YouSaid · the spoken record

Levitte

lines on the record: 1,215
first: 2000-03-21
most recent: 2002-11-12
sittings or episodes: 146
sources: un-security-council

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“We welcome the fact that, barely a month after the report of the Panel of Experts was issued, the Council will adopt a draft resolution taking on board more than three quarters of the recommendations made by those experts. The draft resolution covers a particularly wide range of issues, including the delivery of arms, fuel, trafficking in diamonds, financial resources and the travel of UNITA leaders. The recommendations put forward in this text are addressed first and foremost to Member States. But they also call for the active cooperation of a variety of players in a number of different arenas, including international and regional organizations, enterprises, professional organizations and experts.”
2000-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4129 (2000) · source
“Mr. Levitte (France) (spoke in French): At the outset, I should like warmly to welcome to the Council table the Minister for External Relations of Angola, Mr. Miranda. The draft resolution that we will be adopting today reaffirms the Security Council's determination to ensure effective implementation of the sanctions against UNITA. Today, through this draft resolution, the Council will once again send a clear and firm message to Mr. Savimbi and UNITA to put an immediate end to hostilities and to finally fulfil their obligations under the Lusaka Protocol. My country fully endorses that message. Jonas Savimbi's overwhelming responsibility for the continuation of civil conflict in Angola and his refusal to take account of Council resolutions must be most seriously condemned.”
2000-04-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4129 (2000) · source
“Experience has shown that the international community's support for certain sanctions regimes wanes because keeping them depends on the resolve of a very limited number of Council members. This can only strengthen the intransigence of the target State. In conclusion, the Secretary-General's penetrating analysis in his millennium report, which I commend, should provide inspiration for the Security Council. The sanctions should be better targeted and be "intelligent". An effort has been made in a number of cases but "unintelligent" sanctions still persist. We hope that the Security Council's informal working group effectively chaired by Canada, which has drafted a code which we fully endorse, will be bolder not only with regard to future sanctions but also for those regimes still being applied.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“Although it is indisputable that since 1990 Iraq has complied with some of its obligations, the Security Council has never seriously examined the possibility of reducing the sanctions against this country, although this is provided for in paragraph 21 of resolution 687 (1991). Thirdly, the problem of the duration of the sanctions has to be addressed. Some sanctions have not been lifted even though the circumstances that caused them to be adopted no longer exist. Others are no longer applied, without this prompting any reaction from the Council. The credibility of sanctions suffers as a result. In order to ensure periodically that the tool remains legitimate, sanctions should be decided on for a specific period. There should be a provision that at the end of this period the Council is invited to take a new decision to renew the sanctions.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“Secondly, we must take care that the measures decided upon are in proportion to the situation and that sanctions are adjusted with regard to developments in the political situations they are supposed to correct. It is therefore necessary to evaluate their appropriateness throughout the time they are in force. No sanctions regime can work if it does not encourage the targeted State to amend its attitude. The logic behind sanctions is not punitive, but rather to provide an incentive. We therefore believe it is essential to define beforehand clear criteria which, once met, would lead to an easing of sanctions. For sanctions to remain a credible instrument, the Security Council, or some of its members, must not give the impression that sanctions will remain in force regardless of the attitude adopted by the State concerned.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“Cases in which the imposition of sanctions is feasible must be strictly interpreted. The measures referred to in Article 41 of the Charter may be used only to maintain or restore international peace and security. For example, we are not in favour of sanctions being applied solely because it is alleged that certain States are not complying with sanctions decided upon by the Security Council. It is obviously imperative that all Member States of the United Nations comply with the sanctions regimes imposed by the Council, which are mandatory; but other, more effective means exist to enforce the Council's decisions. We should avoid increasing the number of sanctions regimes. The United Nations already has the greatest difficulty in securing compliance with those currently in force.