YouSaid · the spoken record

DiCarlo

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1,676
first
2008-08-08
most recent
2023-12-18
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218
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un-security-council

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  1. As the Secretary-General has consistently underlined, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a blatant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. The United Nations remains fully committed to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions. The parties involved have the responsibility to avoid actions that could further escalate tensions. In particular, any threat to use nuclear weapons is utterly unacceptable, as is jeopardizing the safety and security of nuclear power plants and other critical infrastructure. In recent days, experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency have heard a series of explosions apparently taking place some distance from the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  2. On 27 June, Russian missiles hit the city of Kramatorsk, reportedly killing 11 people, including 14-year-old twin sisters. At least 60 others were injured. On 6 July, bombardments hit Kyiv, Odesa and Lviv, which are far from the front lines. On 8 July, Russian artillery shelling reportedly killed at least eight civilians and wounded 13 in Lyman. And communities in the Sumy region continue to be under constant Russian shelling. Civilians in areas under Russian control also face mortal danger. On 9 July, four civilians were killed and many more injured while receiving humanitarian aid in the town of Orikhiv, in the Zaporizhzhya region. Attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure, wherever they occur, are indefensible and strictly prohibited under international law. They must cease immediately.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  3. Ms. DiCarlo: More than 500 days after the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, life in Ukraine remains a living hell, as the Secretary-General has characterized it. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 9,287 civilians have been killed and 16,384 injured, most of them under fire from Russian armed forces. That statistic includes 537 children killed and 1,117 injured. And those are only the confirmed statistics. The actual number of victims is likely considerably higher. Children have been particularly hard hit by the conflict. Ukraine was the country with the highest number of children killed and maimed in 2022 and with the most attacks on schools and hospitals. Nowhere is safe in Ukraine.

    2023-07-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9380 (2023) · source

  4. Vanessa Frazier for her leadership as Facilitator for resolution 2231 (2015), as well as the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission, for our continued cooperation.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9367 (2023) · source

  5. The Secretariat also received an invitation from the Government of Yemen to examine the debris of a cruise missile used in an attack by the Houthis on the Al-Dabba oil terminal last November. The Secretariat is still analysing the available information. Finally, the Secretariat did not receive any official information alleging actions inconsistent with the assets-freeze provisions of the resolution. Eight years after the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and its endorsement by the Council, we remain convinced that the Plan is the best available option for ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, as well as for enabling Iran to reach its full economic potential. In closing, I would like to thank Her Excellency Mrs.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9367 (2023) · source

  6. France, Germany, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States have also reiterated their request, in letters to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council and in statements to the Council and the media, for the Secretariat to examine the debris of those UAVS, in Kyiv or any other suitable location. Noting that the accusations were not substantiated by evidence, the Permanent Representatives of Iran and the Russian Federation disputed the imagery and evidence of the UAVs provided by the United Kingdom and Ukraine, as well as the claim by France, Germany, Ukraine and the United Kingdom that Iran had transferred UAVs to the Russian Federation in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). The Secretariat will continue to examine the available information.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9367 (2023) · source

  7. We also received letters from Ukraine, France, Germany and the United Kingdom concerning alleged transfers of unmanned aerial vehicles from Iran to the Russian Federation, in a manner inconsistent with paragraph 4 of annex B. The United Kingdom and Ukraine also provided photographs and their analyses of the UAVs recovered in Ukraine. The two countries assessed the devices to be of Iranian types Shahed-131, Shahed-136 and Mohajer-6, and that they had been transferred by the Islamic Republic of Iran in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). Their assessment was based on comparison with debris of other UAV attacks in the Middle East and with imagery of Iranian UAVs available via open sources.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9367 (2023) · source

  8. The United Kingdom shared imagery of the seized components and its analysis that the components were of Iranian origin and transferred in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231 (2015). The Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom conveyed their view that some of the seized components are controlled items listed in the document S/2015/546 and that their transfer without prior approval of the Council was therefore inconsistent with the resolution. In their responses, Iran and the Russian Federation stated that there was no evidence linking the intercepted vessel and its cargo to Iran, and no clear indication that the seized components were of Iranian origin. We continue to analyse the available information.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9367 (2023) · source

