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1992-11-13
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  1. Rather than proceed with measures that were initially committed to by the entire Group as part of the peace plan and its rejection by the Serbian side, they chose a road of avoidance when some members of the Group reneged on those initial commitments. Secondly, with some second thoughts on the part of one or two members that unfortunately did not prevail, the Contact Group as a whole has made the Security Council a rather convenient and self-serving chamber to relentlessly steer its programme and legitimize premature and inadequate measures. Not only is the Security Council being told that no changes can be made to the draft resolution because of the sanctity of the Contact Group, but it is being compelled to vote on the draft as a matter of urgency. What is the urgency?

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  2. This can only bring us to one of the following conclusions: first, the monitoring regime has been constituted in response to political considerations rather than a serious view of the task; secondly, the monitoring regime is designed to succeed by failing to see and by providing the necessary collaboration to exonerate the aggressor and those that have no heart to confront the aggressor. The last conclusions are not advocated lightly. They are in fact supported by all of the processes that have brought us here. First, the self-designated Contact Group has placed a higher priority on the perception of its unity than on a real solution to the problem.

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  3. If the monitoring regime is structured in such a fashion as to be limited in its scope and distance of vision, then, like a man in a dark theatre, it will see only what is projected for it to see. How can the Security Council be asked to rely upon the authority of a monitoring regime that is, firstly, almost totally reliant upon the cooperation and resources of the object of the monitoring and, secondly, staffed by fewer than 200 people along a 450-kilometre border, when the Secretary-General has already on two occasions asserted that at least 800 to 4,000 individuals, well coordinated and equipped, are necessary for the task?

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  4. Serbia and Montenegro has not been required to endorse the peace plan by recognizing the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina within its current borders, an essential element of the Contact Group plan. Instead, Serbia and Montenegro is being rewarded for taking tactical steps that are designed to make it appear that Serbia and Montenegro is splitting from its offspring and agents. This brings us to the issue of monitoring. Are we to believe that the monitoring regime negotiated for this purpose in Belgrade will be capable of fulfilling its theoretical task? While those already deployed on the border in conjunction with this task issue Serbia and Montenegro a clean bill of health, other United Nations personnel witness massive violations of the border.

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  5. Our opposition to this draft resolution is not born out of habit or a desire to punish; it stems from our deep fears as to the consequences. This draft resolution lacks balance; for while it seeks to reward those who now have admitted to at least complicity in crimes and war-making, the victim is not assisted, even as promised, in confronting the still expanding and ongoing crimes and aggression and the consequences thereof. Secondly, this draft resolution undermines the necessary improvements in human rights standards within Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sandjak, as well as not addressing the ongoing occupation of the Republic of Croatia. Thirdly, this draft resolution seeks to solely reward Serbia and Montenegro for a set of implausible, self-designed measures of self-policing.

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  6. How do we distinguish between the so called Bosnian Serbs and the Croatian or Krajina Serbs, who are not targeted by this draft resolution, but in fact do fully coordinate their activities? How do we separate the arm of the criminal conspiracy in Banja Luka from its brain, inspiration and torso in Belgrade? It is Belgrade's vision that is still now taking shape in occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is the weapons of Serbia and Montenegro that carry out the destruction, and it is still the tactical support and resources of Serbia and Montenegro that flow to Bosnia and Herzegovina to maintain the aggression. Which brings us to the third draft resolution, which is contained in document S/1994/1085, concerning the easing of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro.

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  7. We also support the spirit of the draft resolution contained in document S/1994/1084 on the enhancement of sanctions with respect to the so-called Bosnian Serbs. We, however, must question the effectiveness of this measure in securing the desired objectives, especially the reversal of the consequences of aggression and ethnic cleansing. We have proposed amendments that would be more likely to promote these latter goals, but they have been ignored by the sponsors. The reasons given for this ignoring of our proposals seem to reflect intra-Contact Group politics rather than the impact on the desired objectives and overall peace in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We also must question the practical implementation of this draft resolution.

