YouSaid · the spoken record

Osman

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852
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2010-10-22
most recent
2023-12-01
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91
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un-security-council

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  1. Somali National Army forces have weakened Al-Shabaab, disrupted its network and supply lines and pushed back the bulk of its forces. Somali National Army forces have opened main supply routes between the cities of Beledweyn, Mataban and Mahas. As a result of the heavy defeat of Al-Shabaab, it has responded with desperate acts of terrorism against soft targets and civilian populations. That was seen in Al-Shabaab’s deliberate and indiscriminate attack against the civilian population on the outskirts of the city of Beledweyn on 3 September, which resulted in the killing of 20 innocent civilians and the burning of seven vehicles transporting food, amid a severe drought in the country.

    2022-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9125 (2022) · source

  2. Its upcoming meeting, to be held later this month in Mogadishu, will focus on trust-building and the execution of the detailed road map and plan of action for achieving the main national priorities. On the security front, as outlined in the recent implementation report of the Federal Government of Somalia on the Somalia Transition Plan, which was submitted to the Security Council on 10 July, considerable progress has been made on the implementation of the Plan. The Somali National Army continues to conduct offensive military operations against Al-Shabaab. In the past three weeks, towns and villages were recovered in Hiraan, Middle Shabelle and parts of Galmudug. The gallant Somali National Army soldiers defeated the enemy and recovered towns and villages.

    2022-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9125 (2022) · source

  3. Since winning the election, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has taken steps to create an environment of unity and reconciliation among all stakeholders and visited three federal member states: South-West state, Galmudug state and Puntland state. Furthermore, the President held the first National Consultative Council meeting, laying the road map for the main national priorities. Those priorities include finalizing the provisional constitution, adopting a unified election model, realizing political and social reconciliation, finalizing the federalization process and adopting a suitable justice model. The meeting of the National Consultative Council emphasized that national unity is essential in achieving all priorities, including improved security and the development of the economic sector.

    2022-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9125 (2022) · source

  4. I would like to begin by congratulating you, Madam, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. I take this opportunity to welcome the newly appointed African Union Special Representative to Somalia, Mr. Mohammed El-Amine Souef. I also want to thank Mr. James Swan, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia; Ms. Fiona Lortan, Deputy Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Acting Head of the African Union Mission in Somalia; and Her Excellency Ms. Annette Weber, Special Representative of the European Union for the Horn of Africa, for their briefings on recent developments in my country.

    2022-09-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9125 (2022) · source

  5. It is essential that the United Nations work in a spirit of collaboration and synergy with the Federal Government of Somalia. We have taken significant steps towards achieving peace and stability and towards establishing a more legitimate and representative Government, with the new leadership capable of guiding the future of the Somali people. While we look with optimism at the significant progress achieved in security matters, we are aware that that progress must be consolidated on various fronts. Somalia, as a viable Member of the United Nations, is ready to contribute to guiding our country, our region and the world towards peace, sustainable development and economic growth. The meeting rose at 10.20 a.m.

    2022-05-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9044 (2022) · source

  6. Different interpretations and discussions of federalism in terms of power-sharing or revenue-sharing among the Somalis in different regions should not alter the United Nations shared commitment to a strong and united Somalia. It is also crucial that all necessary efforts continue to be undertaken to implement measures against the internal and external actors who are attempting to undermine peace and stability in Somalia. In conclusion, we look forward to the Secretary- General’s strategic review of the United Nations efforts in Somalia, which, we trust, will take into account the progress as it presents options that are fully aligned with the Federal Government’s priorities in enhancing the coordination of the United Nations system in Somalia.

    2022-05-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9044 (2022) · source

  7. The Somali Government is now in a position to articulate those priorities and lead the discourse. Secondly, in the process of the review it is important to clearly identify defined, measurable and realistic benchmarks to track UNSOM’s timely execution and achievement of its tasks, while reducing fragmentation, to advance efficient and effective delivery. Furthermore, the end state must be clear, encompassing a common understanding and a shared vision of the road map for the transition from special political mission to United Nations country team. Last but not least, the international community must remain strongly committed to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia. The United Nations should be geared towards safeguarding the territorial integrity of, and federalism in, Somalia.

    2022-05-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9044 (2022) · source

  8. That has caused the Mission’s actions to become more reactive to events, with little ability to prioritize and properly address the evolving political and security developments. We look forward to engaging with the Department of Political Affairs in a consultative process of analysis and assessment of the current mandate in the process of the strategic review. We believe that the following three considerations should guide us regarding the Secretary-General’s strategic review. First, we stress that, in formulating options for the future United Nations presence, it must be led by the needs and expectations of the Somali people and their leadership. The review must take into account the need for national ownership and must always be aligned with the national priorities.

