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1992-11-13
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2000-10-26
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un-security-council

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  1. To state or even imply that a terrorist act exhibits an even greater reason for negotiations is to give political and diplomatic weight to that very act. Members of the Council: keep your end of the bargain, your pledge to the proper response, and we will remain committed to the difficult negotiating track. In this context, we encourage the Security Council and the Secretary-General to ensure that the negotiations are not subject to the so-called realities of the Serbian aggression and conquest - the realities of war and genocide - and that peace is achieved on the basis of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and the United Nations Charter. Most notably, "ethnic cleansing" should be reversed, and the acguisition of territory and the changing of borders by force or genocide should be rejected.

    1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source

  2. The Bosnians are continuing their commitment and efforts towards negotiations. We are making very painful concessions. We even continue to sit across the table from those who are responsible for the market-place massacre and other terrorist acts. The Western Powers have chosen this two-way track to a negotiated settlement. Ultimately, we may all have to pay the price for negotiating with and legitimizing terrorists and fascists. None the less, we have no option but to follow the lead of the most powerful, those who are, presumably, the defenders of democracy, freedom and tolerance. But I remind all not to forget the second track. The proper response to a terrorist act is the use of force and not a call for more negotiations.

    1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source

  3. Any inclination to avoid taking the current first step under the terms of resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993) would not be constructive. Although we are prepared to consider United Nations demilitarization and administration of Sarajevo as part of a final and overall peace plan, such premature attempts can only delay the taking of the necessary steps and deviate from the desired conclusion. In fact, any inclination to overlook what may be seen as partial or even minimal Serbian non-compliance would be most dangerous for our citizens, for NATO's credibility, for the efforts of the United Nations in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and for overall peace in the region. The siege of Sarajevo should be completely lifted, and movement into the city should be free of any Serbian control and interference.

    1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source

  4. The Secretary-General and NATO have been delegated with this responsibility, and the international community and Member States expect that these delegated obligations and commitments will be carried out without egquivocation. The Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is, under resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993), explicitly allowed to retain its forces and weapons within the "safe areas", including Sarajevo. None the less, as a commitment of good will, we have also agreed to withdraw or to deliver our heavy weaponry to United Nations control. Our good will here certainly heightens the obligation of NATO and the international community to be true to the letter of their commitment, since our citizens may become even more defenceless and exposed to any Serbian full or partial non-compliance.

    1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source

  5. This first step cannot just be labelled as the logic of war or the logic of peace; it is the only logical step. We commend the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, for initiating this first step and the commitment by NATO. Resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993) do not require any further action or consultation by the Security Council if the terms of those resolutions and the ultimatum are not met by the Serbians. The conditions of resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993) and the withdrawal of the Serbian forces and their weapons should be executed fully and in a timely manner. Any deviation should trigger the necessary response, to which there is already a commitment.

    1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source

  6. Let me also acknowledge the efforts of all those contributing to the humanitarian relief, including the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), in our country. We recognize the potential risk that these new steps may pose for all, but we are certain that a failure of will to change the deteriorating status quo would result in even greater danger for Bosnian civilians, in no progress towards peace and in disaster for all. The new path that we have hopefully and finally taken is the only logical first step towards peace. For those who understand only the language of force and the logic of war, this step will be the first to counter their aggression and terrorism. For us, who understand the logic of peace, this will provide the necessary credibility and confidence to establish a more suitable environment for the creation of peace.

    1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source

  7. The citizens of the safe area of Bihac have been exposed to a week of an intensified Serbian onslaught and shelling. Civilians are once again the targets. Bihac city hospital has been shelled consistently; in the last few days it has been hit directly eight times, killing 14 patients and causing enormous damage to the facility. This attack was timed to coincide with the world's focus on Sarajevo, but the consequences have been just as deadly as the terrorist attack on Sarajevo's market-place. Late is better than never anda little is preferable to nothing when human lives are directly at stake. Let me, therefore, thank NATO for its most recent effort, and in particular for the leadership shown by its Secretary-General, Manfred Woerner.

