YouSaid · the spoken record

Ladsous

lines on the record: 1,177
first: 1992-11-19
most recent: 2017-03-16
sittings or episodes: 118
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“I would have to add that we have continued to experience violations of the status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) such as restrictions of movement, impounding ofassets, threats to our personnel and premises, assaults, harassment, arrests, detentions and restrictions on imports of equipment, including, for a while, equipment for the Chinese and Ethiopian contingents. Those seem to be clearing, but we still have to see what will happen on the ground. Yesterday, I circulated a fact sheet on SOFA Violations to give the Council a breakdown of all such events that occurred in January. So we have a very fragile security environment and an ongoing round of peace talks that is not very likely to achieve more progress.”
2015-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7392 (2015) · source
“All battalions are expected to be able to exercise flexibility so as to act as reinforcements anywhere in the country. We now have roughly 3,500 of the 5,500 newly authorized troops deployed, and full deployment of the infantry and their enablers will be completed by April, enabling the Mission to further expand its presence in the country. Six of nine utility helicopters have been deployed, and we are pursuing the deployment of tactical helicopter units from Ethiopia and Rwanda. Deployment of a Chinese battalion and additional troops from Kenya is currently under way, and the balance of the troops from Ghana and a riverine unit from Bangladesh will also be deployed in the near future, hopefully by April.”
2015-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7392 (2015) · source
“Last month alone, UNMISS conducted over 5,000 patrols through South Sudan of various natures: short-duration, long duration, dismounted, integrated and dynamic air patrols. The vast majority of these missions have been focused on positive and proactive engagement with vulnerable communities outside our bases. We have established temporary operating bases in key population centres as part of this strategy. For the time being, we are looking at options for establishing forward-operating bases in Bentiu, Malakal and Bor, and seeking the approval of local authorities to that end. We have prepared contingency plans in the event of a worsening security situation. Those plans rely on maintaining quick-reaction forces at a high level of readiness so they can respond swiftly and robustly.”
2015-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7392 (2015) · source
“In line with seasonal patterns, a drastic deterioration could occur between April and July this year, when the lean season reaches its peak. Needless to say, conflict- affected states are most at risk because markets have been destroyed and foods stocks have been and are being depleted prematurely. Every effort is being made to bring assistance to those in need. Insecurity and harassment, especially for national humanitarian staff, are hampering response efforts. As I stated in my last briefing, UNMISS continues to take every opportunity to move from protection by location to protection by presence. The emphasis is increasingly on conducting dynamic, integrated patrols to enhance the protection and reassurance of local communities and to gather vital information to facilitate appropriate and timely responses to new threats.”
2015-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7392 (2015) · source
“The humanitarian situation in South Sudan is at high risk of deteriorating further over the coming months. We currently host 113,000 IDPs in eight sites, and there are an additional 1.5 million displaced across the country as well as close to 500,000 outside it. As fighting continues, displacement is increasing. Over the past two months alone, about 100,000 additional people were displaced despite the fact that it has been a period of relative calm. The number of food-insecure civilians is expected to rise further as we approach the lean season. About 2.5 million people are already in emergency and crisis levels of food insecurity - almost twice as many as in December 2013, when the crisis started - and an additional 3.9 million people are in a state of stress when it comes to food security.”
2015-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7392 (2015) · source
“Journalists have been detained and harassed for criticizing the Government. The Nation Mirror newspaper was closed down on 3 February, after publishing an article claiming that Government forces had abandoned a key town near the international border with the Sudan. On 16 February, even the United Nations Radio Miraya was threatened with shutdown if it continued to interview opposition leaders. Since then, Special Representative Ellen Laj has addressed that situation in a meeting with the Minister of Information of South Sudan, but we remain very concerned about the general trend of shrinking press freedom in the country. Meanwhile, opposition political parties also continue to be prevented from participating in the Addis Ababa peace talks.”
