YouSaid · the spoken record

Levitte

lines on the record: 1,215
first: 2000-03-21
most recent: 2002-11-12
sittings or episodes: 146
sources: un-security-council

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“Mr. Levitte (France) (spoke in French): I would like to thank most warmly Mr. Jean-Marie Guehenno for his clear and precise briefing. The position of the European Union, which France entirely endorses, will be put forward by the representative of Sweden. I would just like to make a few comments to complete and supplement what Ambassador Schori will be saying. It is essential that violence be curbed in Kosovo. Since June 1999, impressive progress has been made. The international community has played a decisive role in this evolution. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) has met the challenge before it in a frequently difficult environment. It has taken courageous action to preserve the security of the peoples. This was the case just recently in Mitrovica, where some 20 soldiers from KFOR were wounded.”
2001-02-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4277 (2001) · source
“On this point, I would like to assure President Kagame of France's resolve to work for such a settlement, which must take into account the interests and legitimate concerns of all the parties involved.”
2001-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4273 (2001) · source
“The matter of the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe militias will also undoubtedly have to be resolved, in part, between the Kinshasa and Kigali authorities. But assistance from the international community will also be needed. In this spirit, the Security Council has made it known that it is ready to envisage the deployment of MONUC personnel to Goma or Bukavu along the border with Rwanda. The coming weeks must enable long-overdue progress to be made in settling this conflict. The meeting between the Security Council and the Political Committee of the Lusaka Agreement in two weeks, and the meetings and summits preceding it, should, if all the parties to the conflict make the necessary efforts, lead to an irreversible process of disengagement and withdrawal that will bring us closer to a resolution of this crisis.”
2001-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4273 (2001) · source
“It should be noted, nonetheless, that establishing an internal dialogue involving all political actors must not be confined to the Democratic Republic of the Congo alone. This is one of the keys to the settlement of the crisis for the region as a whole. President Kagame rightly emphasizes his concerns about security. His concerns are legitimate, and the Security Council is aware of Rwanda's need to enjoy peace and stability within its borders that would not be jeopardized by foreign threats. We have all noted the efforts of the Rwandese authorities to settle the matter of the former Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), and we are pleased to note that many of them have already been reintegrated into the Rwandan Patriotic Army. We must continue in that direction.”
2001-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4273 (2001) · source
“There is also concern about information on large-scale plundering of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly in Kivu. In this connection, we all await with great interest the conclusions and recommendations of the panel of experts created by the Security Council, which must submit its report at the end of March. The return to stability in the region therefore requires first of all the implementation of the withdrawal of foreign forces. However, the internal aspect of the Lusaka Agreement is also necessary. In this connection, we welcome the encouraging commitments made by President Kabila, whose implementation we will follow with interest.”
2001-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4273 (2001) · source
“The Security Council has already had the opportunity to emphasize that the presence of forces of aggression in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is unacceptable. It is the Council's duty to recall everywhere and at all times the fundamental principles of the Charter: respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. We have noted the willingness expressed by the Rwandese authorities to withdraw their forces from Pweto once the MONUC observers arrive. The latter must be deployed quickly, and we will follow closely how Rwanda lives up to its commitment. That will be a first step in the right direction. I would also like to recall the concerns expressed by the Council about massive violations of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly in the eastern part of the country.”
2001-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4273 (2001) · source
“Relaunching the Lusaka Agreement process and then finally proceeding to phase II of the deployment of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) requires the disengagement and withdrawal of foreign forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo without further delay, pursuant to the accords signed by the parties to the conflict and to the relevant Security Council resolutions. I wish to recall that these resolutions, particularly Security Council 1304 (2000), state that that withdrawal should be progressive and phased and should begin with the withdrawal of troops of the uninvited States in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The States to which these resolutions apply cannot subject their implementation to conditions.”
2001-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4273 (2001) · source
“Mr. Levitte (France) (spoke in French): It is an honour and a great pleasure to see you, Sir, presiding over the Security Council meeting today. We are glad for the opportunity to hear President Kagame today, and we welcome the good proposals he has shared with us to settle the conflict. We have also noted with great interest the meeting a few days ago between President Kagame and President Kabila. That dialogue, if it continues, as we ardently hope it will, will bring us closer to a settlement of the conflict. These are encouraging signs at a time when, as the Secretary-General said last week and again today, a certain calm has returned to the conflict zones of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Today there is undoubtedly an opportunity to be seized to relaunch the Lusaka Agreement process. But how long will this last?”