    1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source

  8. Each of these terrorist acts should have triggered the Western and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commitment to stop the strangulation of Sarajevo, not to mention the obligation to protect the safe areas, as required by Security Council resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993). Of course, the plight of the other five "safe areas" in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as that of the remainder of the country, continues, at the same level of deprivation and suffering. The Muslim and Croat citizens of Banja Luka are being exposed to Nazi- style repression and physical torture. Recently six civilians were murdered, without any provocation, by the Serbian military police in Banja Luka. No legal recourse has been pursued by the Serbian occupation authorities with respect to this crime.

    1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source

  9. Six of them found death as their only escape from the horrors of Sarajevo. Their surviving friends will have to live with physical and emotional scars because of their attempts to recapture childhood fantasy. A couple of months ago 15 Sarajevans were targeted and murdered while playing soccer. It is impossible to recount all the other incidents in which one or two or three innocent Sarajevans happened to be the lonely, and therefore the forgotten, victims of Serbian gunners targeting civilians for random terrorism. In each previous instance the United Nations forces concluded that the Serbian forces were responsible for the atrocities. Each instance symbolizes the ongoing siege and strangulation of Sarajevo.

    1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source

  10. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's ultimatum to the Serbian forces besieging Sarajevo is most welcome, and overdue. However, it is fair to note that the massacre of innocent civilians in the market-place was unigue only in its death toll and in the media coverage it has received. Bosnian civilians have been targets of Serbian gunners on a daily basis; they have often been struck by gunfire as they struggle to gather the essentials of life or as they venture out of their homes and cellars seeking to overcome the psychological depression of the siege. Just the day before the market-place massacre, nine Sarajevo civilians were murdered and almost 20 were maimed while waiting in line at a United Nations relief centre. Three weeks ago a group of children were murdered while seeking to recapture their youth by sledging on the snow.

    1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source

  11. At the outset, Mr. President, let me commend you for the able fashion in which you have directed the activities of the Security Council, and for the attention that you have given to the matter in hand. Let me at the same time direct my compliments to the Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic for the fashion in which he directed the Council during the month of January. The terrorist attack on Sarajevo's market-place last weekend shocked and awakened the world by its brutality and carnage. For the last 22 months, though, the citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been traumatized on a daily basis by this form of terrorism. The lack of response to such atrocities had forced the people of Bosnia to become resigned to their abandonment by the Western Powers.

