YouSaid · the spoken record

Levitte

lines on the record: 1,215
first: 2000-03-21
most recent: 2002-11-12
sittings or episodes: 146
sources: un-security-council

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“We would like Iraq to respond to that willingness to engage in dialogue with constructive gestures, so as to restore trust: the return of Kuwaiti missing persons and Kuwaiti property; adherence by Iraq to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; and permitting travel by the Chairman of the sanctions Committee. An opening by Iraq would enable the Security Council to begin working to clarify certain elements of resolution 1284 (1999). Difficulties in the implementation of resolutions 687 (1991) and 1284 (1999) should not prevent the Security Council from acting. If Council action is unified and takes into account humanitarian and regional security needs, it will be useful.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“We intend to continue advocating the return of United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and International Atomic Energy Agency monitors to Iraq. We welcome the preparatory work done to this end by Mr. Blix, and we call upon Iraq to cooperate with the United Nations and UNMOVIC. We appreciate the efforts of the Secretary-General in the context of the dialogue he began with Iraq after the Islamic Summit Conference in Doha last November. We encourage the Secretary-General to continue his dialogue with Iraq in order to better ensure that Iraq will understand Council action, to remind it that resolutions 687 (1991) and 1284 (1999) are the Council's reference points and to promote the resumption of Iraqi oil sales and the implementation of the oil-for-food programme.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“It endeavoured to do this by adopting resolution 1284 (1999), which we think was an improvement upon resolution 687 (1991). In exchange for the return of inspectors to Iraq and the establishment of a long-term monitoring system, Baghdad could have speedily obtained the suspension, and then the lifting, of sanctions. The advantage of this proposal was to reconcile humanitarian needs with security concerns and to provide a long-term solution. Iraq could expect to rejoin the community of nations. This course has not yet been taken because of Iraq's rejection of resolution 1284 (1999). Yet this course remains available. resolution 687 (1991) and its complement, resolution 1284 (1999), remain the foundation for the Council's work.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“However, the extremely bureaucratic nature of the system and the blocking of the functioning of the sanctions Committee have barely made it possible to do anything other than ensure the survival of the Iraqi people and keep them indefinitely dependent on assistance. Iraq's interruption of its oil sales a month ago can only further aggravate the situation. Finally, it is not satisfactory for regional security. For two and a half years the Security Council has no longer had any inspectors in the field to verify that Iraq has not resumed its programmes of weapons of mass destruction. The magnitude of smuggling, a practice representing several billion dollars, makes the validity of the escrow account illusory. It is essential that we find a way out of this impasse. Despite its divisions, the Security Council is aware of this.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“Mr. Levitte (France) (spoke in French): is pleased that a public debate in the Security Council open to all Members of the United Nations is being devoted to the question of Iraq. This is a useful first on an issue that has occupied the attention of the Council for 11 years now. Maintaining the current status quo is not satisfactory. It is not satisfactory in terms of the authority and credibility of the Council. Its decisions have remained a dead letter. The Council has been unable to impose a solution. It is not satisfactory for the Iraqi population either. Iraq is experiencing a humanitarian crisis of unparalleled scope. Just to take one figure, the infant mortality rate has more than doubled since 1990. The efforts made by the Council through the oil-for-food programme have of course had their merit.”
2001-06-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4336 (2001) · source
“Here I would recall Security Council missions, proposals or support for peaceful resolution of disputes, preventive disarmament, preventive arms embargoes, combating illicit trafficking in mineral resources, diamond embargoes, the creation of demilitarized zones and the preventive deployment of peacekeeping operations, including in the civilian police area. These are all very important avenues. In conclusion, I wish to say that today's debate is a useful opportunity to recall the shared concerns of Council members on a question that directly affects us all as we discharge our mandate and that should be translated into action and decisions in the months to come. We hope that soon this report will be taken up in the General Assembly so that all competent bodies can be fully involved in this useful and necessary effort.”
