YouSaid · the spoken record

Lavrov

lines on the record: 2,533
first: 1994-09-23
most recent: 2023-09-20
sittings or episodes: 322
sources: un-security-council

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“Clearly, the time has come to give serious thought to the convening, under the auspices of the United Nations, of an international conference on Afghanistan, which would act as a guarantor of post-conflict state- building in the country and would elaborate a broad programme for the economic recovery of the country. We believe that the "six plus two" group is an important forum, in whose context we can find an effective balance between the interests of the various parties concerned. We deem to be an absolute sine qua non the fact that work in that group should be based on close partnership and on the search for options for a post-conflict political system in Afghanistan that would be agreeable to the international community as a whole, and to the countries of the region in particular.”
2001-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4414 (2001) · source
“Only on that basis will it be possible to ensure a stable political regime. Thirdly, the Taliban movement, which has discredited itself because of its support for international terrorism, can have no place in the power structures in Afghanistan. Unless this criminal movement, which has no popular support, is eliminated, we cannot hope to see the definitive eradication of terrorism in Afghanistan. Here we must draw a clear distinction between the Taliban on the one hand and the Pashtuns and the traditional Afghan clergy on the other, most of whom do not share the radical views of the Taliban.”
2001-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4414 (2001) · source
“First of all, it must be a peaceful and truly independent state, one that has friendly relations with its neighbours and with the international community as a whole. Its government should not be pro-anyone - only pro-Afghan. It is essential that in future that country not pose any threat to regional and international security. Secondly, given historical realities in Afghanistan, it is clear that the viability of its future political system will depend directly on whether the new government is broadly representative and multi- ethnic in nature. It is important that, in the new political system, no one ethnic group should have dominance over any other. It is essential to work out acceptable forms of partnership among the Afghans, Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras and Uzbeks.”
2001-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4414 (2001) · source
“We are convinced that the United Nations should play the central role in facilitating the transformation of Afghanistan into a normal, stable and prosperous state - not only because averting the threat to regional and international security emanating from Taliban- controlled territory falls squarely within the purview of the Security Council and the General Assembly, but also because we believe that only within the context of the United Nations can we find practical solutions that would be acceptable to all parties to the peace process, thereby ensuring the parties' cooperation in their implementation. What is our view of the principles of the future political dispensation in Afghanistan?”
2001-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4414 (2001) · source
“Of course, it is, without a doubt, up to the Afghans themselves to find a solution. However, it is clear that, without the active assistance of the international community, the Afghans alone will find it difficult to deal with these tasks. It is necessary to resolve these issues effectively, not only for the Afghan people but for the entire international community. Otherwise, it will be impossible to neutralize the threats emanating from Afghanistan - terrorism, the drug trade and other threats that affect the interests of the whole of humankind.”
2001-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4414 (2001) · source
“Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We, too, are grateful to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Ambassador Brahimi, for participating in today's meeting. This meeting is very timely. We are grateful to you, Mr. President, for having convened it. The counter-terrorist operation by the international coalition and the major military successes of the United Front, which in recent days has succeeded in liberating from the Taliban a significant portion of Afghan territory, including Kabul and other towns, give particular relevance - even urgency - to defining the international community's task of providing assistance to the Afghan people for post- conflict peace-building, in particular for the political reconstruction of their country.”
2001-11-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4414 (2001) · source
“Yesterday's statement by the Council and the draft resolution we are adopting today demonstrate unconditionally the resolve of Council members to do all they can to leave not one terrorist act unpunished and to increase efforts to prevent and end terrorism. In a statement of 11 September, President Vladimir Putin said: "Russia knows very well what terror is and so we understand better than most the feelings of the American people. On behalf of Russia, I turn to the people of the United States of America. I would like to say that we are with you, we are in full solidarity with your feelings of grief and we support you."”
2001-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4370 (2001) · source
“Mr. Lavrov (Russia) (spoke in Russian): The United States has come up against an unprecedented act of aggression of international terrorism. On behalf of the Russian leadership, we would like to express our most sincere and deepest condolences to all of the victims and to the people and Government of the United States of America. Yesterday's events in the United States transcends national borders. It is a brazen challenge to all of humankind. What took place on 11 September once again highlights the timeliness of the task of joining the efforts of the entire international community in combating terror, this plague of the twenty-first century. This task was set forth in Security Council resolution 1269 (1999), which was unanimously adopted at the initiative of Russia.”
