YouSaid · the spoken record

Ladsous

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1992-11-19
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2017-03-16
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118
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un-security-council

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  1. The movement continues to deny having lost ground and suffered losses in Jebel Marra, while the Government maintains that the entire region is under the control of regular forces and that the recent rebel attacks were really only desperate attempts to give the illusion that the Abdul Wahid movement had survived politically and militarily. (spoke in English) The security situation in other parts of Darfur remained calm but with a sporadic seasonal spike in violence between pastoralists and farmers over the use and management of water and grazing land. Outbreaks of intercommunal and intracommunal violence occurred in some hotspot areas, amid a reduction in the number of large-scale conflicts.

    2016-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7781 (2016) · source

  2. However, we have our ears to the ground, and as the recent clashes seem to demonstrate, since the Sudanese Government launched its offensive in January its forces have only partially succeeded in achieving their objective of dislodging the fighters of the Sudan Liberation Army/ Abdul Wahid from their operational bases in the foothills of Jebel Marra. Continued fighting in recent weeks is clearly worrisome, given the fact that the dry season, which has just begun, is usually the optimal time for large-scale military operations. Moreover, we have received limited and conflicting information on the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid.

    2016-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7781 (2016) · source

  3. Since June, there have been new skirmishes and frequent aerial bombardments in the area. There is a sense that the security situation deteriorated further as of 17 September, when there were reports of heavy fighting around Gulo and Guldo, situated north-east of Nertiti in Central Darfur. Other clashes have also occurred in western Jebel Marra, in which at least nine Villages have been attacked. Unfortunately, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) is not in a position to confirm these reports or to evaluate the military situation with any precision because, I am compelled to reiterate, the Government of the Sudan continues to impose access restrictions.

    2016-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7781 (2016) · source

  4. I should like to thank you, Sir, for giving me this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the situation in Darfur. The latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2016/8l2), issued on 27 September, provides updates on the main developments in the situation. I should therefore like to focus today on some of the most salient points in the report and on several important events that have taken place in the past week. First, with respect to the security situation, we must acknowledge that the situation in the Jebel Marra region of Central Darfur remains volatile. The fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid that took place from January to May has somewhat abated in intensity but has never stopped altogether.

    2016-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7781 (2016) · source

  5. We must make it clear to the current leadership that our efforts must be aimed at continuity and long- term results. As I have said on several occasions in Bangui, MINUSCA must be the final United Nations peacekeeping operation in the country. We do not have the luxury of making a mistake. We must maintain our commitment, ensure that it works, and avoid any reason to return as we have done repeatedly in the past, after three, five or seven years. That would be a collective and catastrophic failure and the loss of a major opportunity for the Central African people, who are in need of a solution. Once again, I believe that long-term commitment to maintaining political resolve is absolutely essential.

    2016-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7734 (2016) · source

  6. The President has assembled his Cabinet by including representatives from each of the prefectures of the country. He has also extended a hand to the armed groups, but that hand must be grasped and the gesture must be reciprocated. I believe that the President very clearly intends to break with the past. Once again, inclusivity and reconciliation are very important. We must recognize that there is no quick fix. The problems are too profound for that to be realistic, given the fleeting nature of the attention that the international community focused on the Central African Republic in the past. Intense attention lasted for a relatively brief period, and then we moved on to other things. I believe that it would be a serious mistake to repeat that.

    2016-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7734 (2016) · source

  7. On 24 June, a Senegalese policeman was killed in circumstances on which we are trying to shed all possible light. It was unacceptable. I personally gave instructions to MINUSCA, in liaison with the Central African Government, to find out what happened, who is responsible and to make arrests if necessary. All of this is regrettable and worrisome. We must not paint too bleak a picture, but we are nevertheless reminded that the situation in the Central African Republic remains fragile. Outstanding progress has been made over the past two years, but we must not risk having those gains reversed. It is therefore more important than ever that the authorities remain firmly committed to inclusive and transparent governance and to addressing the root causes of the crisis. I believe that there are also positive signs.