2001-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4334 (2001) · source
“The periodic reports of the Secretary-General on regional or subregional situations will provide an opportunity to nurture dialogue on this point with the Security Council. There is also a need to strengthen the early warning, reaction and analysis capacities of the Secretariat, so that the Secretary-General can be in a better position to perform this function. Proposals on this were made in the report of the Secretary-General of 1 June 2001 (A/55/977) on the follow up to the Brahimi report, and they deserve every attention and support on our part. The Security Council has at its disposal a whole range of means that it should use as and when appropriate.”
2001-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4334 (2001) · source
“However, in practice, cooperation among all actors concerned will be necessary and proper coordination mechanisms must be established, in particular with the regional organizations and the Bretton Woods institutions. The third very important point concerns the specific roles played by the Secretary-General and the Security Council. It is important to note that the Charter entrusts special roles in conflict prevention to the Secretary-General and the Council, and it is important to lend our support to the specific proposals made in the report on this subject. The Secretary- General is authorized to bring to the attention of the Security Council, pursuant to Article 99 of the Charter, any given situation that may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.”
2001-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4334 (2001) · source
“Given the diversity of the actors involved in the various aspects of conflict prevention policies, coordination is decisive. This is more difficult to promote than peacekeeping or peace-building, because to a certain extent the aspect of gravity or urgency that spurs action is lacking. Mobilizing energies for conflict prevention will depend both on the culture of prevention that I referred to, and on good coordination among the various actors. Here we must not limit ourselves to the distinction that is sometimes drawn between "operational" measures and "structural" measures for conflict prevention. It does describe the whole range of possible measures within specific time frames.”
2001-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4334 (2001) · source
“The increased trend in UNDP activities towards encouraging good governance and the rule of law, in order to make development projects part of harmonious and sustainable economic and social development, is a step in the right direction. Awareness within the Bretton Woods institutions must also be developed. The United Nations organs could also usefully draw on the proposals contained in the report to create the structures for dialogue and discussion about specific conflict-prevention problems. France hopes that such structures will soon emerge. In due course France will be making its contribution, particularly in the Economic and Social Council, in the General Assembly, or in the Security Council. Secondly, there should be increased coordination among the various actors in conflict prevention.”
2001-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4334 (2001) · source
“It is important, as stressed by the Secretary- General, that not only the United Nations bodies - the Secretary-General, the General Assembly, the Security Council and agencies and programmes such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) - but also the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and private actors - non-governmental organizations and enterprises - all acquire a true preventive reflex either to identify and follow up on reliable indicators to mobilize the attention of the international community, or to better design and guide their own actions based on a clear goal of conflict prevention. Efforts already made and described in the report should be encouraged.”
2001-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4334 (2001) · source
“I wish to highlight three points that emerge from the report and that reaffirm ideas brought out in previous discussions. First of all is the need to develop a true "culture of prevention", that takes a much longer View of action than is the case today, and that is sufficiently well established across the entire United Nations system, while also bringing in external actors to a greater extent.”
2001-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4334 (2001) · source
“Post-conflict peace-building, although it draws largely on the same resources and instruments as prevention, is consequently a more difficult and uncertain kind of action. Unfortunately, we see confirmation of this every day. If we really want to implement fully the primary mandate of the United Nations, which is "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", we must therefore take more account of the need for prevention in our work, while respecting the principles of the Charter. All actors - Member States, United Nations organs, agencies and programmes, donors, regional organizations and civil society have their role to play. The report of the Secretary-General gives us an assessment and useful avenues for reflection and action.”
2001-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4334 (2001) · source
“Certainly this is the least costly solution - whether in human, political, economic or financial terms. Above all, it is the most suitable way to establish conditions for lasting peace. In the countries middle of an acute crisis - and we have several examples of such crises in Africa - the United Nations and the donors face the worst possible conditions in war-torn and occupied countries, with their resources sometimes plundered, and with a lack of clear political prospects for restoring trust among the people. In these conditions, to start implementing the economic and social development programmes that are necessary for bringing about a lasting resolution to the crisis is a considerable challenge. Moreover, these countries are marginalized by a world economy that has left them behind.”