    2022-05-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9044 (2022) · source

  9. This is the moment for the international community to renew its commitment to the Somali people and, at the same time, strengthen coordination and consistency in the efforts among the different entities and agencies of the United Nations and other regional international partners, thereby creating an environment capable of advancing the Federal Government of Somalia’s priority to achieve political stability, security and sustainable development. Despite all the progress of the Federal Government of Somalia in many areas since the establishment of the special political mission in Somalia, UNSOM’s mandate and activities seem to be increasing in a way that is disproportionate.

    2022-05-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9044 (2022) · source

  10. At the outset, I would like to send our sincere condolences to the Government of the United States of America and the families that were impacted by the massacre at the elementary school in Uvalde, Texas. Somalia welcomes the unanimous adoption of resolution 2632 (2022), renewing the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) for five months to conduct the strategic review by October.

    2022-05-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9044 (2022) · source

  11. That will help us utilize our Government systems and achieve medium- to long-term solutions to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals and target our citizens, who are experiencing vulnerability. In conclusion, we are committed to continuing to work together to overcome any obstacles in our path in a democratic way, in line with our Constitution. We wish to reiterate our appreciation to the African Union and the United Nations for their steadfast support of the Somali people, and we look forward to working with international and regional partners towards a peaceful, secure and prosperous Horn of Africa.

    2022-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9040 (2022) · source

  12. As Council members are aware, my country is also facing a protracted and recurring humanitarian crisis, coupled with the convergence in 2020 into the triple threat of flooding, desert locusts and the coronavirus disease. We are grateful for our humanitarian partners’ generous recent appeal to assist in our response to the life-threatening needs. Nevertheless, humanitarian assistance alone cannot provide a sustainable or cost- effective solution to the recurring shocks in Somalia, as that requires substantial development investment through our national development plan and strengthening the nexus between humanitarian and developmental assistance.

    2022-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9040 (2022) · source

  13. The more immediate challenge, of course, is the insecurity, namely, the threat of Al-Shabaab, which has caused major losses in terms of both human lives and wealth in Somalia. There is no doubt that we are succeeding in the fight against Al-Shabaab in a multipronged approach, embedded in the political strategy. The brave Somali national forces are dismantling Al-Shabaab hideouts and financial networks as we prepare to assume full security responsibility from the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia, to pave the way for its agreed exit by 2024. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to the troop- and police-contributing countries’ personnel and recognize their sacrifices.

    2022-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9040 (2022) · source

  14. With the election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, we continue our proud, long-standing tradition of the peaceful transition of power in Africa. The newly elected President and the Parliament are now ready to continue to deepen federalism and reconciliation and to tackle the socioeconomic, structural and political issues that millions of Somali women, men and children face in their daily lives. Those tasks will not be easy, but we are confident in our partners’ support, especially in clearing Somalia’s arrears to allow us to move along a path towards the completion of the debt-relief process and access to international financial institutions, which are essential ingredients for economic development and the improvement of the living conditions of the people of Somalia.

    2022-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9040 (2022) · source

  15. At the outset, I would like to congratulate you, Madam President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month, and I wish you all the best in fulfilling your mandate. I want to thank the briefers for their briefings on the recent developments in my country. The presidential election took place on the eve of the seventy-ninth anniversary of the founding of the first political party in Somalia — the Somali Youth League, which was singularly instrumental in achieving the independence and unity of Somalia in 1960. In the process, the Somali Youth League also helped to create one of Africa’s first democracies. The optimism and hope created by the Somali Youth League nearly a century ago are also a major source of our current optimism for achieving peace and prosperity, thereby leading towards a better Somalia.

    2022-05-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9040 (2022) · source

  16. The Federal Government of Somalia looks forward to closely working with the AU and the United Nations in ensuring effective establishment of ATMIS in the next two years. The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.

    2022-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9009 (2022) · source

  17. Somalia requested the Security Council to appropriately address these three issues in the resolution on the ATMIS mandate so as to realize a successful achievement of the end state and ultimately for effective change to materialize through this new Mission. In so doing, the Council will also ensure that the resolution is aligned with Somalia’s guiding strategic document on security, the Somali transition plan and the joint Federal Government of Somalia-AU CONOPS. In this regard, and finally, we want to acknowledge and express appreciation for the fact that some of our suggestions have already been considered and thank the cooperation and the engagement of the penholder and other Council members for the breadth of their support for the Federal Government of Somalia.