2001-09-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4370 (2001) · source
“In conclusion, once again I would like to congratulate and sincerely thank the entire Colombian delegation, Ambassador Valdivieso and yourself, Mr. Minister, for the attention you have given to the work of the Security Council in August. This has contributed greatly to the successful outcome of our work.”
2001-08-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4363 (2001) · source
“In July of this year, hardly a month ago, a conference was held on this problem, and it adopted a final document. It seemed that it would be very difficult for the Security Council not to repeat what had already been done at that conference. Nevertheless, the statement that we issued today has a specific nature that is unique to the Security Council. It does not duplicate the decisions of the General Assembly. It defines ways that the Security Council can in the future contribute to addressing this problem in accordance with its mandate and without impinging on the competence of other bodies. The substantial discussions on the problem of small arms and light weapons - discussions which you presided over, Sir - contributed greatly to this outcome. I will limit myself to these remarks.”
2001-08-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4363 (2001) · source
“But in most cases, as I said, the August presidency succeeded in obtaining results. We are pleased also to note that all meetings of the Security Council, both formal meetings and consultations, had sensible, well-thought-out agendas setting out specific issues, not general or theoretical considerations. That is of particular importance to my delegation; we have constantly argued in favour of such an approach to the Council's activities. We would not like the Council to duplicate debates held in the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council or other bodies. We are grateful that, as President, Colombia drew a clear line between the competencies of the Security Council and those of other intergovernmental bodies of the United Nations. A very good example of this is the statement that the Council has just issued on small arms.”
2001-08-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4363 (2001) · source
“Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I endorse the words of welcome addressed to you, Mr. President. We are very happy to see you here, and are very pleased at the constant attention you devote to the work of the Security Council. As the President requested, we will not repeat the substance of our positions on the items discussed by the Security Council in August. I wish only to say that characteristics of Colombia's presidency of the Security Council were clarity in the organization of our work, a highly rational style, and persistence in working to attain the goals that had been set. It was not possible, of course, to attain those goals on all the issues that were before the Council. Ambassador Wang Yingfan has just mentioned one example of where the Security Council was unable to reach a decision.”
2001-08-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4363 (2001) · source
“We are convinced that the lasting settlement of the Kosovo Macedonian pockets of tension in the region is possible only in a general Balkan context, and that that goal should be promoted by the implementation of the Russian initiative: to conclude a legally binding agreement to strengthen the security and the sovereignty of all countries of the region, and to that end to convene a Balkan summit, with international participation. We believe that that Russian proposal remains relevant.”
2001-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4359 (2001) · source
“While reaffirming that position, we think it necessary to stress once again also that the international presences in Kosovo will have to take very decisive action to cut off any possible flows of weapons destined for Kosovo Albanian terrorist groups, because the military embargo with regard to these groups must remain in full force. All this is necessary in order to cut off the channels of financial and material assistance from the territory of Kosovo to extremism, terrorism and separatism in the Balkans.”
2001-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4359 (2001) · source
“Talking about Macedonia and about the current operation there, I would add that we are disquieted by information we are receiving about efforts to create in Macedonia another army - an Albanian national army- which is trying to unite under its banner the most militant fighters and to retain a battle-ready core of extremists. That cannot be allowed. We have repeatedly stated that we are in favour of lifting the arms embargo imposed by resolution 1160 (1998) against the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and we support the appeal by Ambassador Hume to resolve this question as soon as possible.”
2001-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4359 (2001) · source
“We know that during the operation that has just started in Macedonia, the NLA is supposed to be handing over the weapons that its militants possess. Those who are carrying out operation Essential Harvest have to be sure not to repeat the unfortunate experience of Kosovo, in which it was ceremoniously proclaimed that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had been disarmed, stripped of its uniforms and disbanded. But in fact, it turned out, of course, that the KLA retained its organizational structures, its weapons, its access to new arms deliveries and its ability to destabilize various parts of the Balkan region.”
2001-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4359 (2001) · source
“To cite just one example, on 13 August, Russian KFOR troops arrested two Kosovo Albanians in the region of Kosovska Kamenica on the administrative border with Serbia. One of those detained had an automatic weapon, ammunition, a bullet-proof vest and a National Liberation Army (NLA) uniform. He confessed that he was part of the 111th company of the NLA brigade, which had conducted battle activities in Macedonia in the Aracinovo region. This June, he was one of the militants allowed to leave the buses that were being blocked by the Macedonians in the Aracinovo region. Now he had turned up in Kosovo on the administrative border with Serbia with his weapons and his uniform. That is just one example that shows that the problem is still there. It has to be resolved.”