2001-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4334 (2001) · source
“The report of the Secretary-General and the discussion that will be taking place in the Council and in the General Assembly come at a good time. While the Brahimi report and the Millennium Summit have paved the way for the necessary reform of peacekeeping and the daily management of United Nations operations make us think increasingly of strategies for crisis resolution and post-conflict peace- building, it appears urgent to gear our strategies also towards the prevention of armed conflict. Given the considerable United Nations efforts in peace operations to deal with conflicts, usually at a moment's notice and in urgent circumstances, it is necessary and legitimate to wonder whether the international community should not make an extra effort in order better to anticipate and prevent conflicts while there is still time to do so.”
2001-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4334 (2001) · source
“Mr. Levitte (France) (spoke in French): It is an honour and a pleasure to see you, Mr. Foreign Minister, presiding today over this very important debate that has brought us together. France welcomes the important report that the Secretary-General has transmitted to us. We also welcome the initiative taken last July by Jamaica. Given the discussions on this theme that were conducted in 1999 and then in 2000, this is a good occasion to take stock of the situation on the basis of the assessment, conclusions and concrete recommendations of Secretary-General Kofi Annan, for which we thank him. Sweden will be making a statement in due course on behalf of the European Union, to which my delegation, of course, fully subscribes. I would like to make a few comments on the points that seem to me particularly essential.”
2001-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4334 (2001) · source
“There is no future for extremists, whatever their origin. It is only through respect for its Constitution and the strengthening of its central institutions that Bosnia and Herzegovina will be able to move forward in its process of rapprochement with Europe. The international community will not let itself be distracted from the achievement of its aspirations in the region, as the Secretary-General very aptly recalled. The heads of State or Government of the European Union, meeting, even as we speak, at Goteborg, are determined fully to play their part in achieving these objectives. This is the same message that the Security Council will convey unambiguously during its forthcoming Visit to Kosovo.”
2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source
“Further, to strengthen coordination and the effectiveness of its civil activities, the international community invited the High Representative, in agreement with UNMIBH, to make proposals. We hope that the restructuring process, which has been described in detail by Ambassador Klein, will begin as soon as possible. We listened with great interest to the remarks made by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative concerning the political prospects in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the entire Balkan region. As the Secretary-General's report indicates, some people seem to believe that borders and democratic institutions can be altered if obstructionism and violence are strong enough to weaken international resolve. Those individuals must understand the Dayton Accords have to be respected, and that they will be respected.”
2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source
“Along with the sanctions that can be applied under annex ll of the Dayton Agreements, Ambassador Klein is right to emphasize also the need to provide appropriate training for the Bosnian police and to improve their financial and material resources. UNMIBH is taking concrete steps in that direction. The international community must lend assistance in this respect, but the Bosnian political authorities cannot shirk their responsibilities. By officially and sincerely promoting the fight against corruption and organized crime, by encouraging the independence of the judiciary, and by taking every practical measure to accelerate the return of minority groups, Bosnian leaders will be making a contribution to the construction of a modern police force, more in keeping with European standards.”
2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source
“The first was the dissidence of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) leaders, who tried to incite the Bosnian Croatian police to violate the Dayton Agreements. Later on, riots orchestrated in Banja Luka and Trebinje in response to the reconstruction of mosques posed a fresh challenge, which demonstrated the lack of professionalism and above all the lack of respect for institutions and legality on the part of the Bosnian Serb police leadership. Acting along with the High Representative and the Stabilization Force (SFOR), UNMIBH reacted in the most appropriate manner: it promptly de-authorized the authors of these serious Violations of the letter and the spirit of the Peace Accords.”
