamentary elections. Since our most recent briefing to the Council (see S/PV.8912), there have been ongoing dialogue initiatives among political, security and economic actors from across Libya. We have seen reports of consultations between the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the High State Council, as well as among presidential candidates from western and eastern Libya.”
2022-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8952 (2022) · source
“Discussion in the House of Representatives and among political actors is also increasingly focusing on the status of the Government of National Unity. Special Adviser Williams has reiterated to Libyan interlocutors that the focus of the political process should remain on the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections, to be held in the shortest possible time frame. In all her meetings, the Special Adviser highlighted the 2.8 million Libyans who have registered to vote. She called on all stakeholders to respect the will of the Libyan people. She also encouraged them to continue to focus on the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections as soon as possible and to adhere to the timeline agreed to in the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum road map, which was endorsed by the Security Council.”
2022-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8952 (2022) · source
“Since her arrival in Libya on 12 December, the Special Adviser has undertaken wide-ranging consultations in Tripoli, Benghazi, Misratah and Sirte. She has met members of the Presidency Council, the Government of National Unity, the High National Election Commission, the House of Representatives, the High State Council and the Supreme Judicial Council, as well as candidates for the presidential and parliamentary elections. She has also consulted with relevant political, security and civil society actors from across the country. Clearly, Libyan stakeholders hold different views regarding the path that can take the country to free, fair, inclusive and credible national elections and a peaceful transition.”
2022-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8952 (2022) · source
“In response, on 28 December 2021, the House of Representatives established a road map committee to elaborate a new political path towards national elections. On 17 and 18 January, the Speaker of the House of Representatives convened Parliament and announced that the new road map would define the timetable and process for the holding of elections in coordination with relevant institutions. The road map committee is delivering its preliminary report today and the Parliament is expected to deliberate on it today or tomorrow. On 5 December 2021, the Secretary-General appointed Ms. Stephanie Williams as his Special Adviser on Libya. The Special Adviser is working closely with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), as well as with Libyan regional and international stakeholders.”
2022-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8952 (2022) · source
“Ms. DiCarlo: I thank you, Madam President, for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the latest developments in Libya. Since the last briefing to the Council on 24 November 2021 (see S/PV.8912), growing polarization among political actors in disputes over key aspects of the electoral process ultimately resulted in the postponement of the 24 December elections, despite the advanced stage of technical preparations by the High National Election Commission. In announcing the postponement, the Commission cited shortcomings in the legal framework for the elections, contradicting court rulings on candidacies, and political and security concerns. The Commission referred the matter to the House of Representatives.”
2022-01-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8952 (2022) · source
“In recent days, both Iran and the United States have again affirmed their seriousness in seeking to return to the full implementation of the JCPOA. The Secretary-General is encouraged by these pledges and calls on both countries to expeditiously translate those commitments into a mutually acceptable agreement. He is grateful to the other Joint Commission participants for their continued diplomatic efforts and urges them to maintain an environment conducive to the continuation and completion of the talks in Vienna. In closing, I would like to thank Her Excellency Ms. Geraldine Byrne Nason, Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I would also like to thank the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for his continued cooperation.”
2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source
“The Secretariat also had the opportunity to examine the debris of an alleged Iranian UAV that was intercepted by the Israel Defense Forces as it entered Israeli airspace via the Jordanian border. Israeli authorities believe that this UAV was launched from either Iraq or Syria. The Secretariat is still analysing the information collected and will report back to the Council on these issues in due course, as appropriate. Finally, on the asset-freeze provisions, the Secretariat received information from a Member State regarding financial and commercial activities of two individuals and one entity on the list established pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), which may be inconsistent with the asset freeze. The Secretariat is currently analysing the information received and will report back to the Council, as appropriate.”
2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source
“Thirdly, the Secretariat received information from Saudi Arabia and Israel related to paragraph 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), which pertains to the supply, sale or transfer to or from the Islamic Republic of Iran of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in document S/2015/546. That document includes ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicle systems (UAVs)with a range of 300 kilometres or more, including target and reconnaissance drones, and cruise missiles. The Secretariat has examined the debris of six ballistic missiles, one cruise missile and several UAVs used in various attacks against Saudi Arabia. Saudi authorities believe that those weapons systems had been transferred to Houthi fighters in Yemen in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015).”
