YouSaid · the spoken record

Sacirbey

lines on the record: 379
first: 1992-11-13
most recent: 2000-10-26
sittings or episodes: 32
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“The basis for action has already been given, and the airports, aircraft, artillery and infantry of the so-called Krajina Serbs continue to violate the Bihac region and to be a threat to the civilian population of that region as well as to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Nor should we ignore the fact that these violations by the so-called Krajina Serbs are, most directly, also violations of the no-fly zone, of the supposedly demilitarized status of the United Nations Protected Areas in the Republic of Croatia, and of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
1994-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3461 (1994) · source
“First, we are not convinced that the draft resolution before the Security Council was necessary in order to allow for the appropriate response to the recent attacks upon the safe areas in Bihac. From our - by now very disillusioned - perspective, this appears to be another attempt at delay by some, an effort to put off action until some future violation - when some new excuse could be found for inaction. Frankly, members of the Security Council, it will be very easy to relieve us of our scepticism. Just act as the entire world has expected you to act for two weeks.”
1994-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3461 (1994) · source
“I would like to thank all of them, whether they speak in support of our cause or not, whether they share our views or not, for participating and for once again taking the time and making the effort to prepare and present their views.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“It seems to us that this offer has either been misunderstood or, in some cases, perhaps even deliberately misinterpreted. None the less, the offer stands, and we look to the Security Council to act in a manner that welcomes the offer and that builds upon it. We certainly remain open to cooperation with you, Madam President, with the remainder of the Security Council and with the members of the Contact Group in this effort. We believe that flexibility is a virtue. Unfortunately for the Bosnians, we have been asked to be too flexible for too long. I think it is now time for flexibility on the part of those whose actions and ideas in Bosnia have not proven to be successful. As a last point, I believe that over 40 nations are participating in this debate.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“Our President came to the General Assembly in late September and made an offer in the interests of peace and in the interests of cooperation with the Contact Group and with the Security Council as a whole in bringing about a settlement for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We have already made many concessions in the past, and we thought we were making one more compromise, that is asking the Security Council today to lift the arms embargo and to defer the application of that decision for six months, to give the international community and the Contact Group a last opportunity to compel the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace plan - in fact to give them additional leverage to pressure the Bosnian Serbs, knowing that the Bosnian Serbs would no longer enjoy an advantage in weapons.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“There can be no greater threat to regional peace and security - to international peace and security - than the legitimization of the aggression through the sanctioning, through the creation, through the legitimization of a "Greater Serbia". How can we talk of regional peace and security if efforts here amount to the promotion, the legitimization of ultra-nationalism and the concept of ethnically homogeneous territories and countries? These in fact are the greatest threats to peace, not giving weapons to a victim that wants to defend itself and preserve a multicultural society. Let me turn to the following point.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“The spill-over is from Serbia and Montenegro into the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and we must find a way to stem that spill-over. We certainly welcome the placement of border monitors on the border between Serbia and Montenegro and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But if these border monitors are to be subject to Serbian whims, then they are not in fact serving their intended purpose. Let me now address the issue of the potential threat to regional peace and security if the arms embargo is lifted. There already is instability; we are already on the brink of war in the entire region. In fact, if there is a failure to stem aggression, if there is a failure to address the consequences of that aggression and to allow the victim to defend itself, then I am afraid that the threat to regional peace and security will increase.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“If in fact Serbia and Montenegro chose to react to the lifting of the arms embargo by allowing weapons and men to flow into the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that again would be an admission of continuing aggression and would need to be responded to accordingly. Is an attempt now being made to tell the Bosnians that they cannot defend themselves, that they cannot receive weapons, because if they do they will be the target of aggression? That is not the logic of the Security Council; that is not the logic of international peace and security; that is not the logic that we should be bound by. Ambassador Djokic yesterday spoke of the "spill- over" of what he calls the civil war in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact, there already has been a spill-over.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“We would in fact welcome the international community's undertaking those greater peacemaking efforts. But if the Contact Group and the international community are not in fact prepared to undertake such efforts, then all we can do is ask the Council to redouble its efforts to secure them. 42 We are prepared to continue to live by the Contact Group peace plan. Some speak of the threat that once the arms embargo is lifted Serbia and Montenegro will continue to send weapons into Bosnia and Herzegovina, and will in fact intervene. I think this is a real admission of the original causes of this war: that is, aggression from a neighbouring country.