    2016-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7734 (2016) · source

  8. In Berberati and elsewhere, people have been prevented from returning to their homes by the anti-Balaka, and the humanitarian situation remains worrisome. Of a population of a little less than 5 million, a large part continues to be affected by the consequences of the conflict and a lack of access to social services. Half of the population is in a situation of relative food insecurity and in need of humanitarian assistance to survive. I recall that 20 per cent of the population is displaced and that two-thirds of the total population of the country have no access to basic medical care. All of this creates a complex situation. In May, a total of 26 security incidents affected the operations of governmental and non-governmental organizations, which is a very clear warning.

    2016-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7734 (2016) · source

  9. For example, on 19 June, six Central African police officers were detained for six days by a local self-defence group in PKS/ Bangui. There have been concerning reports of renewed efforts to unite ex-Seleka elements under the leadership of Nourredine Adam. Ali Darassa has been active in Bambari. Seasonal transhumance movements have provoked friction and clashes. In short, I shall not go into detail, but a number of people have been killed and some 35,000 people displaced in recent days. In fact, the leaders whose names I have mentioned are trying to test the Central African Government and the United Nations, and it is therefore now more important than ever to show that we are proactive and will react. Alarmingly, there have been reports of the abusive treatment of Muslims in the capital.

    2016-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7734 (2016) · source

  10. In that context, I welcome the efforts of the Government of the Central African Republic to develop with us what I have called a compact or framework of mutual accountability, which should be endorsed by the national and international partners as a platform for the coordination of international efforts on the basis of a set of mutually agreed priorities that will continue to be developed so as to advance the humanitarian agenda and reconstruction, in view of the international donors and investors conference, which will be a crucial event, to take place in Brussels in November. In the context of recent events, unfortunately, over the past several weeks there have been indications of less than positive developments.

    2016-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7734 (2016) · source

  11. That is one of the strongest message that the international community can send to the troublemakers. Furthermore, we will obviously continue to deploy additional capabilities and new technologies within the framework of existing resources and military personnel, and to strenthgen the military component to facilitate greater flexibility and mobility. MINUSCA cannot carry do all this by itself. What we do is to support the efforts of the Government and in partnership with our Central African friends, as well as with the principal actors in the region and the world. That is where we will have to exercise our best judgement in discerning the comparative advantages offered by all involved. That is critical.

    2016-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7734 (2016) · source

  12. Moreover, we must actively participate in the reform and training of the police and gendarmerie, in full compliance with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. Furthermore, the strategic review recommends and President Touadera requests the continuation of the urgent temporary measures mandate, which the country's current situation clearly requires. We must pursue the operationalization of the Special Criminal Court. Many people have been arrested and imprisonned, but it is important now that they be tried. I believe that will send the best message to the people of the Central African Republic that the issue of impunity, which has been a persistent source of the resurgence of crises over the years, is finally settled. Enough is enough - it is over. There will be no more impunity.

    2016-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7734 (2016) · source

  13. The Mission will focus as a priority on addressing the presence of armed groups through a comprehensive approach, supporting the ongoing dialogue with the armed groups that has been initiated by President Touadera, based on his established agenda, and taking specific steps in support of the national disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation programme, the programme to reduce intercommunal violence, and the coordination of international support for security sector reform. Special importance will be attached to cooperation with the European Union training mission that is currently being put together to train the armed forces of the Central African Republic.

    2016-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7734 (2016) · source

  14. It is this need for visibility that has prompted the Secretary-General to recommend that the Security Council extend MINUSCA'S mandate by 18 months at the authorized level, with no change in terms of military and police personnel. The report presents a flexible, three-pronged approach to implement the strategic objective, in the context of the process under consideration and in line with requirements.

    2016-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7734 (2016) · source

  15. In parallel and to prevent a relapse into conflict, the review recommends that the strategic goal for the coming two to three years be to support the sustainable reduction of the presence of armed groups. By focusing on that objective and prioritizing the activities necessary to achieve that goal, it is clear that MINUSCA could contribute to creating a more secure environment for civilians; assisting in the development of Government structures that are responsive to public opinion and able to deliver the basic services the people expect; and creating an inclusive political environment favourable to the protection of human rights, efforts to combat impunity and the expansion of the rule of law, with a view to strengthening reconciliation and social and economic development.

