YouSaid · the spoken record

Lavrov

lines on the record: 2,533
first: 1994-09-23
most recent: 2023-09-20
sittings or episodes: 322
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Russia has always advocated the speedy attainment of a comprehensive political settlement and national reconciliation in Somalia, and the maintenance of a unified Somali State. As the Council knows, the plight of the Somali people is not the result of religious or ethnic antagonism, but of deep-seated inter-clan fragmentation and the ambitions of certain leaders. These are the main obstacles to the restoration of the unity of the country. Experience over many years has shown that, despite the fact that there has been no lack of peace initiatives for Somalia, to a large extent, the viability of such initiatives has depended on the level of support for them within Somali society.”
2000-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4166 (2000) · source
“The Security Council meeting on the Balkans, without the full participation ofthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, loses its practical meaning, since one of the key parties is being eliminated from the discussion of the problem of a settlement, which could have a real impact on the development of events in that region.”
2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source
“Carla Del Ponte, refused to consider the flagrant use of force and violations of international humanitarian law by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Russia cannot support this destructive attempt to isolate the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, both from the standpoint of a political settlement in the Balkans and of the damage such attempts do to the United Nations as a universal Organization. A very dangerous precedent is thus being created when States that are unpalatable for political reasons are excluded from participation in the work of the United Nations. Gagging people's mouths is not the best way to discuss acute international problems. Even a defendant has the right to defend his or her position.”
2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source
“It is embarrassing for me to have to note that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a country whose interests are directly affected by the item under discussion in today's meeting. If this is not sufficient reason for anyone here, members can recall that, according to Article 32 of the Charter, even a State that is not a Member of the United Nations has the right to participate in the discussion by the Security Council of a situation in which that country is involved as a party. To discuss the Balkan problem without the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is nonsense. We are concerned with the fact that the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia continues to be used as a political instrument, which was recently demonstrated once again when the Prosecutor of the Tribunal, Ms.”
2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source
“Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): It is with great regret that I assess what has just happened in the Council - the direct application ofthe policy of certain countries to exclude the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from participation not only in today's meeting, but generally, in the settlement process for the Balkans. This goes against the letter and the spirit of the United Nations Charter and its purposes and principles, and hinders the Security Council and the international community in the performance of their tasks. It is awkward for me even to recall in this Chamber that, according to Article 31 of the United Nations Charter, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has the right to participate in this discussion on an equal footing with other United Nations Member States that have made such requests.”
2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source
“Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): You will recall, Mr. President, that when we discussed this matter yesterday in the consultations, I proposed that we take a positive View of all requests that we have received for participation in today's meeting. That was the first proposal, and I would be grateful if we could take a decision on it.”
2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164 (2000) · source
“Moreover, we have serious problems also with the provision of the draft that extends the reporting period of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina from three to six months. We warned ahead of time that Russia would object to possible proposals to move the reports of the High Representative to a six-month cycle. We deem this to be an attempt to weaken oversight by the Security Council over the Bosnian settlement process. Russia, as a participant in the Dayton Agreement, will continue consistently to see that it is fully and unswervingly implemented. We will act against any revision or undermining of it and against any reduction of the role of the Security Council in ensuring the strict implementation of the agreements that it has endorsed.”
2000-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4162 (2000) · source
“Russia refused to participate in the meeting of the Peace Implementation Council in Brussels. We believe that the Brussels Declaration has no force since the meeting of the Council was conducted Virtually in violation of Dayton. We are categorically opposed to attempts to oust the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from all multilateral mechanisms on a settlement in the former Yugoslavia. We have repeatedly warned that the policy of further isolating and enforcing a blockade against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia reflects the desire of certain individual States unilaterally to undo the decisions endorsed by the Security Council in the area of a settlement. That policy is counterproductive and could have very serious consequences for the entire Balkan region and for international efforts to stabilize the situation in that part of Europe.”