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“But in the meantime, we believe that UNPROFOR's efforts can be supplemented by measures that effectively allow the Bosnians to defend themselves: by the lifting of the arms embargo or, on the other hand, through an overall peacemaking process - in conjunction, indeed, with the Contact Group peace plan - to achieve a settlement. We must recall for everyone that the lifting of the arms embargo is mentioned in the Contact Group peace plan as part of the overall plan. It should not be something that is considered outside of the plan, for it would then be viewed as being outside a political framework designed to achieve peace. We believe that, in order to achieve the political framework established by the Contact Group, it may be necessary to undertake greater peacemaking efforts.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“If we are told that we must choose between UNPROFOR and the lifting of the arms embargo - and we are actually being given that choice - then we must once again say that we will choose the lifting of the arms embargo. That seems to be the only true way to a real and lasting peace. But I must not simply leave the issue at that point. Some believe that the choice must be to have one or the other: either UNPROFOR or the lifting of the arms embargo. But, as has been pointed out by many members of the General Assembly, including the representatives of other troop-contributing countries, the choice may not in fact be between one and the other. It may be that both options can be chosen. We would welcome the redeployment or withdrawal of those who do in fact believe that it is a choice between one and the other, if that is truly what they believe.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“I cannot confirm this information, but I bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council as a cause for alarm. I have been informed by President Izetbegovic that the Bosnian Serbs intend to take action today, this evening, to demand the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde. We hope that this is not so, because, of course, it would put all of us in a very difficult situation, and particularly the people of Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde. But by bringing this potential truth to the attention of the Council, I hope to ensure that it does not become a real truth. What options does the Council believe are left to us?”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“When this did not meet with a response from the United Nations forces, the shelling of Sarajevo and the sniping at street-cars and the murder of civilians in Sarajevo once again resumed. I am truly grateful to those forces that, between February and late summer of this year, managed to bring a sense of normalcy to Sarajevo through the imposition of the exclusion zone. Unfortunately, I must inform the Council that the people of Sarajevo believe they are worse off today than they were in February. Why? Because in February they had hope that what the Council was delivering to them would be something real, something that would bring about real peace. Now, once again, their hopes have been dashed and they understand that they are living under an illusion. 41 I wish to make one final point.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“We now find ourselves in a situation where once again Sarajevo is being shelled; our young children are being murdered on our streets; and Serbian aircraft are once again flying through our skies like birds of prey. Let me remind the Council of how this re-intensified Serbian war has come about. In July, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina accepted the Contact Group peace plan. Soon after our acceptance, the Serbian forces threatened that they would respond by creating ever-increasing tension and brutalization. Then the Blue Route was closed. Then certain areas of our Republic continued to be subjected to "ethnic cleansing". Then, after this met with no resistance, shelling of the Blue Route and areas around the Blue Route started.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“Not having been confronted yesterday, they decided today to carry things one step further. Yesterday, as was mentioned in this Council, four children and a women were murdered in front of a schoolyard in Sarajevo as a result of the now-intensified shelling of the city of Sarajevo and its civilian population. Back in July of this year, after we agreed to the Contact Group peace plan, we believed that the international community, and particularly the members of the Contact Group, would be prepared to undertake ever- more-forceful measures to compel the acceptance and implementation of peace. Unfortunately, exactly the opposite has happened.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“There would not appear any reason for UNPROFOR to enter into Banja Luka as there does not appear to be atrocities occurring warranting intervention." Why is UNPROFOR in Sarajevo? Why is UNPROFOR in Mostar? It is because they are welcomed by our Government. But they are not welcomed by the criminals who occupy Banja Luka. In the meantime, these elements within UNPROFOR have gradually allowed their real mandate to erode to the point of irrelevance. Today, as I mentioned, I have been informed by my President that Serbian aeroplanes, coming, we suspect, from the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia, have attacked the Bihac pocket in violation of the no-fly zone. I am informed that reconnaissance aircraft flew over Bihac yesterday and were not confronted.