2015-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7392 (2015) · source
“Members of both houses now have one month to look at the proposal, following which the bill would require passage by a two-third majority in both houses, sitting separately. Given the majority enjoyed by the Government in the Legislature, this proposal is likely to be adopted. This step is a response to what was perceived as a strategy of the opposition to call into question the legitimacy of the Government and the President after June this year, and to do so officially so that it would not have to negotiate under pressure. Of course, one can only be concerned that this two-year timeline may become yet another incentive to defer the reaching of compromises necessary for a peace agreement. Lastly, I have to underline the shrinking of political space and freedoms. That is worrying.”
2015-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7392 (2015) · source
“But, in view of the prevailing environment and uncompromising positions expressed by President Kiir and Mr. Machar, the actual implementation of the matrix is very much in doubt. Last week, on 13 February, the Government announced that it would postpone the general and presidential elections by two years and propose to the National Legislature a constitutional amendment that would extend the terms of the Office of the President and of the National Legislature until 9 July 2017. On 19 February, the Government presented the proposed bill for the amendment of the 2011 Transitional Constitution to members of both houses, who had been recalled from recess for a special sitting.”
2015-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7392 (2015) · source
“The situation at the peace talks in Addis Ababa cannot be described in any other way but as a serious failure on the part of a leadership that remains focused on its pursuit for power rather than on care of its people. The talks are stalled over the three issues of power-sharing, security arrangements and constitutional reforms. The likelihood of either side softening its stance remains low. Council members will have noted that, on 21 January in Arusha, the parties signed an agreement to unify the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, following talks facilitated by Chama Cha Mapinduzi, which is apparently the ruling party in Tanzania. On 16 February, the parties signed another document, including a road map matrix with specific timelines, to implement the Arusha Agreement.”
2015-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7392 (2015) · source
“Furthermore, internal political disputes within the coalition Government in the states of Northern and Western Bahr el-Ghazal have resulted in the somewhat questionable disqualification of the Acting Governor and the President of the local legislature. These tensions could also lead to new intercommunal conflict, even though those two states had until recently remained relatively peaceful despite developments elsewhere in the country. (Spoke in English) The volatile security environment is directly illustrates the continued lack of political will of the parties. The Government and opposition do not seem to take the political negotiations seriously and appear unwilling to make the necessary compromises.”
2015-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7392 (2015) · source
“We have also received reports that the Murle community had reached an agreement with the Lou-Nuer - which in itself would be an unusual development - to prevent SPLA troops to move through their territory if they were planning to undertake operations to regions under the control of the armed opposition. Currently, there is a great danger that the conflict could spread in the coming months to Pibor and Akobo counties, in Jonglei state. Tension also mounted in the region oquuatoria, due to the massive influx from Jonglei and Lakes states of heavily armed Dinka nomads, with more than 250,000 head of cattle, onto their neighbors' arable land. These movements reflect long-standing confrontations over grazing areas south of Lakes and Jonglei states. It is clear that this hotspots could easily turn into war zones.”
2015-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7392 (2015) · source
“Meanwhile, in Pibor county, Jonglei state, the slow integration of Murle forces and the lack of financial resources pledged to the Greater Pibor Administrative Area have the potential to destabilize the agreement of 28 March between the Cobra faction of the South Sudan Defence Army, led by David Yau Yau, and the Government. General Joshua Konyi was appointed Commander of the SPLA in the region, which has also raised tensions because Konyi, a former commissioner of Pibor county, had worked closely with the Sudan People's Liberation Army against the forces of David Yau Yau in the region.”
2015-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7392 (2015) · source
“At the same time, both sides continue to mobilize and deploy new recruits in preparation for further clashes, while the ongoing dry season opens up new lines of communication and movements of troops and equipment. On 15 February, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was informed that armed men, probably belonging to a Shilluk militia allied to the Government, had forcibly recruited at least 89 children from camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Malakal county, Upper Nile state. Eyewitnesses reported to UNICEF that gunmen had surrounded the entire area and searched every house for boys older than 12 years.”