  9. Thirdly, we examined information related to paragraph 4 of annex B. That paragraph pertains to the supply, sale or transfer to or from Iran of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as set out in Council document S/2015/546, which require prior approval of the Council. It includes the list of complete delivery systems and subsystems, as well as the associated components and equipment, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and other unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems with a range of 300 kilometres or more. During the reporting period, we received information from the United Kingdom about ballistic missile parts seized by the British Royal Navy in February 2023 in international waters in the Gulf of Oman.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9367 (2023) · source

  10. The renewal by the United States of waivers with respect to certain nuclear non-proliferation projects foreseen in the Plan and the nuclear-related provisions in annex B for another 180- day period was an important step. Secondly, regarding the ballistic missile-related provisions, France, Germany, Iran, Israel, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom provided information to the Secretary-General and the Council concerning a test flight of a space launch vehicle conducted by Iran in March of this year. We also received information from the same Member States about the testing and unveiling of two new ballistic missiles by Iran in May and June, respectively. The letters received from Member States continue to reflect the divergent views as to whether that launch and missile developments are inconsistent with the resolution.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9367 (2023) · source

  11. It estimates that Iran now has a total enriched uranium stockpile of more than 20 times the allowable amount under the JCPOA. That includes increased quantities of uranium enriched to 20 per cent and 60 per cent. Such a stockpile of enriched uranium is of serious concern. I now turn to the restrictive measures set out in annex B, as outlined in the Secretary-General’s fifteenth report on resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2023/473). First, on the nuclear-related provisions, no new proposals were submitted to the procurement channel in the past six months. The Council, however, received 10 notifications, submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B, for certain nuclear-related activities consistent with the Plan.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9367 (2023) · source

  12. In a welcome development, in March of this year, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran issued a joint statement to expedite the resolution of outstanding safeguards issues and to allow the IAEA to implement further appropriate verification and monitoring and reporting activities. In its report of May 2023, the IAEA reported that, in line with that joint statement, it had installed surveillance cameras at workshops where centrifuge parts are manufactured. The Agency added that it had no further questions regarding the presence of high-enriched uranium detected at one location. That encouraging step notwithstanding, we are alarmed that the Agency remains unable to verify the stockpile of enriched uranium in the country.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9367 (2023) · source

  13. Diplomacy is the only way to effectively address the Iranian nuclear issue. It is essential that all parties renew the dialogue as quickly as possible and reach an agreement on the outstanding issues. In that context, I reiterate the Secretary-General’s appeal to the United States to lift or waive its sanctions, as outlined in the Plan, and to extend waivers with regard to the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran. And I echo his call on Iran to reverse the steps it has taken that are not consistent with its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan. It is also important for Iran to address concerns raised by participants in the Plan and by other Member States in relation to annex B to resolution 2231 (2015).

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9367 (2023) · source

  14. Ms. DiCarlo: I thank you, Madam President, for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). The conclusion of the Plan and its endorsement by the Council eight years ago were the result of intensive negotiations to achieve the common objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and regional security, in a manner that delivers tangible economic benefits for the Iranian people. When I last briefed the Council on this issue (see S/PV.9225), in December 2022, all participants in the Plan and the United States had reaffirmed that a return to the full and effective implementation of the Plan was the only viable option to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. Six months later, negotiations to restore the Plan remain stalled.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9367 (2023) · source

  15. The United Nations stands ready to support all meaningful efforts to bring a just and sustainable peace to Ukraine. We are guided in that by the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, as the Secretary- General emphasized during his visit to Ukraine in March and as I reiterated last week in Moscow. This war has created a humanitarian and human rights catastrophe, traumatized a generation of children and accelerated the global food and energy crises. It has weakened the international collective security system that we have all pledged to uphold. We cannot discount further dangerous knock-on effects. An end to the war, founded on international law and the Charter, is the surest way to ensure that the tremendous suffering of the past 16 months will cease.