2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source
“Secondly, with regard to the ballistic-missile-related provisions of the resolution, France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States provided information to the Secretary-General and the Security Council concerning a ballistic missile launch in May and two space-launch vehicle tests by the Islamic Republic of Iran in June. The information provided reflects divergent views among those Member States as to whether those launches are inconsistent with paragraph 3 of the resolution.”
2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source
“During the reporting period, the Secretariat received information regarding the possible transfer of nuclear-related dual-use items to the Islamic Republic of Iran. In one instance, the Secretariat confirmed that items exported from Germany were not on the list of dual-use items contained in resolution 2231 (2015) and therefore did not require Council approval before their transfer. In another instance, an individual was charged in Norway with providing technical assistance to four researchers from the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding an item on the dual-use items list contained in resolution 2231 (2015). The trial in that case is pending and scheduled for 2022.”
2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source
“We also call on Member States and the private sector to engage in trade with the Islamic Republic of Iran and to utilize available arrangements, such as the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges, the procurement channel provided for in resolution 2231 (2015) and the Swiss Humanitarian Trade Arrangement, as appropriate. I will now turn to the measures set out in annex B to the resolution, as outlined in the Secretary-General’s twelfth report on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015)(S/2021/995). First, on the nuclear-related provisions, no new proposals have been submitted over the past six months to the procurement channel. The Security Council, however, has received eight notifications submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B for certain nuclear- related activities consistent with the Plan.”
2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source
“Most recently, the Agency stressed that in the absence of regular access to its verification and monitoring equipment, as agreed to under the Plan, it is now becoming a significant challenge for the Agency to restore its continuity of knowledge concerning Iran’s nuclear activities. The Plan and resolution 2231 (2015) support our common objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and regional and international security. In that regard, the bilateral and multilateral initiatives to improve relationships with the Islamic Republic Iran are positive developments. It is important for the Islamic Republic of Iran to address concerns raised by participants in the Plan and by other Member States in relation to resolution 2231 (2015).”
2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source
“That exceeds the limit agreed to in the JCPOA, which is a total enriched uranium stockpile of 202.8 kilograms enriched up to 3.67 per cent uranium-235. Moreover, on 1 December, the Agency reported that the Islamic Republic of Iran had also begun uranium enrichment using advanced centrifuges at the Fordow fuel enrichment plant. Furthermore, the Agency has reported that its verification and monitoring activities have been seriously undermined as a result of Iran’s decision to stop the implementation of its nuclear- related commitments under the JCPOA, including the Additional Protocol.”
2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source
“Waiver extensions are also required for the transfer of enriched uranium out of the Islamic Republic of Iran in exchange for natural uranium. We also call on the Islamic Republic of Iran to reverse the steps it has taken that are not consistent with its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan. In this reporting period, the International Atomic Energy Agency indicated that Iran has continued its research and development activities related to uranium metal production. While the Agency has not been able to verify the stockpile of enriched uranium in the Islamic Republic of Iran, it estimates a total enriched uranium stockpile of 2,489.7 kilograms, including 113.8 kilograms enriched up to 20 per cent and 17.7 kilograms enriched up to 60 per cent uranium-235, respectively.”
2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source
“The Secretary-General hopes that in their current negotiations, the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran will mobilize the same spirit and commitment that resulted in the JCPOA. There is simply no viable alternative to the full and effective implementation of the Plan and the resolution. In this regard, together with the Secretary-General, I appeal to the United States to lift or waive its sanctions, as outlined in the Plan, and extend the waivers regarding the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Also important is the extension of United States waivers regarding certain civilian nuclear-related activities taking place at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, the Fordow facility and the Arak reactor.”
2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source
“Ms. DiCarlo: I thank you, Mr. President, for the invitation to brief the Council on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and resolution 2231 (2015). On 29 November, diplomatic efforts on the JCPOA resumed in Vienna. The status of the negotiations indicate that the full restoration of the Plan and the resolution will require additional effort and patience. I recall that the JCPOA itself was the result of more than a decade of determined diplomacy. The endeavour, however, was worth it. The Plan, together with resolution 2231 (2015), is widely regarded as a cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and an example of what dialogue and diplomacy can achieve.”
2021-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8930 (2021) · source
“At the ceremony to mark his new mandate last month, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali spoke of his Government’s commitment to resolving the ongoing challenges and his intention to launch a national dialogue. The urgency for such an inclusive initiative has never been greater. In conclusion, let me stress that the United Nations is steadfastly committed to staying and delivering in Ethiopia, in support of all the people of the country. We continue our work there, including thanks to the dedication of our Ethiopian national staff, who must be provided full protection by national authorities, regardless of their background. Ethiopia, a founding member of the United Nations, needs our support. We urge Ethiopians to come together to build a shared, prosperous future before it is too late.”