2000-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4162 (2000) · source
“However, Russia cannot support this draft resolution, and, for the first time in the last two years, it has refused to join the sponsors of the draft resolution in the Security Council on this subject, since the Russian amendments on questions of principle were not taken on board. Operative paragraph 5, which expresses support for the declaration of the meeting of the Peace Implementation Conference, which took place on 23 and 24 May 2000 in Brussels, is not acceptable to us. As the Council is aware, Russia was compelled to refuse to participate in that meeting, since its organizers adopted a discriminatory approach to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It did not allow one of the direct participants - a signatory to the Dayton Agreement - to work in that forum.”
2000-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4162 (2000) · source
“Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): The Russian Federation is one of the main participants in the Bosnian settlement. It deems it important that the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina be further developed on the basis of the scrupulous implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. This should be the thrust of the activities of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), whose mandate we are convinced should be extended for another year. It is precisely in the interest of continuing the peace process that we will not object to the draft resolution before us now, the general thrust of which we agree with.”
2000-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4162 (2000) · source
“If it is necessary to change the statute of the Tribunal, as the President of the ICTY proposes in his report, the question must be approached in a comprehensive fashion on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the work of the Tribunal and bearing in mind the need to redress the well-known deficiencies in that work. That is the position we shall adopt when we consider the proposals regarding organizing the work of experts in the Security Council to discuss possible amendment of the statute of the ICTY. We reaffirm that Russia will support the activities of the Tribunal on the condition that these are strictly in keeping with the mandate adopted by the Security Council for that body.”
2000-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4161 (2000) · source
“Very careful study is required also of the financial implications of the proposed innovations. Thus, while we are certainly prepared to consider the judges' proposals, we think it is important to conduct a wide-ranging, thorough analysis not only of those proposals but also of other views on how to enhance the effectiveness of the work of the ICTY, in particular the ideas set out in the report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, contained in document S/2000/597, along with ideas to be found in other available documents.”
2000-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4161 (2000) · source
“Gabrielle Kirk McDonald justified the creation of an additional trial chamber by assuring the Council that it would significantly speed up the Tribunal's discharge of its mandate. But that measure has yielded virtually no results. Judge Jorda's report includes the rather discouraging conclusion that, if those against whom indictments have already been issued and those now under investigation were brought to justice, the Tribunal would require 15 to 20 years to deal with all cases. That forecast, of course, makes us think hard about whether so long a time is advisable for the functioning of what is supposed to be an ad hoc body. The solution being proposed to resolve this situation - the appointment of ad litem judges - needs careful analysis. At first glance, it does not inspire particular optimism in us.”
2000-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4161 (2000) · source
“Moreover, the activities of the Tribunal should be brought into conformity with the resolutions of the Security Council. If we do not do this in the near future, the Tribunal will no longer be viewed as an impartial organ handing down fair international justice. With regard specifically to the proposals contained in the report of the President of the ICTY, Judge Claude Jorda, these are controversial in many respects; we do not think they have been the object of sufficient work. It is our understanding that there is a lack of unanimity on these proposals among the judges of the Tribunal as well. It is noteworthy that two years ago the Security Council, at the Tribunal's request, increased the number of judges. At that time, Ms.”
2000-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4161 (2000) · source
“This runs counter to the mandate of the Stabilization Force in Bosnia. Let me recall that the memorandum remains secret and has yet to be submitted to members of the Security Council. In our View, then, the ICTY is not helping, as it should, to normalize the political process in the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, the Tribunal's activities have had a destructive impact on the process of reaching a settlement in the Balkans. This situation cannot fail to be of concern to us. In our view, the Security Council needs to engage in a thorough, careful consideration of this matter. We are convinced, for example, that the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as well, of course, as the amendments made to them, should be approved by the Security Council.”