    2023-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9357 (2023) · source

  16. The United Nations is also fully committed to supporting the implementation of the memorandum of understanding on Russian food and fertilizer exports. Before war began, we consistently warned about the impact of a major conflict in Ukraine and the effect it could have on the region and beyond. The recent developments are not assuring in that regard. The announced deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, for example, and the accompanying rhetoric, have further increased regional tensions. We urge all involved to act responsibly and in accordance with international obligations. We reiterate that any threat to use nuclear weapons is unacceptable. As the conflict has intensified, there have also been increased diplomatic efforts and initiatives by Member States seeking de-escalation and calling for a peaceful settlement.

    2023-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9357 (2023) · source

  17. Accountability for all violations of international law, international humanitarian law and human rights law remains of paramount importance. Since its signing in July last year, the Black Sea Grain Initiative has enabled the safe transportation of more than 32 million metric tons of foodstuffs, helping to drive down global food prices. More than half of what has been exported has gone to developing countries. We are, however, disappointed by the slowing pace of the implementation of the Initiative. Food exports through the maritime humanitarian corridor have dropped from a peak of 4.2 million metric tons in October 2022 to 1.3 million metric tonnes in May, the lowest since the Initiative began. We urge that all obstacles be removed to ensure the continuation of the agreement.

    2023-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9357 (2023) · source

  18. To date, OHCHR has documented 158 cases of conflict-related sexual violence, with the majority committed by members of Russia’s armed forces or its penitentiary system personnel. We remain deeply concerned about the cases of forcible transfers of protected persons, including children, to areas of Ukraine under Russian control, and their consequent deportation to Russia. That critical issue, which is affecting the most vulnerable, needs to be addressed urgently, prioritizing the reunification of families. Separately, we welcome the continued efforts by the parties to enable the return of prisoners of war and urge both sides to fulfil their obligations regarding the treatment of prisoners of war and other detainees.

    2023-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9357 (2023) · source

  19. We urge the Russian authorities to act in accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian law and to ensure safe and unfettered access to all areas in need. Aid cannot be denied to people who need it. We are also concerned about the reported damage to the Togliatti-Odesa pipeline, the world’s largest ammonia conduit, in Ukraine’s Kharkiv region. The circumstances of the incident remain unclear. Let me say it again. Attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure are prohibited under international law. All such attacks must stop immediately, whether they are on Ukrainian, Russian or Russian-controlled territory. The United Nations continues to monitor and report on human rights violations and to support efforts toward accountability.

    2023-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9357 (2023) · source

  20. Any threat to the plant or other sensitive infrastructure is dangerous and unacceptable. As part of its immediate response to the incident, the United Nations and its humanitarian partners have rushed to deliver supplies and evacuation support for hundreds of thousands in the affected area. The United Nations country team has been fully mobilized in that vital effort, in close cooperation with the Ukrainian authorities and local partners. We are deeply disturbed by reports that evacuating civilians and emergency personnel have been shelled. There are still people we are unable to reach, especially in low-lying communities under Russian control. The Russian Federation has so far declined our request to go into those areas. The United Nations will continue to seek the necessary access.

    2023-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9357 (2023) · source

  21. Concerns continue to mount about the possibility that the floodwaters could shift landmines into previously cleared areas, further endangering lives. Damaged sewer systems and a lack of clean water heighten the risk of waterborne diseases. Inundated farmland is a further blow to the already beleaguered agriculture and food-production sector. The United Nations is already engaged in assessing the extent of the environmental and ecological needs resulting from this human-made catastrophe. As reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant is planning to resume pumping water that remains accessible, despite a major loss of volume in the Kakhovka reservoir. However, the safety and security situation at the plant is extremely fragile.