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“Even briefings by representatives of United Nations agencies are often problematic. It is essential that the practice of hearing outside speakers be the norm. Well-founded criticism of sanctions might lead to an overall questioning of their legitimacy. We want to avoid this development because we believe in the relevance of this tool. So what can be done? France would like to propose three complementary approaches. First, it would be wise not to use this instrument lightly. Sanctions must remain an instrument reserved for exceptional cases and only after other possibilities for peaceful settlement have been used. Gauging their impact - especially the economic and social effects - on civilians should be done systematically. We regret that this practice, which has been repeatedly recommended, has never been implemented.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“The Secretariat should be in a position to assess the impact of sanctions and the humanitarian situation in targeted countries. It is not normal that after 10 years the Security Council has only scant information on the situation in Iraq. The way committees work must also be modified. The rule of consensus is paralysing. Nothing in the Charter or in resolutions of the Council requires committees to take their decisions by consensus. The adoption of decisions by simple majority, at least for non-essential questions, could suffice. Transparency is also a concept that sanctions committees too often ignore. Third States and targeted States are not invited to speak before the committees. Measures were planned to that end but have not been applied. Proposals have been made but have been rejected by certain members.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“The case of Jordan in 1990 is the only example of a concrete decision by the Security Council to help a country face such difficulties. Too much embargo kills the embargo. If sanctions sometimes have little effect, responsibility also lies with the institutional arrangements that accompany them, particularly at the United Nations. In this regard, we should consider how the Secretariat and the sanctions committee might do more and better in this area. It is first of all essential for the Secretariat to have the necessary expertise, especially with regard to the arms trade, financial assets and customs work. This requires an increase in its human and financial resources. It should be able to play a real role in making proposals and following up on them.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“The effects of comprehensive sanctions often run counter to the desired goal and permit leaders of targeted States to tighten their grip over society by virtue of the isolation in which their country is kept and the increased dependence of the population on the existing regime. Finally, these sanctions indiscriminately affect the regime's supporters as well as those trying to oppose it. Comprehensive sanctions also have a negative impact on neighbouring States, whose cooperation is nevertheless indispensable. Our Council has often deplored the many Violations of sanctions regimes. But we must also realize that this phenomenon is partly due to the fact that the economic impact of sanctions on third countries is not sufficiently taken into account.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“The sanctions against UNITA contributed to isolating and weakening that movement. The Council is now trying to make these measures more effective and to see to it that they are universally applied. Lastly, for many years sanctions have obliged Iraq to comply with most of the demands stipulated in resolution 687 (1991). We must nevertheless note that in many cases our Council has experienced failure. In particular, when excessively prolonged, comprehensive sanctions regimes have a human cost that outweighs the benefits the Council can expect. These sanctions are cruel to people and have little impact on leaders.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“Sanctions are a legitimate instrument whose use is governed by the Charter. They allow us, when faced with a threat to the peace, to take intermediate measures, between simple political pressure and the use of force. In other words, they allow the Council to demonstrate its determination that its decisions should be enforced, without going so far as to use armed force. It is thus essential to maintain the Council's capacity to have recourse to sanctions when necessary. When used well, sanctions have proved to be an effective tool for achieving the aims the Council has set for itself. They played a significant role in South Africa's decision to abandon the apartheid regime. The imposition of sanctions against Libya led that country to cooperate with the legal systems of the countries concerned.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“Mr. Levitte (France) (spoke in French): I wish first of all to thank Mr. Kieran Prendergast for his very precise and specific statement; it constituted the best introduction to our discussion. It is good that the issue of sanctions is today the subject of public debate in the Security Council. Our debate is an extension of the recommendations of the General Assembly on this issue. It is particularly timely because the question of how best to hone the tool of sanctions to make it more effective is at present the subject of a number of seminars. The Security Council has imposed sanctions 12 times since 1990, while it had done so only twice before then. Following what some have called the decade of sanctions, the Security Council is justified in attempting to assess the results of this policy and to formulate guidelines for the future.”
