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1992-11-19
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2017-03-16
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un-security-council

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  1. With regard to the events in Juba in July, as I told the Council, we are firmly committed to the implementation of the recommendations of the report, which resulted from the independent special investigation led by Major General Cammaert. My close colleague, Mr. Wane, is heading up a task force that is working towards implementing all of the recommendations in connection with soldiers, civilians and police officers. All of that has been put in motion, and I promise to keep the Security Council up to date in real time. With regard to the host of questions that were asked this morning, I thank you, Sir, for having taken this initiative. We know the very special role that your country plays in the area of police contributions. I commend both the quantity and the excellent quality of your country's contribution of police personnel.

    2016-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7808 (2016) · source

  2. One of two timely questions was asked concerning Abyei, regarding which we must be aware of the fact that, despite several political commitments that were made five and a half years ago, there is still no joint police force there. The United Nations and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei provide the minimum necessary level of police to ensure the minimum level of law and order in the Abyei box. We have created units that provide and contribute to community policing in the Ngok Dinka community. Need I mention that we made the same offer to the Misseriya community, which was rejected by the Government of Khartoum and resulted in the asymmetrical situation, which, I believe, the representative of the Russian Federation pointed out. That continues to be our objective.

    2016-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7808 (2016) · source

  3. With your permission, Mr. President, I think it would be a good idea to ask each of our four Police Commissioners to respond - briefly, I would emphasize - to the questions specifically aimed at them, after which I could complement their answers. I think that would be more logical.

    2016-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7808 (2016) · source

  4. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank and pay tribute to our policemen and -women for their untiring efforts in the field to save lives and contribute to stability - sadly, work that is not without considerable risk but which they do with commendable courage and determination.

    2016-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7808 (2016) · source

  5. As the Council knows, our police officers spare no effort to implement resolution 2272 (2016), which the Council adopted in March, and all the measures discussed in the Secretary-General's report on sexual conduct (A/70/729), an area where the police have a specific role to play regarding punishment as well as prevention and, especially, assistance to victims. In conclusion, the Secretary-General will shortly be issuing his second report on United Nations policing, and in that context, we will be relying the support of the Security Council more than ever to enable us to implement the report's recommendations as effectively and efficiently as possible.

    2016-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7808 (2016) · source

  6. We continue to see considerable disparities between the working conditions of various types of personnel, even when they are doing pretty much the same jobs. Some are treated very differently from others, and that cannot help having an impact on morale and therefore to some extent on performance, particularly for those serving in very problematic areas, such as Libya and Somalia. We therefore have to revisit our approach to mission subsistence allowances and allowances for service in dangerous conditions. That is a real issue; we are working on it, and the Secretary- General has been made aware of it. I have one last comment on conduct and discipline.

    2016-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7808 (2016) · source

  7. We are unfortunately seeing victims of this all too often, and the human costs for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali are far too high. That is all because we are dealing there on the ground with a terrible combination of criminal networks, extremist groups and political stakeholders who are not always very transparent about what they are doing. Those are four illustrations of what we have to deal with, and while they are to some extent dictated by current events, any issue can be tackled within the framework they represent. I would like to take a moment to emphasize the importance of taking better account of the constraints that our police are dealing with on the ground in terms of their welfare.

    2016-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7808 (2016) · source

  8. By the way, the Office of Internal Oversight Services recently carried out an assessment that recommended making efforts to better align the goals mandated for our police officers and to improve the level of resources available to them. I think that is the case in Haiti, where there is no question that we need to create a post for a deputy chief of police, among other things. We have to monitor things carefully in order to ensure that all these demands are properly aligned within a realistic time frame. Fourthly, there is the security of our personnel, especially in areas where that is an issue, such as in Mali, about which Commissioner Yacouba will be sharing his experiences of operating in an area where the threats come on a daily basis.