2001-02-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4273 (2001) · source
“These are a few ideas that we hope may be discussed in greater detail with all the Security Council members when we come to consider the practical effects of this debate. Forgive me for having spoken at such length, but we feel very strongly about this issue, which we consider to be critical.”
2001-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4272 (2001) · source
“The point has been raised several times, specifically in the Brahimi report, that the Secretary-General has to play a greater role in coordination when strategies are being drafted and peace-building programmes implemented. The coordinating role should be assigned to the Secretary- General's representative in situ, when there is one. The fifth and last idea concerns regular briefings for the Council. The Council should be kept regularly informed - as is already the case, for example, with the Central African Republic and Guinea-Bissau - of progress made and difficulties encountered in peace- building, since any failure or reversal in this domain would thrust peace and security concerns to the fore once again, starting with the Security Council's direct intervention.”
2001-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4272 (2001) · source
“Ideally, the division of roles and financing should be clearly defined at the time the Security Council establishes the peacekeeping operation and could even appear in an annex to the resolution. I stress this point because I feel it is fundamental. One can imagine the Council's holding consultations in parallel with potential troop contributors. Thus, from the very outset, the Security Council would establish a double partnership with the troop-contributing countries and with all the financial institutions - the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and others - entrusted with carrying out the Council's decisions. We feel that this point, too, is fundamental. The fourth idea concerns strengthening the coordinating role of the Secretary-General and of his representative in situ.”
2001-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4272 (2001) · source
“The focus of early consultations between the Security Council and all the agencies involved in peace- building, and of the Secretary-General's coordination efforts, should be, with due respect for their respective powers and their decision-making autonomy, the formulation of peace-building strategies that: clearly define the responsibilities of each actor; ensure satisfactory cooperation among the various bodies; establish a timetable for the implementation of programmes; ensure, as far as possible, predictable financing, especially for missions relying on voluntary contributions; and provide for a transition between the peacekeeping and peace-building phases and a bridge between peacekeeping operations and peace-building programmes under the best conditions possible and within reasonable time frames.”
2001-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4272 (2001) · source
“Such a contract could, for example, take the form of an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the head of State or Government of the State concerned, as has been the case with the Central African Republic. Mention of this could appear in the Security Council resolution authorizing the peacekeeping operation. The third idea is to formulate peace-building strategies and obtain stable, predictable financing.”
2001-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4272 (2001) · source
“The main point is that this process of consultation should take place sufficiently early so that there is time to work out a peace-building strategy and to obtain the necessary resources. The second idea is to establish a long-term contract between the international community and the authorities of a State emerging from conflict. Insofar as such authorities have the minimum requisite legitimacy and administrative resources, they should pledge to implement programmes, with the assistance of the international community, to rebuild political, economic and social infrastructures. The investment of the international community makes sense only if there is a corresponding real desire on the part of local actors for a fresh start.”
2001-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4272 (2001) · source
“We believe it is essential for the main agencies involved in peace-building to be consulted as soon as possible at the start of the peacekeeping phase. Naturally, this would be done chiefly by the Secretary-General. The report (S/2000/809) of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations chaired by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi made that quite clear. But it might also be necessary for the Council to contact those agencies directly, for example by inviting their heads to take part in the Council's deliberations, as was done when representatives of the United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were invited to take part in the Council's recent debates on Guinea- Bissau, the Central African Republic and East Timor.”
2001-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4272 (2001) · source
“That is why it is essential, in association with the relevant agencies, to devise a long-term strategy to ensure stable, predictable funding for programmes of action and a gradual takeover of actions by the peacekeeping operation, as, for example, what was done in Eastern Slavonia or in Haiti. It is clear that the Security Council plays a Vital role in the satisfactory coordination of and transition between the tasks for which it has primary responsibility - re-establishing and maintaining peace - and those which bring into play a great many different actors: peace-building. Allow me to put forward a few practical proposals as to what we could do in this regard. First, we would advocate early consultation between the Security Council and agencies responsible for peace-building.”
2001-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4272 (2001) · source
“The second example is the reconstruction or consolidation of a reliable and impartial police force and judiciary. Peacekeeping operations play a key role in the phase following the signing of a peace agreement, but their purpose is not to continue indefinitely as the sole guarantee of public order. That is something that has to be founded on reliable and impartial local capabilities. So it becomes necessary to reform, reorganize and train police forces and courts. That has been part of the mandate of many operations and in some cases has been central to them, as for example in Haiti and in Bosnia. But often, it is a long- term undertaking exceeding the duration and resources ofa peacekeeping operation.”
