YouSaid · the spoken record

Ladsous

lines on the record: 1,177
first: 1992-11-19
most recent: 2017-03-16
sittings or episodes: 118
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“I would reiterate that we continue to seek pledges for important outstanding capabilities, including medium- utility helicopters, armed helicopters, intelligence, information operations and special forces. We are counting more than ever before on the continued support of both our traditional and our new troop-contributing countries to help us fill those critical shortfalls. I think that the activities that we are conducting in Mali are an excellent example of the unique nature of United Nations peacekeeping as a political-military endeavour. Under the leadership of Special Representative Albert Koenders, whose role in the Mission I commend, the Mission has played a key role alongside the Economic Community of West African States and the African Union in the political negotiations leading to the preliminary agreement on Kidal.”
2013-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6985 (2013) · source
“Its immediate focus will be on the officer ranks, so as to ensure that the most important messages regarding the mandate, as well as the posture, attitude and conduct of the United Nations force, reach the troops deployed throughout the country. The majority of our civilian, police and military staff will be in the north. We are currently looking at establishing civilian field offices in Timbuktu and Gao and, very quickly, a small presence in Kidal to support the implementation of the preliminary agreement. We will also maintain a military presence in the key population centres, defined for the purposes of the mandate as Douentza and Diabaly; the key cities of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal; and the towns of Menaka and Tessalit. Our emphasis will be on a mobile force able to project influence across the wide geographical areas in the north.”
2013-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6985 (2013) · source
“With respect to the police, we intend to re-hat the three formed police units currently deployed with AFISMA in Bamako, Gao and Timbuktu on 1 July, if the Council so decides. Assessments of those units are currently being conducted. Twenty additional individual police officers from AFISMA will also be re-hatted, while 10 new police officers are expected on the ground by 1 July. Two additional formed police units and 50 individual police officers are expected to be deployed in August. Training will play a key role in managing the transition in Mali from AFISMA to MINUSMA. We are deploying a mobile team to Mali today to conduct initial training for AFISMA personnel to undergo the transition to MINUSMA.”
2013-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6985 (2013) · source
“I would note that some have raised concerns about the transition of the AFISMA Chadian troops as Blue Helmets, given Chad's listing by the Secretary-General among the countries that have allowed child recruitment in their armed forces. Clearly, the Government of Chad will need to comply with and implement the five short- term measures of its action plan to end the recruitment of child soldiers within the four-month grace period Ijust mentioned, as agreed with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. Let me assure the Council that the United Nations is making every effort to screen the Chadian contingent that is to be re-hatted and ensure that no troops under 18 are among them, as well as enhance our efforts on training on child protection issues.”
2013-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6985 (2013) · source
“The MINUSMA military component will be built up in the coming months. On 1 July, MINUSMA will have an initial operational capability, including in the force headquarters. The Force Commander arrived in Mali today and the Deputy Force Commander deployed last week. The two sector headquarters in Gao and Timbuktu will also be operational soon, with staff for all headquarters to be further and quickly built up over the next two months. The two Sector Commanders have been recruited and will deploy shortly. By the end of July, we expect 100 staff officers to be on the ground and all headquarters to be fully staffed by the end of August. I can therefore state that we anticipate reaching full operational capability by 31 December.”
2013-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6985 (2013) · source
“A limited presence will be maintained in Bamako, and all MINUSMA operations will take into account the need to minimize the risk to civilians. In preparation for the transition, AFISMA has continued to gradually assume operational responsibility for several areas in northern Mali, as Operation Serval has begun to draw down. As of today, 25 June, the strength of AFISMA stands at 6,148 troops, with personnel deployed in the towns and regions of Timbuktu, Gao, Menaka, Tessalit, Aguelhok, Douentza, Diabaly and now Kidal. Since its establishment on 25 April, MINUSMA has begun to implement its mandate in terms ofpolitical good offices, electoral support, human rights and, in close cooperation with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, support for the restoration of State authority.”