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  8. None the less, I do hope that the UNPROFOR Commander in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is as successful in securing an invitation for his troops to Banja Luka as he has been in arranging for visits of foreign dignitaries to General Mladic. If UNPROFOR is to make a positive contribution to the peace process and its overall humanitarian mandate, it cannot limit itself to a traditional peace-keeping mission when there is no peace to keep and to waiting for invitations from the war criminals to stop their crimes. Otherwise, we are not impressed by projections of doomsday scenarios by those who now promote the continuing role of UNPROFOR as an excuse for reneging on their commitment to lift the arms embargo on our Government.

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  9. Can the Security Council afford to send the message that soldiers will not dare go to those places where old men are beaten, women are raped, young men are sent off to forced labour and concentration camps, never to be heard from again, and young children are made to traverse an obstacle course of battlefields and mines in bare feet? I do understand that it is safer for such soldiers to receive the proper invitation to enter these areas from those carrying out the ethnic cleansing, but I dare say that a rapist or molester would tend to prefer that there were no witnesses, and certainly no law enforcement personnel, to confront their crimes.

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  10. We must raise two questions, though: Firstly, why did it take in excess of three months to bring this draft resolution to a vote even after numerous appeals from human rights organizations, countless stories in the press, evidence provided to the Council and even the eye-witness reports directly provided to the Council by such individuals as the Bishop of Banja Luka? Is there not a perversion of priorities when this draft resolution is finally brought to a vote as the crimes are completed, and those who inspired the crimes are now rewarded by an easing of sanctions? Secondly, why is the draft resolution so watered down as to diminish the commitment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to deploy its forces in the places where ethnic cleansing is being executed?

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  11. Unfortunately, it is the procedure by which these draft resolutions are being brought to a vote before the Council that most reflects on the efficacy and integrity of the Contact Group peace process and the overall response to the aggression and to the human rights and humanitarian crises in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We do endorse the draft resolution contained in document S/1994/1083, which is intended to address the crimes of ethnic cleansing now being perpetrated against thousands of men, women and children in Serb-occupied areas of our Republic.

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  12. Mr. President, let me assure you of our highest cooperation in your efforts this month and commend you on your work so far. Let me also indicate our appreciation for the long service of Mr. Yuliy Vorontsov, both as a President of the Council for the last month and as one of our colleagues over the last 20 years. My delegation has decidedly mixed views with respect to the three draft resolutions before the Council. On the other hand, our opinion regarding the manner by which these draft resolutions have been brought before the Council is unambiguous.

    1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source

  13. Therefore, we must reasonably conclude that the Government of Serbia and Montenegro is the same as that of the so-called Bosnian Serbs. So much for the false allegations and theories of a civil war. Finally, those who continue to deny the right of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to self-defence through de facto arms embargo should feel uncomfortable that Ambassador Djokic invokes the same arguments as many of them do.

    1994-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3370 (1994) · source

  14. Ambassador Djokic's representation, presumably on behalf of the so-called Bosnian Serbs, that the Bosnian Serbs are exhibiting a willingness to negotiate and make painful compromises is most welcome. Still, this representation begs two questions. First, does Ambassador Djokic also mean good-faith negotiations? One need only be reminded of lies told and promises broken over the past three weeks by the so- called Bosnian Serbs at the expense of various United Nations representatives and the representative of the Russian Federation and, most painfully, at the direct cost of Bosnian lives. Secondly, Ambassador Djokic seems to be equally and as comfortably able to speak on behalf of Serbia and Montenegro as he is on behalf of the so-called Bosnian Serbs.

    1994-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3370 (1994) · source

  15. It is most unfortunate that I am compelled to invoke the right of reply with respect to the statements of both the Russian Federation and Ambassador Djokic. With regard to the statement of the representative of the Russian Federation, I wish only to remind all that the defence forces protecting the "safe areas", and all of our Republic, are, in fact, the defence forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They are entitled and obligated to do so by our status as a sovereign State, and they are explicitly recognized in this capacity in resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993). Moreover, any reference to our Government or defence forces as "Muslim" is inaccurate, delegitimizing and biased. We represent and incorporate all ethnicities.