    1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336 (1994) · source

  12. In view of this unprecedented crime against every generation of Bosnian women, I find it reprehensible that the names of only two women candidates out of a total of 23 have been forwarded by the Council to the General Assembly for selection as judges for the war crimes Tribunal.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  13. If the international community had been true, and possessed the will to Support the principles so eloquently stated before the Council in the past, peace would be at hand, concessions to aggressors would not taint the integrity of the international community, and the credibility of this body and the restatement of principles promoted in the pas: would not be an embarrassment for inaction in the present. There would be no need to muffle the cries of a tortured victim. Let me add one final point. I do not lightly apply the analogy of a gang rape to the plight of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As we know, systematic rape has been one of the weapons of this aggression against the Bosnian women in particular.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  14. The draft resolution is timely in that it is being adopted before the resumption of the Geneva process to find a just and durable peace. We, the Bosnians, remain committed to this process and the search for peace. We, the Bosnians, thank the members of the Security Council for adopting the draft resolution and ask them to remain committed to the application of the principles outlined therein and especially to ensure that those principles are promoted by the Co-Chairmen in Geneva at this critical time.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  15. In view of the crimes being committed - genocide, rape, torture and ethnic cleansing - no one has the right to be just a bystander, not even a sympathetic one, or one who offers temporary comfort in lieu of permanent remedies. The draft resolution re-emphasizes that a cease-fire and the free flow of humanitarian relief provide a logical, ethical and hospitable environment for negotiations. The threat of the crime's being continued should not be used to pressure the victim to legitimize and accept the consequences of the crime in the first place. Under such circumstances, the betrayal of the victim and principles enters into a free fall. The draft resolution re-establishes some of the principles that will provide the framework for any settlement and therefore Stops the free fall.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  16. The draft resolution outlines certain basic principles which would establish the basis for further segotiations. Although the negotiations themselves may have the disconcerting result of forcing the victim to bargain with the criminal, we also recognize that we should not expect the cavalry of the strong and gallant. Nene the less, all should recognize as well that in fact it is the real, clear and constant threat of military action that has provided any impetus for, or balance in, the negotiating process. Furthermore, those nations that find themselves at the scene of the crime, being unable or uncommitted to confront the criminal, do not have the moral right to discourage policing action because they, as innocent bystanders, may be caught in the crossfire.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  17. It is also clear that the voicing of moral outrage is worth only as much as the action which accompanies this outrage. Action based on convenience is no substitute for resolute response when one is needed. For 16 months the cries for help from the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been heard. For 16 months the gallant have voiced their concern, pleading for an end. For 16 months the strong have bowed to injustice, when what is required is a resolute response and not one of convenience. The Council must remember and adhere to its words, resolutions and commitments. Failure to do so would be catastrophic, not only for the people of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also for the people of the world, who deserve and command the very ideals upon which the Council was established.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  18. p.9-10) and added: "The Serbian authorities have a clear choice before them: confrontation with the international community or cooperation and the search for a negotiated solution." (ibid.) Concluding his remarks, the French representative warned: "The Belgrade authorities must realize that the international community will not back down. Just as our determination went one step further with resolution 816 (1993), so today we are not ruling out going even further if it proves necessary to do so." (ibid. ) The Serbians rejected the Vance-Owen peace plan and heard the Council's threats. The international community backed down, and it and the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia finally discarded the Vance-Owen plan and adopted a new, so called, deal, promoted by the regimes in Belgrade and Zagreb.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  19. On 18 April 1993, upon the adoption of resolution 820 (1993), the Permanent Representative of France noted that stiffer sanctions were: "the right response, at the right time, to take up the challenge from the Belgrade authorities and the Serbian elements in Bosnia that they are blatantly supporting." (S/PV.3200, p.8) He continued: "The international community has shown extreme patience and good will. Our Council has seen promise after promise not kept." (ibid.) And, finally, he reiterated "Our Council's support for the Vance-Owen plan" (ibid.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  20. It does legitimize the consequences of aggression and ethnic cleansing. It adopts the repugnant concept of ethnic division and, as such, is not durable or just. Some may choose to term my comments as direct or even intemperate, but I call upon the representative of the United Kingdom to reply. Our questions deserve to be answered. Why have principles been abandoned, and why are these principles so dangerous and repulsive as to be avoided? We do not presume to offer lessons in morality to France. France has certainly in the past put before the Council the principles at issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  21. There can be no acceptance of the acquisition of territory or alteration of borders by force. This means that until the Serbs withdraw from the land they have seized, there can be no final settlement." (S/PV.3228, p. 58) On 29 June, when the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom offered that he would not reply to some, as he put it "rather intemperate and unfounded remarks" (S/PV.3247, p.134) made by me, he also reiterated that the "Council must do everything in its power to sustain and nourish the peace process. That does not mean that we should support solutions which would be inequitable for one of the communities in Bosnia." (ibid. p.135) Lord Owen himself has described the current so-called peace plan proposed by the mediators as an awful plan. It is inequitable.