    2023-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9357 (2023) · source

  22. Additionally, UNESCO has verified damage to 260 sites since February 2022, including 112 religious sites, 22 museums, 94 buildings of historic significance, 19 monuments, 12 libraries and one archive. The most significant destruction of civilian infrastructure to date took place on 6 June, when the Kakhovka dam was damaged. While the exact circumstances remain unclear, it is a catastrophe that will have massive adverse consequences. Some 80 communities along the Dnipro River were reportedly flooded, with tens of thousands of people directly affected. Dozens have lost their lives. The Kakhovka reservoir — one of Europe’s largest, and a source of drinking water for at least 700,000 people — has lost 70 per cent of its capacity, according to Ukrainian authorities.

    2023-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9357 (2023) · source

  23. That means that since my previous briefing, 2,131 civilians have been confirmed killed. The actual figures are likely considerably higher. Since February 2022, OHCHR has also verified a total of 1,036 attacks affecting educational and medical facilities, of which 649 occurred on territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine, 301 on territory occupied by the Russian Federation and 86 on territory that was contested at the time of the attack. The World Health Organization has verified more than 1,000 cases of attacks on health- care objects, causing 101 deaths and 139 injuries. Of those, 898 incidents affected health-care facilities and 273, health supplies. Most of the attacks involved the use of heavy weapons.

    2023-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9357 (2023) · source

  24. Ms. DiCarlo: As we are all only too aware, the killing, destruction and suffering continue unabated in Ukraine. Sixteen months since the beginning of the full- scale Russian invasion, the prospects for peace remain desperately dim. Indeed, since the last time I briefed the Council on Ukraine (see S/PV.9243), the war has escalated and become more fluid and unpredictable. The impact of the intensifying violence on civilians remains our gravest concern. Russian missile barrages and drone attacks across Ukraine nearly tripled in May. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has recorded 24,862 civilian casualties to date. The breakdown is as follows — 9,083 civilians killed, including 530 children, and 15,779 injured, including 1,086 children.

    2023-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9357 (2023) · source

  25. And, as always, we stand ready to work closely with the League on various mediation efforts in the region, through joint, coordinated and focused action. Next year, we will organize our sixteenth United Nations — League of Arab States General Cooperation Meeting to review our biennial framework, take stock of our accomplishments and open new avenues for cooperation. That meeting will bring together all departments, agencies, funds and programmes of our two systems, acknowledging the significance of the peace-humanitarian-development nexus. We are committed to meeting our common challenges and seizing the opportunities before us, in the Arab world and beyond. Together, we can achieve what neither organization could achieve on its own.

    2023-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9343 (2023) · source

  26. As highlighted in the Secretary-General’s report, we also continue supporting, through the United Nations Liaison Office to the League of Arab States and in close cooperation with UN-Women, the League’s efforts to implement resolution 1325 (2000), the Arab Women Mediators Network and the action plan for women and peace and security in the Arab region. Those are but a few examples of how our ongoing cooperation deepens and expands to address new and emerging priorities, including through the United Nations Liaison Office to the League of Arab States. The Office continues to strengthen our communication and cooperation, while facilitating regular contact between United Nations special envoys and the League.

    2023-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9343 (2023) · source

  27. That involved a consultative process that enabled the voices of more than 300 young people from 13 countries to be heard, achieving a level of outreach and public engagement unimaginable not so long ago. We are now looking at the ways the United Nations can support the implementation of that strategy. We encourage the League’s member States to use it to guide regional, subregional and national implementation of resolution 2250 (2015) and other relevant aspects of the youth, peace and security agenda.

    2023-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9343 (2023) · source

  28. We will continue to work with all, as the United Nations facilitates a Syrian-led, Syrian-owned political process, but we cannot do that alone. We need the support of all key actors, in particular the member States of the League. The Arab region faces a range of urgent challenges related to peace and security, development and climate change. But the region also possesses immense potential, particularly in its young women and men. Sixty per cent of the population is under 30 years old. Together, we continue to encourage Member States to engage with and invest in Arab youth. That is not only the right thing to do, but it is also the sensible thing to do for the region’s future. Earlier this year, we supported the League in the development of an Arab regional youth, peace and security strategy.

