YouSaid · the spoken record

Sacirbey

lines on the record: 379
first: 1992-11-13
most recent: 2000-10-26
sittings or episodes: 32
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“However, do not underestimate either our will or our comprehension of the situation, and do not generalize or unnecessarily browbeat. To repeat the words of the representative of the Netherlands: Give the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina some credit. I would also like to give credit to the members ofthe Security Council. I listened carefully to their comments and found they were well versed in the situation and had done their work on behalf of Bosnia very well. I thank them. Finally, on behalf of President Izetbegovic', let me thank the representative of Malaysia for his most kind words. I am sure the President will very much appreciate them.”
2000-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4209 (2000) · source
“But we were told that we must accept the lesser of two evils: a bad peace over ajust war. As someone who signed that bad peace as Foreign Minister, I must reiterate that I believe that we made the correct decision, and we, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a sovereign State and Member of the United Nations, invited the international community, including through the establishment of the Office of the High Representative, to help turn our situation into a good peace. No one conquered Bosnia and Herzegovina. No army had to fight its way in. Clearly, this is an indication of the understanding and commitment that most Bosnians and their leaders have to this transition to a normal, stable peace. We need the assistance and, unfortunately, too often the leadership provided by the international community.”
2000-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4209 (2000) · source
“Rather, these are qualitative nuances, and if I did not take this opportunity to repeat and re-emphasize the accountability of the High Representative and others in promoting the Peace Agreement and normalcy in my country, I am not sure what other task my Mission, I myself and all diplomats here from Bosnia and Herzegovina would have. Let me remind everyone that there are many of us who continue to struggle for Bosnia's place as a normal State, a member of the Euro-Atlantic family, free of ethnic prejudices and divisions. We were there in Dayton and before, and many are still here. We sometimes feel swallowed up by the generalizations. In Dayton we did not want an ethnically stratified Government that would promote ethnic polarization. We did not want four passports. We did not want so much of what is bad and criticized here today.”
2000-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4209 (2000) · source
“We look forward to the Government in Belgrade cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, to concluding with it the discussion on succession, and to that Government becoming a Member of the United Nations and other relevant international forums. Fifthly, let me welcome Ambassador Petritsch's decision on the victims of Srebrenica. I congratulate and personally thank him. This decision promotes those options consistent with the views of the Srebrenica report and I believe with this Council's moral responsibility. Finally, I would not wish to create any impression that my comments are meant to convey any significant disagreement with the specifics of Ambassador Petritsch's report. To the contrary, I must, unfortunately, agree with too many of the negative, as well as the positive, assessments.”
2000-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4209 (2000) · source
“The results may not be fully satisfactory, but in fact the elections must be judged by the conditions under which they are held. Here I must recall that we have had at least half a dozen elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were certified by the OSCE as just, fair and democratic. Regardless of the outcome, I, and/or my successor, will be obliged to fully respect such results and follow the instructions of such new or old leadership and such new or old Government. That is democracy. Fourthly, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains prepared to establish diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia without condition.”
2000-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4209 (2000) · source
“The establishment of a single travel document for Bosnian citizens is an example of correcting a misdeed in which the international community initially played a crucial role- that is, made a mistake. I think sometimes we are all in need of a reality check. I also must recall here that the ethnic stratification of our political institutions is not the choice of most Bosnians, but is the result of what happened during the negotiation of the Dayton Peace Accords. This is something we were told at the time we must accept. Thirdly, while I would personally prefer to see the scheduled elections bring about many of the changes in leadership that Ambassador Petritsch, and I am sure others, would prefer, I must caution that the democratic success of elections cannot be judged by the outcome, but rather by the process.”