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  22. "This resolution rightly makes special reference to the odious practice of 'ethnic cleansing'." It is appalling that in the last decade of the twentieth century, such actions should be prevalent" - and be trumpeted by the international community as a way to achieve a just and lasting peace. "The forcible removal of civilian populations is wholly contrary to the accepted tenets of international humanitarian law." (S/PV.3106, p. 36) We agree, unreservedly, whether the victims are Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic, Jewish or other. On 4 June the Ambassador of the United Kingdom once again revalidated the principles for negotiations: "The principles which must be observed in a peace settlement are spelled out in the Vance-Owen peace plan, and they remain valid.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  23. And that cannot be ducked; it is simply no good suggesting that they have nothing to do with the events that are going on in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Multiple-rocket launchers are not found in Serbian peasants' barns." (ibid., p. 43) In response to the denials of responsibility from the Belgrade regime, the Ambassador noted, "They must think we are very stupid people indeed" (ibid.). On 13 August 1992, on the adoption of resolution 770 (1992), the same representative, speaking of Serbian concentration camps and crimes, emphasized that "The camps themselves are only one aspect of a wholly unacceptable policy of the Serbs, both in Belgrade and in Bosnia, to extend Serb control of Bosnian territory by attacking and expelling other communities.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  24. Mladic have been identified as responsible for crimes against humanity in Bosnia and Herzegovina by numerous independent organizations, including Helsinki Watch and Amnesty International, as well as by the United States Department of State, It is obvious that we, the Bosnians, must be dismayed by and suspicious of so-called peace plans initiated by Mr. Milosevic, based upon the "realities" executed by Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Mladic and now adopted and promoted by those in theory responsible for delivering peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the same debate of 30 May 1992, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland eloquently reiterated that "there really is no doubt at all where the principal responsibility now lies: with the authorities, civil and military, in Belgrade.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  25. In his remarks to the Council on that day, the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation noted that "So far, however, Belgrade has not heeded good advice and warnings and has not complied with the demands of the international community". (S/PV.3082, p. 37) He emphasized that the Security Council "must shoulder the responsibility for a settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina ... making use of all the measures for the restoration of peace provided for in the Charter of the United Nations". (ibid.) Unequivocally, the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation called for the establishment of "an international commission with the task of identifying and punishing those specifically responsible for Slaughtering civilians in Sarajevo and other areas". (ibid., p. 38) Mr. Milosevic, Mr. Karadzic and Mr.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  26. Some of you, members of the Council, have even found yourselves witnesses to the crime. Many of you have offered evidence of the crime and in your debates in the Council decried those responsible. You pledged to this body that you would not allow this crime to go unreversed and unconfronted. You spoke of uncompromisable principles and of your resolve to uphold them. Noble principles were enunciated by all. On 30 May 1992, as the crime was initiated and as Bosnia and Herzegovina cried out for help, resolution 757 (1992) was adopted, placing responsibility for the crime squarely with the Belgrade regime and Mr. Milosevic.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  27. Once forced into a submissive position by acts of violence and aggression, one does not become any less a victim of a criminal act just because the victim is exhausted by the struggle. The victim calls out for help. The strong and gallant hear the cries and rush to the scene of the crime. They plead with the criminals to stop. The criminals respond even more loudly, with fierce and perverse determination. Afraid to confront the criminals, the strong avert their eyes; the gallant explain their inaction with the age-old excuse that "the victim was really asking for it". Having failed to confront the rapists, they now hope that the criminals are fatigued from and satisfied with their criminal orgy and are prepared to return to the life of law-abiding members of the community. All have heard the cries of the victim in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  28. Now, in a climax of that continuing perversion, it is subtly suggested that the reemphasis of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), Security Council resolutions, decisions of the International Court of Justice and the London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia would somehow undermine the chances for a negotiated settlement. The legal absurdity and moral degradation of that argument can only be compared to a policeman being instructed not to interrupt a gang rape because, after resisting, the victim is finally ready to submit coolly to the inevitable. Under that theory, the most heinous of crimes, a gang rape, becomes an act of seduction. Bosnia and Herzegovina is being gang-raped.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  29. Finally, let me thank the representative of Venezuela, His Excellency Ambassador Diego Arria, for his able efforts to see that justice and lasting peace are brought to Bosnia; thank you very much, Your Excellency. The last time I spoke before this Council the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was told, in a perversion of the United Nations Charter and the principles of international justice, that its right to obtain defensive weapons and fully exercise self-defence would pose a threat to the United Nations forces in my country and would prolong the war.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  30. Let me take this opportunity to congratulate you, Madam President, on your most able efforts during this month, and to wish you continued success. Let me take this opportunity also to congratulate the representative of the United Kingdom on the able fashion in which his delegation handled the Council's proceedings last month. I wish also to thank the members of the non-aligned caucus, under the leadership of Mr. Benjelloun-Touimi of Morocco, for their able efforts to bring the cause of Bosnia before the Council again, on the basis of principles. I also thank the representative of New Zealand, Mr. Colin Keating, for his efforts in helping ensure that today's draft resolution be brought before the Council.