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“Some of them may even be murdered. But they still do live there. The final, overall UNPROFOR comment is: "This is a draft that condemns the Serbs and argues that the UNPROFOR should enter the Banja Luka area under the auspices of Chapter VII, ie., peace enforcement. This would mean that impartiality would be lost. There would not appear any reason for UNPROFOR to enter into Banja Luka as there does not appear to be atrocities occurring warranting intervention. This draft appears to be another attempt to gain more territory". While The New York Times and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) report continuing atrocities, we hear this comment from UNPROFOR - and I repeat it: "This would mean that impartiality would be lost.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“The leap of logic from expulsion to mass murder is not acceptable". I think we all know that mass murder has occurred in the Banja Luka area. There is a war crimes Tribunal in The Hague right now, which yesterday indicted the first criminals associated with mass murder in Banja Luka. I turn now to the next point, which concerns the following phrase from the draft resolution: "Calls for the immediate deployment of UNPROFOR into this region to deter further attacks and human rights abuses against the non-Serb population". The UNPROFOR comment is: "Tf all Muslims and Croats have been expelled, then there is no requirement for UNPROFOR. This appears an attempt to gain more territory for BH Government". There are almost 50,000 non-Serbs - Muslims, Croats, gypsies - who still live in the Banja Luka area. Yes, they may all be expelled very soon.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“The first comment concerns the paragraph from the Security Council draft resolution that reaffirms that all parties are bound to comply with the Geneva Conventions. The comment reads: "This is motherhood and in no way accomplishes anything." I would call that cynical. The second comment relates to the following phrase from the draft resolution: "Strongly condemns 'ethnic cleansing' by de facto Serbian authorities in Banja Luka...". In fact, UNPROFOR's comment is: "No comment". The third comment is on the phrase in the draft which reads: "Demands that the de facto Serbian authorities end despicable acts, which constitute a form of genocide". UNPROFOR's comment on this element of the Security Council draft resolution is: "emotional and non-objective; unlikely to be accepted by Security Council.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“This is on going with an estimated 1,696 refugees moving from Northern BH (Banja Luka area) to Croatia in May 94." This is just one month. This is May 1994, and refugees are moving only into Croatia, not into the rest of Bosnia. I would consider this cause for alarm. 40 The second general comment is that in resolution 780 (1992) the Security Council expresses "grave alarm at continuing reports...of mass killings and the continuance of the practice of 'ethnic cleansing""' (fourth preambular paragraph). In the comments from which I have been quoting, the statement is made that "This appears to be the basis for the draft". I think that is an accurate statement. There are comments on particular paragraphs of the Security Council draft resolution. I will not go through all of them but will read out only a few.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“We may recall that back in June the Secretary-General's Special Representative was in fact asked by the Security Council, and was given permission by the Bosnian Serbs at that time, to go into Banja Luka. On several occasions the Security Council has in fact demanded once again that the Special Representative, Mr. Akashi, be granted access to Banja Luka. Allow me to read the comments of UNPROFOR regarding the proposed resolution to deploy UNPROFOR forces in Banja Luka. Under the heading of general comment, we read: "This draft is emotional and complete with rhetoric. Yet there is some truth in it. According to the UNHCR the ethnic cleansing and the movement of refugees from the BANJA LUKA and surrounding area has been extensive since 1991.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“Now I quote again: "The DRAFT does not include Serb authorities in a city where 'UNPROFOR will be responsible for maintaining the security of the city' and 'where all the police and the internal security of the city would be placed under the joint authority of UNPROFOR and the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with participation of other local authorities." This seems to be the basis for UNPROFOR's having rejected, certainly reacted negatively to, at least one potential effort to bring peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the gradual application of the concept of demilitarization and peacemaking. Another resolution was proposed, which was to allow UNPROFOR forces to enter Banja Luka in order to deter further human rights abuses.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“The 20 km exclusion zone includes most of SARAJEVO but not all." It seems to me that this is the real crux because what the Bosnian Serbs do not want, UNPROFOR does not do. I continue to read from the analysis: "The idea to eliminate any internal confrontational lines and to dismantle all check points is noble but would in fact hand over territory to the BH government as the Draft implies." 39 Again, we are not claiming Sarajevo for "BH government"; we are claiming Sarajevo for its citizens - an open city demilitarized.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“The European Union Action Plan is not the Vance-Owen Plan. And here is the commentary: "The Vance Owen plan does not exist now. To restore old initiatives now may be counter productive as other initiatives for an overall peace plan are ongoing in GENEVA. It appears to me that this draft is an admission of failure of the GENEVA initiatives or an attempt by the BH government to further secure SARAJEVO in order to carry out the war successfully on other fronts. It is apparent that no overall peace settlement will be agreed by the BH government at this time." Once again, demilitarizing Sarajevo and placing it under United Nations control is part of the current Contact Group peace plan. The analysis continues: "Tt is unlikely that the Bosnia Serbs would agree to complete demilitarization of SARAJEVO including all ten opstinas.