    2016-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7734 (2016) · source

  16. There is almost no access to basic services and there are no representative, professional or inclusive security services to ensure minimally acceptable conditions. Moreover, armed groups maintain control over vast areas of the national territory and pose a significant threat to civilians. Their capacity to stire unrest and impede economic development and freedom of movement remains very much a reality. Against that background, the strategic review makes a number of recommendations. The absolute priority, as always, is the protection of civilians and facilitating the creation of a secure environment to ensure both the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the return of refugees and internally displaced persons under proper conditions. These remain MINUSCA's absolute priorities.

    2016-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7734 (2016) · source

  17. The election of President Faustin Archange Touadera - who is often called a man of the people ~ and the creation of a new Government launched a period of heightened expectations of lasting and positive change. While we acknowledge the gains achieved during the positive transition, the strategic review that has been undertaken confirms that the Central African Republic still faces many serious challenges. The security situation remains fragile and, despite everything, can be reversed. State capacity is very low and sometimes non-existent. Many areas of the country are affected by persistent division, exclusion and marginalization. The people continue to suffer a very low level of economic development.

    2016-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7734 (2016) · source

  18. We must acknowledge that considerable progress has been made since then, particularly with the support of the Economic Community of Central African States, countries of the region and the deployment of international forces, including MINUSCA. Earlier this year, after nearly two years of political transition, voters in the Central African Republic took to the ballot box in a peaceful and democratic environment. As I stated at the time, the Central African Republic provided a good example in a region of the world where few elections take place without a predetermined outcome, preparations are sometimes chaotic and the outcome is contested. However, in the Central African Republic elections took place in a perfectly proper manner and those who lost conceded defeat. It was therefore an exemplary election process and that must be highlighted.

    2016-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7734 (2016) · source

  19. I shall introduce the special report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic (8/2016/565), which is based largely on the recommendations of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations and elaborated in close cooperation with the authorities of the Central African Republic and partners. The report presents recommendations regarding capacity, as the Council has requested, such that the Mission will have the required configuration and capacity to fulfil its tasks in a post-transitional environment, while incorporating peacebuilding objectives. As the Council recalls, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) was established in April 2014 at a time of great difficulties in the country.

    2016-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7734 (2016) · source

  20. We therefore continue to call upon all parties to continue efforts in good faith to achieve the much-needed cessation of hostilities in Darfur and to work towards ensuring a credible and inclusive national dialogue process. Based on the status of the UNAMID benchmarks and pending the implementation of the recommendations of the Joint Working Group, the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission therefore recommended for the two Councils to consider extending the mandate of UNAMID for 12 months, until 30 June 2017, without modification to its priorities or adjusting its authorized troop and police ceiling. I would note that yesterday the African Union Peace and Security Council endorsed that recommendation. I therefore wish to reiterate the Secretary-General's request for the Security Council to also do so.

    2016-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7716 (2016) · source

  21. The review recommended for the current number of military and police personnel to be retained and for the mission to take measures to enhance its overall flexibility through the reinforcement of troops at the team sites having greater operational significance. In parallel, the reduction or closure of other team sites should take place and a highly mobile reserve military capability should be established while increasing the field presence of police officers from within existing capabilities. While focusing on those issues will serve to enhance the impact of UNAMID's conflict resolution and protection mandated activities, their effect will remain limited in scope in the absence of further progress towards a comprehensive and sustainable political solution.

    2016-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7716 (2016) · source

  22. UNAMID needs to continue engaging the Government of the Sudan on the need for those goals to be achieved. In the absence of a more long-term solution, however, UNAMID would build on its existing activities and develop a strategy bringing together all the relevant mission components to address some of the most pressing sources ofviolence through prevention and mitigation and, with the United Nations country team, support for the resolution of the underlying causes. As part of the joint assessment, the African Union and the United Nations also conducted a review of the effectiveness of the military and police components.