    2016-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7808 (2016) · source

  9. That is not enough, because we need them not only for conducting dialogue but also for sharing information on the ground, which women are especially equipped to do. Thirdly, capacity-building is crucial to enabling us to support political processes, redeployment and the re-establishment of the Government on the ground. Those who have heard this before will have to forgive me for quoting myself yet again, but, as we say in French, in many situations good behaviour starts with a healthy fear of the police. When the people see police out there, they say there you are, the Government is back and functioning. And that is all about the rule of law. We will be hearing from Commissioner Monchotte, who sees that routinely in Haiti.

    2016-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7808 (2016) · source

  10. That is extremely important to us, and Commissioner Makotose will be discussing it, for the reasons we are well aware of- first, because women, like children, are particularly at risk in most of the situations on the ground, and we have to take that into account - and also because we need to have more women in posts. We have in fact reached a level where 20 per cent of our individual police officers are women, in accordance with the goal established by the Secretary-General, but we have to do better, just as we have to do much better with female formed police units. I have seen them on the ground in Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti, and that is responding to a genuine need, but women make up only 7 per cent of formed police units.

    2016-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7808 (2016) · source

  11. I would like to remind the Council, as I have done before, that the protection of civilians we have been managing in South Sudan is not something we should be cutting back on, since the 200,000 displaced persons in the camps owe the fact that they are still alive to the United Nations, and to the United Nations police in particular. Were it not for that, many of them would not be here. At the same time, however, that creates an enormous organization problem when it comes to running the camps in South Sudan's current chaotic environment. Regardless, that compels us to consider how to improve the situation on the protection front and what tools, techniques and talents we need in order to optimize the joint functioning of the civilian and military components. Secondly, we have the issue of ensuring full gender integration.

    2016-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7808 (2016) · source

  12. Today, we have chosen what we have found useful in the current context in our various theatres of operations - four aspects represented by the presence of four of our Police Commissioners on the ground: the protection of civilians; the integration of a gender perspective; building police capacities; and personnel security, behaviour and discipline. I will therefore be very brief, since the Council is here to listen to them rather than me. First, with regard to the protection of civilians, it is clear that we are dealing with enormous challenges on the ground. We see it every day in South Sudan, and Commissioner Munyambo will be discussing that.

    2016-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7808 (2016) · source

  13. I wish to thank you, Mr. President, and the Senegalese presidency for this fresh opportunity for dialogue with police officials as part of the annual week for United Nations police in New York - a week that is always, and perhaps even more so this year, an opportunity to discuss all the challenges our police forces face and what must be done to improve our tools. This meeting comes two years after the very important adoption of resolution 2185 (2014), which was the first ofits kind in the history of the Security Council, as it was the first time that the Council recognized the central role of Blue Helmets in peacekeeping operations.

    2016-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7808 (2016) · source

  14. Central African institutions must do everything in their power and more to stop attacks against humanitarian actors and help create the conditions for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, an area that has seen very little progress. More than ever, MINUSCA and the international community must stand firmly by the side of the Central Africans to address these challenges. Everything that can be done, in particular by the members of the Council, to rally the greatest number of Member States, including non-traditional donors, to support the country ahead of the Brussels conference should be done. With such concerted and persistent effort, there is a good chance that we can help Central Africans to lay down the foundations for a lasting peace in a country that has suffered for too long.

    2016-10-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7787 (2016) · source

  15. Important progress has inarguably been made so far, but there is a great need for it. The country's institutions must be strengthened in a spirit of inclusiveness to make progress in national reconciliation. Key reforms must be undertaken in the security and defence sectors. The promotion and protection of human rights needs to be strengthened, and impunity must be brought to an end. Inclusive economic development must be fostered. State authority under the rule of law must be extended. Finally, basic services for all must be improved. Recent events show that the situation remains fragile, and spoilers are still active on both sides, I would say.