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“It should be noted that [Security Council resolutions] 824 and 836 were designed to support the then on going Vance Owen plan that had been signed by the [Bosnia and Herzegovina] and Croat governments but refused by the Bosnian Serb government. [Security Council resolutions] 824 and 836 define the Safe Area concept and reaffirm SARAJEVO as a safe area. The NATO ultimatum supported the lifting of the siege of SARAJEVO as a step toward placing SARAJEVO under UN administration in conformity with the plan and commended the current efforts of the UN negotiators toward securing - the demilitarization of SARAJEVO. The plan referred to was the European Union Action Plan of 22 Nov 93. (Vance Owen Plan)." Apart from the fact that this constitutes a judgement of a Security Council initiative, it is incorrect.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“On several occasions we have discussed new options to try to gradually bring peace to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of the ideas born out of the European Union initiative was the concept of demilitarizing Sarajevo and ultimately placing it under the temporary control of the United Nations. It is an idea that was advanced on several occasions in discussions in the Council and in a draft resolution submitted to the Council. I have before me an analysis by certain political elements within UNPROFOR that are actually giving their judgement as to why this potential effort by the Security Council should not be supported. I will read from that analysis as follows: "The logic can be traced through [Security Council resolutions] 824, 836 and 900 and the NATO ultimatum of 9 Feb 94.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“Unwilling to confront ever-increasing Serbian challenges by using all the mechanisms available to them, some elements within UNPROFOR have now established a negotiating process parallel to that of the Contact Group and the mandate given to them by the Security Council. Instead of insisting upon full compliance by the Bosnian Serbs with relevant Security Council resolutions, and instead of pressuring them to accept the Contact Group peace plan, these elements within UNPROFOR are now second-guessing and effectively eroding the mandate given to them by the Council; they are now actually formulating alternatives to the Contact Group peace plan. We find this parallel track to be inconsistent with UNPROFOR's mandate and the Contact Group peace plan. We of course must ask: Is it in fact the tail wagging the dog?”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“However, that effort seems to have been stillborn and is not much more than an attempt to buy time in order yet again to offer an excuse as to why more resolute action is not necessary, including the use of the famous words "Why we have not reached the point of last resort". I am afraid we have reached the point of last resort; the last resort is the status quo. Unfortunately, last night, while spouting untruths and appeals to religious prejudice, Ambassador Djokie also killed any hopes that the European Union's plan could bear quick fruit, bitter or otherwise. He rejected the call for mutual recognition between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). So what other avenues are open for peacemaking?”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“From the perspective of both the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and those genuinely concerned for our country and people, the benefits of UNPROFOR are quickly becoming outweighed by the longer-term disadvantages and taxing costs that it places upon citizens desperate to get back to normality, not just to receive humanitarian assistance. So what are we to do? What efforts are to be made in the pursuit of peacemaking? Some members of the Contact Group, particularly certain European Union members, have advocated a position that we heard yesterday, which includes further attempts at political inducement of the Serbians, both Belgrade and the Pale Serbs. Some could refer to this ongoing process as appeasement. I will not use that term today - I think we can all judge for ourselves.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“On the other hand, the Serbians tolerate UNPROFOR as a factor that provides them with international legitimacy; that in fact can be plundered or pruned to augment fuel and other supplies to the Serb military and profiteers. It is tolerated because it is a vehicle for preserving the status quo in the absence of peacemaking action, and in fact it is tolerated because, through UNPROFOR, the international community can be effectively intimidated and held hostage. Today I was informed that the Serbians will in fact be given more fuel by UNPROFOR, in order ostensibly to clear the roads of snow. This is but one example of how UNPROFOR's resources are pruned to serve the interests of a war machine.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“As for neutrality, UNPROFOR cannot maintain its neutrality by supporting a status quo that not only is disadvantageous but in fact means the gradual and certain demise of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Government. You see, there is a harsh reality in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina beyond the idealism of peace- keeping and humanitarian work. UNPROFOR is tolerated by both sides in the conflict because it serves the different interests of both. 38 We, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, have welcomed UNPROFOR because it is an important source of humanitarian assistance for many of our desperate citizens. It is a source that can moderate the war; it could also have been an effective peacemaking vehicle.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“Ambassador Keating - a man for whom I have the highest respect and who, I noticed, stayed here for the entire debate yesterday evening - was one of several representatives who spoke of the negative implications of lifting the arms embargo upon the "peacemaking " efforts of UNPROFOR. Therein, I am afraid lies the problem. At least the current command of UNPROFOR, not to mention a few key members of the Security Council, have effectively neutered UNPROFOR to the point that it is, by no stretch of the imagination, a peacemaking force. What is it then? The UNPROFOR Command refers to itself as a peace-keeping force and emphasizes its neutrality. I am afraid there is no peace to keep and the situation is only getting worse.