    1994-04-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3370 (1994) · source

  16. "As this is not enough to put an end to the humanitarian tragedy in Gorazde, the four relief workers still active in the field will stop all communications with the outside world for 24 hours. "May this silent protest honor all innocent victims of this war." The communique is signed by "Pablo, Olivier, Daniel, Klaus". I remind all that the necessary authority of the Security Council and NATO already exists to provide close air-to-ground support to protect these United Nations-mandated humanitarian workers - Pablo, Olivier, Daniel and Klaus. No new debates or authority are required. The debt of promises and commitments to the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to all those who provide humanitarian assistance has come due a long time ago, and we cannot afford to extend the time for delivery any longer.

    1994-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3367 (1994) · source

  17. "The international community and the parties in conflict are aware that: Many civilians - (children, women and elderly) were and are being killed and injured by indiscriminate shelling and sniper fire in Gorazde town and in the villages of the former pocket. A large number of villages have been and are being burnt and destroyed and their inhabitants killed or injured. ". The Gorazde hospital, the local Red Cross and its refugee center as well as purely civilian areas have been and are being exposed to shelling and constant sniper fire. Access is being denied to all medical and relief convoys. Reunification of families separated for two years already is being denied. Residential water supplies to Gorazde town have been cut for the last two years. Evacuation of urgent medical cases has been refused.

    1994-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3367 (1994) · source

  18. To the contrary, it amplifies your responsibility, for now you also owe a debt to the courageous and forthright individuals, your own citizens, who now struggle and sacrifice, at their own risk, to overcome your initial failure to respond properly. They now suffer and die with us like our own brothers and sisters." Let me read out verbatim the communique of the lonely four International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) personnel who have stayed behind in Gorazde while all others have abandoned it. They say: "Since the night of 28-29 March 1994, the international community has been receiving reports about the war in Gorazde and its tragic consequences on the population of this UN-protected Muslim enclave.

    1994-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3367 (1994) · source

  19. They were made in part in lieu of the Security Council's recognizing the Bosnians' right to self-defence. The accumulated debt of promises has grown beyond all measure of reason. More words are inadequate and constitute a counterfeit substitute for the necessary action. We, the Bosnians, have had to pay a very heavy price for diplomatic words and unfulfilled promises. We say to the Council: "We do gratefully acknowledge the contributions of your young men and women, the brave and committed peacekeepers, pilots, human rights and humanitarian relief workers. This, however, does not relieve you of your obligation.

    1994-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3367 (1994) · source

  20. I urge all members of the Council, for the sake of the dead, the dying, the maimed, the endangered of Gorazde, not to call for any more talks until they have taken the very necessary and obvious steps to restore good faith to any negotiating process and once again to make talks a tool of peace rather than a weapon of genocide. Similarly, if some mean to usurp the negotiating process in order to ratify the fruits of Serbian aggression, to adopt the consequences of "ethnic cleansing", to compel the partition of our country and to betray the United Nations Charter, let them openly accept this responsibility and not avoid accountability by seeking the cover of our acquiescence under the duress of continuing genocide. Promises in this sacred Chamber have been made to the Bosnians for the last two years.

    1994-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3367 (1994) · source

  21. Let me quote the principled and reflective words of the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Mr. Vitaly Churkin, after his endless efforts and talks with the Serbian party: "I have never heard as many lies as I have heard from the Serbians in the last 48 hours." Mr. Churkin continued: "We should stop any type of conversation with them. The time for conversation has ended. I do not feel any desire by the Serbian side to agree on the subject [of stopping the offensives]." So-called talks have been used as a weapon to murder the innocents in Gorazde.