2001-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4272 (2001) · source
“The first category is either integration into a reorganized, democratic and apolitical army, requiring in most cases the implementation of a programme to restructure the armed forces such as has been started in the Central African Republic, or something that is even more ambitious: the reconstitution of those forces, which is what is taking place in Sierra Leone now with the decisive support of our United Kingdom friends. Achieving these goals requires bilateral or multilateral programmes, often on a fairly large scale and extended in time. The second category is socio-professional integration into non-military areas, which requires action to provide job training and reconstruction programmes to relaunch economic activity. Here, peace-building borders on development assistance in its broadest sense.”
2001-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4272 (2001) · source
“But the Council also underlined "the necessity of a clear definition of tasks and division of responsibilities among all actors involved in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, including United Nations agencies and programmes". (S/PRST/2000/lO) The reintegration aspects of DDR are a perfect illustration of the difficulty of satisfactorily linking peacekeeping, peace-building and development assistance. There can in fact be no real demobilization, much less lasting demobilization, unless those who have been demobilized find a Viable alternative to the status and life of the soldier. That means they have to be offered alternatives that fall broadly into two categories.”
2001-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4272 (2001) · source
“The solution to these two problems should be to assess what is required for peace-building as far in advance as possible; to formulate strategies that will ensure the full participation, from the outset, of the relevant agencies, funds, programmes and banks that are involved in peace-building; and to speed up the pace of disbursement. I will offer just two examples to better illustrate the difficulties confronting us. The first example is the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, commonly referred to as DDR. In a statement by its President on 23 March 2000, the Security Council noted that "the mandates of peacekeeping missions increasingly include oversight of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration as one of their functions" because the task has proved to be one of the key aspects of peacekeeping.”
2001-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4272 (2001) · source
“Because so many actors are involved in peace- building programmes and the means of financing differ, obtaining financial resources can be a rather slow and very unequal process. The slowness of financial institutions in disbursing money is often the crux of the problem that prevents a smooth transition from actions by peacekeeping operations to the intervention of organizations involved in peace-building. This slow pace also conflicts with the sense of urgency often perceived on the ground, namely that international intervention must quickly produce tangible improvements in the daily lives of populations, who will otherwise start turning against those operations.”
2001-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4272 (2001) · source
“In extreme cases such as East Timor and Kosovo the authorities simply do not exist or no longer exist, and the first task of the international community is to establish these authorities in a democratic way. The weakness of the local authorities often complicates the task of the international community in peace-building. There are also financial problems. Peacekeeping actions in operations decided upon by the Security Council are financed by assessed mandatory contributions. Most of the peace-building operations, however, rely on voluntary contributions. It is contradictory to recognize the crucial nature of peace- building operations and not to ensure the steady and predictable financing that is required.”
2001-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4272 (2001) · source
“Finally, in the country concerned, the natural interlocutor with the international community - with which peace-building strategies should be worked out - should in the first instance be the Government that has emerged from the peace agreement and often from subsequently organized elections. Yet in practice such authorities often lack the minimum of expertise and the requisite material and financial resources. In addition, their legitimacy and authority may be challenged by rebel groups that have remained outside the peace agreement or by parties to the agreement who violate their commitments - the case of UNITA in Angola and the RUF in Sierra Leone.”
2001-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4272 (2001) · source
“Let us consider first the institutional problems. Peacekeeping operations are authorized by the Security Council, and they include elements of peace-building. But the Security Council is not competent to be the "project manager". On the other hand, the Council must ensure that there is no gap in continuity and that the investment of a peacekeeping operation is not wasted. In addition, the multiplicity of actors involved in peace-building - the United Nations Secretariat, United Nations funds and programmes, international financial institutions and regional organizations - results in a variety of priorities and criteria defined and implemented by each of them. This very diversity complicates the task of formulating a peace-building strategy in a given country and of carrying out programmes built into these strategies.”
2001-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4272 (2001) · source
“It can arise because the mandate of the peacekeeping operation was more ambitious and included from the beginning an important component for restoring public authority and rebuilding social and economic infrastructures - for instance, in the case of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium in Croatia, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor. Lastly, it can be because offices or missions for peace-building programmes follow up on a peacekeeping operation, as is the case in Liberia, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti and Tajikistan. The problems of peace-building fall into two categories, our View: institutional and financial.”