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“The contributions of the brave and committed individuals associated with UNPROFOR and humanitarian relief have been intended to mitigate the consequences of aggression and suffering. We are truly grateful to these individuals, to the families of those that have lost their lives trying to help our citizens, and to the countries that have provided, and continue to provide, the necessary resources in support of UNPROFOR and humanitarian assistance. Unfortunately, this cannot be a substitute for the real cure. Humanitarian assistance would be most effective as a supplement to peacemaking but it can be politically convenient, and abused, if applied as a substitute instead of a supplement.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“Continuing to prescribe the arms embargo to the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is like continuing to prescribe thalidomide to pregnant mothers after having witnessed its most tragic and unfortunate side-effects on the innocent ones, the newborn babies. The original idea behind the medicine, which was to provide symptomatic relief to the nauseated mother, may have seemed like a good idea at the time, but 37 unfortunately the resulting side-effects are much worse than any benefits that could be derived. We actually give serious consideration to the potential consequences for UNPROFOR and for humanitarian efforts in the Republic if the arms embargo is lifted.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“I think you must ask only one simple question: Has the current policy of applying the arms embargo to both the victim and the aggressor, to both the unarmed defender and the initially well armed attacker, produced the desired result, which is peace? The answer is clearly "No". In fact, I believe most of you acknowledged in the debate yesterday that the situation seems only to be deteriorating further, that more civilians are endangered and that we are further from peace than before. If you wish to continue to prescribe a medicine, then, at least examine its initial effect upon the patient and re-evaluate its curative benefits and see whether the effect, the relief, is only symptomatic or perhaps even counter-productive.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“One or two members of the Council retorted yesterday, "More guns do not mean more peace." This may be an appropriate basis or theory from which to work in the search for global disarmament, but it is not an appropriate remark to make with regard to a country that has already had the unfortunate fate of being overrun and brutalized by a more than amply armed aggressor which frankly, is not concerned with lofty principles. But more to the point, would you have raised such a question with your own people or your own soldiers when your nation was the subject of aggression and occupation? Would you even raise this question today when weapons - defensive weapons at least - are viewed as part of the balance of power and deterrence of aggression? No.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“Maybe too idealistically, I believe these nations of the Security Council to be most inclined to represent the opinions of the general membership in view of their temporary status in the Council. I was struck, at times, by the lofty language and surrealistic nature of the debate. I was also struck by the fact that some members of the Council, after having stayed through the statements of their fellow colleagues in the Council, with whom they exchange views on a daily basis, were not present in person to hear the statements of the general membership. The situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has for too long been discussed in the abstract.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“In the meanwhile, we will leave it up to the overall membership of the United Nations to ponder and to challenge why the right of self-defence, the targeting of civilians and the affirmation of sovereignty and territorial integrity have succumbed to a secondary priority. I believe this is an especially appropriate question for the non-permanent members of the Security Council who have joined the Council from the rank and file of the General Assembly membership, and who, in reality, after a brief two-year term will descend from their position once again into the ranks of the general membership. Yesterday evening, I listened intently to the debate and, in particular, to the commentary of the non-permanent members.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“Over the last 30 months, on more than one occasion this Council has heard the convincing logic of why the application of the arms embargo is counter-productive for the peace process, why it has actually contributed to the further victimization of the civilian population and why it is inconsistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I am afraid, though, that this logic is not considered important to at least some of the members of the Security Council. Their predisposition not to hear our pleas or to comprehend our reasoning is not something that we will once again attempt to confront with more pleas and more clear arguments. We will now seek to speak in terms and language that they can no longer avoid or ignore.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“It is, I think, truly an honour for all of us, Madam President, to have you chairing the Security Council for this month and we certainly welcome the opportunity to have the benefit of your leadership. Let me also say again that it was a benefit for the Council to have the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, Sir David Hannay, in this leadership role last month. My statement to you today will be augmented by several comments based on instructions I received from President Izetbegovic this morning, and by some new information. Therefore, I beg your indulgence in following this presentation.”