2000-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4209 (2000) · source
“Secondly, from Ambassador Petritsch's comments one may be left with the damagingly false impression that all that goes wrong in Bosnia is due to the Bosnians and that all that happens right is due to the representatives of the international community. It is my diplomatic duty, as representative of the current Government in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to say that this is not true. It is also my personal duty, though, to say that this is only half true. Many of the difficulties that we deal with in Bosnia and Herzegovina are of our own doing- that is, the leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some of the difficulties have also been made more complicated by many missteps and misunderstandings by the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
2000-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4209 (2000) · source
“I do not believe, though, that it would be constructive for me to address such specific issues in this manner, except to add my agreement to Ambassador Petritsch's perspective- that is, the cautiously optimistic view of the regional situation as a whole. Instead, we would prefer to point out several ofthe following. First, it is appropriate that through my presence here and my opportunity to speak the representatives of the international community are accountable to the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as to this Council and other such forums. This is part of taking ownership of our future.”
2000-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4209 (2000) · source
“Mr. President, we are most pleased to see you presiding over the Council for this most significant briefing. May I here thank the High Representative and his staff for their work, commitment and endless efforts as well as for the most recent report which, I am sure, we all appreciate. May I also thank you, Mr. President, and others responsible for the opportunity to speak on behalf of Bosnia and Herzegovina before the Council. This opportunity is not only fair, but is also critical for our development toward self-sustainability. Unfortunately, this also puts me in a difficult position, as a representative of my country and of all the people in my Government, of either having sometimes to defensively respond to Ambassador Petritsch's critical observations or having to accept such as true through my silence.”
2000-10-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4209 (2000) · source
“Today, we are compatriots in the same progressive endeavours in the service of our one common country. He is my Deputy now; he sits behind me. I have full confidence in his commitment as well as in his words. I would therefore like to pass on to Milos Prica the opportunity to continue and make the statement on behalf of our delegation. It is important that now the Council also hear his words- our words; feel his commitment and our commitment; and understand the common goodwill and vision of our one future. With your permission, Sir, I would like to cede the floor to Mr. Prica.”
2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164Resumption1 (2000) · source
“Rather, ethnicity and religion are used as weapons of war by the forces of political darkness that, unfortunately, still exist. That is why we supported the vote rejecting the participation of the current regime in Belgrade in this debate and we further endorse the comments of Ambassador Holbrooke, Ambassador Greenstock and others on the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the United Nations. But now I move on to an equally important matter. It is our opinion that much can be done between people of goodwill given the opportunity to work together. Where institutions may be sadly inadequate - and that certainly is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina - goodwill can overcome such structural deficiencies. Mr. Milos Prica at one time may have been considered my enemy. Suspicion and animosity were rife.”
2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164Resumption1 (2000) · source
“It is most positive to see you, Mr. President, in this position of leadership - such a trusted face and such confident words from a leader from our part ofthe world. I should also like to welcome the words of Mr. Solana and Mr. Bildt. I believe they have made a very good contribution. For over eight years now, I have spoken before this Council of the plight of Bosnia and Herzegovina and our confidence, despite everything, in the future of coexistence, tolerance and pluralism. Maybe some of have come to doubt my sincerity; others may have questioned my sanity. Unfortunately, generalizations about ethnic hatreds and age-old religious animosities still plague debates about our region within this Council. Again, we reject the notion that ethnicity and religion are the cause of war and instability in our region.”