    2022-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9009 (2022) · source

  18. We must address this issue in order to effectively execute the planned military operation across Somalia and ensure that the conflict in Somalia is not subject to politicization as a result of lack of command and control in the African Union force and the troop-contributing countries. Notwithstanding the authority of the force commander in relation to the various ATMIS contingents, the planning and execution of the operation should be guided, monitored and evaluated by the Somali Transition Plan Strategic Steering Committee, as noted in resolution 2628 (2022). This is to ensure that such efforts are in line with the strategic objectives, priorities and end state of the Mission as agreed jointly between the Federal Government of Somalia, the African Union and more broadly the wider international community.

    2022-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9009 (2022) · source

  19. In order to facilitate effective operation, all troop-contributing countries in the ATMIS structure should formally agree for their troops to be under the full operational command of the ATMIS force commander. Having reflected on the command-and-control issues that marked the outgoing African Union Mission in Somalia, the Federal Government of Somalia agreed in good faith with the AU that the force commander shall hail from the country contributing the largest number of troops. This approach is based on our 15 years of experience and contextual lessons learned concerning the shortfalls of the past Mission.

    2022-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9009 (2022) · source

  20. A second issue we wish to address is the exclusion of the agreed enhanced civilian component, which was supposed to have Somali nationals comprise 30 per cent of the new mission staff in all categories, which had been agreed by the Federal Government and the AU with a view towards an effective security transition in Somalia. Allow me also to address a third issue that Somalia takes note of in resolution 2628 (2022) on the mandate of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia. Somalia believed that a Security Council resolution should recognize the importance of the new Mission having a clear command-and-control structure, with an empowered force headquarters having operational command over forces so as to ensure strategic coherence in implementation of the Somali transition plan and the joint CONOPS.

    2022-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9009 (2022) · source

  21. Thirdly, and finally, the depletion of the UNSOS trust fund remains a cause for concern in terms of the ability of UNSOS both to sustain the scope of support that is needed and to provide sustainable and predictable funding for the supported personnel. Moreover, Somalia urges the Security Council to consider increasing non-lethal support for the number of Somali security forces personnel who are eligible to receive support under the UNSOS trust fund pursuant to the requirement that the forces be integrated, mobilized and generated and that they realize the drawdown of ATMIS personnel. Somalia stresses that the lack of predictable and sustainable funding for its security forces will hamper the delivery on and implementation of the Somali transition plan and the joint Federal Government of Somalia-AU CONOPS.

    2022-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9009 (2022) · source

  22. Somalia appreciates the general support from our partners that have made voluntary contribution to the dedicated United Nations trust fund in support of the Somali security forces. Somalia calls on the entire international community, in particular the Security Council, to ensure that the support for the Somali security forces is sustainable and predictable. Nevertheless, in the light of the changes addressed in the mandate of the new Mission, it is important that we address the three key challenges that our security forces are facing under the technical arrangement of the UNSOS trust fund. First, the logistical tempo has been remarkably slower than the operational requirements. Secondly, there is no logistical support other than designated and allocated support for the Somali security forces.

    2022-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9009 (2022) · source

  23. We all have the collective responsibility to ensure that the Somali security forces are well equipped and resourced in order to undertake the activities outlined in the joint Federal Government of Somalia-AU CONOPS and the Somali transition plan. I would like Council members to recognize this important contradiction and ensure that the dearth of support for Somali security forces neither hampers the planned military and non-military operations and activities nor results in undoing the gains we have already made. Currently, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) is mandated to provide non-lethal support to 13,900 Somali security forces personnel — 12,900 of whom are in the National Army and 1,000 of whom are in the Somali National Police.

    2022-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9009 (2022) · source

  24. I would like to remind the Council members that this leaves the Somali security forces, which are indeed conducting independent and simultaneous operations with ATMIS, with little to no logistical support. This should be a cause for concern for us all. Resolution 2628 (2022) takes note of the exit strategy and the end state articulated in the joint Federal Government of Somalia-AU CONOPS and security transition plan and the gradual and conditions-based transfer of the security responsibility from ATMIS to the Somali security forces. However, it is necessary to note the contradiction in setting forth an exit strategy without properly addressing the logistical support that is required to fully realize this objective.