2015-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7392 (2015) · source
“Our force could not confirm this development on the lines of defence around Bentiu. On 13 February, the SPLA also captured at least five members of the opposition army following clashes between Bentiu and Guit, and those five remain in detention. Similarly, in Upper Nile state, the security situation has recently been dominated by sustained exchanges of fire between the SPLA and the armed opposition from 8 to 17 February in the Nasir region beyond the Sobat River. There have also been reports of new clashes in the counties of Maban, Melut and Manyo over the past 10 days. The clashes in these states clearly indicate that the oil fields located there remain prime targets for the forces of the military opposition.”
2015-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7392 (2015) · source
“I thank you, Sir, for this opportunity to introduce the latest report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan, issued on 17 February (S/ZOlS/llS). As always, I shall take this opportunity to inform the Council on operational developments since then. As Council members know, the security situation in South Sudan is very worrisome. Many violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, signed more than a year ago on 23 January 2014, have been reported and confirmed, as have numerous clashes between Government and opposition forces, in particular in Unity and Upper Nile states. On 10 February in Unity state, many bombings were reported in the region of Madrassa, south-west of Bentiu. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) reported having opened fire after observing the SPLA in Oppostion advance on the city of Bentiu.”
2015-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7392 (2015) · source
“We are on the right path, but more efforts are needed from all ofus to achieve what is in our common interest and our common goal: durable peace and stability in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region. That will require translating the political commitments agreed at Addis Ababa two years ago into concrete action, now more than ever, in particular with regard to the neutralization of armed groups.”
2015-01-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7367 (2015) · source
“MONUSCO'S drawdown will depend on the Government's commitment and ability to make tangible progress on neutralizing armed groups, in particular the FDLR and the ADF; on building the capacity of the army and the police in a sustainable manner; and its capacity and resolve to hold credible elections that would contribute to consolidating stability in accordance with the Constitution. Let me conclude by underscoring that we have come a long way and that a great deal has been achieved in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular since the signing almost two years ago in Addis Ababa of the Framework for Peace, Security and Cooperation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region.”
2015-01-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7367 (2015) · source
“MONUSCO's exit strategy must be progressive and tied to specific criteria and targets jointly developed with the Government. Over the past 15 years we have made considerable investments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I think that it is in our collective interest to ensure a gradual withdrawal, without reversing the hard-won gains achieved thus far. Neither the United Nations nor the Government can do this in isolation. The Secretary- General has therefore recommended that MONUSCO and the Government enter into a strategic- level dialogue to develop an exit strategy and road map in the coming months. We would be happy to work with the Government in order to enable it to implement a strategy that could be accelerated, provided that conditions allow it. Ultimately, the solution to the problem is in the hands of the Government.”
2015-01-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7367 (2015) · source
“We must also recognize that achieving tangible results in the fight against the FDLR will require both resources and time, considering the dispersed nature of the armed group and its immersion within the local population, so, again, it will take time. We will also have to be careful to avoid any repetition of what happened in 2009, when the FARDC had undertaken military operations against that group, which led to devastating humanitarian consequences. This, however, does not mean that MONUSCO should stay in the Democratic Republic of the Congo indefinitely. We are ready to hold discussions with the Government to develop jointly a plan that would make it possible for the Government to progressively take over the tasks that we are currently performing.”
2015-01-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7367 (2015) · source
“That requires a strong military component that is able to flexibly and effectively undertake the military aspects of a protection-of- civilians strategy, until the Government forces have the capacity to take over the tasks that have been entrusted to MONUSCO. MONUSCO also has, as the Council is aware, the mandate to neutralize armed groups, which is now more than ever our key priority. To implement that unique mandate, we need adequate capacity and specialized capabilities, in particular in View of operations against the FDLR and the ADF. I reiterate that military operations against the FDLR must start now.”
2015-01-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7367 (2015) · source
“Their view is that maintaining the numbers proposed by the Secretary- General, that is, a cut of 2,000 personnel, would send a negative signal. But, as I explained to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tshibanda N'tungamulongo, that recommendation by the Secretary-General is based on an in-depth military capability study and troop- to-task analysis. Considering the numerous political and security challenges that remain, we think that any reduction beyond the recommended figure would have negative implications for the ability of the Force to implement its mandate. The protection of civilians remains MONUSCO'S core mandated task.”