    1994-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3367 (1994) · source

  22. Will the Serbians be allowed to move their weapons from their besieging positions around Gorazde, as they did from around Sarajevo, to use the same weapons against some other unfortunate town and civilian population? In addition, who will intercede on behalf of the Croats and Bosnians now being tortured, raped, "ethnically cleansed" or murdered in places like Banja Luka, Prijedor, Bielina or Shipovo, all of which are under Serbian occupation? Thirdly, the precedent of Gorazde has a direct impact on, and poses a danger to, the peace process in the Republic of Croatia as well as the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This issue must be addressed directly. Finally, let me make one point abundantly clear: we are fully prepared to negotiate to end the hostilities and settle this war - that is, to take part in good faith negotiations.

    1994-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3367 (1994) · source

  23. It is this designation and the Council's commitment to it, when resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993) were adopted, that was offered in lieu of our unabridged right to self-defence. Secondly, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a haphazard composite of safe areas or urban ghettos. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has a responsibility to defend all of its citizens as well as its sovereignty and territorial integrity as a whole. The Council cannot continue to impede our right to self-defence unless it accepts the responsibility in full. Otherwise, the next Gorazde will be in - God forbid - Maglaj, Brcko or some other non-safe area.

    1994-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3367 (1994) · source

  24. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). We welcome President Clinton's course of action with respect to NATO, and thank him for the initiative he outlined yesterday. Finally, we endorse the draft resolution before us, although it falls short on several fronts. Unfortunately, none of the steps I have mentioned address certain basic and most important considerations. First, this Council must act immediately to respond to the slaughter of innocents in Gorazde. Those who voted for the designation of Gorazde as a safe area cannot now avoid the moral, legal and practical burden that they bear for the lives of those 70,000 individuals.

    1994-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3367 (1994) · source

  25. I will endeavour to review all the comments of the Council members and the other speakers. While Gorazde has been turned into a slaughterhouse, and Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a graveyard, unfortunately this most noble of institutions has been usurped into a Chamber of false promises and rationalizations for inaction. I hesitate to make such a statement, but in the end, it is you, Excellencies, who are responsible for the credibility of your words. On the other hand, I owe my best and honest efforts to my battered and betrayed Republic and the innocents that are now being massacred in Gorazde. I will keep my comments short. Almost everything has already been said and repeated on several occasions. We endorse the 18 April 1994 letter from the Secretary-General, Mr.

    1994-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3367 (1994) · source

  26. Let me first take this opportunity to commend and thank the French Ambassador, Ambassador Merimee, for the manner in which he presided over the Security Council during the month of March. Let me also thank you, Sir, in the sincerest terms, for the steady and attentive fashion in which you have directed the work of the Council for this month. It has been an especially difficult month for all of us. I should also like to take the opportunity briefly to inform the Council that we can now confirm the reports that there is house-to-house fighting in Gorazde. This fact may make our debate and words here either of greater urgency or irrelevant. The choice is, at least partly, ours. Let me also apologize in advance to the Council for having to take early leave of this debate, as I have urgent business to attend to on this very matter.

    1994-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3367 (1994) · source

  27. However, we will not feel bound by any agreements reached between the brutal force occupying our country and members of this Council unless such agreements are consistent with our status as a Member of the United Nations and with our sovereignty and territorial integrity. The latter principle has to be the basis for the implementation of the present draft resolution as well as any further endeavours to bring about a solution.

    1994-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3344 (1994) · source

  28. If the Council wishes to maintain any semblance of progress, it must respond promptly and resolutely to the plight of those whom the Serbians consider to be fair game because they do not appear on the television screens or in the newspapers. Finally, we must add that the Serbians are encouraged in their cowardly and aggressive actions by certain attempts to legitimize the fascist philosophy in their control of occupied territories. This has even reached capitals of certain members of this noble body and this Council Chamber. The Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina welcomes the assistance of all Governments in trying to bring peace.

    1994-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3344 (1994) · source

  29. Unfortunately, while we are speaking here of potential options for peace, there are clear threats that will send us tumbling back to the labyrinth of despair. Serbian forces have not chosen as yet to walk the path of peace; rather, they have increasingly used the focus on Sarajevo and a continuing lack of will by the international Powers to confront them to launch new attacks on Brcko, Bihac, Maglaj and Usora. They have reinvigorated campaigns of terror, rape, torture, murder, "ethnic cleansing" and genocide in areas they now attack as well as occupy. Civilians in Banja Luka are exposed to daily Serbian terror and many are expelled.