    2016-10-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7787 (2016) · source

  16. The country's needs for the next five years have been jointly assessed by the Government, the United Nations, the European Union and the World Bank. As a political complement to these efforts, I welcome President Touade'ra's personal commitment to strengthening cooperation between the Central African Republic and the international community through the mutual accountability framework, sometimes called the "compact", which is in development. At the ministerial-level meeting held on 23 September on the margins of the general debate, President Touadera announced his intention to finalize this mutual accountability framework before the Brussels conference. It is therefore more critical than ever to maintain a positive momentum to build peace in the Central African Republic.

    2016-10-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7787 (2016) · source

  17. The importance ofthe donors' conference, hosted by the European Union in Brussels on 17 November, cannot be overemphasized. In previous crises in Central Africa, the international community often failed to sustain its engagement in the country over time, which critically undermined stabilization efforts. While the primary responsibility for the restoration of peace and stability rests with the Central Africans, the international community must also keep its word. I would like to mention that, in a demonstration of the United Nations commitment to peace in the country, the Deputy Secretary-General agreed to lead the Organization's delegation in Brussels. Preparations for the Brussels conference have benefited from a unity of effort between the international community and the Central African Government.

    2016-10-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7787 (2016) · source

  18. In line with its strategic objective, MINUSCA has supported all the Government's outreach and awareness-raising efforts to help lay the groundwork for the dialogue. Last Wednesday, MINUSCA met with ex-Seleka representatives in Bria and urged them to join the first committee meeting. Indeed, many ofthe leaders agreed to participate and reiterated their commitment to forging lasting peace, while nonetheless noting their concerns over the Government's commitment to inclusive solutions. In this regard, the ex-Seleka assembly in Bria can be seen as an effort to strengthen the negotiation position of certain armed groups before the dialogue. Continued international support for the Central African people in their endeavours to stabilize the country is now more critical than ever.

    2016-10-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7787 (2016) · source

  19. In stark contrast with these worrying developments, the Central African authorities continued to make progress in implementing President Touadera's vision for the country, including by engaging the armed groups to start a formal dialogue on the launch of the national programme on disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation. The first meeting of the consultative monitoring committee is expected to be convened in Bangui on 12 October by President Touadera. Representatives of 11 out of the 14 armed groups are expected to participate. Those refusing to attend include the ex-Se'leka Front patriotique pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique; the Return, Reclamation and Rehabilitation, or the 3R; and the anti-Balaka Mokom faction.

    2016-10-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7787 (2016) · source

  20. MINUSCA has enhanced its uniformed personnel deployments and used its good offices in these areas to protect civilians and reduce tensions. Meanwhile, in the north-east of the country, members of some ex-Se'le'ka factions have continued to gather in the town of Bria for an assembly, which some want to use to reunite the ex-Se'leka. MINUSCA, in line with its mandate, maintains a robust posture in the area. The Mission continues to enforce the weapons- free zone and to communicate its intent to arrest any combatant caught in town with a weapon.

    2016-10-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7787 (2016) · source

  21. For example, on 7 October the body of a young Muslim man was dumped by alleged elements of the Central African Armed Forces in front of one of MINUSCA's camp. The Government, MINUSCA and civil society leaders are making an effort to break the cycle of violence and put an end to impunity. In the provinces, in the north-west and in Kaga- Bandoro, recent clashes between anti-Balaka and ex- Sele'ka factions and retaliatory attacks against the civilian population have resulted in significant loss of human life and forced 3,200 people to flee their homes. The more than 16 attacks on aid groups in the region in September alone forced many organizations to temporarily relocate staff and reduce or suspend their operations.

    2016-10-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7787 (2016) · source

  22. It also engaged with the Central African Republic authorities at the highest level to coordinate the response. Representatives of the Government of the Central African Republic and the Muslim community called for calm. President Touadera ordered an investigation into the killings, including the reprisal actions. The President also activated - for the first time - the joint coordination mechanism between MINUSCA and the national security and defence forces. Joint patrols were undertaken and MINUSCA adjusted its protection efforts to better and more directly respond to the needs of civilians and to encourage community dialogue. Calm has since largely returned to Bangui, but the tension remains palpable.