2015-01-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7367 (2015) · source
“The Secretary-General has therefore recommended a reduction in MONUSCO military personnel by 2,000 troops and the replacement of the two formed police units that were deployed to South Sudan early last year. His recommendation is based on the relative improvement in the security situation in some parts of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo following the military defeat of the M-23. It is also based on the fact that there has been an improvement in the capacity of the Forces armees de la Republique democratique du Congo (FARDC) to address the threat posed by armed groups. It is also based on a number of concrete measures that were taken to make the Force more mobile and more flexible. It is true that President Kabila and his Government are advocating for deeper personnel cuts.”
2015-01-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7367 (2015) · source
“With regard to the military component, at the meeting held yesterday with the troop- and police-contributing countries, I conveyed a very clear message: that the changes necessary to more effectively implement MONUSCO's mandate will not happen merely through a transformation of the MONUSCO force. What is necessary beyond that is a change in the behaviour of the troop-contributing countries deployed on the ground. All of the contingents must be ready and willing to use armed force against those who continue to pose a threat to the civilian population, and this resolve must be translated into action in a more proactive manner. Of course, it is clear that the protection of civilians cannot be limited to military action only.”
2015-01-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7367 (2015) · source
“However, it is true that have heard some criticism about how the Mission is implementing certain aspects of its mandate, specifically the performance of some of its contingents. We take those criticisms seriously, and the report before the Council contains a number of recommendations aimed at ensuring that MONUSCO becomes more effective in implementing its mandate and achieves more tangible results. It should be noted that this also includes a recommendation by the Secretary- General for MONUSCO to intensify dialogue with the Government on a number of key policy issues.”
2015-01-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7367 (2015) · source
“Furthermore, the fact that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ordered Internet sites, text messaging services and radio stations to shut down is a source of concern, as the freedom of expression and communication are essential rights in a democracy and should not be curtailed. Throughout the discussions I mentioned earlier that we had with the Congolese authorities, we discussed at length the threats facing the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We discussed the role of MONUSCO and the size of its military and police components. Overall, our assessment was that MONUSCO continues to play an important role in stabilizing the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in supporting the Government in neutralizing armed groups.”
2015-01-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7367 (2015) · source
“The Congolese have the right to express their opinions and demonstrate peacefully. Clearly, the use of violence is unacceptable. Of course, demonstrators and their leaders must be urged to pursue political objectives by non-violent means. However, we are concerned by reports of security forces using force against peaceful, unarmed demonstrators and by reports of arbitrary arrests. It is the responsibility of the Government to maintain a political space and allow for the peaceful expression of opinions. The Government must also ensure that the response to such violent protests is proportionate.”
2015-01-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7367 (2015) · source
“In spite of our military defeat of the Mouvement du 23 mars at the end of 2013, armed groups - both Congolese and foreign ~ remain, in particular the Forces democratiques de liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Those armed groups continue to pose a threat to the civilian population and the overall stability and development of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and to the Great Lakes region in general. First, allow me to mention what happened in the past few days with regard to the troubling incidents related to the electoral process in Kinshasa, Goma, Bukavu and Lubumbashi. I would like to express our deep concern about the violence that occurred during those events and to deplore the loss of lives, the destruction of property and the acts of looting.”
2015-01-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7367 (2015) · source
“I would add that I myself had many meetings with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Secretary-General spoke with President Kabila Kabange over the phone and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Martin Kobler had a long meeting with President Kabila Kabange over the past weekend. Throughout all those meetings, we had an opportunity to discuss with the Congolese authorities a wide range of issues, including the political situation, security challenges and the upcoming elections. We agreed that over the past years much has been accomplished: the withdrawal of foreign armed forces, the reunification of the country, the establishment of the transitional Government and two national elections. And yet challenges remain.”