    2023-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9343 (2023) · source

  29. With regard to Syria, we take note of Arab meetings in Amman and Jeddah and the resolution adopted at the Jeddah summit, which reflected the importance of resolution 2254 (2015), the only internationally agreed road map for resolving the Syrian conflict. If the renewed regional attention on Syria is translated into action, we could see momentum build towards a negotiated political settlement of the conflict. Addressing the fate of the detained, the disappeared and the missing is essential to moving closer to sustainable peace. We call on all parties to take meaningful steps to that end. We urge Member States to support the establishment of an institution dedicated to the missing. Regarding refugees, protection concerns need to be addressed more visibly, transparently and systematically.

    2023-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9343 (2023) · source

  30. Among other decisions, we welcomed the Summit’s resolution on developments in Libya, which is a demonstration of the League’s engagement on the issue, including as a member of the Libya quartet, together with the United Nations. We especially commend the League’s expression of support for the ongoing United Nations efforts to find a political solution for Libya. In the coming weeks and months, the international community will need to remain united behind ensuring the holding of elections in Libya by the end of 2023. Libyans want to elect their leaders, restore legitimacy to their institutions and halt the cycle of endless political transitions. They have already had to wait too long to do so.

    2023-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9343 (2023) · source

  31. The Agency plays a critical role for Palestinian refugees and regional stability. The World Food Programme also needs immediate financial support to continue vital assistance to Palestinians. We share a common goal with the League, which is a two-State solution that realizes the legitimate national aspirations of Palestinians and Israelis, in line with international law and United Nations resolutions. That is the only path to sustainable peace between the two peoples. We followed the outcomes of the 19 May League of Arab States Summit closely, noting that many of the resolutions that were adopted highlighted issues of mutual interest, as well as our ongoing cooperation in numerous areas.

    2023-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9343 (2023) · source

  32. Last month we witnessed yet another devastating escalation in Gaza, with tragic loss of life on both sides and further damage to fragile infrastructure. Tensions also continue to simmer, and indeed to regularly boil over, in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Unilateral actions, including settlement expansion and violence against Israeli and Palestinian civilians, continue to undermine our collective efforts to realize a two-State solution. The acute financial and institutional challenges facing the Palestinian Authority and the lack of progress on advancing intra-Palestinian unity and the holding of general elections must all be addressed. I also want to echo the Secretary-General’s call to ensure full funding for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

    2023-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9343 (2023) · source

  33. Furthermore, the Sudanese Armed Forces announced the suspension of their participation in the talks, citing the Rapid Support Forces’ violations of the ceasefire. It is critical that the parties remain committed to the ceasefire agreement, but that will not be enough. We need a permanent cessation of hostilities and eventually a resumption of the political process. In that regard, we commend the League, the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the Sudan’s other partners for their efforts to support peace in the Sudan. It is essential to coordinate our various efforts if we are to maximize our impact in support of the Sudanese people. The role of the region will be key to ending the conflict. The situation in the occupied Palestinian territory keeps deteriorating.

    2023-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9343 (2023) · source

  34. As the Secretary-General reminds us in his report (S/2023/331), cooperation with the League of Arab States, consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, serves to enhance collective security. In the report, the Secretary-General reviews the areas of cooperation and engagement of our two organizations across the region. Today I would like to highlight the issues of common concern and some additional developments since the report was prepared. With regard to the Sudan, where fighting is devastating the lives of civilians and destroying the country’s future, the Jeddah agreement brokered on 20 May by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States gave rise to much hope. Unfortunately, the parties have failed to implement it.

    2023-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9343 (2023) · source

  35. Ms. DiCarlo: I am pleased to have the opportunity to address the Security Council on our cooperation with the League of Arab States. And I am honoured to be speaking alongside His Excellency Mr. Aboul Gheit, Secretary-General of the League. In recent years, multilateralism has come under great strain. Trust in institutions and processes has been sorely tested, most recently by the uneven response to the coronavirus disease crisis. Defiance of international law and the norms that bind us is making international and regional cooperation to maintain peace and security ever more difficult. In such a fraught context, it is heartening that the relationship between the United Nations and the League remains robust.