    1994-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3344 (1994) · source

  30. It also follows the logical road to peace that emphasizes solutions based upon the legitimization and encouragement of moderate and tolerant elements. The road to peace cannot be based on new, arbitrary lines drawn on maps which divide what has not been segregated in the past. Instead, the road to peace is most simply to pave the way for a return to a centuries-old formula for success in Bosnia and Herzegovina - that is, tolerance, pluralism, multiculturalism and open societies. This not only has been a successful formula for coexistence but, in fact, has been successful in terms of our prosperity and development as a society. We now call upon those Serbs who have found themselves on the other side of an arbitrary line and who are free of war crimes to join us on this natural road to peace, a return to our proven formulas of success.

    1994-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3344 (1994) · source

  31. This agreement certainly brings to an end an unnatural combat between victims of fascism. It also establishes close cooperation - that is, a confederational agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as a federation within the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But most critical of all is the fact that this agreement reverses the long and ill-advised approach to negotiation that seeks solutions on the basis of ethnic division, fragmentation and even appeasement. This agreement and the very helpful role played by the United States Government and certain European Union members should signal an end to at least some of the discredited policies of the past.

    1994-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3344 (1994) · source

  32. On the other hand, this appropriate response on the part of NATO planes was unique and came only after the Serbian planes had ignored numerous warnings and dared to carry out a bombing attack against one of our towns, in full view of NATO planes. Clearly, the arrogance had been reinforced by the sense that the NATO planes enforcing the no-fly zone would not respond this time and, therefore, that the provocation would not be met with the appropriate resolve. Still, we must thank those countries, and in particular the United States, that finally took the position of intercepting these violators and that placed their citizens at risk. The third development that signals a positive step may be the most critical. It is the long-sought agreement between the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosnian Croat elements.

    1994-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3344 (1994) · source

  33. Unless the current draft resolution is correctly implemented in order to lift the blockade of Sarajevo and remove Serbian checkpoints that are impeding movement, Sarajevo will remain under siege. In effect, the partial implementation of this draft resolution, as well as of resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993), will make UNPROFOR and the Security Council unwitting parties to the institutionalization of the siege of Sarajevo. The second development giving us hope is the recent confrontation by NATO planes enforcing the United Nations no-fly zone over our Republic with Serbian planes that had invaded our airspace. Unfortunately, though, Serbian invasions of our airspace in violation of the no-fly zone have been too frequent - indeed, almost daily occurrences.

    1994-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3344 (1994) · source

  34. Clearly, allowing the status quo to continue and using the forces of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), from whichever country they may originate, to interject themselves between besieging Serbian forces and the defenders are not consistent with the aims of lifting the siege or maintaining the unity of this multicultural symbol or with resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993). Before we even move ahead with the implementation of this draft resolution, those who have the responsibility of liberating the city from shelling must now take steps to stop the increasing shelling and sniping and other violations of the Sarajevo exclusion zone that are increasingly testing the resolve of the United Nations and NATO. Finally, we must be fully honest with ourselves.

    1994-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3344 (1994) · source

  35. The current draft resolution should move towards the full implementation of those resolutions in regard to Sarajevo by, first, the full withdrawal of Serbian forces - to quote resolution 824 (1993) - "to a distance wherefrom they cease to constitute a menace to [its] security and that of [its] inhabitants" (resolution 824 (1993), para. 4 (a)); secondly, the full lifting of the road blocks of Serbian forces impeding access to the city; and, thirdly, the restoration of essential services to the city and its population.