2000-06-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4164Resumption1 (2000) · source
“I think when we talk of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ethnicity should be the last consideration in our dialogue. Rather, it is a matter of making sure that the resources, the methodology and, of course, the political will exist. I think the ethnic factor will be, as I said, one of our advantages and one of our resources, rather than one of our obstacles.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“We would ask J SAP, therefore, to take a look at this problem and see how we can move ahead with this process. Finally, it is absolutely true that the regional situation has an impact on Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is very important for us to see further progress in the region, particularly in Belgrade, towards a commitment to cooperation and peace. At the same time, I would also be very careful not to view the region as one indistinguishable mess. Clearly it is possible to make progress in one area in Bosnia and Herzegovina when perhaps things do not appear to be going quite so well in some other regions. It is certainly not accurate to depict the region as being somehow characterized by various ethnic hatreds or even various ethnic compositions. One situation varies very significantly from the other.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“I would like to emphasize here not only the issue of making a change in methodology but also that of addressing the institutional problem. Unfortunately, the Dayton Accord apparently - and I emphasize the word "apparently" - has left us with an institutional vacuum, which is an important factor in Bosnia and Herzegovina's integration into European institutions. Bosnia and Herzegovina does not yet have a link with the appropriate European courts, and particularly a court of human rights, that would allow cases to proceed from the local level all the way up to the level of the court in Strasbourg. That is because Bosnia and Herzegovina does not currently have a centralized judicial system, except for one narrowly defined court, the Supreme Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which generally does not handle these types of cases.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“However, Dayton also envisioned a sharing of the resources stemming from customs revenues, and this ultimately should be more than enough to cover the budgetary demands of the Border Service. The difficulty right now is that the resources of the central Government are so limited. Most of the resources that come to the central Government do so through the entities, so of course the central Government has at times found itself to be the object of the goodwill of the entities. I think that one point on which we should expand a little bit more, because it is a direct responsibility of the Security Council, is the Judicial System Assessment Programme (JSAP). How does it continue? The truth is that it is a long-term process.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“Frankly, I think that the comments made by Mr. Annabi accomplish most of the task of answering the questions. I should like simply to make a few observations. The process of implementing the Border Service is still under way. I think it would be accurate to say that the difficulties in reaching an agreement and in mustering the political will necessary for some to agree obviously may be reflected in the implementation process, so it will be important to be vigilant. I am afraid that, if I say anything more, I will violate my neutrality. Secondly, regarding the budget, it may be appropriate to kick-start some of the financial requirements with respect to the Border Service, and I thank countries like Austria and others that have helped us in this way.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“We are now partners, with the added benefit of Bosnians of all backgrounds participating in United Nations police and peacekeeping efforts. That is good for the United Nations and for us, and we look forward to enhancing such efforts and opportunities. In that context, the representative of Italy will enlighten us all about some further helpful efforts in that direction.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“That would be to perpetuate the dangerous stereotypes of a vicious cycle of ethnic hatreds in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is not the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. To paraphrase the words of the representative of Jamaica, all of us in Bosnia and Herzegovina know that our greatest resource is all of our people, and of course our diversity. I thank that representative for those words. Let me conclude on a promising note. I thank the Council for a most constructive debate and for its continued support. In particular, let me express our appreciation for the efforts of Mr. Jacques Paul Klein and the entire staff of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“The success of the implementation of the Dayton-Paris Accords, and in particular needed initiatives - or infusions if you will - such as the New York Declaration, will be the best counter to those who believe that the only option for progress is to change the Dayton- Paris Accords. Thirdly, although I am not here to defend the words or actions of any member of the Presidency, I do not believe that it is either accurate or helpful to characterize President Izetbegovie's words as stating that the members of another ethnic group, as such, are enemies. I believe that Ambassador Lavrov is mistaken in his reading. However, most important, I do not believe that any - I emphasize "any" - member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina sees members of another ethnic group, purely by their ethnicity, as enemies.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“Secondly, the Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations will make a sincere effort to provide to this Council and this international body as a whole the accepted positions of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Government as a whole, and sometimes the views, even if controversial, of important political leaders within Bosnia and Herzegovina. We do this to inform the Council rather than to advocate. In that sense, the Council will in fact soon receive a proposal by a member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Ante Jelavie. I must emphasize that this is not necessarily something that the Mission would agree with, but it is for the purpose of information and making a helpful contribution to the debate regarding the accords and their implementation. But here, let me offer a very personal View.