    2016-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7716 (2016) · source

  23. Building upon its current strategy for the protection of civilians, UNAMID would support the work of humanitarian partners and of the Sudanese authorities by providing protection to the displaced and prioritizing existing resources based on a mapping of the situation in the camps, the areas at risk for further displacement and potential areas of return across Darfur. The sustainable resolution of intercommunal violence in Darfur would require a comprehensive political agreement that should recognize fully and uphold the rights of both farmers and nomads, empower local-level conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms and that should strengthen the capacity of the criminal justice system to maintain law and order and ensure accountability for crimes.

    2016-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7716 (2016) · source

  24. Within that framework, the Chairperson and the Secretary-General therefore recommended for UNAMID to focus its activities, first, on protecting the displaced populations and, secondly, on addressing intercommunal violence more comprehensively. In a situation of continuing armed conflict, intercommunal violence and attacks against civilians, the current security conditions in Darfur are not conducive to a large-scale return of IDPs to their places of origin. Any such return would have to be voluntary, consented to, safe and accompanied by durable solutions.

    2016-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7716 (2016) · source

  25. They agreed on a general evaluation of the benchmarks and on recommendations whose implementation would provide elements for a gradual and phased exit strategy. However, the Joint Working Group did not reach consensus on the issue of the process leading to a possible reconfiguration of the mission. On 23 May, during the twenty-first tripartite meeting, which was also held in Khartoum, the three parties endorsed the outcome of the Joint Working Group and requested it to reconvene in four months to review the implementation of its recommendations and the benchmarks. Given the current situation in Darfur, the joint assessment mission concluded that the strategic priorities of UNAMID and their corresponding benchmarks remained valid.

    2016-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7716 (2016) · source

  26. At the latest tripartite meeting, held in Khartoum on 23 May, the Government reiterated its commitment to continue working with UNAMID on resolving those issues. More recently, the Sudanese ForeignMinister reiterated his Government's commitment to address those challenges. We very much hope that those assurances will result in much-needed progress on the ground. Further to the request of their two Councils, the United Nations and African Union also continued their discussions with the Government on the development of an exit strategy for UNAMID based on the benchmarks. The Joint Working Group met from 12 to 22 May. The Working Group, which is made up of the three parties, visited the five states of Darfur and held discussions in Khartoum.

    2016-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7716 (2016) · source

  27. They cited for that the absence of security, stability, justice, access to basic services, compensation and issues with their land rights. With respect to relations with the Government of the Sudan, UNAMID continued to face considerable challenges that impeded the implementation of its mandate, including denials of access and freedom of movement, particularly, as I already noted, to conflict areas such as Jebel Marra. Denials and delays in the issuance of visas and the clearance of shipment containers at Port Sudan have also continued. Delays in the clearance of military and police equipment, food rations and sustainment supplies remain a significant obstacle in that context. The African Union and United Nations, with the support of Security Council members, have consistently engaged the Government of the Sudan on those matters.

    2016-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7716 (2016) · source

  28. As of today, while 2.6 million people remain displaced across Darfur, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has reported 80,000 verified internally displaced persons (IDPs) since the resumption of fighting in the Jebel Marra area in mid-January. It has also received reports of as many as 127,000 additional displaced persons, but that number has not been verified, due to the lack of humanitarian access, particularly in Central Darfur. Furthermore, a total of 1.6 million civilians continue to reside in the region in some 60 camps for internally displaced persons. Although some of those displaced have returned to their homes, many have chosen to remain in camps or in urban areas. By the way, IDPs have largely voiced their rejection of the Government's plans to implement a voluntary process to end displacement by 2017.