2001-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4272 (2001) · source
“This task is indispensable if the gains from the re- establishment of peace are to be preserved. The organic link between re-establishing peace and building peace has surfaced over the past few years in several ways. It can be in the inclusion of peace- building elements in the mandate of an operation in which the principal objective was peacekeeping, as in the case of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic.”
2001-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4272 (2001) · source
“Mr. Levitte (France)(spoke in French): I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for having organized this debate on a subject that is not at all theoretical. What is at stake is the success of actions carried out under the authority of the Security Council. I would also like to thank the Secretary-General for attending this meeting today, in View ofthc decisive role that he brings to the Security Council. Sweden will shortly make a statement on behalf of the European Union, to which the French delegation fully subscribes. I should like to comment on some points that are of particular interest to us. The change in the nature of conflicts - for the most part these are now internal, even though many have a trans-border dimension - has compelled the United Nations to be concerned with peace-building.”
2001-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4272 (2001) · source
“We must take the opportunity vigorously to relaunch the peace process and to hasten the settlement of a conflict that has caused all too much harm to civilian populations. It is in that spirit that France will work in the coming weeks - a period that we hope will be decisive.”
2001-02-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4271 (2001) · source
“As President Kabila has just said, the door to inter-Congolese dialogue must be open to all, without preconditions and without exclusion. France encourages President Joseph Kabila to continue the constructive talks with Burundi that have been underway for some months - as he has just said he will. As President Kabila has just indicated, peace in the region must be comprehensive and lasting if it is to lead at last to the implementation of the policies of development, growth and democracy for which the peoples ofthe Great Lakes region long. Today's gathering inaugurates a series of meetings which will include the visit here on 21 and 22 February, under your presidency, Sir, of the members of the Political Committee of the Lusaka Agreement.”
2001-02-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4271 (2001) · source
“MONUC observation of the disengagement and withdrawal of forces and the regular reports on this matter to be made to the Security Council will serve as a guarantee to the parties and will encourage them to carry out their commitments. All parties concerned must effectively ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of MONUC personnel. France is also well aware of the security problems that could arise along the borders with some countries neighbouring the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We continue to support the principle of MONUC deployment in border areas, especially Goma and Bukavu. Finally, the relaunching of national dialogue, in a framework that can undoubtedly be adjusted, should facilitate the solution of the specific political difficulties of the Congolese.”
2001-02-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4271 (2001) · source
“Without such a withdrawal there can be no lasting peace in the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo. Secondly, as President Kabila has just forcefully said, the plundering of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo must cease. This ongoing violation of the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is unacceptable. Those who carry out such activities should in due course be punished by the international community. France eagerly awaits the final report of the panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo. Thirdly, the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo must be accompanied by rapid deployment of MONUC.”
2001-02-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4271 (2001) · source
“The international community must encourage the other signatories of the Lusaka Agreement to respond without delay to the overtures made by the new President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. My country's position on the resolution of the Congolese crisis was clearly reflected in the recent conclusions adopted by the Council of Ministers of the European Union. Here, my delegation wishes to recall several simple principles that should guide the implementation of the peace process in the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo. First, it is essential that all the parties implement their commitments under the Lusaka Agreement and that they respect the various resolutions of the Security Council. The withdrawal of foreign forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, especially the withdrawal of uninvited forces, is imperative.”
2001-02-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4271 (2001) · source
“We are particularly encouraged by President Joseph Kabila's commitments with respect to peace and to the restoration of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo through the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement and the relaunching of the inter-Congolese dialogue. Also encouraging is the President's wish to facilitate the deployment of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), under the fine leadership of Ambassador Kamel Morjane, to whom we convey our greetings. The role of the international community here is resolutely to encourage and support the Congolese authorities on the path of peace and dialogue, while, of course, giving them time to build these new approaches.”
2001-02-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4271 (2001) · source
“We believe that President Joseph Kabila's decision to come to New York to address the Security Council, only a few days after officially taking office, is particularly significant and encouraging. That gesture reflects a desire for true relations of trust and partnership between the United Nations and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and we hope that those relations will continue and deepen. In his statement, President Joseph Kabila has just reaffirmed an approach based on dialogue and reconciliation, which we welcome. His inauguration statement before the Congolese nation had already laid the foundations for that. Further, President Kabila discussed this with President Chirac two days ago in Paris, and President Chirac indicated to President Kabila that he supported his avowals of peace and dialogue.”