2015-01-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7367 (2015) · source
“I thank Council members for giving me this opportunity to briefthem on the strategic review of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), a task that the Council entrusted me with pursuant to resolution 2147 (2014) and that has taken quite a lot of time over the past months. I would like to start by expressing my appreciation for the support and assistance provided by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo throughout this important exercise. This was demonstrated by the time accorded to us while our delegation was in Kinshasa by several Congolese ministers, led by Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tshibanda N'tungamulongo. There were several meetings, each one lasting several hours, which is a testament to how seriously the Government has taken the review.”
2015-01-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7367 (2015) · source
“He led the meeting of the Joint Technical Security Commission. I express my gratitude and admiration to him for his work.”
2015-01-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7355 (2015) · source
“Allow me to thank all partners of the United Nations involved in the mediation, led by Algeria, including the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States and all other countries participating actively in the process. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank former Special Representative Bert Koenders, Deputy Special Representatives David Gressly and Arnauld Akodjenou, and the Special Representative-designate, Minister Hamdi, who is also present here today and whom I wish the greatest of success in his role. I would also like to express my gratitude to the former Force Commander, General Kazura, who the Council will recall left his functions in December. We are in the process of selecting a new Force Commander, but for the moment General Bikimo of Chad has taken over command ofthe force.”
2015-01-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7355 (2015) · source
“In order to be able to continue operating in what remains a very complex environment characterized by the presence of terrorists and criminals, we have continued to develop ambitious plans for construction and for action against mines and explosives - efforts that I believe are unprecedented given the scale of the threat. The implementation of all of that will take some time. We are doing everything possible with the resources we have, but it will not happen overnight. I shall conclude my remarks here and refer Council members to the report of Secretary-General for updates on a number of aspects that I have not gone into.”
2015-01-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7355 (2015) · source
“In the past few days we have seen our Blue Helmets attacked almost daily, with rocket attacks on MINUSMA's bases, and often on bases that also belong to Operation Barkhane. There have been targeted attacks using improvised explosive devices, between 29 December and 1 January, for example. No fewer than 20 rockets were launched against the Tessalit base. There was an improvised explosive device attack on a convoy in the Gao region on Sunday 4 January, resulting in four Blue Helmets wounded. I repeat, the cost is high, and this is an opportunity to recognize and express our admiration and sadness to the troops, the police and their contributing countries. Since 1 July 2013 we have suffered a total of 33 dead and 109 wounded. No other mission in this era has seen so much bloodshed.”
2015-01-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7355 (2015) · source
“We should not, by the way, ignore the fact that reaching an agreement in Algiers is only a first step, and while it is necessary, afterwards each delegation will need time to explain and "sell" the terms of the agreement to its members. The peace agreement will also have to include detailed arrangements for its implementation, since that is what will determine the credibility of the process and MINUSMA's capacity to do everything necessary to support the implementation. Again, I think the ball is in the parties' court. It is up to them to show genuine political will and leadership. The international community supports the Malian parties, but it cannot stand in for them. I would like to say one more thing about the security environment, which continues to be extremely difficult and costly for our forces.”
2015-01-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7355 (2015) · source
“It is clear that if a lasting agreement is to be reached, those underlying causes must be dealt with. During the past 50 or 60 years the crisis in Mali has gone through various stages, including several negotiation phases, but none of them have really addressed the underlying causes. And we do not want the same causes to produce the same effects in future. I think the difference between this stage of the crisis in Mali and previous ones is that for the first time the international community, with the United Nations at the forefront, is directly involved and actively engaged. We must try not to repeat past mistakes. What is at stake here is re-establishing the Malian State in every aspect and coming up with lasting solutions. For that we need courage, determination and vision.”
2015-01-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7355 (2015) · source
“Bearing that in mind, I believe it is more important than ever that we appeal to all the parties to end all these violations of the ceasefire and show good faith both on the ground in Mali and at the negotiation table in Algiers. We can certainly expect that the negotiations will take a little more time, since it must be said that direct interaction between the parties has so far been limited, and some of them have yet to move from the positions they held at the start, although that does not apply to all. Therefore, what we are asking is that they demonstrate a spirit of decisiveness, leadership and willingness to compromise in order to reach an agreement. We know the crisis in Mali is complex and deep-rooted. Inter-community tensions and weak governance have created fertile ground for terrorism and transnational crime to develop.”