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“Before I surrender the floor, I would also like briefly to address some of the other comments made by other members of the Council, Ambassador Lavrov in particular. The Dayton/Paris accords have constitutionally enshrined Bosnia and Herzegovina' s full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal. The accords, particularly in the annexes, in fact also adopted the mechanisms of the arrests that have been performed. The Dayton/Paris accords continue to enjoy the full support and confidence of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite the numerous arrests that have been carried out by the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and other legal forces within Bosnia and Herzegovina, the sovereign authority of Bosnia and Herzegovina - that is, the Presidency - has not sought fit to challenge such arrests.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“Nonetheless, with the maturing presence of a variety of international factors, we would be wise to evaluate - and certainly we would encourage such an evaluation - the effectiveness of such factors in fulfilling their mandate within Bosnia and Herzegovina. The representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina are held accountable by the international community and, most importantly, by the constituency of Bosnia and Herzegovina- that is, its voters. I think it is also appropriate that those international factors be held accountable by a body such as the Security Council. Coincidentally, we would also agree with Ambassador Greenstock's view of the Judicial System Assessment Programme (J SAP). A change in the methodology of the work of the local institutions, particularly the judicial institutions, is as critical as any change in ideology.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“In this spirit, I am most proud to ask the Council to take note, only briefly and without the fanfare and congratulations that have been offered in some instances, that the Mission of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations is fully integrated, with all entities and ethnic groups represented. Our work here at the United Nations reflects goodwill and a professional commitment to peace in our country. Secondly, consistent with Ambassador Greenstock's comments regarding an exit strategy, I think we need to review the effectiveness of the numerous international factors operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Certainly, without them the implementation of the Dayton/Paris accords would not be possible.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“Regarding the methodology of the report provided to the Security Council, let me first make the following points. First, it is most constructive that the issues are addressed in such detail, with the problems being specifically outlined. This moves us away from the placement of collective guilt or responsibility, from generalizations and from the entrenching of unhelpful and illegitimate stereotypes. I hope, too, that Mr. Annabi will have the opportunity to acknowledge that, besides the Obstructionists, there are also many - maybe even the majority - from all ethnic backgrounds who are supportive of the efforts of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and who are the backbone of the growing success of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“Let me express how pleased we are to see you, Sir, in your current position of leadership. It is most fortuitous for Bosnia and Herzegovina. We also welcome the format and substance of this meeting. We think it serves our purposes well. We have two statements to make, and then I would like to offer to answer any further questions and comments from those participating in this debate. Now, let me very briefly comment not so much on the substance of the report that has been provided, but on the methodology at work here. The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina has most recently forwarded a progress report on the implementation of the Peace Agreement, in particular the New York Declaration. This should stand on its own, although I am prepared also to answer questions on this point.”
2000-03-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4117 (2000) · source
“We do not wish to see once again a response come late once again for Bosnia, if once again injustice, nationalism and ethnic cleansing are allowed to go undisturbed in our region. I would be here before the Council if the issue were Sierra Leone or any other situation that deserved its urgent attention. Unfortunately, in today's world it seems that we cannot hope for the United Nations and the Security Council to always be effective and prompt in bringing peace. That is unfortunately the reality that we deal with. But at least we should not allow the Security Council and the United Nations to be seen as an obstacle.”
1999-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3989 (1999) · source
“I believe the case with Croatia is the same. There is also an issue of history. Just before my statement, I heard the representative of Cuba speak of the fight of the Serbs against Nazism. The Bosnians were part of that fight. My uncles died in that fight. The greatest resistance to the Nazis was found in Bosnia. I do not with to see history once again rewritten here on another point. There is also a moral obligation. We in Bosnia came and pleaded before the Security Council, and then pleaded outside the Security Council to the Contact Group and others, for any salvation, any response. Thanks to many of the countries around this table - France, the United Kingdom, the United States and many others - that response finally came. We say it was late, but it was welcome. We do not wish to see now a response come too late for the Kosovars.”
1999-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3989 (1999) · source
“Let us not once again allow the Security Council and the United Nations to be seen as ineffective in, or even as an obstacle to, the necessary steps for peace or, even more so, for stopping the vast human rights abuses. In the alternative, should we debate here in the Security Council the necessary response to what is going on in Kosovo, to what Belgrade is doing in Kosovo, as we did for Bosnia and Herzegovina for three and a half years? Do we have the luxury of that time? Are we to set aside daily the lives that are being wrecked and lost? Why does Bosnia and Herzegovina speak before the Security Council today? Well, first of all, let me mention that there is the issue of self-interest. And I would like to correct one point: Bosnia and Herzegovina's airspace is closed on the basis of our own decision.”
1999-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3989 (1999) · source
“When the war against Bosnia and Herzegovina was being waged, the United Nations was too frequently criticized, even savaged, for its ineffectiveness in stopping the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina - the human rights violations, genocide and aggression that we suffered. Unfortunately, even we were too frequently a part of pointing the finger at the United Nations. For this we would like to apologize to all those who may have misunderstood us in our time of deep need. Now, in hindsight, it is clear that responsibility in the failures and successes of Bosnia lay with the United Nations Members themselves, particularly the most powerful: the members of the Security Council. The same responsibility now exists with respect to Kosovo.”