    1994-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3344 (1994) · source

  36. They have borne out the importance of confronting aggression resolutely and of stemming those forces and trends of fragmentation in favour of a return to pluralism, multiculturalism and reintegration. At the same time, we must be extremely careful not to slide back into the old, discredited behaviour and options for resolving this problem. There are signs that the Serbian forces are testing our resolve and our commitment to previous measures designed to bring peace. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ultimatum to the Serbian forces besieging Sarajevo, designed to, at least in part, bring about the implementation of Security Council resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993), stopped the shelling of Sarajevo.

    1994-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3344 (1994) · source

  37. If I have not had a chance personally to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the new position you have undertaken, let me now wish you all the best. Let me also thank the Permanent Representative of Djibouti for his able leadership last month, when so many important issues came before the Security Council. For the first time since the aggression and genocide against our Republic was initiated, there is a sense of optimism that we may have finally begun to reverse the long and unfortunate trend of aggression and _ the legitimization of the consequences of such aggression. In this context, three recent developments have been especially critical.

    1994-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3344 (1994) · source

  38. Allow me to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to extend our heartfelt condolences to the families of the slain worshippers, murdered by an individual bent on hate and the continuation of violence. We hope that peace and freedom, for which these worshippers were praying, will soon become a reality.

    1994-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3342 (1994) · source

  39. However, we must emphasize that if Israel's commitment to peace is to be fully realized more can and should be done to ensure the safety of all inhabitants of the region. It is of concern that dangerous signals continue to emanate from extremist elements. In this regard, Israel has the clear responsibility to disarm and/or withdraw all elements that may threaten peace and abridge the rights of the civilian population. We welcome the new presence of international observers as a stabilizing force. We would also welcome dialogue and confidence-building measures that address all aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the underlying causes. Promptly tackling the issues - including the settlements question - on a comprehensive basis is essential.

    1994-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3342 (1994) · source

  40. When the perpetrators are confronted, their brazenness in waging terrorism is checked. However, terrorism can re-emerge if resolute measures are not maintained with vigilance. Any failure to check terrorist acts can serve only to undermine the credibility of any peace process. The bullets used in this terrorist attack were fired not only at innocent Palestinian worshippers, but at the peace process as well. My Government calls upon the relevant Israeli authorities to take all necessary measures to protect Palestinians in the occupied territories, consistent with relevant Security Council resolutions and the Fourth Geneva Convention. We welcome the Israeli Government's swift and unreserved denunciation of this terrorist attack and welcome those measures that have been taken to disarm known extremists and potential terrorists.

    1994-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3342 (1994) · source

  41. In the face of the terrorist shelling of afternoon shoppers in Markele marketplace in Sarajevo and the terrorist massacre of peaceful worshippers at the Al-Haram Al-Ibrahimi mosque in Hebron, both of which challenged the Security Council's dignity and authority while shocking the conscience of all peace-loving peoples, the Security Council was led, in the most skilful manner, to rise to the occasion and meet those affronts. These events demonstrate, in the most obvious fashion, the necessity of confronting ultranationalistic chauvinism and violence with steps that negate the ability of terrorists to carry out such barbarities. As proved by the experience of my country, ultranationalistic terrorism must be resolutely confronted or it will only gain in strength.

    1994-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3342 (1994) · source

  42. Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on your accession to another term as President of the Security Council. Your past experience in this role gives our delegation the utmost confidence that this body will be wisely guided. Allow me also to extend to the Permanent Representative of Djibouti our delegation's sincere acclaim on his responsible guidance of the Security Council last month, a month marked by new lows in terrorism directed towards murdering innocents and sabotaging peace.

    1994-03-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3342 (1994) · source

  43. We are now to believe, according to Ambassador Djokic¢, that while the citizens of Sarajevo are encircled and shelled by the Serbian forces, we have not had quite enough of this suffering: so now we Bosnians also shell ourselves for good measure.