2001-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4359 (2001) · source
“It is clear to all that there is a link between the conflict in Macedonia and the situation in Kosovo, since Kosovo has basically become a rear base for Albanian armed groups in Macedonia. All this sheds stark light on the failure to find a solution to the problem of disarming Kosovo militants and eliminating their illegal armed formations. We are convinced that the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) must take additional robust steps in this area. We have no doubt that it is still important to halt the spillover of extremists from one part of the region to another and their use of various covers to conceal their terrorist activities.”
2001-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4359 (2001) · source
“I would add that all participants in the process of the settlement must show as much responsibility as possible. In this connection, the decision taken by the head of the mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) does not add any optimism that they are able to certify for participation in the elections the extremist party known as the National Movement of Kosovo. Clearly that is a mistake, and that mistake has to be redressed. Otherwise, we might get the impression that the OSCE was officially recognizing the legitimacy of a structure that represents Albanian extremists, and that the OSCE was actually trying to encourage such structures. The situation in Kosovo - and this point has been made before by Mr. Guehenno and Ambassador Hume - cannot be seen in isolation of the situation in the region as a whole.”
2001-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4359 (2001) · source
“I am referring in particular to the creation of tax collection posts on the administrative border with Serbia. And I refer to the imposition of the 96-hour notification regime for travel to Kosovo by officials from Yugoslavia. We are troubled that UNMIK has not managed to establish normal relations yet with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Committee on Kosovo. We share the hopes of many regarding the appointment of Mr. Covic as leader of the coordination centre of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of Serbia on Kosovo. However, it is clear that this appointment, in and of itself, cannot resolve all the serious problems remaining. Ultimately, the main guarantee of success is the scrupulous and comprehensive compliance of all with resolution 1244 (1999). This is possible only if there is proper cooperation between UNMIK and Belgrade.”
2001-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4359 (2001) · source
“The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and KFOR must robustly increase their activities in order to resolve the security problem there, the problem of returns and freedom of movement; they must do this well ahead ofthe elections. We can say that the main thing is that the Government of Yugoslavia has unambiguously called upon the Kosovo Serbs to participate in the elections. But to expect that this is going to resolve all the problems is naive, to put it mildly. We note that the United Nations Mission is taking certain steps to establish dialogue with the Government of Yugoslavia. But these steps are obviously not enough. At the same time, the head of UNMIK is taking other decisions that are creating additional irritation in relations between UNMIK and Belgrade.”
2001-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4359 (2001) · source
“Two thousand people in all: this figure speaks for itself. The reasons for this situation - and this is not the first year we have been talking about them- include the fact that the security problem in Kosovo is not being duly resolved. The return of refugees is not being guaranteed, and the numbers Mr. Guehenno gave us on organized returns are paltry. Security is not guaranteed, nor is freedom of movement for the minorities in the province. All of this is well known. Unless these conditions are guaranteed, it is hard to talk about any real democratic electoral process. The conducting of the elections in these conditions in November of this year could lead to an increase in Kosovo separatism.”
2001-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4359 (2001) · source
“Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful to Mr. Gue'henno for his briefing on the situation in Kosovo and aspects relating to the situation in other parts of the region, particularly in Macedonia. I would first like to comment on the main part of his briefing, namely, preparations for the elections in Kosovo. This is one of the most important questions, and although some progress has been made in this process leading up to the elections, we must say that on the whole the situation does not encourage optimism. As is known, in the registration of members of the Serbian and other non-Albanian communities in the province by 17 August, three months before elections are to be held, just over 2,000 people have been registered among the Serb, Gypsy, Turk and other minorities.”
2001-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4359 (2001) · source
“The Security Council has twice already 4 in resolutions 1327 (2000) and 1353 (2001) - emphasized the need for the study of means to make more active use of the Military Staff Committee in order to strengthen United Nations peacekeeping operations, and we are expecting the Military Staff Committee do respond to the Council's resolutions. In conclusion, I would like to support Ambassador Valdivieso in saying that for planning our work it is extremely important to stick to the agenda, and that those questions that need to be discussed under "other matters" should be discussed after the planned items on the agenda. Once again, Mr. President, I would like to congratulate you and the Secretary-General.”