2013-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6985 (2013) · source
“Political engagement with Malian actors in order to promote dialogue and reconciliation between and among communities remains the cornerstone of our involvement, as was the case last week during the recent negotiations in Ouagadougou. MINUSMA will also be very active in promoting human rights and support for the restoration of the authority of the State, including in the areas of justice and strengthening the rule of law. MINUSMA troops and police officers will help create a safe environment that is conducive to stabilization by deploying from major cities in northern Mali. They will conduct patrols, both alone and together with the Malian defence and security forces. MINUSMA troops will be mobile and will conduct operations across a wide area on the basis of integrated analysis and information-sharing with partners.”
2013-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6985 (2013) · source
“There will be a grace period of four months to allow military and police units to strengthen their contributions and incorporate the capabilities requested by the United Nations in terms of staffing, training and equipment. The support of international partners will be very important in that regard. I would note that the United Nations continues to receive additional commitments from potential contributors, enabling us to reach the maximal authorized personnel levels and thus respond to the Mission's needs. But we still face critical gaps, especially with regard to enablers and force multipliers. MINUSMA will therefore play a key role in the stabilization of Mali and the protection of its citizens threatened by insecurity in the north of the country.”
2013-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6985 (2013) · source
“I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to address the Security Council at this undoubtedly decisive juncture in our collective involvement in Mali. Indeed, if the Council decides today that the security situation prevailing in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) areas of responsibility allow for a transfer of authority from the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to MINUSMA on 1 July, MINUSMA will eventually become the third largest United Nations peacekeeping operation. MINUSMA will operate under robust rules of engagement. Its military and police forces will absorb the majority of the AFISMA forces.”
2013-06-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6985 (2013) · source
“In conclusion, I would like to pay tribute to UNICEF, the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Save the Children Sweden and Member States that have partnered with us in the training initiative. Their support attests to the strong global partnership that has been built around child protection. For its part, I believe the Security Council can be credited with playing a critical role in creating and sustaining this partnership for the benefit of children in the most difficult circumstances.”
2013-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6980 (2013) · source
“As part of the transition from the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, all AFISMA troops will be subject to predeployment training and vetting procedures, including in accordance with the requirements of the United Nations human rights screening policy, so as to ensure that they meet force requirements and have the necessary skills to implement the mandate. In addition, DPKO will deploy a mobile training team to Mali, which will deliver child- protection training for AFISMA personnel deployed there. Similar training is being undertaken for troops being deployed to the Force Intervention Brigade in MONUSCO.”
2013-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6980 (2013) · source
“The United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual issued by the Office ofMilitary Affairs last year includes guidelines on child protection, notably a provision prohibiting the use of schools by peacekeepers for operational purposes. DPKO also worked with Member States to finalize predeployment training materials on child protection for all peacekeeping personnel. The materials will be piloted at courses in partnership with the Governments of Malaysia and Uruguay in September and October. Awareness of the professional obligations of peacekeepers to protect children and their accountability to meet those obligations, in Mali and in other theatres where United Nations peacekeepers operate, is critical.”
2013-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6980 (2013) · source
“Our efforts in child protection constitute an excellent example of the kind of action in peacekeeping that requires a high degree of integrated action by civilian and uniformed components alike. Embedded in the heart of the mission, child protection advisers ensure that a mission's material and political assets and advantages - from access to authorities to other capabilities, including uniformed and civilian expertise - are applied effectively to fulfil the mandate for child protection. Given the magnitude of the challenges facing children affected by conflict, our achievements are no doubt modest. We are mindful that much more needs to be done. With that in mind, at the Headquarters level, we have invested in providing guidance and in developing training standards on child protection for peacekeepers.”
2013-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6980 (2013) · source
“That training provides peacekeepers with key information on the situation of children in the specific mission context, and therefore prepares them to respond appropriately to any child- protection concerns that they encounter in the field. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is committed to ensuring that child protection receives attention throughout the peace consolidation process. The political engagement of peacekeeping operations has helped lay the groundwork for institution-building while highlighting child protection in national agendas. Important work is taking place in that regard in Haiti and Cote d'Ivoire. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti continues to provide training to the Haitian National Police brigade for the protection of minors and supports legislative reform on important child-protection issues.”