2000-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4161 (2000) · source
“In recent years, the Tribunal has repeatedly tinkered with the norms and rules of international humanitarian law to suit its own purposes and interpreted them at it own convenience. Moreover, exploiting the lack of any real control by the international community over the elaboration of the rules of procedure and evidence, the Tribunal has introduced into these documents some very legally dubious practices, such as handing down sealed indictments and submitting them to international organs. Also wrong was the 1996 decision taken by the Tribunal, behind the Security Council's back, to conclude a memorandum of understanding with NATO, which virtually sanctioned the special operation by the NATO contingent in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose purpose was to track down indictees.”
2000-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4161 (2000) · source
“However, if questions arise - for instance, concerning the actions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)- the Tribunal, even in the face of such obvious facts as the deaths of innocent civilians, the destruction by air strike of civilian targets, finds no grounds for launching an investigation. We are appalled by the Tribunal's failure to act in response to ongoing ethnic cleansing against Serbs and other national minorities in Kosovo. With respect to the judicial activities of the Tribunal, we cannot fail to recall that, when the statute of the body was being drafted, it was assumed that the ICTY would strictly apply only existing norms of international humanitarian law. The statute says nothing about the right of the ICTY to create any new law. In practice, however, an entirely different picture has emerged.”
2000-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4161 (2000) · source
“Unfortunately, however, we have seen political ambitions emerge in the activities of the Tribunal and a clear anti-Serb line has been adopted. Having predetermined for itself the main culprit in the Yugoslav tragedy, the Tribunal nevertheless often turns a blind eye to cases of non- compliance with the norms of international humanitarian law by other parties to the conflicts. When it comes to reports of violations committed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Tribunal immediately issues indictments and gets down to work, as, for example, in the case of the situation in Kosovo.”
2000-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4161 (2000) · source
“Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Judge Jorda for introducing the report before us. We welcome the efforts of the judges of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (ICTY) to improve the functioning of that body of international criminal justice. We understand their frustration at the pace and methods of the functioning of the Tribunal. For our part, we, too, have serious reservations about the work of that international body. When it established the Tribunal, the Security Council believed that the ICTY would make an important contribution to settling the crisis in Yugoslavia and that it would fulfil this task unburdened by political considerations.”
2000-06-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4161 (2000) · source
“Recognizing that fact, and not wishing to bear the responsibility for it, Russia was compelled not to participate in the Brussels meeting. We confirm our position that any attempt, under any pretext, to isolate the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from the processes relating to the settlement of the situation in Bosnia, Kosovo or the Balkans as a whole would be counter-productive and lead only to the further accumulation of problems, which could precipitate a new crisis. In conclusion, I should like to say that Russia, as one of the main participants in the Bosnia settlement, will continue to make an active contribution to the development of the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina and will support the activities of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in strict compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement.”
2000-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4154 (2000) · source
“The violation of the mandate of the Stabilization Force should be brought to an end. Such violations are taking the form, in particular, of the deliberate use of force to arrest people. I also wish to note that the failure to invite the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Brussels meeting of the Peace Implementation Council, which was held on 23 and 24 May, was a serious blow to the entire Dayton structure, I should like to recall that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is one of the parties to the Dayton Peace Agreement and is an essential guarantor of its implementation. We are convinced that, unfortunately, the failure to invite the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Brussels meeting of the Peace Implementation Council will have a negative impact.”
2000-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4154 (2000) · source
“Due to the inactivity of Bosnian politicians, there is an acute problem relating to the return of refugees, approximately 300,000 of whom remain outside the country. We need to continue to reform the armed forces and reduce the defence budget. Constant attention should be given to economic reform, which is being complicated by a reduction in the level of international assistance. Additional efforts should be made to attract foreign investment flows and to combat organized crime and corruption. In the light of the experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, our highest priority remains freeing its activities from elements of politicization and short-term interests. We have repeatedly made this point recently.”