    1993-08-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3269 (1993) · source

  31. Whether peace is to come to Bosnia and Herzegovina through confrontation or through negotiations with the aggressor, there is only one choice with respect to this draft resolution: the Bosnians must be provided with the leverage to undertake fair and promising negotiations, or, in the alternative, to confront the undiminished aggression. So far Bosnia has not received this assistance from the most prominent members of the Council. Therefore, the Council does not have the authority to demand any further concessions from us, but should only free us of the shackles that diminish our self-defence and our capacity to pursue joint negotiations.

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  32. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina claims no special status within the family of nations, but we do not agree to be reduced to a lower status so that certain permanent members of the Security Council can carry on with the illusion of their elevated responsibility. Neither do we appreciate being treated with disdain because we dare to challenge certain permanent members on their unique responsibility and status. We are persuaded that we should be grateful for the selective humanitarian aid that Bosnia receives, but we understand that this aid is a meagre substitute for resolute action. We also understand that while committed and courageous individuals endeavour to save Bosnian lives on the ground the intended goal is in fact protecting the public image of compromised leaders.

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  33. To ignore the Bosnian people's choice on this matter goes beyond arrogance and seeks to mask the failure to honour responsibility. The permanent members of the Security Council claim an elevated status on the basis of their special commitment to the membership of the United Nations to take the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security. By their permanent membershiv of this body, and veto power, they are ina position to dictate action or inaction. In the case of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the permanent members have failed in their special responsibility, but some of them continue to insist on dictating life and death for Bosnia in a way that makes a mockery not only of the United Nations Charter, but of commitments made by this body a mere three and a half weeks ago.

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  34. If that response is worthy of the British people, then I believe that the British people would agree it is also worthy of the Bosnians. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has waited for well over a year for the most empowered members of the Security Council to fulfil their commitment to confront the Serbians in the peacemaking effort. Only after they failed to meet their commitment have we now sought to reassert our right to obtain the means of self-defence. It is not enough to feed us at a subsistence level while we continue to be indiscriminately murdered. It is unethical to tell a hungry people that they must sacrifice self-defence in order to be fed. But, if a choice is to be made between humanitarian relief and self-defence, we have unequivocally told the Council which option we choose.

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  35. President, is it historically justified to ethnically partition a pluralistic, multi-religious society that over 500 years ago was already a safe haven of tolerance and multiculturalism when Jewish refugees, escaping the bigotry of Western Europe and Spain, came to Bosnia? I ask His Excellency the representative of the Russian Federation: did the defenders of Stalingrad persevere to allow, 50 years later in Europe, the fascist siege of Sarajevo? To His Excellency the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Sir David Hannay, I say that when Sir Winston Churchill was being persuaded that he had no option but to capitulate to Hitler, he offered "Give us the tools and we will finish the job".

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  36. Milosevic's vision clearly portends partition and the eventual disintegration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Recent history, I suggest, has taught us that it is Mr. Milosevic's view that has the greater commitment behind it. Nonetheless, again we are told that, even if the new proposals fall far short of stated goals, we must accept the diminished results. We are now being urged to accept the new realities. Those who in fact have actively endeavoured to limit our options now tell us that we have no other options. I ask His Excellency the represencative of France: Could the French people have been convinced that Vichy France was an acceptable alternative to the majesty of a free and sovereign France? Mr.

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  37. A novel approach in healing as well as diplomacy: Adopt the peace plan of the war-maker, subject the victim to the criminals' goodwill and save a pluralistic nation by partitioning it. If Bosnia and Herzegovina wanted to commit suicide, we would not need the assistance of the Dr. Jack Kevorkian of mediation and diplomacy. Even more incredibly, after having committed themselves and us to the Vance-Owen peace plan, certain members of the European Community adopted Mr. Owen's view because they were unwilling to confront the Serbians and to pressure them for the adoption and implementation of the Vance-Owen plan. Even though this so-called new peace plan calls for ethnic division, we are now assured that this is nct a partition plan. Nonetheless, Mr.