2013-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6980 (2013) · source
“It is therefore particularly encouraging that child protection has been institutionalized in South Sudan through the creation of a child-protection unit in the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the inclusion of child protection in the SPLA training curriculum. In addition, approximately 22,000 Sudan People's Liberation Army soldiers from throughout the ranks have been sensitized on child protection issues. (spoke in English) Lastly, child protection advisers advise all mission components on specific aspects of child protection relevant to their work. To achieve that, they deliver in-mission training on child protection issues for peacekeepers on the ground. Last year alone, 7,878 peacekeepers received training on child protection in our field operations.”
2013-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6980 (2013) · source
“In 2012, screening for children by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) of the Forces armees de la Republique democratique du Congo resulted in more than 1,300 children being released from those forces. Another 630 children, including 109 girls, were released by other armed forces and groups in the first quarter of this year. In South Sudan, a revised action plan gave the United Nations Mission in South Sudan and UNICEF access to 71 barracks, from which hundreds of children were released. Protection is first and foremost a national responsibility.”
2013-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6980 (2013) · source
“Our peacekeeping missions are fully engaged, through country-level task forces, in monitoring and reporting serious violations in South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Sudan and Cote d'Ivoire. A second priority is negotiating action plans aimed at ending the recruitment and use of children, sexual violence against children, and the killing and maiming of children. Under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, peacekeeping missions have been contributing both to the negotiation and to the implementation of such plans. Action plans recently signed in the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan have yielded concrete results.”
2013-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6980 (2013) · source
“First, those advisers ensure that child-protection concerns are reflected at all levels of a mission's strategic planning and operational activities. We are aware of how important it is to give purposeful attention to child protection at the earliest stages of operational planning. DPKO has therefore made the deployment of a child-protection adviser to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) a first-phase priority. The adviser will help the Mission to identify key child-protection issues, as well as the approaches and resources needed to address them. Where they are deployed, those advisers ensure that our missions implement the key priorities of Security Council resolutions on children and armed conflict, one of the most important of which is monitoring and reporting serious violations.”
2013-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6980 (2013) · source
“Thank you, Mr. President, for giving me this opportunity to briefthe Security Council on how peacekeeping operations have been implementing the Council's mandates on ensuring the protection of children in conflict situations. The report before us (S/2013/245) is a stark reminder that the situation of children in conflict remains dire and that our sustained engagement is vital at both the political and the operational levels. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is committed to ensuring that child protection, like all protection mandates, is fully addressed in our missions' overall political strategies and operational plans, and at all stages of our engagement. In order to achieve that goal, deploying dedicated and specialized child-protection advisers in peacekeeping operations is crucial.”
2013-06-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6980 (2013) · source
“In that connection, it is clear that maintaining attention to the situation in Darfur amid a series of newer crises remains as important as ever. For too long, the people of Darfur have known conflict and suffering. I urge the Council to do all that it can to help relieve their suffering and bring about an end to the fighting by supporting UNAMID and by applying additional pressure on the belligerent parties to reach a negotiated settlement.”
2013-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6956 (2013) · source
“While there have indeed been mildly encouraging developments in the peace process, in the meantime a fully inclusive political settlement has yet to be reached. UNAMID is working hard to implement its mandate in these circumstances, which remain very challenging. It is clear that better cooperation on the part of the Sudanese authorities and improvements in troop and police contingent equipment levels are needed to enable the mission to operate more closely to its full potential. Furthermore, resolving the conflict continues to require a combined effort on the part of the Council, the African Union and the wider international community to persuade the belligerent parties that there is no military solution to the crisis.”
2013-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6956 (2013) · source
“Eventually, the flights did depart without the officials on board, but not without several hours of negotiations. On 3 April, the authorities issued 401 new entry visas for UNAMID civilian police, but as of 25 April, a total of 858 visas remained outstanding, including 533 for civilian police. In an effort to address those and other issues impeding UNAMID operations, the tripartite coordination mechanism between the African Union, the United Nations and the Government of the Sudan met in Addis Ababa on 15 April. The Government representatives present urged UNAMID to coordinate more closely with security officials in Darfur to improve access. In addition, participants agreed to review the validity of outstanding visa requests submitted in 2011 and 2012. In closing, the situation in Darfur is very troubling.”