1999-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3989 (1999) · source
“The Contact Group made several fair and progressive proposals for peace. The Kosovar Albanians accepted a proposal. Belgrade rejected the peace proposal and actually responded by intensifying its resort to military force against the Albanian Kosovars. Finally, all the Contact Group members except one resorted to the only step available, the step that had been threatened for quite some time against Belgrade's obstinacy. Is the Security Council now to be used as a marginalized institution to actually block or criticize the only viable response in order to bring peace and to stop vast human rights abuses? Remember, these abuses are themselves the most serious violations of the United Nations Charter. I do not need to cite the Ambassador of Slovenia, Danilo Tiirk, on this point.”
1999-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3989 (1999) · source
“Let me take note of one final point - and I am very happy to see that the Secretary-General has been here throughout this entire debate. Like many other Members of the United Nations, we are concerned by the implications of this matter: the NATO military action being undertaken without the sanction of the United Nations Security Council. However, we would be even more concerned and dismayed if the Security Council were blocked and there were no response to the humanitarian crisis and to the legal obligation to confront ethnic cleansing and war crime abuses. The Security Council has on numerous occasions called for Belgrade to refrain from its disastrous policies in Kosovo. Belgrade has refused to heed the Security Council. Then the Contact Group was given the mandate of bringing peace.”
1999-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3989 (1999) · source
“The Belgrade authorities would only then claim a victory, the victory of a brave fighter standing up to the mightiest military force on earth. The new mythology of the Battle of Kosovo, 1999, would be written and the current Belgrade authorities would use this as a revitalized tool, a weapon of war, against the Kosovars, Bosnia and our other neighbours; indeed, as a tool to further enslave the emotions and minds of the Serb people themselves. If this draft resolution had been adopted or even succeeded in garnering significant support, this would have been a defeat for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Let me emphasize: that would have been a defeat for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are not here to preach morality, but we are here to plead for the cause of peace in our country and the region as a whole.”
1999-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3989 (1999) · source
“I must say that I feel deeply disturbed, even insulted, when after the experience in Bosnia some rush to condemn military measures to confront Belgrade's continuing resistance to peace and escalated ethnic cleansing campaign. Who are the real victims and who are the victimizers? Should those rushing to complete ethnic cleansing hope to garner sympathy while the civilian victims of such cleansing wonder if they are being forgotten, or even ignored? Did we learn something from the Bosnia experience, at least gain sensitivity to the victims of genocide? Let me set aside my moral outrage. Let me turn to the alternatives of realpolitik. Do the supporters of this draft resolution believe that a unilateral end to NATO's action would produce anything positive for Kosovo, for Bosnia and Herzegovina or for the region as a whole?”
1999-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3989 (1999) · source
“Unfortunately the Serbian defence against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has primarily consisted of an intensified campaign against its own civilian population, particularly the Kosovar Albanians. But this goes beyond the issue of courage and morality. It goes to the heart of the only two visible strategies pursued by Belgrade: "Let NATO bomb; we will hurry up to create faits accomplis on the ground by completing the tactic of ethnic cleansing. If some Serbs are hurt, if they have to die, and if more Kosovars are killed, so be it, so much the better." Does anyone remember the ethnic cleansing and genocide committed against Bosnians?”
1999-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3989 (1999) · source
“The last time we spoke before the Security Council we emphasized in our statement that resorting to the military alternative is never welcome. We would only wish to further proclaim that View. Unfortunately, though, on the basis of events in Kosovo over the last couple of days, we can only come even more surely to the conclusion that military force sometimes is the only alternative left. We want to join all who believe that the most prompt cessation of all military action is desirable. But have any of the demands made by the Security Council in past resolutions, or the demands of the Contact Group, been accepted? Has Belgrade accepted the peace plan?”