2001-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4343 (2001) · source
“The report of the Secretary-General on peacekeeping has already been issued, and we consider that the Council must actively support the Secretary-General's efforts to continue to improve the United Nations peacekeeping machinery; but the Security Council itself, of course, must make its own contribution to this work in accordance with its own competencies. Here I would like to recall that we, of course, also need to follow up the implementation of our decisions. One of the mechanisms which must be useful for our work on peacekeeping so far is not helping us very much. I am referring to the Military Staff Committee.”
2001-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4343 (2001) · source
“We did not have Macedonia on the agenda, but it was always invisibly present, as were the Balkans as a whole. So I think that the dialogue that we began with the Secretary-General on these issues should be more specific in the months to come. The Security Council should look at how its relevant resolutions on the Balkans are being implemented. I share the assessment of the importance of the resolution on cooperation with troop-contributing countries. The activity of the Security Council on the question of United Nations peacekeeping will continue.”
2001-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4343 (2001) · source
“Despite all of the difficulties, it was possible both to find solutions to specific problems which could not be postponed - as the resolutions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo and on Western Sahara - and to make further progress in the development of the instruments available to the Security Council. We have already referred to the meetings on the report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of conflict. All of this was a direct act of implementing the decisions of the Millennium Summit and, unquestionably, I agree that such meetings should be as informal and interactive as possible. They can be useful as we try to draw lessons from the past month and think about how we will be working in the future. In that connection, I recall the mission to Kosovo and the discussion that took place afterwards.”
2001-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4343 (2001) · source
“Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I associate myself with the warm words of congratulations to the Secretary-General. We are all looking forward to continuing to support his efforts for the reform of the United Nations. His presence here today confirms his intention to work in the closest way possible with the Security Council. I would also like to express gratitude to you and to your delegation, Mr. President. You had a very difficult month, filled with events that arose unexpectedly, but, in my view, you coped with your duties very well.”
2001-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4343 (2001) · source
“The deadlock that has arisen as a result made us unable to implement the Secretary-General's initiative concerning a comprehensive dialogue between the United Nations and Iraq on all pending problems. We regard the status quo as unacceptable, so today we have introduced a specific proposal that contains clear criteria for suspending and then lifting sanctions that are tied to the deployment in Iraq of the ongoing monitoring and verification system on the basis of implementation of existing resolutions of the Security Council. We are convinced that there is simply no alternative to this comprehensive approach if we all want to achieve a lasting settlement around Iraq and in the entire Gulf region that is strictly in accordance with resolutions of the United Nations.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“However, such a discussion must not be politicized and must be geared towards reaching agreement on measures that would genuinely improve the humanitarian programme in order to undertake tasks that are truly humanitarian. At the same time, Russia feels that we must delay no longer the resumption of Security Council work on a comprehensive settlement of the Iraqi problem. Everyone knows that this work was interrupted because of the hasty adoption of resolution 1284 (1999), which contained too many gaps and too much ambiguity that made the resolution not implementable in its current form. Since then, we have consistently advocated creating the necessary conditions and mechanisms for implementing the resolution, but some States members of the Security Council did not want that.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“We are also concerned that, as a result of introducing these so- called "smart" sanctions, serious damage could be done to the legitimate trade and economic interests of many countries, including Russia. We feel that the adoption of the proposed draft resolution on smart sanctions would be detrimental to averting the humanitarian catastrophe, devastate the Iraqi economy and work against a post-conflict settlement in the Gulf region. Taking account of all these factors, we cannot agree to this draft resolution, which seems unadoptable. This certainly does not mean that Russia is not prepared to discuss further questions of how the humanitarian operation functions.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“Overall, the concept that has been put together changes the very essence of the humanitarian programme of the United Nations, politicizes it and makes it and UNMOVIC into an instrument for applying sanctions pressure. Attempts to use the humanitarian operation to resolve tasks unrelated to it would bury all hope for a resumption of ongoing disarmament monitoring in Iraq and the legal lifting of the anti-Iraq sanctions, pursuant to Security Council decisions. The perpetuation of sanctions can make the situation in the Gulf much worse. Given the conditions of the crisis in the Middle East, this would raise regional tension to a qualitatively new level of danger. Neighbouring States of Iraq and other States of the region already see this new concept as a threat to their new socio-economic and political stability.