    1994-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336Resumption3 (1994) · source

  44. Djokie chooses to conceal or ignore the well- substantiated record of his country and its surrogates and their responsibility for war crimes against our civilian population, and deflects his nation's criminal responsibility by accusing the victim of self-infliction. Whatever the difficulties that the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) may have in conclusively allocating blame in this instance, there is no practical doubt with respect to the market-place massacre - and UNPROFOR has certainly had no difficulty in placing conclusive responsibility in dozens of other terrorist incidents. It is clear that it is Serbian forces and weapons that have maintained the siege and the suffering of the civilian population of Sarajevo.

    1994-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336Resumption3 (1994) · source

  45. We must remind everyone that it is Serbia and Montenegro that has for so long had a free hand in Bosnia and Herzegovina in its campaign of genocide and "ethnic cleansing". It is Serbia and Montenegro that now pleads for the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to stay out, while it rejects the calls of the international community to station monitors at the international boundary between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro. This amounts to a burglar demanding that the police stay out of the home that is being burglarized. Thirdly, Mr.

    1994-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336Resumption3 (1994) · source

  46. None the less, Ambassador Djokie was afforded this opportunity, and, unfortunately, the opportunity has once again been abused. First, Ambassador Djokie chose to allude to my country, a fully recognized Member of the United Nations, as the "former Bosnia and Herzegovina" (supra, p. 212). His choice of words is not just intended to be a slight, but is designed to contribute directly to the acts of aggression and genocide against our Republic. Serbia and Montenegro has attempted to use this Chamber and this most noble body to propound the view that our Republic is no longer - aS a consequence of Serbia and Montenegro's criminal military aggression against our country. They seek to complete in this Chamber what they have not as yet managed on the battlefield. Secondly, Ambassador Djokie pleads for no new action to confront the aggression.

    1994-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336Resumption3 (1994) · source

  47. I have asked to speak in reply to the statement made by Ambassador Djokie. I have no option but to refer to him as Ambassador Djokie, since that is the way the Security Council refers to him. Before I continue my comments, I would be most unkind to the members of this body and to all the other speakers who participated in this debate if I did not thank them for their time and effort and for their contributions. Ambassador Djokie appeared before the Security Council under doubtful circumstances, especially in view of his country's aggression against its neighbours and its unapologetic complicity in the design of a "Greater Serbia", in terrorism, and in "ethnic cleansing". The terms of General Assembly resolutions 47/1 and 48/88 bring into greater doubt the legitimacy of his appearance before the Council.

    1994-02-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336Resumption3 (1994) · source

  48. The Council's commitment to ensure full and timely compliance with resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993) around Sarajevo and to extend this commitment to the other safe areas and the remainder of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be critical in determining the necessity for us to exercise our full rights under Article 51. Finally, let me quote Mr. Anthony Lewis, the syndicated columnist, who has so extensively analysed and commented on the aggression with respect to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina: "The NATO ultimatum to Serbian forces around Sarajevo could be, at long last, a first step toward ending the bloodiest aggression in Europe in 50 years. Or it could be an empty gesture by politicians trying only to escape embarrassment." (The New York Times, 11 February 1994, p. A35) It is our sincere hope that Mr.

    1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source

  49. If peace is to be secured and the credibility of the negotiating process is to be established, the international community must move to implement Security Council resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993) in the other five safe areas and to take the necessary measures to secure the safety of all Bosnians throughout our country, or at least to allow us to defend ourselves unhindered. It is clear to us that the arms embargo imposed by resolution 713 (1991) does not apply to the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are a country under attack from a much better-armed aggressor bent on territorial conquest and genocide. It is clear that the aggression continues and that the Council still has not fully confronted the aggressor. Our rights under Article 51 of the Charter are clear and absolute.

    1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source

  50. We will support any efforts to broaden the involvement of the Security Council and Member States in the peace process, and in this context we back the relocation of talks, even intermittently, to New York City. Regardless of the negotiating track, the terrorist attack on the marketplace in Sarajevo once again underscores the need to bring war criminals at all levels to justice. Justice should not be sacrificed for political expediency. Otherwise, we may truly sacrifice any chance for a real and durable peace. The plight of Sarajevo is only the tip of the iceberg of the suffering and the aggression directed against the Bosnian people.

    1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source