1999-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3989 (1999) · source
“We too are a sovereign State - by the way, a State that has offered its own forces to help maintain the peace in Kosovo. When I say its own forces, I mean forces both from Republika Srpska and from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Is it that there is a difference in motivation and desired result in the two capitals? We have opted for peace. Pompous pride and nationalist stubbornness are not the answer. The key, the options for peace, do not lie in New York or in Washington or in Brussels but, in fact, in Belgrade and in Serbia. We hope that this message gets back to them.”
1999-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3988 (1999) · source
“We recall that, even as today's dramatic events unfolded, the Belgrade regime took final steps to shut down all remnants of the free media and to bring internal repression to a new height against Serbs, Albanians, Hungarians, Montenegrans and Bosniacs alike. But we cannot ignore the fact that today's military action also brings greater immediate physical risk to all the people in Serbia. We hope that the military action will be short-lived and that by some miracle the current leadership in Belgrade will come to its senses. I would like members to recall that to cement peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina we invited the international military Stabilization Force (SFOR) onto our sovereign territory. I am not certain why Belgrade fears these international peacekeepers on its own soil while we in Bosnia and Herzegovina have welcomed them.”
1999-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3988 (1999) · source
“Radicalism, nationalism and ethnic cleansing were once again gaining the upper hand in our region. These unfortunate events were a real threat, and were a real concern to us in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nonetheless, I think that we should remember that today's military steps place many lives in danger. We pray for the safety of those who are now intervening to bring about an acceptance of peace. We pray for the innocent Kosovar Albanians, who are already endangered by Belgrade's military campaign and who are fleeing their homes. And we pray for the overwhelmingly innocent Serbian population.”
1999-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3988 (1999) · source
“As for those who disdain today's military steps directed at Belgrade, they should ask themselves whether more talks would have produced a result? So far, ethnic cleansing has only worsened. We in Bosnia and Herzegovina would still be suffering the consequences of war - war itself - if no action had been taken in the fall of 1995. For three and a half years in Bosnia and Herzegovina, people promoted talks, and for three and half years, the war, the genocide, the aggression and the ethnic cleansing continued. Only after military intervention took place did diplomacy succeed. Only once the obstacles to peace were convinced to stop the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina did we in fact achieve peace. Even the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina was endangered by the continuing escalation of the war and the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.”
1999-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3988 (1999) · source
“A country that has unleashed its brutal war machine against its own civilian population cannot now cry victim when the international community steps in to prevent further ethnic cleansing and genocide. A country that has most recently engaged in aggression and military intervention against its own neighbours, that has committed genocidal acts against its own population and others, that has refused to adhere to international law and numerous Security Council resolutions or to cooperate with the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia cannot now credibly plead for the protection of international law. This indeed turns on their head morality, legality and the principles for which this institution, the United Nations, stands.”
1999-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3988 (1999) · source
“Military force is never a welcome option, but it is sometimes the best, the only alternative among many bad options. It may be the only option available to save innocent lives. Of course there was a better option, but despite the efforts of many - in Paris, London and Washington, and the efforts of the other members of the Contact Group - the Belgrade regime has shut the door on this alternative. Here I would like to take the opportunity to commend the tireless efforts of the representatives of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and many others who have at least brought about the signature of one party to this conflict: the Kosovar Albanians. We encourage them to continue their tireless efforts. Now Belgrade seeks the sanctuary of the Security Council to hide its own blatant responsibility.”
1999-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3988 (1999) · source
“Multiple-rocket launchers are not found in Serbian peasants' barns. They are provided from the supplies of the Yugoslav national army If the authorities in Belgrade really wanted us to believe their protestations of innocence, I doubt if they would be bombarding Dubrovnik today. They must think we are very stupid people indeed." [S/PV.3082, p. 43] "They must think we are very stupid people indeed." I humbly request the Council to consider the relevance of these words and of their reference to the Council six years later.”