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  38. Finally, for how long can those of us living in the non-safe areas survive in our homes unless you allow us the means of self-defence? Even assuming effective implementation and enforcement, the "safe areas" resolution at best can only benefit some of our people temporarily and none of our people permanently. The latest supposed option to promote peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina comes directly from the unfortunate President Franjo Tudjman and from Slobodan Milosevic, the man who initiated aggression and who has been identified as a war criminal by several non-governmental organizations and the United States State Department. Inconceivably, immediately after declaring his own plan dead, Mr. David Owen embraced Milosevic's plan.

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  39. Was it not a clearly observed violation of Sarajevo's safe area status when the Serbians lobbed several shells into a playground, killing and maiming tens of children? When will you be prepared to respond if the Secretary-General's implementation report on resolution 836 (1993) apparently relies upon the good conduct of those who still ignore the basic norms of civilized behaviour? How can you have an effective deterrent force if up to now you have lacked the will and commitment to confront aggression? But the most critical question is: For how long do you expect those of us living in disease-plagued Srebrenica and the other five so-called safe areas to suffer the indignity, decay and uncertainty of these new holding pens? How long will you have a commitment to stay?

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  40. Among the Members States here today are some who strongly advocated the establishment of safe areas in six Bosnian cities as delineated in resolution 824 (1993), and later committed themselves in resolution 836 (1993) "to ensure full respect for the safe areas referred to in resolution 824 (1993)" (resolution 836 (1993), para. 4) and reaffirmed in that resolution: "the unacceptability of the acquisition of territory by the use of force and the need to restore the full sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" (resolution 836 (1993), para. 3). Let me inquire of those who were so zealous for the adoption of these measures the reasons for their deafening silence today. Why was it not enough for you to respond when shells rained upon the safe-area of Gorazde?

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  41. Clearly, the necessary measures have not been taken to bring peace, and the Bosnians subsequently find themselves no further along the road to peace but utterly drained by the journey. So we come to the second question: What are the new and necessary measures that should be undertaken to bring peace? Bosnia consists of hundreds of cities and towns and of thousands of villages. While we pursue faithfully the policies established under the "safe havens" resolution, who will defend most of our citizens who happen to live in these non-safe areas when its seems that even the designated safe areas are not so safe?

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  42. Ever more diluted sets of principles, supposedly insuring Bosnia's sovereignty, territorial integrity and justice are once again restated. More negotiations, without the means or the will to implement them, are endlessly pursued. More delegations come to Bosnia. More Bosnians are "ethnically cleansed" from Bosnia. More Bosnians die in Bosnia. Indefinite negotiations, conferences and so-called initiatives do not necessarily advance the cause of peace. But it is clear that some would use the perception of motion to create the illusion of progress. We, the Bosnians, are dead tired of running on this treadmill of cynicism that exhausts us with bitterness, hopelessness and helplessness while serving the public relations interests of certain political leaders.

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  43. Fifteen months after the Serbian aggression was initiated; 11 months after we all first saw television pictures of Bosnian victims in Serb concentration camps; 10 months after the heralded London Conference and its many promises; eight months after Lord Owen and Mr. Vance issued their first set of constitutional principles for Bosnia and Herzegovina; three months after we signed the Vance-Owen plan; and after the visits of countless well-meaning or self-serving high-profile individuals, mediators and delegations to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the agony continues and there is no light at the end of the tunnel. Only more conferences and meetings are proposed. New mediators are appointed while others are retired.

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  44. Secondly, if not, what are the new and necessary measures that should be undertaken to stop this never-ending aggression and mayhem, particularly should the arms embargo on the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina be declared de jure invalid in accordance with the United Nations Charter's guarantee of the right of self-defence? I would also note that one of the few resolutions effectively implemented with respect to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been Security Council resolution 713 (1991). Some may attempt to confuse the matter by redefining the issues in order to excuse failure, justify inaction and mask a lack of real commitment to dealing decisively with the problem. Integrity necessitates that we appraise the Council's measures primarily on the basis of results and not grandiose statements made within this Chamber.