    2023-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9343 (2023) · source

  36. We reiterate our call on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to allow the unimpeded entry of international staff, including the Resident Coordinator, and of humanitarian supplies, in order to enable a timely and effective response. Let me close by stressing that the Secretary- General remains firmly committed to achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. He welcomes the recent reaffirmation by the Republic of Korea of its commitment to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

    2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9336 (2023) · source

  37. However, the lack of unity and action in the Security Council is doing little to slow the negative trajectory on the Korean peninsula. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is unconstrained, and other parties are compelled to focus on military deterrence. I would like to highlight once again our concerns regarding the humanitarian situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The United Nations is ready to assist the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in addressing the basic needs of its vulnerable populations. We welcomed the return of diplomats from one Member State to Pyongyang on 27 March.

    2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9336 (2023) · source

  38. Separately, we have been following reports that illicit cyberactivities attributed to actors affiliated with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continue. According to the final report of the Panel of Experts submitted pursuant to resolution 2627 (2022), actors affiliated with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea stole more in cryptocurrency in 2022 than ever before. Key peace and security issues, such as the situation on the Korean peninsula, must be an area for cooperation. We welcomed the Security Council’s commitment, as expressed in resolution 2397 (2017), to a peaceful, comprehensive, diplomatic and political solution to the situation on the Korean peninsula. Diplomacy, not isolation, is the only way forward.

    2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9336 (2023) · source

  39. It should be recalled that developing a military reconnaissance satellite was part of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s five-year military development plan. That plan was unveiled during the eighth Party Congress, in January 2021, well before the resumption of military exercises in the region. In line with its five-year plan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea greatly increased its missile launch activities in 2022 and 2023, including more than 80 launches using ballistic missile technology. Pyongyang characterized those launches as involving systems with nuclear weapon roles, including so-called tactical nuclear weapons. Further, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has continued to make references to the possible use of nuclear weapons since our most recent briefing (see S/PV.9305).

    2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9336 (2023) · source

  40. He called on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to refrain from conducting further satellite launches using such technology and to swiftly resume dialogue to achieve the goal of sustainable peace and the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The last time the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea conducted a similar launch was on 7 February 2016. In its resolution 2270 (2016), the Security Council condemned that launch, in which ballistic missile technology was used, in violation of relevant resolutions. On 29 May, the Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea justified the need for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to launch a military reconnaissance satellite as a response to ongoing military exercises in the region.

    2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9336 (2023) · source

  41. Other international organizations, including the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Telecommunication Union were not notified. As the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea affirms, it is the right of a sovereign State to launch a satellite and to benefit from space activities. However, Council resolutions expressly prohibit the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from conducting any launches using ballistic missile technology. On 30 May, the Secretary-General strongly condemned the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s satellite launch using ballistic missile technology.

    2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9336 (2023) · source

  42. Ms. DiCarlo: At 6.37 a.m. local time on 31 May, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea launched what it described as a military reconnaissance satellite from the Sohae Satellite Launching Station. The rocket crashed off the Korean peninsula’s western coast after losing thrust following the separation of its first and second stages. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea attributed the failure of the launch to the low reliability of an unspecified new type of engine system and fuel. Official media said the country would conduct a second launch as soon as possible. On 30 May, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea sent a prelaunch notification to the International Maritime Organization.

    2023-06-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9336 (2023) · source

  43. As the Secretary- General has stated, concrete action on this long-standing issue will address a critical gap in the international peace and security architecture and bolster the efforts of the African Union to tackle peace and security challenges on the continent.