2021-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8899 (2021) · source
“They have also called for negotiations on a lasting ceasefire and for the creation of conditions for an inclusive Ethiopian dialogue to resolve the crisis and create the foundation for peace and stability throughout the country. The Secretary-General has been in frequent contact with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali, urging restraint and dialogue and offering his good offices. Furthermore, the Secretary-General has offered President Obasanjo the full support of the United Nations for his efforts to resolve the conflict. United Nations colleagues on the ground continue to urge all sides to the conflict to show restraint and provide unfettered access to vulnerable populations. The recently concluded elections in Ethiopia demonstrated the people’s commitment to the democratic process.”
2021-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8899 (2021) · source
“High Commissioner Bachelet highlighted in her remarks last week that incidents of serious human rights violations have continued. More recently, incidents of hate speech and targeting of ethnic groups have increased at an alarming rate. In that regard, the Security Council’s call on 5 November for refraining from inflammatory speech and incitement to violence is welcome and timely. There must be an immediate cessation of hostilities. That has been the call of the Secretary-General, African Union Commission Chair Faki, Intergovernmental Authority on Development Executive Secretary Workneh Gebeyehu, the leader of Ethiopia’s key neighbour Kenya President Uhuru Kenyatta and the Security Council.”
2021-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8899 (2021) · source
“The report concludes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that all parties to the conflict, including the Ethiopian National Defence Forces, the Eritrean Defence Forces, the Amhara Special Forces and allied militia on one side and Tigrayan forces on the other, committed violations of international human rights law, humanitarian law and refugee law, to include attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, indiscriminate attacks resulting in civilian casualties and extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary detentions, sexual and gender-based violence and forced displacement. The report states that war crimes and crimes against humanity may have been committed. It also outlines steps that should be taken to ensure accountability for those acts.”
2021-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8899 (2021) · source
“Emergency Relief Coordinator Martin Griffiths travelled to Ethiopia over the weekend to review Ethiopia’s increasing needs and plan for a greater humanitarian response, should the fighting continue, as is feared. Unfettered access to conflict areas remains key. Last week, the report of the joint Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights- Ethiopian Human Rights Commission investigation into the conflict in Tigray, covering the period between November 2020 and June 2021, shed light on the horrific suffering civilians have endured.”
2021-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8899 (2021) · source
“A lack of access means that humanitarian organizations have had to scale back core, life-saving activities, including water trucking, food distributions, mobile clinics and support for acutely malnourished children and mothers. Needs and protection concerns are also rapidly escalating in the Amhara and Afar regions, with large numbers of people fleeing their homes as the fighting continues to expand. Let us recall that this expanding crisis is happening in a country that was already grappling with enormous humanitarian challenges, including local conflicts, flooding, drought and infectious disease outbreaks. While needs are most acute in the north, across Ethiopia as a whole more than 20 million people are estimated to need some form of humanitarian support. More than 5 million people are internally displaced.”
2021-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8899 (2021) · source
“Just in northern Ethiopia today, more than 7 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. Efforts to mobilize assistance in Tigray, where more than 5 million people need food and an estimated 400,000 people are living in famine-like conditions, continue to be undermined by an inability to move cash, fuel and supplies into the region. No aid trucks have reached Mekelle since 18 October amid continued air strikes. United Nations Humanitarian Air Service flights have remained suspended since air strikes on 22 October forced a flight to return to Addis Ababa. We have been unable to move fuel into Tigray since August. While some emergency supplies have been moved, it has been four months since the last major shipment of medicines and health supplies into Tigray.”
2021-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8899 (2021) · source
“Elsewhere, insecurity in the Oromia region continues to worsen, while the situation in parts of the Benishangul-Gumuz region remains tense. There has been much speculation concerning how the crisis will unfold over the coming weeks. In a country of more 110 million people, 90 different ethnic groups and 80 languages, no one can predict what continued fighting and insecurity will bring. But let me clear: what is certain is that the risk of Ethiopia descending into widening civil war is only too real. That would bring about a humanitarian catastrophe and consume the future of such an important country. The political repercussions of intensifying violence in the wider region would be immense, compounding the many crises besetting the Horn of Africa.”
2021-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8899 (2021) · source