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  45. A day before the end of your term, Mr. President, let me once again congratulate you on the way you have managed the affairs of the Security Council. And let me here thank the membership of the non-aligned caucus, and in particular the Chairman for this month, Ambassador Jesus, on the work that has been done to bring the cause of Bosnia before the Security Council - something that is so urgently needed, Two questions, and two questions only, are relevant in evaluating the merit of this draft resolution. First, has the Security Council compelled the necessary means to stop the aggression and genocide directed at the Republic and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

    1993-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3247 (1993) · source

  46. Those constructive proposals apparently were rejected. This can only lead us to the conclusion that what motivates at least some of the sponsors is a diplomatic cover to mitigate the need and responsibility for more resolute and comprehensive measures. The manner in which the exercise of drafting this draft resolution was handled and the lack of key elements promoting true peace and real safe areas make us very suspicious that the motivations behind the draft resolution most directly reflect a continuing lack of will to confront the aggressor and an absence of commitment to the Republic and people of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source

  47. We, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, attempted to participate in a constructive process to promote long-term peace in our country. We initially were not even consulted regarding the programme or the draft resolution, but none the less we made the following key but brief suggestions: First, apply the safe areas concept more broadly to address the threats against other population centres in Bosnia and Herzegovina or at least to give the defence forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina the unhindered opportunity to be responsive to such threats; Secondly, establish a time frame to move from the temporary, symptomatic relief offered by the "safe areas" programme towards the implementation of the Vance-Owen plan and real peace}; Thirdly, 'e the Serbians are unwilling to accept the Vance-Owen Plan and any semblance of real peace by a date certain, then allow for all necessary measures to be applied to confront aggression and restore peace, or, at least, consistent with Article 51, fully recognize our Government's right to self-defence against an aggressor committing genocide, whose capability to commit this genocide is sustained by the denial to the victim of the necessary outside help or weapons of self-defence; Fourthly, after a necessary review with the Secretariat, design a mandate that considers all resources necessary to defend the safe areas and produce a realistic plan for implementing and enforcing such a mandate truly to justify the designation "safe areas"; and, fifthly, shorten the review period for the success of the implementation of the resolution and overall progress towards peace from two months to 30 days; Bosnia does not have the luxury of time while the Serbian assaults continue.

    1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source

  48. Bosnia and Herzegovina has amply witnessed the display of status; there has been a lack of will of real leadership; and we certainly have not been the beneficiaries of responsibilities honoured. The new dictionary for Bosnia and Herzegovina is also puzzling for the terms it is deleting - terms such as the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, commitment to long-term peace, sovereignty and reversing aggression. Maybe the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is most accurately reflected by the absence of these terms. I do not wish to present the position of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina only as a bitter critique of the programmes and draft resolutions proposed by certain members of this Council.

    1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source

  49. After over a year of genocidal aggression, broken Serbian promises, arrogant rejection of peace plans and empty commitments to challenge the aggressor, those who wish to bestow upon themselves the title of world Powers now again seek diplomatic cover to avoid confronting petty criminals turned murderers. I just wonder why the one world super-Power has allowed itself to be compromised into this "joint avoidance programme" by would-be super-Powers that betray their own peace plan and the principles of multiculturalism, pluralism and democracy. Integrity and virtue once lost are difficult to recapture. Principles, once compromised, no longer can be the basis for a new legal, moral or even strategic world order. Status and the privileges of leadership carry a corresponding responsibility.

    1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source

  50. Without clear time limits and long-term solutions, the United Nations forces will make the bureaucratically wise decision that the "safe areas" are too costly and risky to maintain, and will remove the by then listless and psychologically tortured population to new "safe areas" in a final act of United Nations-executed "ethnic cleansing". There is another new term in this special dictionary for Bosnia and Herzegovina: Joint Action Programme. One word in that phrase is especially misleading - "Action". Diplomacy provides wide latitude in the manipulation of words, but we all know that the objective that has motivated this Programme is avoidance.

    1993-06-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3228 (1993) · source