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“An analysis demonstrates that this list of goods would not be broader, but would be rather more prohibitive. Its approval could undermine prospects for the industrial development of Iraq. The draft resolution contains nothing investment or economic projects f and not only infrastructure projects - which runs contrary to resolution 1352 (2001) in respect of facilitating economic ties with Iraq. There is also total silence concerning the fate of the Memorandum of Understanding between Iraq and the United Nations, on which the humanitarian programme has been based to date. It would therefore appear that this new scheme is to be introduced without Baghdad's consent, and that is utterly unrealistic. Moreover, it is contrary to the decisions of the Council concerning the need to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“Those Arrangements, however, which bring together a limited group of countries on a voluntary basis, are already being applied in practice, inter alia, in respect of Iraq. Giving those Arrangements a "sanctions status" under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations would have very serious legal and political consequences. Above and beyond the Wassenaar Arrangements, a third part is being proposed for this "goods review list", in which there would be a list of additional products also subject to monitoring for delivery into Iraq. Included in this third category are goods defined in such a way that it would be possible, via very vague procedures for considering contracts, to block projects that are essential to the recovery of the energy, oil, industrial and other areas of Iraq's economy.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“Until recently, the Security Council proceeded on the premise that, in order to ensure that Iraq did not resume its programme of weapons of mass destruction, it was quite sufficient to have the so-called "1051 list", including in the post-sanctions period. That list is already in effect and a procedure in place for its regular review. Such a review has just been carried out by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the revised list requires further study. In any event, we believe that the list will continue to be applied on the basis of resolution 1051 (1996). It is now being said that the authors of the new concept regard the "1051 list" as inadequate. They want to include in their "goods review list" goods from the so-called Wassenaar Arrangements.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“One basic element is that the system proposed in the draft resolution leads us away from the task of full implementation of Security Council resolutions on Iraq and basically requires the freezing of the current situation, in which sanctions are preserved with unacceptable consequences for the people and economy of Iraq and no progress is made on disarmament. Specifically, the key elements of the United Kingdom draft appear to lead not to easing the very harsh economic situation of Iraq, but rather to tightening the sanctions. Many questions are raised by the authors' proposal of a "goods review list" for deliveries to Iraq.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“Accordingly, we participated in work on various possible ways of improving the humanitarian operation and very seriously considered all the various proposals made, including the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom. I must say frankly that the deeper we get into the details of proposed changes in the sanctions regime, the more our doubts grow as to the feasibility of the concept enshrined in that draft and its political viability vis-a-Vis the prospects for a lasting settlement in Iraq.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation proposed the convening of today's meeting in this open format, with the participation of all interested States, in order to consider ways of improving the humanitarian situation in Iraq under the devastating sanctions that have been in place for so many years, as well as the question of a comprehensive post-conflict settlement in the Gulf region on the basis of relevant Security Council resolutions. Resolution 1352 (2001) of 1 June clearly defined the main goal of possible changes in the Iraqi humanitarian programme: facilitating trade and economic ties between Iraq and the rest of the world.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“Most serious attention should be given to retaining the targeted nature of the sanctions: making sure that they continue to be directed against the leadership of the Taliban, rather than against the Afghan people. On the basis of these principles we will be cooperating with other Council members in the further work on this report.”
2001-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4325 (2001) · source
“The report contains many other practical proposals, including on expanding the list of embargoed goods and on unifying national legislation as regards arms trading, customs policies and so forth. We are prepared to review these proposals, many of which will require careful study. But right now, I repeat, we believe the Council should concentrate on preparing and adopting a draft resolution that would allow the monitoring mechanism to quickly begin work. The recommendations requiring further study can be considered at subsequent stages. We support the view that sanctions against the Taliban should be implemented in close connection with other United Nations decisions that seek to ensure peace and stability for Afghanistan.”
2001-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4325 (2001) · source
“Of course we will still have to define the plan's specific parameters, including the functions of each of the proposed elements, particularly with regard to the teams to be set up in bordering countries. Of course there should be the closest possible consultation with the interested States on this matter. With regard to the location of the monitoring mechanism, we think it would be preferable for it to be in New York. This is important for effective interaction with the sanctions Committee, and also so as to have a link with the Security Council. If the monitoring mechanism is set up in a location other than New York, this link would be weakened, which we think would be a mistake. It is important to take a close look at the possible options for financing the mechanism so that its activities are properly funded.”
2001-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4325 (2001) · source
“We believe that initially the work of the monitoring mechanism should focus most fundamentally on the key requirements: ensuring compliance with the arms embargo and closing the terrorist training camps. I understand that these are difficult tasks; however, we cannot afford to do nothing. That would be worse. It seems to me that the experts' proposed plan will allow real progress to be made. Perhaps all of the Security Council's demands will not be completely implemented as a result, but the plan will, I repeat, promote real progress towards that goal. I am referring in particular to the proposals to set up the Office for Sanctions Monitoring and Coordination and the Sanctions Enforcement Support Teams in the region. We are prepared to use this plan as a foundation.”