    2022-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9009 (2022) · source

  25. The effective execution of the Somali transition plan and the joint Federal Government of Somalia-AU CONOPS requires a new mission that plays a supporting and enabling role through specialized training, provisions of mobile forces and high-end capability, notably in engineering, countering improvised explosive devices, casualty evacuation, logistics and intelligence, and surveillance and reconnaissance. It is worth noting that, as the new Mission assumes a supporting and enabling role under the new mandate, the Somali security forces will be conducting both independent and simultaneous operations in addition to the planned joint operations with ATMIS as the new Mission embarks on its supporting and enabling role.

    2022-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9009 (2022) · source

  26. To appropriately meet the evolving threat, especially over the long term, the Federal Government of Somalia decided to address the recurring and persistent failures to replace AMISOM with the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia, by duly articulating in the guiding strategic document of the security transition plan, the joint Federal Government of Somalia-AU concept of operation (CONOPS) in bilateral and multilateral negotiations and agreements and in several official communiqués to both the Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council.

    2022-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9009 (2022) · source

  27. This was further worsened by the lack of centralized command and control within AMISOM, with sectors taking decisions based on their respective troop- contributing countries’ directions, which increased the susceptibility of some contingents to volatile political dynamics that are hindering Somalia’s stabilization efforts, further undermining the United Nations mandate requirement for an apolitical centralized AMISOM command and control.

    2022-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9009 (2022) · source

  28. In addition, the threat posed by Al-Shabaab has been further exacerbated by the limited movement between forward operating bases (FOBs), which has given Somalia’s adversaries the freedom of movement and ability to disrupt free passage on the main supply routes, especially in the supply route between Mogadishu and Baidoa and the supply route between Jowhar and Jalalaqsi. The limited movement between the FOBs has increased the already significant threat to progress that there had been in key strategic locations.

    2022-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9009 (2022) · source

  29. Somalia welcomed resolution 2568 (2021), whereby AMISOM was mandated to provide mobile capabilities to assist the Somali security forces’ posture in becoming more offensive with one designated AMISOM mobile reserve forces per sector, capable of acting as a quick- reaction force and operating across sector boundaries with other forces, by the end of August 2021. However, upon closer scrutiny, we noted that only one sector was successfully mobilized. Moreover, AMISOM’s delay in generating the expected number of mobile reserve forces hindered the consolidation of the gains that had already been made in joint operations, increasing the threat posed by Somalia’s adversary.

    2022-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9009 (2022) · source

  30. However, in the past decade or so, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has been conducting joint operations with the Somali security forces across vast areas in the scattered forward operating bases, with limited tactical cooperation and without the immediate and available agile forces required to join the operation. That has impeded the Somali forces’ operational capability and tactical agility, hindering the holding of locations cleared of Al-Shabaab. To address this evolving threat, especially over the long-term, the Federal Government of Somalia decided to take action and respond to the evolving threat by calling for a change in the modalities and operations of the new Mission and calling for a new Mission that focuses on conducting effective, agile and mobile operations.

    2022-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9009 (2022) · source

  31. Through various independent and impartial assessments conducted jointly by the Federal Government of Somalia, the African Union (AU) and the United Nations, we collectively recognize that Al-Shabaab is a terrorist group that has evolved into an organized criminal enterprise. The insurgent and terrorist threat in Somalia is consistently evolving and at an unprecedented pace. Al-Shabaab continues to rely on asymmetrical warfare tactics, attacking the Somali national armed forces, allied and friendly forces and civilians with tactical agility and mobility. Over the past 15 years, Al-Shabaab has continued to pose a significant threat through the groups Amniyat units, increasingly responding to the changes and specializing in suicide attacks, which comprise the most prominent type of improvised explosive device attacks.

    2022-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9009 (2022) · source

  32. Despite negotiating in good faith and formally transmitting Somalia’s technical and tactical inputs on the modalities of the new Mission in Somalia, in particular on the logistical support plan, the need for unified and centralized command and control and the exclusion of the agreed enhanced civilian component and modality, it is with deep regret that those three issues were disregarded by the drafters this resolution. From the outset, it is worth noting that the purpose and the objective behind the Federal Government of Somalia’s call for the proposed change in the previous mandate.

    2022-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9009 (2022) · source

  33. I would like to extend to you, Madam President, and to the United Arab Emirates delegation our best wishes and warmest congratulations on the success of your presidency of the Security Council for this month. The Federal Government of Somalia acknowledges the receipt of the final draft of resolution 2628 (2022), on the mandate of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). The Federal Government of Somalia expresses its concern over the decision to disregard some important inputs and suggestions made by Somalia during the negotiation phase of the new ATMIS resolution.