2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source
“I should like also to convey to Ambassador Klein our deep satisfaction at the outstanding work he has been doing for almost two years now as head of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The Special Representative's method is sound. UNMIBH has set clear-cut objectives for itself and has identified the ways and means of achieving them. It gives account regularly and transparently of all of the obstacles it encounters in the implementation of its mandate and tells us what efforts it is making to overcome them. In the field, Mr. Klein deploys all his energy and talent to bring about the success of his mission. We would like to convey our warmest encouragements to him and thank him for his exemplary action. Several alarming events over the past few months have challenged the police in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source
“Mr. Levitte (France) (spoke in French): France unreservedly supports the statement to be made later on by the Permanent Representative of Sweden on behalf of the European Union. I should like simply to add a few more specific observations from my national perspective. First, I should like to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Jacques Paul Klein, for rounding out the excellent report of the Secretary-General with his comments - comments which, as always, were not only precise and very incisive but also imbued with a genuine vision of the objectives that we must achieve in the long term, as Ambassador Cunningham has just pointed out.”
2001-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4330 (2001) · source
“As Ambassador Greenstock has suggested, we could take advantage of the opening of the fifth-sixth session of the General Assembly, in late September or early October, when ministers members of the Political Committee of the Lusaka Agreement will be in New York, to organize a further meeting with the Security Council. In that way, we could deepen our confidence-building dialogue and our cooperation to the benefit of peace for the people of Congo and for all the other peoples of the Great Lakes region.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“The international community must also be prepared to assist all the States of the region in implementing solutions developed by those States themselves with a view to ensuring stability in Central Africa. Here, I am thinking, inter alia, of the proposed regional conference on peace, security, democracy and development. But here again, it is efforts by the parties to the conflict that will enable that partnership to bear fruit. Because the Council is to extend the mandate of MONUC, we must continue our close contacts with the signatories of the Lusaka Agreement to enable us to assess our support for the peace process as best we can and as accurately as possible.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“The Secretariat also needs information about the composition and location of foreign armed groups and about the sites where they will gather for the purpose of demobilization. All the parties must provide this information as soon as possible; without it, MONUC will be unable to provide support. The Joint Military Commission must be co-located with MONUC headquarters to make it possible for those two bodies to engage in daily cooperation. The parties to the Lusaka Agreement have established a partnership with the Security Council. Beyond the Council, the entire international community must today marshal its efforts. It must speedily provide substantial economic assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Congo so that the return of peace can be accompanied by improved living conditions for the Congolese.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“MONUC is today in its second phase of deployment, in which it is following the disengagement process. Like the Secretary-General, we consider that in order to support the dynamic of peace we must prepare for MONUC's next phase. In the third phase, the Mission will assist the parties to implement the withdrawal plans and the process of disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and reintegration. But again, the ball is in the parties' court. Overall plans have been prepared, and they are an excellent point of departure. But they must be finalized as a matter of urgency. For the Secretariat to begin its planning, it requires detailed information on the location and composition of foreign forces and on their withdrawal routes.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“This summer, the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which was established by the Council, will submit a further assessment of the situation. We are determined to take whatever measures may be necessary to put an end to this plundering, which has come to fuel the conflict. Only complete respect by the parties for the commitments they themselves negotiated will enable the dynamic of peace to continue. The primary responsibility for the implementation of the Lusaka process lies with the belligerent parties themselves. For its part, the Security Council is determined to assist the parties in their efforts - if they fully respect their commitments. The Council has demonstrated this by authorizing the deployment of MONUC.