2001-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4325 (2001) · source
“Given this situation, it is particularly important to consistently implement resolutions 1333 (2000) and 1267 (1999). In our opinion, an important step along this road should be Council support for the experts' recommendations regarding the creation of a monitoring mechanism. Of course we understand that no sanctions monitoring will be effective unless the States neighbouring Afghanistan cooperate in the matter, first and foremost the States bordering Afghanistan. We welcome the proclaimed willingness of the six States to comply with resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000). We believe that cooperation with them should continue as we work further with the experts' recommendations. I support the appeal made by the Permanent Representative of China regarding the importance of cooperating with neighbouring countries.”
2001-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4325 (2001) · source
“They have not taken the least step to extradite Usama bin Laden, nor to close those camps where international terrorists are being trained in Taliban-controlled territory. In the broader context, the Taliban, relying on external military assistance, are continuing to try to resolve the Afghan conflict by force. In addition, recently we have witnessed new Taliban activities that go against all norms of human morality and ethics. There continue to be gross violations of the rights of women and girls. The Buddhist statues were destroyed. Discriminatory measures, similar to those used in ghettos in the past, have been imposed against adherents of non-Islamic faiths who are living in Afghanistan. As I said, no progress has been achieved as regards the Taliban's support for international terrorism.”
2001-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4325 (2001) · source
“Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I join in the words of gratitude expressed to the Chairman of the sanctions Committee and to the Chairman of the Committee of Experts, which prepared the report in accordance with resolution 1333 (2000) and made recommendations about the monitoring of the arms embargo and the closure of terrorist training camps in the territory of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban. We have studied the report and support its main conclusions regarding the need to set up a monitoring mechanism to control the implementation of resolution 1333 (2000). It is clear now that since the resolution's adoption half a year ago the Taliban have in no way tried to comply with the Security Council's demands.”
2001-06-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4325 (2001) · source
“We agree with the members of the Security Council mission that there is a need to intensify the efforts of States members of the regional initiative in order to encourage the armed opposition to enter into the dialogue with the Government. Overall, we are willing to support the proposals on strengthening the negotiating mechanisms for Burundi by broadening the role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General after these proposals have been appropriately discussed and worked through with the international facilitator for the Arusha process, Nelson Mandela. In conclusion, I would just like to say to all members of the mission that we are grateful to them for the work they have done.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323Resumption1 (2001) · source
“As for the Council's consideration of further measures to stop illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, this matter is still important, and, in our view, we should continue to consider it, taking into account the reliable and verified information about the dynamics of the situation in this area. As we know, this kind of information is to be submitted to the Council by the Panel of Experts and the Secretary-General. Russia shares the concern over the danger of a resumption of large-scale violence in Burundi, and it also agrees that there is no military solution to the conflict in that country.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323Resumption1 (2001) · source
“In turn the picture that the participants in the mission got will also help the Council in determining its position as to what the United Nations actually has to do in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as concerns phase III of the peacekeeping operation. We are willing to work towards reaching agreement on a decision in the Council on transiting to phase III of MONUC, which implies a strengthening of the mission within the context of the authorized numbers of persons involved. We continue to believe that a practical increase in the scope of this operation must be preceded by additional steps by parties to the conflict to implement their respective obligations, primarily in completing the disengagement of forces and ensuring an adequate level of security for United Nations peacekeeping personnel.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Along with moving towards a peaceful settlement, international humanitarian efforts in that country should also be intensified. The Russian side has already informed the leadership of United Nations humanitarian agencies that we are interested and ready to participate in the planned international humanitarian operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We think it is important that the mission helped to confirm the principal responsibility of the parties to the conflict for a settlement to it. I think it also showed them a realistic picture of the limits on the assistance that can be provided to them by the United Nations within the context of efforts to find a settlement.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The results of the meeting of the members of the mission with Sir Ketumile Masire showed that the facilitator is also preparing for more concrete and realistic measures in organizing the inter-Congolese dialogue. In this connection, we note that 16 July has been decided as the date for the preparatory meeting for the dialogue. Evidence of a responsible approach to power was provided in a statement by President Joseph Kabila on 17 May, when he recognized the wretched situation of the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and promised to take steps to improve it. It is the duty of the international community to provide assistance in these efforts, primarily by meeting the urgent humanitarian needs of the population in that nation.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323Resumption1 (2001) · source