2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source
“But we can also think of other situations where the Council did not take the necessary decisions to put an end to massive violations of human rights. Can the Council, duly informed, remain divided and do nothing? We do not think so. At the opening of the most recent session of the General Assembly last September, the Secretary-General appealed to the international community to consider how the United Nations could intervene quickly and more effectively in these situations. A debate was launched, which we need to continue in order to enable the Council fully to play the role entrusted to it by the Charter and to avert in future humanitarian tragedies such as the ones our world has witnessed in recent decades.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“Our goal should be to place the Council in a better position to assess the risks faced by missions in the field and to adapt their mandate and their means accordingly. In the face of violence and the massacre of civilians, the decisions of the Council, and, beyond that, those of the troop contributors will always be particularly difficult. When the time comes to commit the United Nations, will we be sufficiently mindful of the lessons drawn by the Inquiry into events in 1994 in Rwanda? We certainly hope so; otherwise, we would be betraying the memory of the victims. The attitude of the Council to the violence committed in East Timor last September is an encouraging sign. The deployment of the multinational Force led by Australia made it possible to stop the violence. The Council made that decision in a very short space of time.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“The information provided by the Secretariat needs to be supplemented, according to modalities to be defined, by other data - particularly historical data - so that we can better understand the situations at hand. We must also improve the Council's follow-up of United Nations missions. Experience has shown that once missions have been deployed in the field, implementation of their mandate is not always followed up carefully enough by the Council. We need greater regularity in this area. This means that we need to refocus our work on crisis situations and United Nations operations. We should spend more time considering these situations and less time on the so-called thematic subjects.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“The report of the Inquiry makes some recommendations in this respect: a plan of action against genocide, improved deployment capacities of the United Nations, protection of civilians, and so on. We welcome this trend, which is conducive to better circulation of information in the United Nations and to a greater capacity to react to events. The report that the Secretary-General requested from the panel chaired by Mr. Brahimi will make it possible to conduct a deeper analysis of this situation. Turning now to the work of the Council, two points need to be made. First, in the setting up of new operations, decisions of the Council must be better prepared.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“But it is the effective deployment of the second phase of MONUC that will attest to the will of the international community to contribute fully to bringing about peace in the country and in the Great Lakes region. Here it might be useful to recall the situation in Burundi. The Council lent its support to the facilitation process led by President Mandela and to the efforts of the Burundian parties. This process is a difficult one. In order to strengthen it, the international community must, now that sanctions against the country have been lifted, assist it by speedily resuming economic assistance, which is so necessary to the people. Beyond the Great Lakes region, we must consider ways of stepping up United Nations action in crisis situations.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“This is definitely a source of concern for the international community. Indeed, United Nations action with respect to the Great Lakes region as a whole must be more sustained. The Council has authorized the deployment of the second phase of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). We must ensure that this operation receives the necessary means, in particular the necessary funding. Impartial action by Council members vis-a-vis each of the belligerents, with a view to inducing them to fulfil their commitments, is also essential to buttress the July 1999 Lusaka Agreement, all of whose elements must be implemented. The next mission of the Council to the territory will be an opportunity to get all of our messages through.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“Carlsson's report, we must draw conclusions for the work of the United Nations in the Great Lakes region. Let us turn first to Rwanda. Mr. Carlsson's report calls upon the international community to help in reconstruction, reconciliation and observance of human rights. And we should add, to help in the matter of justice, which is essential to attain these goals. France supports this appeal. We participate in this effort together with our European Union partners. The Secretary-General has proposed to Rwanda a new partnership with the United Nations, and we hope that efforts on both sides will make it possible to make headway in this regard and that, in exchange for serious security guarantees, Rwanda will move towards peaceful democracy, allowing a return to regional stability.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“Canada announced that it was prepared to head that operation. France said that it was willing to participate. The disagreement in the Council finally meant that the operation had to be abandoned. The international community once again remained inactive in the face of new massacres, the magnitude of which has not fully been measured. As of August 1998, the Council was faced with a war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The information that reached us reported violence against civilian populations, particularly in the east of the country and attested to the seriousness of the situation. This time, will we be able to take the necessary action? The events that occurred starting in 1994 are part of the context created by the Rwandan genocide. As we now consider Mr.