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“All parties to the conflict must do much more in this area, especially in the eastern part of the country. We are concerned to note that local human rights organizations are everywhere subjected to serious harassment. As Mr. Otunnu has so eloquently reminded us, children continue to be the most vulnerable victims of the conflict. His recommendations, especially the demobilization of child soldiers, should be a priority for everyone. The plundering of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo must cease. The Council has taken note of the initiatives announced by some States, such as Uganda, to shed light on this matter. But here again, we are awaiting results.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“The civilian populations of Congo and of neighbouring countries, particularly Burundi, will have to foot the bill for this. All parties to the Lusaka Agreement, and especially the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, must ensure that all support for those foreign armed groups ceases. This issue must be resolved through a negotiated process of the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement of those groups. The Council encourages the development of a dialogue among the heads of State concerned to address this important problem in accordance with the Lusaka Agreement. The Council takes note of the assurances just given by Mr. Okitundu; they must be acted upon as soon as possible. Human rights violations are another cause for great concern within the Council.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“It is unacceptable that those troops remain there a year after the adoption of resolution 1304 (2000), which called for the demilitarization of Kisangani. Finally, both the FLC and the RCD, must fully cooperate with MONUC. The obstacles that those two movements are placing in the way of MONUC's deployment and of its verification and monitoring teams, which are described in the report of the Secretary-General, are unacceptable and are incompatible with the pursuit of the peace process. While the ceasefire is generally being respected by the signatories of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, we note that foreign armed groups that are not signatories to the Agreement have acted to engage in clashes. These could jeopardize the peace process.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“First of all, the disengagement phase must be completed; the parties to the conflict have prepared and signed disengagement plans, and these must be implemented in full. The Front de liberation du Congo (FLC) announced that it would disengage to agreed positions with effect from 1 June. That announcement is described in the account of the meeting of the Political Committee and the Security Council mission. Mr. Jean- Pierre Bemba reiterated that commitment during his meeting with the Security Council mission on 25 May. That promise must be kept through concrete action. The FLC must redeploy without delay to the positions of the Harare sub-plans. The demilitarization of Kisangani is another priority. Rwanda and Uganda have withdrawn their troops from the city, and the Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD) must do the same.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“The Security Council had an opportunity to address these various points during the consideration of the report of its mission to the Great Lakes region. Today, we have before us the eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), document S/2001/572. As we work on a draft resolution to extend the Mission's mandate, we must assess the current situation and consider the message the Council should send to the parties. The Council shares the cautious optimism to which the Secretary-General refers in his report. But the peace process has not yet reached the point of no return. It remains fragile, and the parties to the conflict must continue their efforts.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“Several States have begun to withdraw their troops from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including Uganda, Zimbabwe and, soon, Namibia. The inter-Congolese dialogue is also progressing, with visits to all the provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo by envoys of Mr. Masire, aimed at appointing representatives for the dialogue; the preparatory meeting will start on 16 July. Finally, the announced reopening of the River Congo, with the arrival of the Uruguayan riverine unit, is a harbinger of hope for millions of Congolese from Kinshasa to Kisangani. None of the parties should threaten this hope in any way. All must participate actively in the Congo River Basin Commission.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“Mr. Levitte (France) (spoke in French): It is a pleasure to welcome the presence in this Chamber of Mr. She Okitundu, Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. My first words will be to thank Mr. Jean-Marie Guehenno and Mr. Olara Otunnu for their brilliant presentations on the situation and to extend warm wishes for the recovery of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Kamel Morjane. The mission that the Security Council carried out recently to the Great Lakes region was exceptionally important. It made it possible to make certain progress, limited yet concrete. The peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is showing encouraging developments. The ceasefire is being fully respected. Disengagement proceeds.”