2013-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6956 (2013) · source
“Against that backdrop of insecurity, the Government replaced, through presidential decree, the incumbent governors of Southern and Eastern Darfur with retired Sudanese Armed Forces Lieutenant General Adam Mahmoud Jar al-Nabi and Mr. Abdul Hamid Musa Kasha, respectively. While the outgoing Governor of Eastern Darfur was said to be in poor health, no explanation was provided for the decision to replace the Governor of Southern Darfur. Movement restrictions and other obstructions imposed by the belligerent parties have continued to hamper UNAMID operations. On 2 and 6 April, Government security forces forcibly prevented UNAMID helicopters from departing from Shangil Tobaya and Saraf Umra after the crews refused to transport local officials who did not appear on the flight manifest.”
2013-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6956 (2013) · source
“Further to the heavy intercommunal fighting between the Aballa and Beni Hussein militias described in the report before the Council, a reconciliation conference scheduled for 15 April was postponed by the authorities for one month to allow the parties more time to prepare. UNAMID is supporting the process through workshops on conflict resolution and the provision of logistical assistance. An isolated clash between the communities near Um Dafog, which is north of El Geneina in Western Darfur, allegedly in response to the harassment of Beni Hussein farmers by Aballa herders, highlighted that relations between the communities remain tense.”
2013-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6956 (2013) · source
“Government security forces prevented UNAMID from accessing the affected area until 17 April, when a patrol reached Um Dukhun and observed that several surrounding villages had been abandoned and damaged by fire. The authorities deployed security forces to defuse tensions and formed a committee comprising State Government officials and traditional community leaders to mediate between the parties. Those efforts led to the signing on 10 April of an agreement to cease hostilities. However, intermittent fighting continued after the signing and now a second reconciliation conference is scheduled for tomorrow, Tuesday.”
2013-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6956 (2013) · source
“Intercommunal violence in Darfur involving well- armed militias has also caused significant suffering among the civilian population. On 3 April, an attempted armed robbery triggered clashes between militias drawn mainly from the Misseriya and Salamat tribes in Um Dukhun, in Central Darfur. Sporadic fighting between the groups continued and spread eastwards, between 6 and 17 April, to Rehed al Bardi, 245 kilometres south- west of Nyala, and northwards to Darlay, 130 kilometres south of Zalingei, in Central Darfur. Community sources estimate that upwards of 68 people were killed and 60 injured in the clashes. Officials from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Chad registered the arrival of 16,000 people displaced by those precise hostilities.”
2013-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6956 (2013) · source
“(spoke in English) Three days after Government forces regained control of Muhajeria, unidentified armed assailants attacked the nearby UNAMID base. The assault took place in the early hours of 19 April and lasted for 40 minutes. Tragically, one UNAMID peacekeeper was killed and two were injured in the exchange of fire. At least one of the attackers was also killed. The base was reinforced with a company of peacekeepers from Nyala later the same day. I would like to take this opportunity to condemn unreservedly those responsible for that deeply troubling incident. I express my deepest condolences to the family and colleagues of the fallen peacekeeper, as well as to the Government of Nigeria. I call on the Government of the Sudan to swiftly bring those responsible to justice.”
2013-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6956 (2013) · source
“UNAMID is currently reviewing reports of casualties resulting from the fighting, which, it should be noted, diverge widely. The authorities have prevented the Mission and humanitarian actors from providing the necessary assistance and supplies to the area while the villages were under the control of SLA-Minni Minawi. UNAMID finally gained access to provide reinforcements and provisions to the bases on 18 and 19 April. On those dates, humanitarian actors were able to begin preparing to provide the necessary assistance, which was provided on April 23. At the same time, sporadic Clashes between the Government and SLA-Minni Minawi elements continued in Southern Darfur, for example in Marla to the south-east of Nyala, and, on April 22, near the Nyala airport.”