    2016-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7716 (2016) · source

  29. The aim of that was to dislodge the SLA/Abdul Wahid from its strongholds in the mountainous area, which the latter resisted through asymmetric warfare and the high mobility of its forces. While the Government stated in April that the rebellion had ended with the capture of Sorrong in Central Darfur, reports of clashes have continued, including indiscriminate attacks against the civilian population, which UNAMID could not verify due to a lack of access. Most recently, on 30 May, Abdul Wahid forces reportedly attacked the Sudanese armed forces positions east of Nertiti, in Guthrum in Central Darfur. Ground fighting and aerial bombardments followed, and continued until 5 June, with reports of casualties on both sides, as well as among civilians.

    2016-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7716 (2016) · source

  30. (spoke in English) In the face of such violence, the Government, particularly at the State level, has taken measures to restore security by deploying additional forces to hot spots, enhancing mediation efforts, including between farmers and nomads, and planning a broad civilian disarmament campaign. Despite such efforts, however, the violence persists, as its underlying causes, which are inherently linked to those of the broader Darfur conflict, are yet to be addressed. Thirdly, while direct clashes between the Government and the armed movement forces have subsided as a whole, the fighting with the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid faction in Jebel Marra, which rejects any negotiations with the Government, has continued. In mid-January, the Government launched an aerial and ground offensive in parts of Central, North and South Darfur.

    2016-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7716 (2016) · source

  31. That communal violence has also been exacerbated by the politicization of disputes, the degree to which communities are being armed, inadequate efforts - it must be said - to restore the rule of law, and the recurrent impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators of acts of violence. There have been four major incidents since January between Arab tribes and their neighbours - the Gimir and Masalit - in West Darfur, triggered by incidents of cattle rustling. On 22 May, for example, a member of an Arab tribe and a soldier of the Sudanese army were killed in Azerni, east of E1 Geneina, following the escalation of a dispute on the non-payment for services rendered, which escalated into an attack on a mosque in which six Masalit civilians were killed.

    2016-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7716 (2016) · source

  32. For now, the United Nations and the African Union have called on the Sudanese opposition to follow the road map proposed by the High-level Panel and signed by the Sudanese Government in April. If all stakeholders were to abide by the road map, that would undoubtedly lead to significant progress in the peace process, thereby opening the way for progress with regard to ceasefire negotiations in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, the political process in Darfur and the national dialogue. Secondly, there is the element of intercommunal violence, which are emanating from disputes over access to land, water and grazing areas, remains a major cause of insecurity in Darfur.

    2016-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7716 (2016) · source

  33. The nature of the conflict in Darfur remains unchanged since the renewal of the mandate of the mission, for many reasons. First, little progress has been made in finding a viable political solution to the conflict. The Government of the Sudan and the non-signatory armed movements have yet to reach consensus with regard to the role of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in the negotiation process led by the piece High-level Implementation Panel of the African Union. On 30 and 31 May in Doha, UNAMID and the Government of Qatar consulted with the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) to help achieve a rapprochement of the positions of the two parties. It is regrettable that the Abdul Wahid faction was absent from the negotiating table, and it which should be urged to engage constructively in achieving consensus.

    2016-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7716 (2016) · source

  34. I thank you, Mr. President, for this new opportunity to present a briefing to the Security Council on the situation in Darfur and the activities of African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The special report (see 8/2016/510) ofthe Secretary- General and of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission presents the results of the Darfur joint assessment mission by the African Union and the United Nations of the situation in Darfur and the steps to be taken to implement the UNAMID mandate, as well as the operational effectiveness of the military and police components of the mission. I will present the conclusions and recommendations that were the outcome of the joint assessment and the major events that have taken place since it was published, on 8 June.

    2016-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7716 (2016) · source

  35. In that regard, there is a need to pursue efforts to optimize the full range of support modalities, including, as I mentioned at the beginning of my statement, the timely operationalization of the African Standby Force. Let us bear in mind that this is a critical issue in strengthening collective security together. A more effective African Union, as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, will make it possible for the United Nations itself to further and better respond to situations on the ground and the needs of Member States. Ultimately, financing is part of a broader partnership. We therefore remain firmly committed to support all the efforts of the African Union to build capacity on mission planning and support, as well as standards and performance.