2015-01-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7355 (2015) · source
“MINUSMA had troops deployed in the Ber, Zarho and Bamba sectors and intervened with both sides in order to try to reduce tensions. More generally, during this period MINUSMA increased its efforts to render the ceasefire mechanisms operational. To that end, the first meeting of the expanded Mixed Technical Commission on Security was held in Gao on 16 December. In that context, the Government and the armed groups agreed, first, that from then on the Commission would meet on the fifteenth of each month, and then that the Timbuktu joint observation and verification team would be operationalized on 10 January, as would the Kidal team on 16 January. In the past few days, a first joint team arrived in Timbuktu on 2 January to conduct an inquiry into the incidents Ijust mentioned in the Ber, Zarho and Bamba areas.”
2015-01-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7355 (2015) · source
“I would like to take this opportunity to offer my condolences to the people and the Government ofMali, since, as the Council has heard, yesterday, 5 January, some unidentified assailants attacked the Malian army garrison in Nampala, in the Segou region, very close to the Mauritanian border, resulting, regrettably, in about a dozen victims. We are still waiting for exact numbers. A few days earlier, on 29 December, fighting broke out in the Bamba area, fairly close to Gao, between militia from the Groupe d'autodefense touareg Imghad et allies and the Coordination of the Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad. The net result was three dead and five wounded. The situation on the ground remains tense, with all the parties threatening to escalate military action.”
2015-01-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7355 (2015) · source
“The parties did indeed meet in Algiers to conduct new negotiations, which for the first time included direct discussions between the armed groups and the Government. The mediation, led, as the Council knows, by Algeria, circulated a draft peace agreement in November, and the parties are currently reviewing it. As I said, it is based on that that a new meeting is supposed to be held, most likely at the very beginning of February. The three weeks since 16 December, the end of the period covered by the report, have featured serious clashes on the ground.”
2015-01-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7355 (2015) · source
“The Secretary-General's report (S/20l4/943), to which the President referred, gives a great deal of information on all those problems, as well as on the deployment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and the action that has been taken to strengthen the Mission's capacity to operate in viable security conditions in northern Mali, where once again the threats to Mission personnel remain very serious. Today I would like to focus on the peace process, particularly the developments that have occurred during the period covered by the Secretary-General's report, from 16 September to 16 December. As the report states, the progress made in the peace process since the last time the Council was briefed, in October (see S/PV.7274), has been relatively modest.”
2015-01-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7355 (2015) · source
“Now that the Malian parties will be meeting again, most likely at the very beginning of February, in order to sign off on the draft peace proposal that was circulated to them in November, I think we can say that the Malian peace process is at a critical stage. This a time, it must be said again, when the security situation in northern Mali remains extremely volatile and worrying, creating continued challenges to restoring the State in the area, to human rights, to humanitarian access and to development programmes.”
2015-01-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7355 (2015) · source
“It is therefore very important for the Central African authorities to stay the course and for the country's regional and international partners to remain engaged in a sustained and coordinated manner in order to provide the Central African Republic with the assistance necessary to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of its actions and decisions.”
2014-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7329 (2014) · source
“Still, the risks remain high that additional disruptions to the political process and to the security situation could put the transitional process in jeopardy. The transitional authorities, for their part, have reaffirmed their commitment to ensuring that the Central African Republic's transition is managed in an inclusive and consensual manner. The Head of State of the Transition herself has stated repeatedly her intention not to run for the elections, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitutional Charter for the Transition. However, it must be clear that any further delays beyond August 2015 could undermine the transition itself.”
2014-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7329 (2014) · source
“"Chocolat" is accused of a series of very serious human rights violations. We will need to follow up on his case. MINUSCA has also continued to broaden and improve its capacity to monitor and address threats to civilians and human rights violations through enhanced training for MINUSCA troops and the establishment of field offices outside Bangui. In areas where there is no MINUSCA presence, close coordination and communication with humanitarian agencies has resulted in the dispatch of integrated MINUSCA and United Nations agency teams to threatened areas, for instance to Zemio and Yaloke. It must be said that the Central African Republic is entering a critical phase at a time when international attention to the crisis is starting to wane.”