2013-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6956 (2013) · source
“Following the military hostilities described in the report of the Secretary-General, the Government and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)-Minni Minawi clashed on several occasions this month in Eastern and Southern Darfur. On 6 April, SLA forces seized control of Labado and Muhajeria in Eastern Darfur. The next day, they took control of Ishma village, 30 kilometres east of Nyala in Southern Darfur. Following those clashes, about 33,000 people are still concentrated around the UNAMID bases in Muhajeria and Labado. Between 6 and 13 April, Sudanese military aircraft conducted intermittent offensive operations in and around those two villages. On 16 April, the Government army, supported by air operations, regained control Muhajeria and Labado.”
2013-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6956 (2013) · source
“The Institute, which is an international non-governmental organization, was involved in capacity-building for the Movement and provided technical assistance to support the transformation of the Movement into a political party. The high- level negotiations between representatives of the National Congress Party and the Liberation and Justice Movement with regard to the ongoing participation of the Movement in the Government are underway. With regard to the security situation, the escalation of the conflict in Darfur due to military confrontations and intercommunal clashes is the source of serious concern. Humanitarian agencies estimate that this year the clashes have resulted in the displacement of214,000 people, including 24,000 to Chad. That is much more than the total for last year.”
2013-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6956 (2013) · source
“forces loyal to Gibril Ibrahim, near Darma, 220 kilometres north-east of El Geneina in Northern Darfur, on 18 April. Two soldiers from Mohamed Bashar's forces were killed and nine were wounded in the clashes. UNAMID is currently investigating the exact cause of the clashes. In addition, the Mission has called on the factions to stop the hostilities and to resolve their differences through dialogue. On April 24, the Liberation and Justice Movement informed the authorities of its intention to immediately withdraw from the Government. The reasons cited by the Movement for that decision were the delays in the implementation of the Doha Document and the expulsion from the Sudan of members of the International Republican Institute by the authorities earlier that day.”
2013-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6956 (2013) · source
“At the conference, most participants expressed strong political support for the Darfur Development Strategy, which is the framework serving as the basis for economic reconstruction, development and poverty eradication. The total amount pledged for implementing the Strategy was $3.7 billion, including $2.65 billion previously committed by the Government of the Sudan and $500 million from Qatar. We must take note of the fact that the total amount fell short of the target of $7.2 billion set by the Development Strategy for the next six years. Concerning the adoption of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur by the faction ofthe Justice and Equality Movement (J EM) led by Mohamed Bashar, hostilities broke out between that group and IBM.”
2013-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6956 (2013) · source
“Ithank you, Sir, for this opportunity to update the Council on the situation in Darfur. Council members have before them the report of the Secretary-General (S/2013/225) on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), dated 10 April 2013. I would like to focus on the most recent developments in the peace process and in the security and humanitarian situations. With respect to the political situation, during the days leading up to the donor conference held in Doha on 7 and 8 April, several hundred displaced people held peaceful protests in the Kalma and Hassa Hissa camps, in Southern and Central Darfur, respectively. The protesters raised the issues of insecurity, unresolved land disputes and the predominance of armed militias as reasons for their opposition to the Doha conference. N0 arrests were reported.”
2013-04-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6956 (2013) · source
“In that regard, we should explore the possibility of discussing the setting up of a light, flexible framework for inter-mission cooperation that would allow the Secretariat, the Security Council and the troop- and police-contributing countries to plan for inter-mission cooperation on a contingency basis.”
2012-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6886 (2012) · source
“Peacekeeping operations and the Secretariat must plan ahead and, whenever possible, anticipate their needs in terms of inter-mission cooperation, and they must prepare accordingly. (spoke in French) All of the foregoing are lessons learned. (spoke in English) Inter-mission cooperation is increasingly in demand. Instances of such cooperation are becoming increasingly frequent. It behooves us to learn from past difficulties and build on successes to ensure that we tap into the full potential of inter-mission cooperation in support of our missions.”
2012-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6886 (2012) · source
“As I mentioned earlier, this type of cooperation is at times a tool not of choice, but ofnecessity. In an ideal world, the tool of choice for strategic, over-the-horizon reserves would be the standing up of highly capable, self-contained and dedicated units, which would maintain high readiness to deploy to any peacekeeping crisis theatre at short notice. We can but dream, however. Such arrangements are unavailable at present. In any case, consent of troop- and police-contributing countries, host Governments and the Security Council are and will remain key enabling principles for inter-mission cooperation. We must also preserve the flexible and versatile character of inter-mission cooperation to ensure its continuing relevance.”