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“Several comments could be made concerning the Great Lakes region, as well as the work of the Council and peacekeeping operations in general. The Rwandan tragedy occurred in a particularly unstable environment. We recall in particular the massacres committed in Burundi in October of 1993 in an atmosphere of general passivity. Since 1994, this instability in the Great Lakes region has increased. After the failure to deal with the Rwandan genocide, the United Nations was not able to face up to subsequent crises. In the months following 1994, the Council did not react in time to the problems caused by the presence of armed elements in the refugee camps in eastern Zaire. In autumn of 1996, the Kivu crisis prompted the Council, at the urging, inter alia, of France, to authorize the dispatch of a multinational humanitarian force.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“In the face of the spring 1994 genocide and in the light of the delays and difficulties encountered in strengthening UNAMIR, France, in June, with the support of the troops of African countries, assisted the people who were under threat, and it did so in transparency and with the authorization of the Security Council. We are aware of the criticism, which we think unjustified, that Operation Turquoise elicited. But should we once again have stood by passively? The report submitted by Mr. Carlsson reflects some of this criticism, but it also says "many interlocutors have credited Operation Turquoise with saving a number of lives in a situation where few other initiatives were being taken" (ibid., p. 49). This is the point we wish to retain from that intervention. Now we need to learn the lessons of this tragedy.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“The accords reached were the framework in which lasting peace could have been established with mutual respect for all. The parliamentary report also demonstrated that France, while aware of the risk of confrontation, underestimated the upsurge of extremism. Nevertheless, it tried to mobilize the international community, through the United Nations, to prevent a massacre. Mr. Carlsson's analysis shows that neither the other Member States present at the time nor the Secretariat used any better the information that, subsequently, was to prove crucial. This attitude goes a long way in explaining the inability of the United Nations to prevent the 1994 genocide. This tragedy still has one unclear area regarding elements that triggered the genocide, though this will no doubt be clarified one day.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“The mission, which was presided over by Mr. Quiles, throughout 1998 gathered testimony from many participants in and witnesses to the tragedy. All of this information, in the spirit of transparency, was made public. This work made it possible to better understand several aspects of the Rwandan tragedy. Mr. Carlsson's Inquiry supplements those analyses. From the report of the French Parliament, I note that France, before the events of 1994, had made an effort to avoid a military solution and to encourage the parties to share power in Rwanda. We need to place this tragedy in its historical context, which goes beyond the offensive by the Rwandese Patriotic Front in 1990, all the way back to events of 1959, the time of decolonization. The active support of France for the negotiations concluded in August 1993 in Arusha illustrated this policy.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“The United Nations had deployed about 70,000 Blue Helmets throughout the world, and several missions were facing difficulties. These elements certainly affected decision-making. We should also pay tribute to the troops of UNAMIR, those of Belgium, and particularly of Ghana and Tunisia, who remained there on the ground and, as well as they could, protected the threatened civilians. However, the overall picture is one of failure. The United Nations was not able to assist the Rwandans and, as the Inquiry stresses, all of us - Security Council members, the Secretariat, States Members of the Organization - bear the heavy responsibility for this. Before the United Nations undertook its own inquiry into actions in Rwanda, the French National Assembly set up a parliamentary fact-finding mission on Rwanda.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“The report of the Independent Inquiry provides a thorough analysis of the mistakes that led to the failure of the United Nations in Rwanda. The report highlights the shortcomings of decisions taken before the outbreak of genocide: the inadequate mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), the lack of resources provided for the Mission, poor use of information, and an inability to adapt the mandate of the Mission to the requirements of the situation on the ground. The report also highlights the serious mistakes that resulted in a "Failure to respond to the genocide" (ibid., p. 35), a lack of determination to strengthen UNAMIR, inability to understand the real nature of events and to decide on what action should be taken. Of course, as the investigators say, the situation in 1994 was particularly tense.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“More than ever before, we need to ensure that the United Nations will no longer remain inactive or powerless in the face of such tragedies. But I wish first to welcome the initiative taken by the Secretary-General, who had the courage to task the Independent Inquiry with investigating the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide. We support that initiative. When the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hubert Vedrine, received the Independent Inquiry last November, he said that France shared this determination to achieve transparency and effectiveness. In France, that determination was reflected in the 1998 establishment of a parliamentary fact-finding mission on Rwanda. Let us in turn have the courage together to look the truth in the face. The United Nations seriously failed in its mission.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“Mr. Levitte (France) (spoke in French): I too wish to welcome Mr. Carlsson and to thank him for the report before the Council today, which describes the horror of the genocide committed between April and July 1994: "Rwandans killed Rwandans, brutally decimating the Tutsi population of the country, but also targetting moderate Hutus. Appalling atrocities were committed, by militia and the armed forces, but also by civilians against other civilians. "The international community did not prevent the genocide, nor did it stop the killing once the genocide had begun". (S/1999/1257, annex, p. 3) The debate that you have organized, Mr. President, provides an opportunity for us to think about the lessons to be learned.”