2014-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7329 (2014) · source
“For MINUSCA a critical priority in that context clearly remains the protection of civilians; in that regard, securing the full deployment of MINUSCA'S troop and police contingents remains a top priority. This month, MINUSCA will achieve 80 per cent of its full troop deployment, and in January 2015, 9 out of the 10 of the formed police units will be deployed, with the tenth to arrive very soon thereafter. In the framework of MINUSCA's mandate of urgent temporary measures agreed by the Government of the Central African Republic, 217 people have been arrested by MINUSCA and handed over to the local judicial authorities. On 24 November near Bouar, MINUSCA arrested the well-known anti-Balaka leader "Chocolat" - his real name, too, is unknown to us - who was transferred to Bangui.”
2014-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7329 (2014) · source
“In response, MINUSCA expedited the deployment of the first troops of a MINUSCA contingent assigned to the area, and supported the creation of a reconciliation committee composed of leaders from opposing communities. Similarly, in the city of Bambari in Ouaka province, bloody clashes took place once again between different faiths. Several people were killed and houses burned down over the past two weeks. On 5 December, three United Nations peacekeepers were wounded in an attack by anti-Balaka elements following the arrest by MINUSCA of their local leader, John "Americain". We do not know his real name. In the west, some communities at risk remain confined to areas where, it must be said, living conditions remain extremely precarious.”
2014-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7329 (2014) · source
“On 24 November, 15 nationals of Cameroon and one Polish priest held hostage by the Front democratique du peuple centrafricain (FDPC) were released following negotiations in Cameroon that resulted in the freeing of FDPC leader Abdoulaye Miskine from detention there. The remaining 10 Central African hostages still held by the FDPC were liberated on 29 November. Unfortunately, in the eastern and central parts of the country, intercommunity violence, confrontations between armed groups and violent attacks on the civilian population continue. While the Lord's Resistance Army remains a threat in the south-east of the country, recently the Zemio area in Haut-Mbomou province was a theatre of ethnic confrontations in which at least 5 people were killed and 13 wounded.”
2014-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7329 (2014) · source
“On 3 December, MINUSCA, in cooperation with Sangaris and EUFOR, supported by the Chief of Staff of the Forces armees centrafricaines (FACA), took action to verify and clarify the position of selected FACA elements who will constitute the first company of a static protection battalion to be put in place after the Bangui forum. Each of the troops signed a declaration of honour, a commitment of good service, and a pledge to respect human rights and humanitarian law. I believe that this is a symbolic and important step towards the reoperationalization of FACA pending future efforts to complete security sector reform. Outside Bangui, there have also been violent clashes involving factions of the ex-Seleka and anti-Balaka, as well as other armed groups.”
2014-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7329 (2014) · source
“On 24 November, an incident also took place inside the Bangui central prison when inmates seized weapons and shot and threw hand grenades at United Nations peacekeepers who were on guard duty outside the prison. Three United Nations soldiers and one United Nations police officer were injured in the incident. It must be said that all these serious security incidents in the capital could have significantly escalated without the robust efforts by MINUSCA, supported by Sangaris and EUFOR, to restore order. Our national counterparts are also taking measures.”
2014-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7329 (2014) · source
“Following the violence in October in Bangui, driven by the anti-Balaka and during which civilians as well as MINUSCA, Operation Sangaris and EUFOR personnel were actively targeted, some ofthe ex-Seleka elements who had been regrouped in three camps in Bangui since December 2013 threatened to explode a significant arms cache in one of the camps unless they were provided with substantial assistance. Approximately 900 ex-Se'le'ka elements have since been relocated from these camps to their communities of origin. There are also ongoing efforts with the transitional authorities and the support of the international community to complete the relocation of the remaining camp residents and remove the arms and munitions from the site.”
2014-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7329 (2014) · source