2001-02-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4271 (2001) · source
“Mr. Levitte (France) (spoke in French): I wish at the outset to thank you, Mr. President, for having placed the Democratic Republic of the Congo at the heart of the Security Council's agenda for the month of February, during which you will be presiding over the work ofthe Council. I want also to thank the Secretary- General for the message of hope he has just conveyed to the Security Council: hope that peace will be restored in the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo. I thank President Joseph Kabila for his presence here today, and for the statement he has just made. On behalf of the French leadership, I extend our condolences to President Kabila on the tragic death of his father, President Laurent-Desire Kabila.”
2001-02-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4271 (2001) · source
“Will return operations be accelerated to enable the refugees to participate in the elections? Failing this, should we provide for voting by mail? These are some of the questions we wanted to ask the Special Representative.”
2001-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4265Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Such a capacity to adapt to a rapidly evolving situation is an indispensable prerequisite for success in our international effort in East Timor. As for the form of the international presence after independence, France will examine with care the recommendations to be made by the Secretary-General. We will have to think carefully about the distribution oftasks among the various actors concerned. In conclusion, I would like to put a few questions to the Special Representative concerning preparations for the elections to the Constituent Assembly. How, in the post-election period, does he see the part to be played by UNTAET, side by side with an elected Constituent Assembly? What changes in the mandate will be required - or, at least, what changes to UNTAET's mode of operation?”
2001-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4265Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Such a mandate, however, should not prevent more frequent consideration of the means and objectives of UNTAET. It might be useful for the Council to have more frequent updates on the situation. France hopes that a thorough consideration of the appropriateness of the means available to UNTAET, in terms ofthe situation on the ground, will be carried out within three months, on the basis of detailed recommendations from the Secretariat. In the draft resolution currently under discussion, France will make proposals regarding such a consideration. For instance, we should consider the suitability of the operation in the eastern parts of East Timor, where security seems easier to ensure and where risks linked to militia infiltration are not so great.”
2001-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4265Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Independence will mean the definitive transition from peacekeeping to peace- building. It is up to the Council to see to it that the transition progresses as smoothly as possible. The Council must make sure that the transition is prepared upstream. Our debate last November on the item "No exit without strategy" can be applied perfectly to East Timor. Thus, in the coming months, the Council should frequently examine the mandate and the means of UNTAET in order to make sure they are optimally consonant with the rapidly evolving needs of East Timor. France supports the Secretary-General's proposal to renew the mandate of UNTAET to 31 December. This exceptionally long period for a peacekeeping operation should enable UNTAET to calmly traverse the hectic political transitional period.”
2001-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4265Resumption1 (2001) · source
“These are some ofthe many challenges that will have to be faced for an independent Timor to be viable. In dealing with these challenges, we will have to appeal increasingly to bilateral and multilateral donors, the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme and other funds and programmes, particularly those of the United Nations. The pledges made at the Brussels donor conference last December must be honoured, and disbursements should be accelerated. East Timor should be a test, but it must be a successful test of the effectiveness, suitability and celerity of actions and funding for peace-building. Independence will bring about a profound change in the part played by the international community in East Timor. Its action will have to be complementary to that of the Timorese authorities and must no longer replace them in any way.”
2001-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4265Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Less than a year before the date planned for independence, UNTAET's budget, the largest of all United Nations peacekeeping operation budgets, still represents more than 10 times the budget of East Timor. The recruitment of upper-echelon and mid-level Timorese public officials remains too slow. More attractive training programmes and salaries must be proposed. Communications remain a serious obstacle to development in the country's interior, and health services are provided almost exclusively by international non-governmental organizations. The education sector still operates to far too great a degree on a basis of emergency aid. The viability of many enterprises set up in the last few months still depends too much on the international presence.”
2001-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4265Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Several examples of successful transitional authorities bear witness to this fact. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia lasted 18 months, and the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium lasted just under two years. It is indispensable to accelerate as much as possible the progressive emergence of Timorese political and administrative power. Some notable efforts have been made. The figures speak for themselves: over 7,000 Timorese officials have been recruited; there is a majority of Timorese in the Transitional Cabinet; and the Timorese budget has been endowed with $124 million. But more progress remains to be achieved.”
2001-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4265Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Yet another success remains to be achieved: the post- independence era. For the Timorese people, independence remains, most understandably, a growing aspiration. Not to respond to these expectations could only provoke uncertainty and frustration. We must send the Timorese an unambiguous signal of our trust in the future of their country. The political class in Timor has developed a partnership with UNTAET that deserves to be encouraged. It is up to the international community to help the Timorese to achieve their goal. A clear Vision must be provided to them. France is gratified that the Secretary- General, in paragraphs 4 and 50 of his report, confirms that independence by 31 December 2001 is the goal. The speedy transition is a positive factor; it avoids the risk of getting bogged down.”