2000-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4154 (2000) · source
“Unfortunately, a certain type of action and thought based on ethnic approaches continues to prevail in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ethnic confrontation and ethnic discrimination persist. Despite the success of moderate forces in the municipal elections, the prevalence of nationalist parties has not been eliminated in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We cannot fail to be concerned by the fact that efforts to create effective central structures of authority are being blocked by the passivity of the unified institutions, which have no will or initiative to build consensus on reconciliation. It is extremely important to seek the further democratization of society in order to overcome any resumption of political extremism and to achieve the support of the independent media.”
2000-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4154 (2000) · source
“Thanks to its efforts, it has been possible to strengthen the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to enhance the professionalism of the local police and reorganize it on a multi-ethnic basis, and to achieve a certain amount of progress in reforming the judicial system and in establishing a unified Border Service. Positive changes are occurring in Brcko. Unified structures within the Ministry of the Interior in Mostar. In this way, a meaningful contribution has been made to the building of democratic institutions of authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, positive trends towards development, including the consolidation of statehood and the growth of pluralism in social life, should not give the international community any grounds for complacency. We note that this point was just made by Mr. Klein.”
2000-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4154 (2000) · source
“Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful to the Secretary-General for his report and to Mr. Klein for his briefing and thorough assessment of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We note that there have been some important positive changes in that country that give grounds for optimism. The key to the success and irreversibility of the process of the Bosnian settlement is full and consistent compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement. We deem any attempted revision of that document to be inadmissible. It is solely on the basis of its implementation that any viable, multi-ethnic State can evolve, consisting of two equal entities and in respect for the rights of all peoples of that country. The United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) has made an important contribution to that process.”
2000-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4154 (2000) · source
“Russia will continue to make a constructive contribution to finding a political settlement in Kosovo against this background: full and total implementation of the resolution. There is no real alternative to increasing these efforts in the international community, for we would not be providing peace, stability and prosperity in the Balkans in the interests of all peoples who live there.”
2000-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4153 (2000) · source
“In conclusion, all these problems we have been talking about are interrelated and unless they are resolved as a whole, it will be difficult to expect any change in the current extremely disturbing situation. Unless they are quickly resolved, UNMIK and KFOR - which have of course done some work to normalize the situation in Kosovo - will not be implementing the tasks assigned to them by the Security Council. We know the very difficult circumstances in which the personnel of the international presence in Kosovo must function. We are sincerely interested in providing them with every possible kind of help and support. But this can be done only if the leadership of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo and KFOR indeed ensure that all their actions are geared towards full and comprehensive implementation of resolution 1244 (1999).”
2000-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4153 (2000) · source
“It is perfectly obvious that those provisions were flagrantly and grossly violated during the bombing of the Belgrade television centre, the bridges and the train on the bridge in Gordelitse, the bombing of buses, refugee columns, convoys and many other facilities. These facts are very well known. However, the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal, Ms. Del Ponte, at the Security Council briefing on 2 June, said that she was not going to continue investigating NATO activities in Yugoslavia because she did not see the actions as violations of international humanitarian law. But we have a question regarding that. Does the Prosecutor for the Tribunal know about the norms of international humanitarian law in this connection? What about her willingness to apply these norms in practice?”
2000-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4153 (2000) · source
“Similar assessments were issued earlier by Human Rights Watch. We would recall that article 57 of the first Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions emphasizes the need, in planning and implementing military actions, to refrain from any attacks that might be expected to cause collateral loss of life among the civilian population or the wounding of civilians, or that might by chance damage civilian infrastructure and facilities. Article 52 of the same Protocol establishes that in the event of any doubt as to whether this facility that is normally used for civilian purposes might be used for military purposes, it is necessary to assume that the facilities are civilian ones.”