    2016-10-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7787 (2016) · source

  23. Last week, on 4 October, tensions flared when a member of the Central African Armed Forces, the former of head of the personal security team of the interim President Samba-Panza, was shot and killed in the predominantly Muslim neighbourhood of PKS in the third district of Bangui by a gunman reportedly affiliated with a self-defence group from PKS. In retaliatory acts of violence, a total of 12 people were killed and another 20 wounded by some by uncontrolled elements of the Central African Armed Forces, self-defence groups and unknown perpetrators. Fourteen people are still missing, but may be hiding. MINUSCA acted decisively to prevent an outbreak of intercommunal violence, including by securing the perimeter ofthe PKS neigbourhood.

    2016-10-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7787 (2016) · source

  24. The Council has before it the report of the Secretary-General (8/2016/824) on the situation in the Central African Republic and on the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) . I would like to briefly update the Council on key developments since the issuance of the report. We are at the end of the rainy season - a traditionally volatile period - which has been used by armed groups and other spoilers to advance their interests.

    2016-10-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7787 (2016) · source

  25. I deeply regret the sombre tone of my presentation today, but I would be remiss if I did not draw the attention of the Council to the persistent absence of concrete progress in the implementation of the peace agreement and the deterioration of the security situation, 18 months after the signing of the Algiers Accord. The situation poses serious questions as to the sustainability and the very relevance of the overall framework for peace and stability in Mali, a framework that the Malian parties have agreed to and that Mali's international partners have committed to supporting.

    2016-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7784 (2016) · source

  26. We take every opportunity to work towards that goal, including at the London peacekeeping defence ministerial held a few weeks ago and at the ministerial meeting on Mali held here on 23 September. I attended a meeting in Europe, in Slovakia, last week, and I have also spoken to all interlocutors. But the reality is that no Member State has so far committed to filling in the gaps in our capabilities or to provide us with the capacities that have been authorized by resolution 2295 (2016) and previous resolutions. Indeed, there is a glaring lack ofvolunteers.

    2016-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7784 (2016) · source

  27. As tragically illustrated by the attacks on Monday, the Mission's capacity to protect civilians and counter asymmetric attacks in active defence of its mandate has further been hampered by the absence of the capabilities recommended by the Secretary-General in his report issued in June, which the Council authorized in resolution 2295 (2016). In that context, I regret to have to inform the Security Council that MINUSMA, instead of receiving reinforcements, will soon be facing the loss of key enablers. For example, two troop-contributing countries have recently apprised us of their decision to withdraw three of the Mission's five helicopter units by early 2017. I can assure the Council that we will make every effort to generate assets to replace them.

    2016-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7784 (2016) · source

  28. It is in that context that Special Representative of the Secretary-General Annadif has been engaging the Governments of the Group of Five Sahel Member States, while the Mission is currently planning the deployment of liaison officers as stipulated in the resolution. The participants in the ministerial meeting of 23 September unanimously stressed that the primary responsibility for the success of the peace process in Mali lies with the parties. MINUSMA will not be able to fully implement its mandate as long as the signatories to the Peace Agreement do not resolutely engage in its implementation. The time has come - it is certainly time - to rise above those immediate localized interests and to think of the long-term expectations of the constituents directly affected, as well as the needs of the country as a whole.

    2016-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7784 (2016) · source

  29. While the state of play of the peace process currently precludes the return of the Malian army to the north part of the country, the Mission has already taken concrete steps to support them in the centre of the country, for example, by upgrading protection for the armed forces at its base in Nampala and by deploying troops with air support to aid them in reasserting control over Boni. Meanwhile, in parallel, MINUSMA continues to seek to enhance collaboration with Mali's neighbours and to support a regional security initiative to more effectively address all the common security challenges.