    2022-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9009 (2022) · source

  34. The Federal Government of Somalia reiterates that it will no longer request any renewal or modification of that resolution, since it has successfully achieved its intended objectives after nearly 15 years. We convey our gratitude for the collective efforts of our international partners over the past and recent decades to eradicate the threat of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia. We will continue to work on the security of our maritime domain and sustainable development in line with the Somali national priorities.

    2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8965 (2022) · source

  35. I am pleased to report that the Office of the Attorney General of Somalia has been carrying out specialized and rigorous maritime training for prosecutors, judges, the coast guard and police and criminal investigation divisions over the past four years at the level of the federal member states. We have accelerated our efforts to build and capacitate our maritime law enforcement agencies and have established a specialized maritime unit to specifically deal with international maritime crime, including the rampant, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in Somali waters. Considering that it is near the end of the three-month technical rollover of resolution 2608 (2021), we are pleased about the planned termination of the anti-piracy Security Council resolution on 3 March.

    2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8965 (2022) · source

  36. We now have in sight a new mission that will be agile, mobile and able to fight effectively, but also whose capability will correspond to the threat levels in Somalia, guided by the Somali transition plan. Our objective and priority during the transition phase will be to strengthen the building of well-trained, equipped, affordable and self-sustaining Somali security forces. With those outlined objectives, we can commit to assuming full security responsibility across Somalia. Our commitment to our security is not limited to the land, but includes our national waters.

    2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8965 (2022) · source

  37. On the security developments, we had high-level consultations with the African Union (AU) and signed an agreement outlining the principles and modalities for the new transition mission, in which a clear road map was agreed to deliver three key tasks, as stipulated in resolution 2568 (2021), namely, a joint concept of operations, a joint proposal for a new mission and options for a logistical support plan. Our recent Federal Government of Somalia, AU and African Union Mission in Somalia technical teams concluded a week-long consultation in Addis Ababa on a strategic objective and the parameters for the new AU transition mission in Somalia, which focused on the new expected mandate, the strategic end state, key objectives, the composition, benchmarks, the exit strategy and transition phases.

    2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8965 (2022) · source

  38. That steady progress underlines the fact that the Federal Government of Somalia is committed to a free, transparent, credible and inclusive electoral process. The recent convening of the National Consultative Council was successfully completed. It provided an opportunity to address concerns submitted by leaders of the federal member states, opposition candidates and civil society. As a result, the agreed rectification enabled timely progress to the current level of elected members. The electoral process has regained its momentum, credibility and trust among the people of Somalia, and we are adamant about concluding the electoral process in the shortest time possible.

    2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8965 (2022) · source

  39. I would like to extend to you, Madam President, and the delegation of the Russian Federation our warmest congratulations and best wishes for success during your presidency of the Security Council this month. I would also like to acknowledge the presence of Mr. James Swan, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia; Mr. Francisco Madeira, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia; and Ambassador Olof Skoog, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations. I thank them for their comprehensive briefings. The Federal Government of Somalia is pleased to report that in the past few weeks 45 per cent of the House of the People has been elected across all federal member states.

    2022-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8965 (2022) · source

  40. We will spare no effort in our fight against insecurity and injustice in all its forms. My last comment is an expression of gratitude to the five outgoing elected members of the Council leaving this body at the end of the month, namely, Estonia, the Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia and Viet Nam, for their valuable cooperation and contributions during their mandate. I thank them all. The meeting rose at 2.15 p.m.

    2021-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8917 (2021) · source

  41. Indeed, the militarization of our national Somali waters over 15 years has been a successful operation that has led to the eradication of piracy. But the absence of pirates leaves no doubt as to the fact that the continuation of that militarization of our national and territorial waters is definitely an issue not linked to piracy or armed robbery off the coast of Somalia. Thirteen years after this resolution was first adopted, the milestone reached of there being not a single incident of piracy for four consecutive years, and no piracy hostages being held in Somalia, is true testament of the Federal Government of Somalia’s ownership of the problem, in addition to our hard work in collaboration with our international partners. We will continue our comprehensive approach combining development, security and good governance.