2000-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4153 (2000) · source
“Dienstbier, and the leadership of UNMIK itself could more actively establish contacts with Belgrade on this matter. Against this backdrop, to us the idea of establishing yet another post of special representative on missing persons looks a little artificial and could only lead to politicization of this purely humanitarian issue. We are already well familiar with attempts to politicize humanitarian aspects of the crisis in Kosovo. I was thinking particularly about attempts such as those being made through the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Let me just cite one example. In the last few days there has been a lot of discussion about the Amnesty International report citing facts of violation by NATO of norms of international humanitarian law during the bombing of Yugoslavia.”
2000-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4153 (2000) · source
“First of all, however, we should not forget that hundreds of Serbs are also missing in Kosovo and that their fate must also be investigated. Secondly, we must recall that Belgrade has not refused to cooperate on the problem of the missing and the detainees. This problem was dealt with by the representative of the International Red Cross and the special rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Mr. Jiri Dienstbier, on their trip to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. They had access to whomever they wished to meet, and they discussed with representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia about continuing contacts. We think it is necessary to support the work which is already being done by the International Committee of the Red Cross and Mr.”
2000-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4153 (2000) · source
“Unfortunately, the Security Council, because of the positions of individual members, today has once again not been able to hear the representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at a meeting devoted to his country. We noted the short discussion held in this Chamber about who should participate in Council meetings devoted to the question of Kosovo. We believe that in any case participants must include official representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We are hearing more talk lately about the missing or the detainees and that these are Kosovar Albanians. It is said that without clarification of what happened to them, there can be no return of Serbs to Kosovo. This problem is indeed a very painful and difficult one and the matter must be resolved.”
2000-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4153 (2000) · source
“That is in fact what could happen if the parameters of the future status of Kosovo are not determined before the municipal elections. There has been no decision on the participation of Serbs in the elections and on the absence of basic conditions for ensuring safe return. The results of the elections cannot be considered legitimate without the participation of the Serbs and the other minorities. The UNMIK leadership has personal responsibility for election preparations, which should not legalize the involvement of political extremists and isolationists in Kosovo who are hatching plans to declare ethnically clean independence. We are convinced that attempts to isolate them from Belgrade are extremely dangerous to the future of Kosovo, Yugoslavia and the entire Balkan area.”
2000-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4153 (2000) · source
“Such interaction must occur on all issues relating to implementation of the resolution. There are delays in implementing provisions of that resolution that relate to beginning a political process for determining the future status of Kosovo. This process is not possible unless there are talks involving the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, so far we only hear about the idea of some kind of contract between the United Nations Mission and the population of Kosovo. We believe that any kind of contract like that, without the involvement of Belgrade, would be a violation of resolution 1244 (1999) and would not have legal credibility. We would not like to think that the acquiescence of UNMIK with respect to the status of Kosovo would mean the desire to protract this transitional period and prejudge the future of the region.”
2000-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4153 (2000) · source
“We have already warned that unilateral experiments with property could have highly explosive consequences. The Security Council's decision on the return to Kosovo of the agreed contingent of Serb and Yugoslav troops and police has not been implemented, which makes it more difficult to implement the provision of resolution 1244 (1999) on the establishment of proper control over Kosovo units in the border areas of Albania, Macedonia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Kosovo. Resolution 1244 clearly states that during the transitional period UNMIK must implement administrative management of the region in such a manner as to ensure that all the inhabitants enjoy substantial autonomy in making up their part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This is impossible unless there is real interaction with the Yugoslav authorities.”
2000-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4153 (2000) · source
“It has been impossible to implement the provisions of resolution 1244 (1999) regarding the return to the region of the 300,000 non-Albanians who fled to other parts of Yugoslavia and to neighbouring countries to escape the arbitrary violence. Again, there is no respect for the principle of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Many facts indicate that this principle is being violated; everyone knows of these violations, and we have spoken of them often in the Security Council. Disturbing new facts include UNMIK's plan to bring about a full privatization of State property belonging to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as indicated in the recent "white book". On this there was absolutely no consultation with the Belgrade authorities.”