    2016-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7784 (2016) · source

  30. New violations of the ceasefire have further hampered access for humanitarian actors, who are doing their best to answer the most pressing needs of the population, pending the resumption of basic public services by the State. I also regret to note that there have been serious allegations of human rights violations, notably by the Groupe d'autodefense des Touaregs imghad et leurs allies in the Kidal region, and we also continue to receive reports of the excessive use of force by the Malian army in the centre of the country. Pursuant to resolution 2295 (2016), MINUSMA has developed a plan to support the redeployment of the Malian armed forces, which is fully in line with the human rights due diligence policy of the Organization.

    2016-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7784 (2016) · source

  31. With regard to additional capabilities, they have not yet been generated. The force has utilized the tools at its disposal to the fullest extent in order to project a more robust and proactive posture to protect civilians. Following the clashes in July in Kidal, the Mission launched an operation to deter clashes and protect civilians by showing a robust presence with patrols and checkpoints. It was therefore a very active posture. In August, the Mission launched another operation, again establishing checkpoints and conducting coordinated patrols with the Malian armed forces along the Timbuktu-Douentza-Hombori access from Timbuktu to the Mopti region. Furthermore, in spite of the Mission doing its utmost, civilians continue to suffer from the consequences of military operations by both the armed groups and the Government.

    2016-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7784 (2016) · source

  32. The fact that Malian stakeholders resort to Special Representative of the Secretary-General Annadif's good offices even on issues with indirect links to the Peace Agreement - such as when he facilitated discussions between opposition parties and the Government on the draft revised electoral law - demonstrates the level of trust that Mr. Annadif has been able to establish in the nine months he has been in office. While there is a high level of trust with the parties, unfortunately it must be said that the parties to the Peace Agreement are yet to leave aside their differences - for example, on Kidal and other issues - and to sit down with our colleague to prioritize implementation steps in order to finalize benchmarks and concrete timelines, as requested in the resolution.

    2016-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7784 (2016) · source

  33. In that regard, we must welcome the announcement by President Keita, during the ministerial meeting on the sidelines of the General Assembly on 23 September, that a conference of national accord would be held later this year, which could be an important step in strengthening cohesion and national reconciliation to find a long-term, as inclusive as possible, solution to the deep-rooted causes of the crisis in northern Mali. In the past three months since the adoption of resolution 2295 (2016), MINUSMA has spared no effort to proactively adjust to its new mandate.

    2016-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7784 (2016) · source

  34. In that context, it is very important that the Government of Mali, with United Nations support, continue its efforts to prepare a national counter- terrorism strategy that is multifaceted and coherent and includes comprehensive measures to prevent violent extremism. This is necessary because repeated attacks against the authority of the State are taking place against the background of general degradation in the rule of law and social cohesion. In the region of Mopti alone, intercommunity violence led to 18 deaths and 44 wounded in June, as well as 6 dead and 9 wounded in the period from late August to early September.

    2016-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7784 (2016) · source

  35. On 29 May, in Sevare in the Mopti region, an improvised explosive device - if such devices really are improvised - was exploded during a convoy of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), killing five Blue Helmets returning from a civilian- protection operation in Tenenkou Cercle. On 18 July, a column of 18 vehicles and several motorcycles attacked installations of Malian armed forces in Nampala in the Se'gou region, killing 15 and wounding 34 people. On 2 September, armed individuals briefly occupied the locality of Boni again in the Mopti region.

    2016-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7784 (2016) · source

  36. In that context, the Council adopted resolution 2295 (2016) to call upon the parties to accelerate the implementation of the Agreement, notably by agreeing, inter alia, to prioritize certain provisions. Unfortunately, three months, later I am compelled to report to the Council that, since July, clashes have resumed among signatory groups in the Kidal region, thereby seriously threatening the peace process and postponing once again the appointment of the interim administration. Those institutional and security arrangements should have been in place for nearly a year, and the joint patrols should have been launched in November 2015. I also deplore the lack of progress regarding the process of cantonment and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The situation in the centre of the country has become worse.