2001-06-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4327 (2001) · source
“Let us be clear: the United Nations will be deployed for a long time. We must carefully follow up the results of this mission on an almost daily basis. We will have to move gradually towards peace. We cannot stop along the path, because stopping would mean retreating. I believe that our entire delegation has that determination, because if the United Nations and the Security Council does not get involved, who will go there?”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323 (2001) · source
“In addition, I would like to pay tribute to two men: Kamel Morjane, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo who, with exemplary determination, caution, wisdom, readiness and unremitting effort, has managed to create something that last year seemed to be impossible - the clear climate of trust and cooperation that now exists between the United Nations and the Congolese authorities, whoever they may be; and Jean Arnault in Bujumbura, who, under equally difficult conditions, has done a remarkable job of engaging all the parties in dialogue. Finally, I would like to pay tribute to all the members of the Secretary-General's team, who helped us to prepare for the trip. It was a pleasure to be able to carry out such a well-prepared mission.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323 (2001) · source
“I would like to conclude by warmly commending, on behalf of our entire delegation, the remarkable work carried out by the United Nations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Burundi. The Senegalese contingent, which we saw in the field in Mbandaka, working under extremely difficult conditions, provides a clear example of what the United Nations can accomplish. As I said earlier, we were also very impressed by the arrival of the Tunisians.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323 (2001) · source
“In our meeting with President Mkapa in Dar es Salaam, we suggested that a possible idea would be to set up a Tanzanian- Burundian commission in order to study this matter and to find concrete, pragmatic ways of trying to reduce the tension. My final comment about Burundi is that we have to find a way that would allow President Mandela, the resident facilitator in Johannesburg, and the Secretary- General's Representative in Bujumbura, Mr. Jean Arnault, who has done an excellent job, to be able to work better together. We made contact with President Mandela after having spoken with the Secretary- General, but we undoubtedly need some imagination and creativity when it comes to finding ways to help President Mandela succeed in Burundi.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323 (2001) · source
“We will give them some time; but if by the deadline, which has not been set, there is no positive response from the two armed groups as to their intention to return to the negotiating table, then perhaps the heads of State of the region could decide among themselves to take measures. President Buyoya spoke about his deep concern over the return, as I said earlier, of combatants from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We spoke about this clearly with President Kabila. He also spoke of his concern about the refugee camps that house 500,000 Burundian refugees on Tanzanian soil, on the other side of the border, and that, according to President Buyoya, are a starting point for quick operations carried out by armed groups on Burundian soil.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323 (2001) · source
“We have the most respected personality in the world dealing with the fate of Burundi, and he has proposed a path to peace, so it is certainly unacceptable that some would consider taking the capital by force or pursuing offensives, even if only to support a political process. The path of dialogue exists, and President Mandela embodies it. The Arusha Agreement is on the table. If some have corrections, additions or criticisms to make, they must do so around the negotiating table. There is a temptation in the region to impose sanctions against those two groups. We reached an agreement with President Museveni, who is the Chairman of the group of States concerned, that in the immediate future the messages of the Security Council to the two groups must be used in order to consult the grass roots. We are waiting for their responses.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323 (2001) · source
“As much as we were encouraged by the situation and developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we remain quite concerned about an impasse - a kind of vicious circle - in which Burundi finds itself locked at the present time. We met with President Buyoya, with the political parties and with the leaders of the two armed groups that are threatening to renew hostilities. We visited President Mandela at length in Johannesburg on the first day of our visit to the region. We said very clearly to the leaders of the two armed groups that there was no military solution.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323 (2001) · source
“Finally, we proposed a project for the future that is not new but that today is increasingly topical: the idea of a conference of all the States concerned, those of greater Central Africa - a regional conference - in order to deal with the matter of security between States in the region, their integrated economic development and human rights issues, especially minority rights. These are the three categories that we have suggested. The idea was well received everywhere we went, even if some stressed that we first had to make progress towards peace in every country before organizing the conference, but the idea is once again topical. The fourth and last part of my statement deals with Burundi.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323 (2001) · source