    2023-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9329 (2023) · source

  44. That process would reassure the Council that a given situation has been systematically reviewed by all the relevant entities. It would therefore help the Council decide whether assessed contributions can be mandated. The report presents the joint mission model and the support packages delivered by the United Nations as the two most practical options for ensuring the funding that AU-led operations need. That support would be authorized on a case-by-case basis. The case for adequately financing AU-led peace support operations is beyond solid. We are therefore hopeful that the Security Council will agree to provide its backing, including by allowing access to United Nations assessed contributions.

    2023-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9329 (2023) · source

  45. Most notably, the AU has worked to address the financial challenge of its operations, including by committing to increase its own financial contributions by revitalizing its AU Peace Fund. The AU, in cooperation with the United Nations and the European Union, also moved to develop and operationalize a compliance framework to meet international human rights and humanitarian law obligations, as well as conduct and discipline standards. AU peace operations should be considered as part of the range of responses to crises in Africa alongside established United Nations mechanisms. The report in front of Council members outlines a standardized consultative planning and mandating process, through which the United Nations, the AU and subregional configurations can assess together the required response to an emerging crisis.

    2023-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9329 (2023) · source

  46. Recognizing that common challenge, the Security Council expressed, in resolution 2378 (2017), its intention to further consider practical steps to establish a mechanism through which AU peace operations could be partly financed through United Nations assessed contributions on a case-by- case basis. The Council has before it today a report of the Secretary-General (S/2023/303) with recommendations on securing such support for AU-led operations mandated by the Security Council and an update on progress made since 2017. The report was prepared in collaboration with the AU, Member States and partners. We are pleased to note that the AU, in close cooperation with the United Nations and other partners, has made significant progress to fulfil the commitments set out in resolutions 2320 (2016) and 2378 (2017).

    2023-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9329 (2023) · source

  47. Mahamadou Issoufou, to lead an independent panel to assess the situation in the Sahel. We anticipate its recommendations on responses to the region’s complex challenges this fall. The imperative of providing predictable, flexible and sustainable financing for AU-led peace support operations is well known to the Council. In 2015, for example, the report of the Independent High-level Panel on Peace Operations (see S/2015/446) concluded that the lack of sustained, predictable and flexible funding mechanisms to support AU peace operations undermines their sustainability and effectiveness.

    2023-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9329 (2023) · source

  48. The AU and the regional economic communities and mechanisms have in recent years scrambled to respond to the challenging nature of conflict in Africa — from the Sahel to Somalia and from Mozambique to the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, among other situations. Armed violence invariably and significantly harms civilian populations and often spills over across borders. In Africa and elsewhere, rising insecurity is characterized by an increasing use of asymmetric tactics, the sophistication of armed extremist groups and the expanding influence of transnational organized crime. Those connected phenomena require commensurate global approaches and responses. The Sahel is particularly affected. That is why the Secretary- General and the Chairperson of the AU Commission jointly invited the former President of the Niger, Mr.

    2023-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9329 (2023) · source

  49. In 2007, the Security Council approved the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In 2009, the Council mandated partial support from assessed contributions to ensure that AMISOM had sustainable and predictable support to carry out its mandate. AMISOM was instrumental in supporting Somali forces in their efforts to stabilize the country, and I would like to pay tribute to the fallen soldiers in AMISOM and in the Somali security sector. Last year, AMISOM became the AU Transition Mission in Somalia, with the objective of handing over security responsibilities to Somali security forces by the end of December 2024. As we look at different parts of the continent, it is obvious that the need to put AU peace operations on a solid footing is increasingly pressing.

    2023-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9329 (2023) · source

  50. With its missions in Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Comoros, Mali, Somalia, and the Sudan, the AU contributed to the maintenance of continental peace and security, in line with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. Those missions demonstrated significant political will and commitment, but they also faced some recurrent problems. Challenges included funding shortfalls and the absence of requisite operational and logistical capabilities, as well as force enablers and multipliers. While the support that the United Nations and other partners have provided has been useful and appreciated, it has also often been unpredictable. Perhaps the most novel form of cooperation between our two organizations has been United Nations support to AU peace enforcement missions in Somalia.

    2023-05-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9329 (2023) · source