    2016-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7784 (2016) · source

  37. Although the relative calm in recent months might have given us some hope that there could possibly be improvement in the situation on the ground, unfortunately we need to realize that the persistent delays we have seen in the implementation of the Peace Agreement and the latest violations of the ceasefire are incompatible with lasting stabilization, even if that were temporary. At the meeting of the Security Council on Mali in June (see S/PV.7727), Foreign Minister Diop announced the agreement of the parties on the modalities for the appointment of interim authorities and the timing for establishing them in the five northern regions of Mali during the June-September period, as well as the establishment of security arrangements, including the structures for the Operational Coordination Mechanism.

    2016-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7784 (2016) · source

  38. I thank you, Mr. President, for your invitation to brief the Security Council along with my colleague and friend Under-Secretary-General Atul Khare, on the overall developments in the situation in Mali. 1 take this opportunity to welcome the new Permanent Representative of Mali, Mr. lssa Konfourou. After four months of calm, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was once again the target of a series of coordinated attacks on 3 October.

    2016-10-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7784 (2016) · source

  39. We remain convinced that the Security Council will bring all the support needed for the cooperative effort of the international mediators to achieve those objectives.

    2016-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7781 (2016) · source

  40. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that, with the signature by all the parties to the political road map proposed by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, we have taken an important step forward in the peace process. This now needs to be consolidated, and the parties should from now on implement both the letter and the spirit of the document and undertake to resume negotiations so as to come quickly to an accord on both the cessation of hostilities and the modalities of humanitarian access to the conflict zones. I would call on them to listen attentively to the hopes of the people, hopes that are focused on peace, stability and a somewhat better livelihood through development.

    2016-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7781 (2016) · source

  41. I have to note further that an initial assessment by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has stated that without further information or evidence being made available, it is not possible at this stage for it to draw any conclusions based on the content of the Amnesty International report. I would therefore encourage the Government of the Sudan, which is party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, to extend its full cooperation to any future OPCW investigation, as in fact the Government in Khartoum has expressed it was ready to do in its statements to the media following the publication of the report, which underscores the absolute urgency of the need for a cessation of hostilities in Darfur and a need for the Security Council to act in unison to bring about an end to armed conflict in the region.

    2016-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7781 (2016) · source

  42. Ending the protracted suffering of the civilian population in Darfur must remain the main priority of the international community. In that context, we are aware of the allegations regarding the use of chemical weapons against civilians by Government of the Sudan forces in Jebel Marra, as presented in the Amnesty International report that was released on 29 September. We have not come across any evidence regarding the use of chemical weapons in the Jebel Marra. At the same time, as Council members know, the Government of the Sudan has consistently denied any access by UNAMID to conflict areas in the Jebel Marra, which has clearly prevented the mission from being able to monitor effectively and report on the impact of the fighting.

    2016-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7781 (2016) · source

  43. However, a significant amount of United Nations and contingent-owned equipment remains at Port Sudan, which continues to hamper the operational effectiveness of the Mission. During my most recent meetings with officials ofthe Government ofthe Sudan, they promised that measures would be taken to address bureaucratic and procedural impediments and to ensure the release of those shipments. On 17 October, the African Union, the United Nations and the Government of the Sudan will resume their engagement on the exit strategy based on the parameters set by the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council. A critical step in that process will be the development of agreed criteria for gauging progress towards the UNAMID benchmarks agreed upon following the last convening of the Joint Working Group, in May.

    2016-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7781 (2016) · source

  44. On the same day, and as earlier promised by President Al-Bashir, the Government released 21 children it claimed had been captured in clashes with the JEM. in 2015. With regard to the National Dialogue, on 26 September, President Al-Bashir officially received the recommendations of the National Dialogue Conference, which he pledged to implement following its conclusion on 10 October. As political disagreements remain over that end date, and as the Sudan Call - as it calls itself- maintains its rejection of the National Dialogue Conference, the political process remains seriously constrained. I am, however, pleased to report a relative improvement in the issuance of Visas to UNAMID personnel and the processing of ration containers for our troops.