2000-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4153 (2000) · source
“It is time to realize that one injustice cannot be remedied with another injustice. KFOR and UNMIK have a clear mandate from the Security Council, which gives them the power to effect radical improvements in the situation. That must take place. Russia is part of KFOR and part of the United Nations Mission; we are willing to join our partners in working in that direction. I note that the statement adopted at the 24 May meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council stressed the determination and resolve of Russia and of NATO to cooperate closely with a View to the full implementation of resolution 1244 (1999), and that neither Russia nor NATO would tolerate any provocation or other attempts to undermine the peace process in Kosovo.”
2000-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4153 (2000) · source
“We heard today about how they are still trying to drive Serbs, Roma and other minorities out of Kosovo; those minorities continue to be attacked and they continue to be victims of violence and terrorism. They do not enjoy freedom of movement in the area. Since the Security Council mission's visit to Kosovo, there has been an upsurge in anti-Serb terrorism, which seems to be a planned campaign of provocation. The Serbian population has protested at killings of Serbs, including children, in just the last few days. The delegation of Kosovo Serbs in the Chamber today has said explicitly that the situation of Serbs in the area has become intolerable. We note statements by the Kosovar Albanian leader and the appeal to end the violence. But words must be followed by deeds.”
2000-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4153 (2000) · source
“KFOR regularly sees activity by Albanian fighters in the security zone, and in the area of Dobrosin there have been a great number of shootings, mine explosions and movements of armed groups. We believe that KFOR should take strong measures to ensure law and order along the administrative border and strengthen its control over actions by illegal units in the territory of Kosovo. Unfortunately, Kosovo Albanian extremist elements feel that they enjoy impunity in Kosovo. They have also begun receiving support from international terrorism. This poses a challenge to the security of many countries, directly including two participants in the process of seeking a settlement in Kosovo.”
2000-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4153 (2000) · source
“It has been said that former KLA fighters, including those who have joined the Kosovo Protection Corps, are able to take action thanks to a very well- organized system by which they are provided with information; they are able to coordinate their terrorist actions extremely well. Moreover, it is well known that, with increasing frequency, KFOR has been finding illegal stores of weapons and ammunition in Kosovo. Some of those stores are of very recent date. We are particularly disturbed about the situation in the Presevo valley, where there is ceaseless provocation aimed at causing the tension to spill over into southern Serbia, which would trigger another conflict.”
2000-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4153 (2000) · source
“Such attacks are being carried out, inter alia, by present and former members of the Kosovo Protection Corps. We know that the leadership has responded firmly to such provocations, but we expect the sternest possible measures to be taken to curb the extremists and force them to respect the status of the international presence, pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999). Just in the past few days, the Russian KFOR contingent camp near Malishevo has been the target of nine night-time attacks; it has been fired on by weapons including machine guns and anti-tank weapons. In that light, how can we talk about the demilitarization of the KLA? How can we talk about success in disarming it?”
2000-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4153 (2000) · source
“It states that this former fighter from the KLA is someone who can kill a person to whom he takes a dislike, and that he is known as an organizer of armed provocation and murder. We believe that UNMIK and KFOR should immediately draw up a list of all persons who are admitted to join the Corps. Otherwise, if these kinds of people are in charge of the Corps, it will not be possible to curb attempts by the former KLA to establish virtual control throughout the region under cover of the supposedly civilian Corps. So far, UNMIK and KFOR have shown a degree of patience with such attempts, even though, again, very disturbing information is available to the United Nations presence in Kosovo. It is simply unacceptable that attacks should continue against KFOR personnel, including the Russian contingent.”