    2016-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7694 (2016) · source

  36. I am pleased to inform members that the United Nations- African Union joint review on financing and support to African Union peace operations will be launched tomorrow, when a technical seminar will begin by evaluating the various United Nations models of support to date. That will feed into the process carried out by the High Representative for the African Union Peace Fund, Mr. Donald Kaberuka, to enhance predictable financing. A review of re-hatting experiences in Mali and the Central African Republic has shown that predictable financing remains critical to the success of transitions from African Union peace operations to United Nations peacekeeping operations. The review also confirmed the fact that no support modality is sufficient on its own.

    2016-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7694 (2016) · source

  37. We, the United Nations and the African Union, need to relentlessly pursue our efforts to provide our peacekeepers with the necessary training and equipment to strengthen their security and improve their performance, all the while ensuring that they adhere to the highest level of conduct and discipline expected of them and observe the values and principles that our respective organizations are committed to. That brings me to my fourth and final point, and I shall conclude quickly. With a view to further enhancing all those efforts and our partnership, the Secretary- General has called for more predictable and sustainable financing and support to African Union peace support operations authorized by the Security Council.

    2016-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7694 (2016) · source

  38. They are working relentlessly and with courage in incredibly difficult circumstances to restore peace and stability in volatile environments, risking their lives every day - as we unfortunately see all too regularly from the painful statistics, as we mentioned to Members States last week during the annual meeting on Blue Helmets. We should therefore pay tribute to their efforts and to the memory of those who have made the ultimate sacrifice.

    2016-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7694 (2016) · source

  39. Out of 16 United Nations peacekeeping missions, 9 are deployed in Africa; 80 per cent of all our uniformed peacekeepers serve in Africa; and more than 50 per cent of all contingents throughout the world come from African Union member States. That serves to demonstrate the absolute need for a strong partnership to be able to put an end to all those conflicts and provide support for peacebuilding. I have no doubt that the Security Council will join me in expressing profound gratitude to all of the African countries that are contributing with troops and police to peacekeeping operations.

    2016-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7694 (2016) · source

  40. All of that was followed by transition planning to facilitate a smooth hand-over from the African Union to the United Nations. Turning to Somalia, cooperation with the African Union is clearly a cornerstone of our collective efforts, and remains a model of partnership that we should tirelessly try to improve and enhance. We will therefore continue to work together with Somali leaders to bring the country out of the conflict that has plagued it for over two decades and make decisive progress towards peace. In this year of elections, it is more important than ever to work hand in hand. Once again, we remain fully committed to supporting AMISOM. The African Union, directly or not, is the most important partner of the United Nations when it comes to peacekeeping. Three simple statistics will serve to illustrate that fact.

    2016-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7694 (2016) · source

  41. My third point relates to the trend of growing cooperation between our two organizations on the ground, including, as I have said, the planning and management of peace support operations and support for greatly increased African Union institutional capacity in this regard. This area of cooperation has been the most active of our partnership recently. Specific achievements in these areas include, as I have already mentioned, support for the development of AMISOM. strategic concepts of operations and the drafting of revised strategic directives for AMISOM leadership. We have also made strenuous joint planning efforts to ensure the deployment and management of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali and the African-led International Support Mission for the Central African Republic.

    2016-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7694 (2016) · source

  42. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been lending support to the African Union-led facilitation efforts led by Mr. Edem Kodjo. Beyond the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations and the African Union have maintained a strategic engagement between the Office of the Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan and the AU High- Level Implementation Panel aimed at advancing a peaceful resolution of the outstanding issues between the Sudan and South Sudan, where the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the High Representative of the African Union, former President Konare, are working closely together and with the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission to advance the implementation of the Peace Agreement.

    2016-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7694 (2016) · source

  43. This has led to some important decisions, including therecentestablishmentinAddisAbabaofajointworking group on sustainable financing; the effectiveness of AMISOM, particularly in relation to command and control; and support for the Somali National Security Forces, in the context of the upcoming elections and the reduction of European funding. More generally, the Joint Task Force has increasingly encouraged proposals to help the African Union and the United Nations coordinate messaging. Members will have noted the recent increase in and regularity ofjoint communiques on issues in which we have a shared interest. There has also been far more information-sharing, joint analyses and follow-up of developments on upcoming elections or crisis situations in Africa.