    2021-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8917 (2021) · source

  42. And the persistence of illegal, underreported and unregulated fishing in Somalia’s exclusive economic zone remains a major concern. In that regard, we urge Member States to abide by domestic and international regulations and take all the necessary measures to ensure compliance and prevent illegal, underreported and unregulated fishing off the coast of Somalia. Our decision today to explore other ways and means in the maritime domain in general is guided by our duty to take into account our national priorities and concerns, as each Member State must ensure that it maintains its sovereignty and preserves its rights to regulate, as well as the ability to manage, its territorial and maritime resources.

    2021-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8917 (2021) · source

  43. Moreover, we firmly believe that the Contact Group is neither inclusive nor useful at this stage — and therefore last year indefinitely withdrew our support and participation in any of the group’s future activities. We thank international partners for their contributions to the Trust Fund to support the initiatives of the States countering piracy off the coast of Somalia over the past decade. Moving forward, we encourage aligning future support with the policy of the Federal Government of Somalia to counter all maritime crimes in a systematic and sustainable manner, including reinforcing the Somali National Coast Guard and the Somali National Navy. As all members are aware, piracy is only one of the many threats to maritime security off the coast of Somalia.

    2021-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8917 (2021) · source

  44. Today there is no single piracy-related incident off the coast of Somalia for the fourth consecutive year, with no single piracy-related hostage in Somalia, thanks to the efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia in collaboration with the international community. In that regard, we gave consent for a technical rollover of three months to allow for our transition to a bilateral maritime cooperation framework within Somalia’s national waters to help us on maritime security, which is the only sustainable way to preserve hard-earned gains. We welcome the planned permanent closure of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia Trust Fund this month, as its mandate, structure and working methods are outdated and not aligned with the Federal Government of Somalia’s strategic priorities.

    2021-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8917 (2021) · source

  45. First of all, allow me to express to you, Mr. President, the satisfaction of the delegation of Somalia at seeing your country preside over the Security Council this month. The Niger is a friend of Somalia to which we wish every success and pledge our full support during your presidency. I also want to take this opportunity to thank the United States of America, penholder on resolution 2608 (2021), for its efforts to bring people together. We believe that the Security Council resolutions on piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia have successfully achieved their intended objective.

    2021-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8917 (2021) · source

  46. In that regard, the Federal Government of Somalia made it very clear in many instances that it will not accept any African Union (AU)-United Nations hybrid multidimensional mission in Somalia. The Federal Government of Somalia continues to engage with the AU Commission and AMISOM in order to finalize the concept operations, as required by the Security Council mandate. Regrettably, despite some progress, that process has been stalled, but it will hopefully resume before the end of the year to enable the Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union to make significant progress and to report back to the Council before the end of AMISOM’s mandate on 31 December.

    2021-11-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8907 (2021) · source

  47. Holding free and credible parliamentary and presidential elections has always been the stated policy of the Federal Government of Somalia and, in many respects, the delay in the elections has been a result of the need to ensure that all stakeholders are not only informed of the process but also accept it in order to ensure the legitimacy of the Administration post- election. On the security arrangements for Somalia post- 2021, the Somali transition plan remains the Federal Government of Somalia’s only foundation and strategic vision for a phased, multi-year, conditions-based configuration of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and for a sustainable approach to countering Al-Shabaab while building the core security functions of Somalia and sustainably recovering strategic locations.

    2021-11-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8907 (2021) · source

  48. The Federal Electoral Implementation Team, as well as the State Electoral Implementation Team, will ensure the 30 per cent quota is observed in accordance with the 17 September agreement, where at least 82 of the 275 lower house seats will be reserved for women. That successful start will undoubtedly encourage the rest of the federal member states to begin elections for the lower house as soon as possible in order to ensure that the elections are completed before the end of the year.

    2021-11-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8907 (2021) · source

  49. At the outset, I would like to acknowledge the presence of Ms. Asha Siyad of the Somali Women’s Leadership Initiative; Mr. James Swan, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia; and Mr. Francisco Madeira, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and thank them for their detailed briefings. With regard to political developments, I am happy to state that the Upper House elections have been completed successfully, with 26 per cent of seats allocated to our capable women. As planned, the lower house elections have already begun, with two members of Parliament from the Somaliland constituency elected and additional nine members of Parliament to be elected by 22 November.

    2021-11-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8907 (2021) · source

  50. Furthermore, we urge for serious consideration to be given to the establishment of a confidentiality and redress mechanism in the Panel of Experts across the Secretariat and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia in order to address serious concerns of leaks and wrongful accusations. With regard to the current location of the Panel of Experts, we strongly recommend that said location become its primary home base in order to increase the Panel’s efficiency, effectiveness and credibility.

    2021-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8905 (2021) · source