2000-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4153 (2000) · source
“Why does this Corps have what is basically a military structure, which, in a way, is simply a reflection of the old KLA structure? Why do the weapons of this purely civilian Corps include firearms, and why does the leadership of the Corps itself determine who will be given these weapons? Basically, what has happened, we believe, is the legalization of some of the units of the former Kosovo Liberation Army. The leadership of UNMIK and KFOR say that when they take people into the Corps they recruit them very, very carefully, and that criminals cannot join the Corps. But I would draw attention to the fact that one of the first persons to join the Corps was Daut Haradinaj. Unofficially, we would like to distribute here a copy of his curriculum vitae. We understand that it was prepared by KFOR.”
2000-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4153 (2000) · source
“This relates to the clear trend to separate Kosovo from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which is fraught with very dangerous possibility of destabilizing the entire Balkan region. Unfortunately, some actions by the leadership of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and KFOR provoke and encourage this dangerous trend. This relates primarily to the absence of the necessary cooperation of all sides with Belgrade and even the Security Council. The demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has been very unsatisfactory, as in the case of the demilitarization of other armed Kosovar Albanian groups. No one can explain to us why the Kosovo Protection Corps is referred to as "troops" in the Albanian language. That is its name.”
2000-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4153 (2000) · source
“If we assess what has been accomplished in the year that has passed since the adoption of resolution 1244 (1999), we can say that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have implemented the demands made by the Security Council with respect to halting acts of Violence in the region and fully withdrawing the Yugoslav army and police from that region. A security zone has been established along the administrative border between Kosovo and the rest of Serbia, and the Yugoslav army, together with the Kosovo Force (KFOR), is ensuring that there is no resumption of military activity along that border. As for other participants in the settlement process to which the Security Council gave specific responsibilities, the situation is bad.”
2000-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4153 (2000) · source
“Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We are grateful to the Secretary-General for his report, and we would like to thank Mr. Kouchner for the briefing he gave us. On 10 June, one year will have elapsed since the adoption of resolution 1244 (1999). That decision by the Security Council, prepared with the very active participation of Russia, allowed an end to the aggression against Yugoslavia and brought the process of the settlement of the Kosovo situation back to the United Nations. The Security Council offered a specific way to deal with the crisis on the basis of the fundamental principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia while ensuring the legitimate interests of all of the ethnic groups constituting the population of this region.”
2000-06-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4153 (2000) · source
“Mr. Lavrov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I wish simply to state that when I asked that we be given a rationale for the existence of the no-fly zones and the use of force there, I requested them of the United Nations Secretariat, not of any national delegation.”
2000-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4152 (2000) · source
“We are trying to alleviate the symptoms of the disease, but we are not addressing the heart of the problem. I do not offer any concrete proposals because, as I said earlier, there are Security Council resolutions and there is reality. I hope that the reality will change some day, but I do not believe it will happen now as we approach midnight. I do hope, however, that it will occur at some point.”
2000-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4152 (2000) · source
“Ijust want to stress that we cannot just continue to pretend each time that there is a humanitarian programme and that there is UNMOVIK - which has a life of its own - while at the same time there are these "no-fly" zones, non- governmental organizations working in northern Iraq and diplomats crossing Iraq's borders without visas. If we were to find out about all this and do nothing to collate all these facts, the Security Council would not be doing its job, which is to resolve problems relating directly to the maintenance of peace and security. That was my essential point. I believe that the United Nations Secretariat has enough authority under the Charter to draw our attention to the fact that the problem of Iraq is not being resolved by the Security Council.”
2000-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4152 (2000) · source
“I would be very interested in having the Secretariat give us a comprehensive legal analysis of what is happening around Iraq, because each time we meet here to extend the oil-for-food programme, we call for the need to reach consensus and to have the Security Council be united. The same is true when we hear reports from the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIK), and the United Nations Special Commission, before it. In recent years, we have stressed the need to get to a comprehensive understanding of the entire Iraqi situation. Unfortunately, all colleagues agree with you when talk with them informally; but when it is proposed that a comprehensive analysis be carried out officially, well, silence ensues. I wish to repeat the point that I do not wish to provoke any kind of confrontation today.”
2000-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4152 (2000) · source