1994-11-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454Resumption1 (1994) · source
“His Excellency Alija Izetbegovic has also emphasized that if this compromise offer is not effectuated, then we will reassert our right, and demand, for an immediate, de facto as well as de jure, lifting, even if undertaken by unilateral means.”
1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source
“Because of the sensitivity of the issue, although:the arms embargo was not a direct matter for the Council's consideration today, I find it necessary to correct the representation made just.now by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland regarding the compromise offer of our President, His Excellency Alija Izetbegovic, on this matter. I emphasize that we have not agreed to a delay in the lifting of the arms embargo. Instead, His Excellency Alija Izetbegovic has clearly demanded the immediate, de jure, lifting of the arms embargo against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with only deferred application for six months.”
1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source
“The status quo within the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the enemy of a civilian population that is continually victimized by the physical and psychological demands of the current situation. The status quo is also the enemy of the peace process and the interests of peace, stability and legality within our Republic, the region and the international community.”
1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source
“original mandate, then the mandate must not be sacrificed. Instead, additional resources should be provided or the mandate itself must be fully terminated. * We must, even if necessary by the adoption of a new resolution, despite the risk of redundancy, re-establish the clear objectives of the UNPROFOR mandate and, most critically, reassert the primacy of the mandate and the civilian beneficiaries of that mandate rather than the self- preservation of those who are responsible for executing the mandate, If we are to experience a consistent and real chance for peace in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina we must not constantly be told what UNPROFOR cannot do. We must be told what it must and can do to promote the change from the current, unacceptable situation to the Stated goals.”
1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source
“Similarly, attempts to redefine the UNPROFOR mandate to reflect a fear or lack of will to exercise the Security Council's directives must not be accepted as a de facto basis for continuing the mandate. This unwillingness to carry out the United Nations mandate must be either publicly rebuked when publicly expressed in the -international press, or result in a request to the Secretary- General to change those individuals who make such statements, especially when such individuals act in direct contravention to existing United Nations resolutions and, of course, the United Nations Charter; or, those who do not have the will to carry out their mandate, as pointed out in various United Nations Security Council resolutions, should be replaced; or, if there is a practical incapacity to execute the.”
1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source
“Within UNPROFOR's mandate there is no reference to peace-keeping but specific assignments that even call upon "the necessary measures" and appropriate responses to attacks on civilian safe areas and violations of humanitarian standards. With respect to the two above-mentioned fundamental points, any threats directed at the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its defence forces exercising the responsibility of defending its civilians, territorial integrity and sovereignty must be viewed as contrary to the word and spirit of the relevant Security Council resolutions, whether such threats come from those who initiated aggression against our Republic in the first place, or who may be in the Republic on. the basis of current United Nations resolutions.”
1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source
“With respect to the renewal of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mandate and, in particular, the draft resolution before us, we must make two clear reflections. First, every Security Council resolution mandating UNPROFOR has been adopted in the context of the unadulterated commitment of the Council to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Secondly, although some elements within the civilian and military authorities of UNPROFOR relentlessly refer to a peace-keeping mission, in fact UNPROFOR's mandate has always been more complex and by definition required more resolve and commitment in addressing the victim's needs.”
1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source
“I will keep my comments brief and to the point, although, frankly, we have much to be disappointed about in terms of the response of the Security Council, other responsible international institutions and in particular the Contact Group to the concerns that we have expressed, Once again, our willingness to compromise and cooperate with the Contact Group is being misappropriated and manipulated through deliberate misinformation. More to the point, commitments to address the urgent situations in Sarajevo, Srebrenica and other besieged areas are being marginalized. These matters deserve to be dealt with urgently in the context of the draft resolution before us in a clear and direct fashion.”
1994-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3434 (1994) · source
“I also know that many of the members of the Council who are not sponsors will characterize their role as that of helpless bystanders. However, unless members confront this victimization of the Security Council, they will have to bear their share of the responsibility as victimizers. Simply put, I urge members not to support this draft resolution as structured and offered to them today.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“Why are some so anxious to avoid the participation of our Presidents, Prime Ministers and Ministers who will be here next week? I suspect we all understand that this draft resolution is not defendable under the current circumstances and is an embarrassment to some. However, what is most embarrassing for all of us is that the urgency of Sarajevo's strangulation, the deliberate denial of water, electricity, gas and road access is accorded secondary priority to the parochial interests served by this draft resolution. An update on Sarajevo: its bakery has had to shut down and the people have now run out of bread. I suspect that many will agree with me that the Security Council itself is an unfortunate victim of this process.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source