2000-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4127 (2000) · source
“We believe that this peace initiative, coming from Afghan civil society, deserves special attention. The advocates of this initiative have decided to send delegations to the belligerent parties to encourage them to join in that effort at reconciliation. We believe that it would be useful for the Secretariat to consider ways of getting all the Afghan parties to support that initiative.”
2000-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4124 (2000) · source
“The Secretariat has just stressed the fact that several thousand foreigners are involved in the military operations, most of them fighting on the side of the Taliban. My delegation therefore fully supports the appeal by the Security Council for a halt to such outside interference. My second comment relates to the political prospects. France fully supports the current efforts being made by the new Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Vendrell, aimed at achieving a political settlement. I am referring to his participation in recent meetings organized by the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Jeddah. Here, I should like to emphasize that the Rome process, which was launched at the end of last year with a view to convening a loya jirgah, or grand assembly, is very important.”
2000-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4124 (2000) · source
“Unanimously, we recall the principles for a political settlement in Afghanistan and, in particular, the objective of attaining a fully representative government, acceptable to all. Such a consensus among members of the Council must be highlighted. We hope that the particularly strong message being sent to the Afghan parties, in particular the Taliban, will be heard and acted upon. I should like to make two specific comments. First, with regard to the military situation, hostilities have resumed, and members of the Council have already expressed concern about the offensive launched by the Taliban at the beginning of March. My delegation is particularly worried about the involvement of foreign elements in the fighting that is taking place.”
2000-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4124 (2000) · source
“The situation in Afghanistan is still extremely disturbing, whether with regard to the continuation of fighting, interference with the work of humanitarian organizations, violations of human rights - in particular, the situation of women - support for international terrorism or the increase in the production of and trafficking in drugs. In all these areas, the Security Council has already taken a firm position. It will do so again after this meeting through a statement by the President. France fully supports the draft presidential statement to be issued. Indeed, it is important to make clear that that statement reflects the unanimity of the membership of the Council.”
2000-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4124 (2000) · source
“Mr. Levitte (France) (spoke in French): I should like to join you, Mr. President, in paying tribute to former President Bourguiba of Tunisia. By attending the funeral tomorrow, President Chirac will express the sentiments and solidarity of all of the people of France, who are united with the people of Tunisia in their grief. I, too, should like to congratulate Ambassador Chowdhury, and I should like to welcome you, Mr. President, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Canada, to our Council. I am grateful to Ambassador Listre for the information that he has given us, and I should also like to thank the Secretariat for providing us with a detailed and comprehensive briefing.”
2000-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4124 (2000) · source
“Nana-Sinkam, the Secretary- General's Representative, to pursue his consultations with the countries of the region so as to resolve the border security issues. The adoption of the confidence-building measures proposed by President Konare of Mali, as current Chairman of ECOWAS, would also seem appropriate. The loss of peace in Guinea-Bissau posed a threat to the peace and stability of the entire subregion. Undoubted progress has been made, but the information contained in the Secretary-General's report, indicating the continuing circulation of large quantities of small arms in civilian communities, is a genuine cause of concern to my delegation. I associate myself with Ambassador Hasmy's statement highlighting the importance of a vigorous implementation of the arms-recovery programme.”