2012-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6886 (2012) · source
“In that context, the transfer of helicopters from MONUSCO to UNMISS, which was possible in January, would be hard to conceive at present, when MONUSCO needs all its capabilities owing to the crisis in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Time and space are key considerations when responding to a crisis. It is about the ability to deploy the right resources to the right place, at the right time and with the right capabilities. To face situations of activity surge, missions keep reserves. The redeployment of units from one mission to another usually occurs over and above existing reserves to relieve missions at times of severe distress. Inter-mission cooperation, in other words, fills gaps, if only temporarily and on a relatively limited scale.”
2012-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6886 (2012) · source
“It is partly a coincidence that, when the post-electoral crisis erupted in Cote d'Ivoire in late 2010 - and obviously that was an unscheduled event - elements of inter-mission cooperation were already in place in connection with a event that was scheduled, namely, the presidential elections in that country. Fourthly, inter-mission cooperation should be a tool not of choice, but of necessity, especially when it is used to fill critical gaps. It should be implemented on a temporary basis only. Inter-mission cooperation cannot and should not be used as a substitute for providing missions with the required military and police capabilities on a dedicated basis. When filling capability gaps, inter-mission cooperation tends simply to move the gap from one mission to the other.”
2012-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6886 (2012) · source
“Incidentally, I am pleased to report that a first group of three military utility helicopters, contributed by the Government of Rwanda, are expected to be deployed to UNMISS by the end of this year. Thirdly, inter-mission cooperation can occur in connection with either scheduled, predictable events, such as elections, referendums and censuses, or unscheduled, unforeseen events, such as security crises and natural disasters. For scheduled events, inter-mission cooperation, where appropriate, can be planned for well in advance. Preparations can be made ahead oftime, and the necessary consent secured in good time. For unforeseen events, however, it is more difficult to plan ahead and obtain the up-front, contingency commitment from troop- and police-contributors, the host Government and, when required, the Council.”
2012-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6886 (2012) · source
“Secondly, inter-mission cooperation has been used as a temporary measure - a quick, temporary fix - to either fill critical gaps or provide for a surge at times when missions were already under extreme stress, including during the start-up phase. Uniformed personnel and assets were transferred between UNOCI and UNMIL in connection with the holding of elections by the host country - a period when there is typically a surge in the security and logistical demands on missions. Similarly, military utility helicopters were transferred from MONUSCO to UNMISS when the latter was facing a crisis in Jonglei state. That transfer was not to provide a surge, but to partially fill a critical gap that UNMISS already had in the field of such assets.”
2012-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6886 (2012) · source
“First, whenever personnel and assets contributed by Member States are involved, inter-mission cooperation requires the consent of the troop- and police-contributing countries, of the host Government and, generally, of the Security Council. Needless to say, delays in obtaining consent can weaken or sometimes cancel out altogether the desired impact of temporary reinforcements. For example, in 2006, owing to delays in receiving formal consent from a troop-contributing country, by the time the temporary reinforcements from UNMIL to UNOCI had arrived in C6te d'Ivoire, the situation in Abidjan had already begun to stabilize.”
2012-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6886 (2012) · source
“In January 2012, two military utility helicopters were transferred from the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to partially fill the helicopter gap during a period of heightened demand on the Mission owing to the crisis that was then unfolding in Jonglei. Last Friday, colleagues from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support briefed a Security Council working group in some detail on those and other examples of inter-mission cooperation. Allow me, therefore, to not dwell on details, but rather try to outline some of the lessons learned. I hope they will contribute to a discussion on the way forward.”
2012-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6886 (2012) · source
“In late 2010 and early 2011, three infantry companies and military aviation assets were redeployed in the opposite direction, from UNMIL to UNOCI, in connection with the elections in Cote d'Ivoire and, later, in connection with the ensuing post-electoral crisis. In October 2011, one infantry company and one formed police unit were transferred temporarily from UNOCI to UNMIL in connection with the elections in Liberia. Additional personnel and assets were put on standby. A year ago, in December 2011, two infantry companies and one formed police unit were transferred from UNMIL to UNOCI in connection with the legislative elections in cote d'Ivoire.”