1998-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3892 (1998) · source
“All we ask is that the Council treat us fairly as well and that it not be duped by the merchants of nationalism and "ethnic cleansing" and by the peddlers of stereotypes. Let me conclude by reminding the Council of the words of one of our most distinguished colleagues, the former Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, Sir David Hannay, speaking on 30 May 1992 as sanctions were imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for its aggression against Bosnia. He said, "there is really no doubt at all where the principal responsibility now lies: with the authorities, civil and military, in Belgrade. And that cannot be ducked; it is simply no good suggesting that they have nothing to do with the events that are going on in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
1998-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3892 (1998) · source
“Regardless of where the weapons may have been taken in Bosnia, the fact that they end up being used to "ethnically cleanse" in Kosovo should be enough proof as to where the blame lies. If we are not careful we all may become the victims of a cliche, a stereotype. The United Nations is already scapegoated in many political quarters. It is blamed for the failures of collective will in Bosnia, for failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda and so forth. Nevertheless, we in Bosnia are sober as to the capacity and responsibility of this institution. We seek to treat the role of this institution honestly, and we again thank all for their efforts and assistance in promoting peace and normalcy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
1998-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3892 (1998) · source
“Who is to blame for the wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and, maybe tomorrow, somewhere else - Macedonia or beyond, or back in Bosnia. The ordinary citizen - Serb, Croat, Bosnian, Albanian or otherwise - is not to blame. It is a leadership that preys in its neighbours, on its own people and on your own stereotypes. The common thread is not Balkan history. The evidence is much nearer. When Srebrenica was overrun and thousands were massacred, the weapons of the United Nations mandated forces, including armoured personnel carriers, were also plundered, as in several other situations during attacks on United Nations forces in Bosnia. Now there is compelling evidence that those weapons taken at Srebrenica are now being used in Kosovo against the Kosovo Albanians.”
1998-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3892 (1998) · source
“Kosovo did not have to explode. A fuse was simply lit to a bomb that had been in the process of manufacture for some time. The subject of Kosovo is not before the Council today. Nonetheless, I bring it up because the handling of the matter reflects a blame-it-on-the-history-and-people- of-the-Balkans stereotype. More urgently, however, those who light the fuse on Kosovo will be looking to play off your fears and prejudices by bouncing its attention from one manufactured conflict to another. They will try to sell their constructive engagement in one situation at the expense of another. Their commitment to constructive engagement in one situation is merely currency for them, to be turned quickly into an opportunity to create conflict in another situation.”
1998-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3892 (1998) · source
“They would use your potential lack of familiarity, your fatigue with the situation and the too-often carelessly expressed prejudices to create self-fulfilling stereotypes and prophecies. When they burn an elderly Serb couple to death, they believe that you will become frustrated and lose confidence in Bosnia. When they beat up a man of God, they believe themselves to be immunized by your association of this crime with a false reading of Bosnia's history and its people. I hope for all our sakes that these enemies of peace and tolerance are not right in their reading of the collective "you". However, it seems that the demagogues and dictators of the region who had shown their stripes in the attempt at genocide and "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia are repeating their strategy, including, now, in particular, in Kosovo.”
1998-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3892 (1998) · source
“No; there is still an ongoing, organized criminal effort to keep the people from going back to their homes and to prevent the process of reconciliation and normalcy from taking hold. Exactly at a time when the momentum is positive, the enemies of peace and coexistence choose to launch their sabotage and send us backwards. This is not my personal assessment. It is shared by the representatives of the Stabilization Force (SFOR), the Office of the High Representative and others, including Bosnians. And that is exactly why careless stereotypes are so dangerous. They not only stigmatize, but they also embolden those who wish to convince you that people who have lived together for centuries have in fact not done so and cannot live together now.”
1998-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3892 (1998) · source
“We must be more sensitive and Wiser. So if we cannot blame it on the Balkans, where should the responsibility lie? The people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of all ethnicities, religions and backgrounds, are overwhelmingly committed to peace and coexistence. But then an elderly Serb couple is burned to death in the home they recently returned to by extremist Croat criminal elements. The Catholic prelate of Bosnia and Herzegovina and his assistants are stoned and placed in deadly danger by an organized Serb mob when they return to a Catholic parish long "cleansed" of its parishioners. Are these coincidences? Can refugees not go back because their old neighbours - ordinary citizens - will not allow them to return simply because the refugee happens to be of a different background?”
1998-06-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3892 (1998) · source