    2016-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7781 (2016) · source

  45. Regrettably, the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid remains outside of the negotiation process, and no consultations with its leadership have taken place since the last meeting with the UNAMID Joint Special Representative, which took place last July in Paris. Meanwhile on the ground in Darfur, on 7 September, President Al-Bashir hosted the Presidents of Chad and the Central African Republic and the Emir of Qatar at a ceremony to mark the end of the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA). On that occasion, he announced a new era of peace and stability for Darfur. And, on 21 September, the President issued a decree formally dissolving the Darfur Regional Authority and all bodies established under the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, with a few exceptions.

    2016-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7781 (2016) · source

  46. At the beginning of September, UNAMID held consultations with the leaders of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/North, the JEM and the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi in Kampala. All restated their areas of contention in the talks and indicated that, if necessary flexibility were demonstrated by both parties on two issues - on the release ofprisoners ofwar and on the mechanism for the oversight of humanitarian assistance - an agreement could be reached. The Government and the Darfur armed movements, together with UNAMID, are expected to travel to Doha for engagement with the Government of Qatar on the way forward. The High-level Implementation Panel also held a new round of informal consultations in Addis Ababa last week end.

    2016-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7781 (2016) · source

  47. Turn to the political situation, as members will recall, the road map agreement was signed at Addis Ababa on 8 August by the members of the Sudan Call. The African Union High-level Implementation Panel then convened talks between the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ North, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi. Those talks were held from 9 to 14 August to consider draft agreements on humanitarian access and a cessation of hostilities in both Darfur the two Areas. Both sets of talks were suspended until further notice following persistent disagreements between the parties. In the face of that impasse, the High-level Implementation Panel, the Special Envoy and UNAMID continued their engagement with the parties to try to bridge their differences.

    2016-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7781 (2016) · source

  48. At this stage, none of the reported numbers can be verified. Local authorities have issued instructions to humanitarian agencies that they are to limit their activities only to old established caseloads, and should not verify, register or share information pertaining to newly arrived IDPs. Moreover, international non-governmental organizations have reported that all missions between Nertiti and Guldo have been stopped until further notice. Despite those access and reporting restrictions, UNAMID continues to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance through logistical support and protection, while engaging the parties to immediately cease hostilities and the Government to allow immediate, full and unhindered access conflict areas in Jebel Marra.

    2016-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7781 (2016) · source

  49. Of course, the Mission remains focused on the core objective given by the Council - to protect civilians. I can only call on the Government of the Sudan and on the international community to work closely, and in good cooperation, to address all these challenges. Turning to the humanitarian angle, the impact of the conflict remains significant. Since the resumption of the fighting, as I mentioned earlier, in G010 and Guldo on 17 September, humanitarian agencies estimate that about 5,500 newly displaced people, mainly women and children, have arrived in the Nertiti- north camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs), although community leaders in the camps report higher numbers f of up to 12,500 people. There are further reports of an additional 4,000 people having arrived in Guldo town.

    2016-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7781 (2016) · source

  50. Local authorities continued to take measures to contain the situation by facilitating peace agreements and ensuring the presence of Government forces in the more sensitive areas. Khartoum also announced a strategy to address intercommunal conflicts and curb criminality by, among other measures, the regulation and control of weapons. That certainly is encouraging recognition of the seriousness of the situation. But, beyond those measures, complex challenges in terms of governance and development still need to be addressed in order to try to restore the social fabric and peaceful coexistence among communities in a region crippled by over a decade of conflict. UNAMID continues to support central and local Government initiatives to restore peace and stability in communities.

    2016-10-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7781 (2016) · source