    2016-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7694 (2016) · source

  44. In that respect, the United Nations- African Union relationship is graduating from an earlier support-and-capacity-building model. The partnership is much stronger now, based on a common vision of purpose and the efforts to be undertaken. Indeed, the strategic partnership has made considerable progress through its specific coordination arrangements. This can be clearly in the Joint Task Force developed as a cooperation mechanism between the decision-making bodies of both secretariats to manage conflict prevention and peacekeeping.

    2016-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7694 (2016) · source

  45. Secondly, the African Union and its regional economic communities and mechanisms have significantly strengthened their capacities over the past decade, while seeking to leverage the comparative advantages of each organization and consistently recognized the primary responsibility of the African Union for the regional mechanisms. African regional partners are involved in peace efforts across the continent, often facing significant human costs, as illustrated by the case of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Thirdly, as Council members know, a joint United Nations-African Union framework for an enhanced partnership in peace and security will be signed by the Secretary-General and the African Union Commission Chairperson in 2016.

    2016-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7694 (2016) · source

  46. The Secretary-General has repeatedly underscored that strengthening global and regional partnerships is absolutely critical, especially in Africa, where the United Nations clearly must continue to work very closely with the African Union to maintain peace and security on the continent. But it is only through concrete instances of collaboration that progress in building mutual trust becomes tangible, leading to an upgrading of the level of cooperation. This brings me to my second point. Several milestones have signaled this change of nature in the partnership between the two organizations on peace and security matters. First, by issuing its new road map for the African Peace and Security Architecture from 2016 to 2020, the African Union has clearly moved away from ad hoc activity-based responses towards a more strategic position.

    2016-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7694 (2016) · source

  47. Ten years later, I am glad to bear witness to the fact that one of APSA's key pillars, the African Standby Force, is about to be declared operational at the African Union Summit in July. This progress has made been through a series of phases in the context of the so- called African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises and on the basis of a strong collaboration with the United Nations in the development of key policy and guiding documents, as well as at the practical level in the planning for the AMANI Africa II Field Training Exercises, all of which were key milestones in the operationalization of the African Standby Force.

    2016-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7694 (2016) · source

  48. On behalf of the Secretary-General, I wish to thank Egypt and you, Sir, for bringing us together today for this timely discussion. I will limit myself to making four points. First, on this tenth anniversary of the annual consultations between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council, we should look back over those 10 years and measure the progress achieved to strengthen our partnership in maintaining peace and security on the continent. Indeed, in their first joint communique of 2007 (8/2007/386, annex), the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council committed to the development of a stronger and more structured relationship, and underlined the particular importance of support for the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

    2016-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7694 (2016) · source

  49. It also involves the rebuilding of the national justice system. In sum, the peace process in South Sudan is extremely fragile. It will require a concerted and sustained effort at every level - national, regional and international. I can only call again on the Council to work closely with IGAD and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to mobilize all the support that is required for President Mogae, the Chairperson of the J MEC, and President Konare, the African Union High Representative for South Sudan, to generate both the incentives and the disincentives so that the current dynamics on the ground can change. Without significant political leverage generated by concerted international and regional efforts, they will not succeed.

    2016-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7678 (2016) · source

  50. Governing 28 states is much more costly than governing just 10. I would urge the Security Council, in coordination with the African Union, to engage the President of South Sudan on this issue, with the aim of halting the implementation of the order until the issue has been discussed and mutually resolved within the Transitional Government. Finally, the most vulnerable of the South Sudanese have suffered the most in the conflict, and they continue to do so. Without justice and reconciliation, the healing of those wounds - the fresher ones and the older ones alike - will not be possible, particularly if the issue of impunity is not addressed. There is a need for all parties to unite on this issue and agree on national reconciliation and transitional justice, including the establishment of the Hybrid Court, in accordance with the calendar.

    2016-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7678 (2016) · source