2012-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6886 (2012) · source
“The economic climate has thus pushed us to examine more closely inter-mission cooperation as a tool for a more rational use of resources, which are, we must admit, increasingly rare, be they financial resources or specialized equipment. The fourth, and final, factor is the fact that inter-mission cooperation is, by definition, a flexible tool. (spoke in English) Most members would be are aware of recent examples of such inter-mission cooperation. They include, but are not limited to, the following cases. In January 2006, an infantry company was temporarily transferred from the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) following violent disturbances in Abidjan.”
2012-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6886 (2012) · source
“This lack has sometimes resulted in missions being unable to implement their mandates, in particular in times of heightened activity, such as during elections or security crises. The tensions that have arisen as a result have led missions to resort to temporarily transferring such equipment from one mission to another, or to two or more missions sharing or jointly owning such equipment or personnel. The second factor is the repeated appeal by the General Assembly and the Security Council for the enhancement of synergies among missions deployed in geographical proximity to each other. The third factor is the economic crisis, which has led us to be even more rigorous in the way that we use our resources.”
2012-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6886 (2012) · source
“Thirteen years later, several missions also provided military observers to the launch of the United Nations Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic in the spring of 2012. In both cases, the provision of uniformed personnel happened with the consent of the capitals concerned. It is therefore not exactly a new tool, but it is obvious that this kind of cooperation has become increasingly attractive over the past few years. I believe that four factors in particular have contributed to this development. First, there is the recurring lack of certain critical items of equipment, the so-called "critical enablers" and "force multipliers" - for example, military transport helicopters.”
2012-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6886 (2012) · source
“It seems to me that this is one example ofinter-mission cooperation that has generated particular interest in the Council, especially in recent months. My colleague, Under- Secretary-General Ameerah Haq, will address those aspects that relate to mission support. That form of cooperation is one of the tools at the disposal of the Council and the troop- and police-contributing countries to support the implementation of peacekeeping mandates. It is not at all a new tool - far from it. Some colleagues will recall that the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina provided 39 uniformed personnel and police to support the launch of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo in 1999.”
2012-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6886 (2012) · source
“Thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the matter of inter-mission cooperation. I personally thank you, Sir, for taking the initiative of addressing the subject. First, allow me to emphasize that there is no official, agreed definition of inter-mission cooperation. Historically, the concept has taken various forms in various scenarios due to many reasons. In fact, its practical modalities have been defined on a case-by- case basis. In today's briefing, I plan to focus primarily on those cases of inter-mission cooperation that have involved the temporary transfer or sharing of personnel or equipment that has been made available by Member States among two or more missions that are often located in close proximity to one another.”
2012-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6886 (2012) · source
“The women peacemakers recommended that the United Nations formalize and systematize consultations with women in every step ofthe United Nations peacekeeping process, from pre-assessment to deployment of a mission, to evaluation of a mission, to the renewal of a mandate, and to the change of a mandate to transition to peacebuilding. Together with our partner, UN-Women, we call on Member States to enhance women's participation and protection by supporting and strengthening their commitment to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. As Michelle Bachelet has said, together we must go the extra mile. Once again, Mr. President, I thank you for this opportunity to brief the Council.”
2012-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6877 (2012) · source
“Another positive example is the recently signed memorandum of understanding between the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan and five women's non-governmental organizations on the implementation of the Women's Police Mentoring Programme, which aims to build the capacity of policewomen and to address the issue of abuse. Finally, I would emphasize that the critical key to removing the obstacles that impede women's full participation in conflict prevention and peacebuilding is active and systematic consultation with local actors and leaders, including women's civil society organizations. That is the only way to develop effective, context- specific and gender-aware solutions. Last month, DPKO and DFS participated in a dialogue with women peacemakers from all over the world who had gathered at the University of San Diego.”
2012-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6877 (2012) · source