“This is a message that we will relay to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which are concerned with this situation themselves. Another economic point I wish to make regards the pillaging of the Congo's natural resources. This is mentioned in the report, as it was at each of our meetings with the heads of State concerned, and we stressed that our message was clear: the pillaging must stop. We are not aiming to punish; we are aiming to encourage. The dialogue has begun. It is up to everyone to take the necessary measures to rectify what needs to be rectified. As for the Council, on the basis of the addendum that is being prepared, we will meet in three months to have a more detailed discussion of the situation and of the developments that we hope will have taken place within the next three months.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323 (2001) · source
“We are very aware of that point, even though I stress that it is not up to MONUC but rather to the Congolese parties themselves to ensure security in the zones under their control. It is up to them to maintain law, order and security in these areas. But this point concerns us as well, because we are responsible actors. From the economic standpoint, besides what I have already mentioned, we returned from Kinshasa with the feeling that the devaluation that was decided upon immediately after our departure is bringing considerable turbulence to the Congolese economy and social life. We are attentive to this, because, while it is good to set up a peace plan, we also have to concern ourselves with social stability, especially in the capital.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323 (2001) · source
“Our Security Council has the feeling that it could discreetly help bring about a consensus, together with President Masire, on which city would be the best site for the national dialogue and would welcome it as a symbol of the reconciliation of the Congolese people. A difficult point for which we do not have a solution at present is the provisional administration of zones evacuated by foreign forces. It is clear that the Congolese forces that are currently deployed will remain in their zone, whether space is opened up by the Government of Kinshasa, by the FLC or by the RCD Goma. We are afraid that in some very well-identified areas in the eastern part of the country the withdrawal of forces could lead to security risks.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323 (2001) · source
“It is a comfortable ceiling and gives us some leeway for action. We remain under the ceiling of 5,537 men, and we are ready to move towards phase III. We are opening the door of the transition to phase III. Now the ball is in the court of the Political Committee and of the Joint Military Commission to provide us as soon as possible with the detailed plans that we need in order to be able to plan, under the aegis of the Secretary-General, the next steps of deployment on Congolese soil, of MONUC observers, and, if necessary, additional contingents. That covers the military sphere. As for the national dialogue, MONUC must certainly assist the facilitator's team in moving throughout the country, which has no infrastructure, with aeroplanes or by making helicopters available.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323 (2001) · source
“This was the response awaited so that parties that hesitated to take this step could come to Kinshasa. The co-location must take place as soon as possible. The third item from the military standpoint is before us. On 15 June, the current MONUC mandate comes to an end. We will have to find the means to move forward. Since we are awaiting detailed plans that the Political Committee must convey to us on the basis of the work that has been done thus far by the Joint Military Commission, whether concerning the withdrawal of forces or the disarmament of the negative forces, we are not in a position today to recommend moving on to phase III. We have found a formula that proposes a transition towards phase III. The ceiling of 5,537 men that was decided by Security Council resolution 1291 (2000) seems to be adequate.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323 (2001) · source
“The authority of the Security Council is at stake, and Kamel Morjane, with the Council's active support, should be able to deal with this item in the days to come. For the rules of the game to be respected, the withdrawal of Ugandan forces, announced by President Museveni, should be observed in the field, through the presence of MONUC observers. Beyond this initial aspect, we must carry out the co-location between MONUC's chiefs of staff, who are in Kinshasa, and the Joint Military Commission's chiefs of staff, who are still in Lusaka. As regards the site, everything is ready. From the security point of view, the arrival of a contingent of 200 Tunisian soldiers and officers when we were in Kinshasa provided a very strong reassurance for those who might have had doubts about their security.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323 (2001) · source
“The first is to help one of the Ugandan battalions, situated east of Kisangani, leave by using one of Kisangani's two airports, because the alternative is for this battalion to open a road through the Congolese forest. This, obviously, would be a burden that we should spare that battalion. Unfortunately - and we said this very clearly at the Lusaka meeting - the town of Kisangani is not demilitarized today. It should have been so a year ago, in implementation of Security Council resolution 1304 (2000). It is still not demilitarized because armed elements of the RCD-Goma are still in the town. They are impeding the use of the airports by the withdrawing Ugandan troops. Therefore, this must be handled urgently.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323 (2001) · source
“But beyond that, we have said publicly, and to all our interlocutors in the Congo, that impunity must come to an end, that procedures must be established to prosecute those who carry out massacres and that it is up to the Congolese, within the framework of their dialogue, to decide what procedures should be followed in this regard. Those are the results we have achieved. I will now turn to a third aspect: actions to be undertaken in the weeks and months to come. In the military sphere, the most urgent matter is to help the Ugandan army leave Congolese territory, as was decided by President Museveni. From that point of view, two initiatives should be taken immediately.”
2001-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4323 (2001) · source