2000-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4121 (2000) · source
“We believe that full respect for the Abuja Accord of 1 November 1998 negotiated under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) will require the dissolution of the junta. The full return to constitutional normality is a genuine priority. The armed forces must henceforth obey unequivocally the instructions of the civilian power. At this point, I wish to pay tribute to the very positive role played by the Gambia, in particular by Foreign Minister Jobe. We hope that the agreement reached on 22 March will be put into effect. We support all initiatives to promote the demobilization and reintegration of the military into civilian life and, like others, look forward to learning the results of the World Bank mission to take place in early April. France encourages Mr.”
2000-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4121 (2000) · source
“Prendergast rightly noted, this is an excellent example of the essential role of the United Nations. France welcomes the successful holding of the recent legislative and presidential elections in Guinea-Bissau. The first objectives set by President Kumba Yala seem to point in the right direction and deserve the international community's support. We feel that the President's concern to consult civil society on a regular basis with regard to the various programmes that have been undertaken is also well directed. France will, of course, be participating in a constructive and positive in the forthcoming round table to be organized by the United Nations Development Programme. In view of the successful convening of the elections, we consider it important that civilian power be endowed with all authority necessary to implementing its action.”
2000-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4121 (2000) · source
“Mr. Levitte (France) (spoke in French): I wish to join my colleagues in thanking the Secretariat, in particular Mr. Prendergast, for the introduction of the report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau. France appreciates the energetic activities in that country of the Representative of the Secretary-General in Guinea-Bissau, Mr. Nana-Sinkam, and the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS). We feel that the presence of the United Nations there since June 1999 has allowed its transition from a state of war to one of peace and the gradual re- establishment of constitutional order. The courageous stances taken by Mr. Nana-Sinkam, as well as his close contacts with the authorities and the judiciary, have heightened respect for human rights and the rule of law. As Mr.”
2000-03-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4121 (2000) · source
“It should prompt the Security Council to work in good faith and in a spirit of consensus for the implementation of the positive guidelines of resolution 1284 (1999) in order to encourage Iraq to cooperate, and thus to enable the sanctions to be suspended and then lifted. But beyond that, this situation should make the Council question, in the future, the effectiveness and consequences of broad, indiscriminate sanctions that hurt civilian populations exclusively and whose human cost clearly exceeds any political benefits that the Council could expect of them.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“We hope that the Security Council will be better informed of the situation on the ground, in particular by hearing from representatives of United Nations agencies and from the Humanitarian Coordinator on a more regular basis. We are convinced that if the Council were better informed, it would want to correct the shortcomings of the current humanitarian programme. But we need more in-depth consideration of this matter. In this connection, I echo the Secretary-General's very pertinent comments this morning. In 1999 the panel observed that, irrespective of the improvements that might be brought about, the magnitude of the humanitarian needs was such that those needs could not be met within the context of this programme. That statement is more pertinent than ever.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“Yet the implementation of these two provisions would lead to a significant drop in the number of holds. The arrangements requested from the Secretariat, in application of paragraph 24 of the resolution, to implement a local cash component have still not been communicated to the Council. This measure could, however, improve the programme. All the humanitarian agencies agree on this point. We hope that these arrangements are presented to the Council as quickly as possible. Ms. Bellamy appealed to the Council several months ago to implement a local cash component. Could she give us her ideas on this issue today so as to help the Council consider how her recommendation could be quickly implemented?”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“It is precisely to correct these malfunctions that France insisted that resolution 1284 (1999) contain an ambitious humanitarian section. It made a significant contribution to the drafting of that part of the resolution, which contains many technical improvements. Their implementation at this time does not, however, live up to our expectations. We regret in particular the fact that in the four months since the resolution was adopted, few measures have actually gone into force. The mechanism for notifying the Secretariat of contracts for food, medicines, agriculture and education will at last be implemented because holds were lifted yesterday. The application of paragraph 18, on the approval of the contracts for oil spare parts by independent experts is pending.