2001-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4265Resumption1 (2001) · source
“He told us that Sergio had aged rapidly after coming to East Timor; I would like to say to Jose' that he himself never changes, and I have known him for 20 years. We have heard his statement - the statement of a man of Vision and wisdom. He has given us a realistic and ambitious vision of an independent, democratic East Timor. Let us thank him for that. There is no doubt that the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) will go down in the annals of the United Nations as an exemplary success. The report accurately describes the impressive progress achieved in the past few months, particularly as regards the setting up of a Timorese administration, the functioning of public services and the reconstruction of infrastructures. But that is not the end of the story of East Timor.”
2001-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4265Resumption1 (2001) · source
“For the second time this week, following the open debate on the situation in the Central African Republic, the Council has the opportunity to work with eminent representatives of international financial institutions and of United Nations funds and programmes. This is an example we must follow. It is indeed essential to promote concertation, including during the consideration of complex peacekeeping operations, among the major institutions with responsibilities in the area of peace-building. I should like also to pay tribute to President Holkeri, who led a mission to East Timor with the determination and resolve with which we all are familiar. I should like finally warmly to welcome Mr. Jose Ramos-Horta, member of the Transitional Cabinet responsible for foreign affairs.”
2001-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4265Resumption1 (2001) · source
“Mr. Levitte (France) (spoke in French): I, in turn, would like to convey the heartfelt condolences of France to the people and Government of India and of Pakistan on the occasion of the tragic earthquake that has afflicted both countries. I am particularly pleased to pay a well-deserved tribute to the Special Representative of the Secretary- General in East Timor, our friend Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello. We appreciate the remarkable work done by the Special Representative and his team and their resolve in carrying out UNTAET's mandate. I should like also to thank the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, Mr. Malloch Brown; Mr. Klaus Rohland, Country Director ofthe World Bank; and Mr. Luis Valdivieso, Adviser of the International Monetary Fund, for their statements.”
2001-01-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4265Resumption1 (2001) · source
“The views of ECOWAS - a body that is directly involved in dealing with this crisis - must be heard and respected by the Security Council. Fifthly, France advocates an incremental approach to the implementation of sanctions, so as to allow the democratically elected Government of Liberia to shoulder its responsibilities. By continuing to support the RUF, the Liberian leaders would be assuming a heavy responsibility for increasingly isolating their country from the international community, thus hobbling its chances for development. We would urge these leaders not to make this choice, but rather to cooperate fully, with a view of establishing a lasting regional peace.”
2001-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4264 (2001) · source
“Secondly, the sanctions proposed must in no way penalize or affect the Liberian people, who are among the poorest in the world. The sanctions proposed must be linked to the conflict in Sierra Leone and Liberia's involvement in it. Thirdly, the sanctions proposed must be motivational and be linked to precise criteria for their lifting. The Liberian authorities must understand well what they have to do to get the sanctions to which they are subject lifted. Fourthly, the proposed sanctions must not interfere with the possible development of a solution that may be negotiated with the help of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The sanctions must be an element in an overall political settlement, and not a replacement for such a settlement.”
2001-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4264 (2001) · source
“Beyond Liberia, the settlement of this crisis in West Africa will also require the good will of all the neighbouring countries and a desire to move towards regional peace, rather than futilely pouring oil on the flames. In our view, in order to have a positive impact the sanctions regime to be adopted by the Security Council must respect the following principles. First, the sanctions proposed must be for a limited time. This does not mean going along in any way with the reprehensible machinations of the Liberian authorities; it is simply a question of making sure that the Security Council will be able to review the whole issue in depth and on a regular basis - including, if necessary, evaluating at the appropriate time the extension ofthese sanctions.”
2001-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4264 (2001) · source
“We would like to think that the publication of this report, the awareness of the situation on the part of the international community and the ensuing damage done to Liberia would lead the Liberian Government to revise its policy drastically. However, too many promises have been made in the past for us to be content with nice words. Thus France supports the principle of establishing an effective sanctions regime against the Liberian leaders. We are not here advocating a punitive approach, but rather a motivational system that would complement the steps that are to be taken at the national level. France was particularly encouraged by the recent decision by Liberia to expel from Monrovia all the leaders of the RUF living there.”
2001-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4264 (2001) · source