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“Insofar as Iraq's entire revenue comes from the sale of oil, this warning should not leave the Council indifferent. If oil prices were to fall tomorrow, Iraq's ability to finance the humanitarian programme would be seriously diminished. Consequently, we hope that the Secretary-General's recommendation will at last be heard by the Council. But this alone will not suffice. This measure will have a positive effect only if the spare parts are delivered quickly. The practice of excessive holds in this sector must therefore end. Spare parts with a total value of only $250 million have actually been delivered, whereas the Council has made available the equivalent of $1.2 billion in four phases. The decisions taken by the Council are therefore being largely ignored.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“The Secretary-General invites the Council to give its attention to this today, recommending that it approve an additional amount of $300 million for each of the final two phases. Even last year we believed that the Security Council should assume its responsibilities in this area. We have not changed our opinion. The last report of the independent group of experts mandated by the Secretary-General presents, like previous reports, an eloquent picture of the Iraqi oil industry. The situation in all sectors of the industry continues to deteriorate, endangering the lives of workers, causing serious harm to the environment and damaging oil wells. Unless more spare parts are sent to Iraq quickly, the oil industry's capacity to maintain the current level of production will be compromised.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“But the Council should recognize that the number of holds has become, as the Secretary-General has rightly said, so high that it is unacceptable. As the Russian Ambassador emphasized, $1.75 billion worth of contracts, an unprecedented level, are currently on hold. I would like to point out in particular the high rate in certain sectors essential to improving the humanitarian situation, such as electricity, water and agriculture. In these sectors, the rate of holds exceeds 50 per cent and has even reached 100 per cent in phase V of the telecommunications sector. With such high rates, the humanitarian programme can no longer function in these sectors. The programme to purchase spare parts for the oil industry is also characterized by an excessively high rate of holds.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“Many of these recommendations - on the oil supervisors, the procedures for reimbursement and the illegal contractual clauses - are aimed at correcting long- standing difficulties on which no progress has been made for months. This paralysis of the sanctions Committee is unacceptable. The French delegation, which has made numerous compromise proposals, is prepared to resume discussions without delay to break the present impasse in the Committee. Several of the Secretary-General' s recommendations concern the issue of holds, which have very serious effects. The report details their very negative impact on implementing the humanitarian programme. It is certainly legitimate to make sure that before goods are sent they are not liable to be used for prohibited ends.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“That is why we have closely examined the recommendations in the Secretary-General's report addressed, on the one hand, to Iraq and, on the other, to the sanctions Committee and the Security Council. These recommendations, which are intended to improve the effectiveness of the humanitarian programme, are welcome. With regard to the proposals addressed to Iraq, we hope that programme officials in New York and on the ground will examine with the Iraqi authorities ways and means to implement them quickly. With regard to the recommendations addressed to the Committee, we hope they will all be applied resolutely and speedily.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“But we must keep in mind the conclusions of the humanitarian panel's report, which in paragraph 58 states, "The panel reiterates its understanding that the humanitarian situation in Iraq will continue to be a dire one in the absence of a sustained revival of the Iraqi economy, which in turn cannot be achieved solely through remedial humanitarian efforts." Resolution 986 (1995), even though improved by resolution 1153 (1998), is only a partial and temporary response. Only the suspension of civilian sanctions, which can be envisioned in the context of implementing resolution 1284 (1999), then lifting them completely once the conditions have been fulfilled, will allow the country' s economy to start growing again. Meanwhile, the members of the Security Council have a responsibility to improve the Iraq programme.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“Of course, in order to assist the Iraqi people, on the Security Council adopted resolution 986 (1995), the so- called oil-for-food programme, and significantly improved it with resolution 1153 (1998). As the report emphasizes, despite the difficulties encountered and its shortcomings, the programme has provided real assistance to Iraqis, especially in the areas of food and health.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source
“Lastly, the almost daily bombardments have had negative humanitarian effects on the civilian population. According to our information, these military actions killed 144 civilians and injured 446; 42 per cent of the Victims in the air raids have been civilians. An entire society is today living without structure and being destroyed. This will have long-term consequences for Iraq and for regional balance as a whole. Admittedly, the Iraqi Government bears a heavy share of the initial blame for this disastrous situation. But the Security Council can no longer disregard its own responsibility in the matter, which is indisputable and increasingly condemned by international public opinion.”
2000-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4120 (2000) · source