Vivian Balakrishnan
Singapore
“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not issue advisories on wait times at overseas airports. Travellers may wish to monitor airline and airport websites, as well as news reports for real-time information on wait times and potential disruptions at specific airports.”
“When the conflict in the Middle East deteriorated and commercial flights were halted in March 2026, the Singapore Government mounted four repatriation flights from Muscat, Riyadh and Jeddah to bring stranded Singaporeans home.”
“The Government has stepped up public engagement to explain our foreign policy fundamentals and responses to key international developments to Singaporeans and to hear their views. We do this through dialogue sessions across segments of society, including students, youths, businesses and community leaders.”
“And the larger point during the Committee of Supply was that precisely, because the world is in such a difficult, prickly, volatile and dangerous state, actually, if we keep our wits about ourselves, we maintain unity and we continue to have this clear eye-realistic, but principled, approach, there are many opportunities for Singapore.”
“Well, in short, I completely agree with you. And that is why we have indeed been hosting these events and in your own capacity as a national athlete and also as an official now, you have seen how it works in practice.”
“Since 2022, about half of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) employees are women. The proportion of women in senior appointments has remained stable at about a quarter. We recognise that overseas postings are disruptive for officers with families, especially female officers who bear greater caregiving responsibilities.”
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“In this respect, I also hope that President Win Myint, State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the other detainees will be released so that they can engage in discussions and negotiations in good faith. The stakeholders in Myanmar must find a long-term peaceful political solution, including a return to its path of democratic transition. If the situation continues to escalate, there will be serious consequences for Myanmar and, indeed, for our region. Amidst these escalating tensions, our Embassy in Yangon has maintained regular contact with Singaporeans in Myanmar, particularly those who are e-registered with our Embassy. We have advised Singaporeans in Myanmar to avoid public gatherings and demonstrations, to abide by all local laws and regulations and to monitor the news closely. There are currently about 500 Singaporeans who have registered with MFA and we urge other Singaporeans who may not yet have registered with us to do so quickly. Given the initial news of airport closures, suspension of flights and the disruption of mobile and Internet services, several Singaporeans have been in contact with our Embassy, including some who were considering returning to Singapore. Yangon International Airport reopened on 4 February and the regular weekly relief flights between Yangon and Singapore have been able to operate as scheduled. So far, only 17 Singaporeans have chosen to return home on the flights on 5 and 12 February. The situation in Myanmar remains volatile. The suspension of telecommunications connectivity at this time is deeply concerning, especially when access to information is critical. Singaporeans in Myanmar who require consular assistance may have some difficulty reaching us.”
“Mr Speaker, apart from Mr Giam, I think Mr Christopher de Souza also asked some Questions for Written Answer. I know the situation in Myanmar is evolving and there may be other Members of Parliament who are following this closely, so, I will give somewhat of a more comprehensive answer. The National League for Democracy (NLD) achieved a landslide victory in the November 2020 General Elections. In the early hours of 1 February 2021, the military in Myanmar, the Tatmadaw, detained State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint and other leaders of the NLD government. The detentions occurred in the country’s capital just before the new Union Parliament was scheduled to convene. Daw Suu is presently under house arrest. The military has imposed a one-year State of Emergency, formed a State Administration Council and apparently appointed new Cabinet members. There have been large scale protests against the military and these protests have taken place across Myanmar. There are media reports that some protestors have been injured and, sadly, one succumbed to her injuries. There were also reports of armed vehicle movements and the deployment of troops in several cities, including clashes between security forces and demonstrators as well as the arrests of civil servants and students. Internet services have been cut several times, making access to information difficult. In fact, I think, right now, Internet access is disrupted. These are alarming developments. We urge the authorities to exercise utmost restraint to avoid further injuries and loss of lives and we hope they will take urgent steps to de-escalate the situation. There should be no violence against unarmed civilians and we hope that there will be peaceful resolution and national reconciliation in Myanmar.”
“Mdm Deputy Speaker, that is why I referred to false dichotomies. In contrast to you, the Workers' Party – in my view and I hope you let me speak for you – has taken the more responsible position, that so long as you can envisage certain extreme, certain serious offences, for which you need to make an exception, then this Bill, with its current construction, is necessary. In fact, if you vote against the Bill, then the status quo applies and the status quo is that the CPC has licence over this data as well. So, I would still appeal to your good sense and your sense of responsibility to the nation to do the right thing. I believe it is possible. And give credit to Singaporeans. Singaporeans care, Singaporeans do look out for one another and Singaporeans will also accept that mistakes are made, but as long as you come clean and you explain why you did something, and you can convince them, and slowly step by step, win confidence, we can avoid these false dichotomies. That is why I stand here completely confident that we are doing the right thing. It is not the politically expedient thing. It is not the convenient thing for me personally, politically, but it is the right thing. I thank the Workers' Party for standing with us in doing the right thing in the midst of a crisis. I hope PSP can do likewise, but that is your decision.”
“And for those of you who have served in the Police Force – Ms Sylvia Lim has, I believe, been a Police officer, Mr Murali has been a Police officer and Deputy Prime Minister Heng has been a Police officer – you will know that when you are investigating any leads, indirect, circumstantial or otherwise, may be relevant. And even if you do not identify the suspect, it may help you identify a witness. So, what we are saying, in moving this Bill, is that, at least for these seven categories of serious crimes, let us agree not to tie the hands of our Police Force. And I am grateful to you and to the Workers' Party for saying you support this Bill.”
“What it does in order to tell you whether you are okay or not, is that it has to query a central server as to whether the SafeEntry check-ins that you have done, have overlapped in time and space with someone else. If you have, then some of you may receive a slightly more worrying message to say that this has happened. If you have symptoms, please see a doctor and please get tested. Now, of course, if we have identified you as a close contact on the basis of Bluetooth proximity data from TraceTogether, you do not need to wait for that message, we will call you, and test you and isolate you, if necessary. But anyway, to come back to that question of, "How come you know I am on but I do not know when you are off". So, I know you are on because you have actually queried the database to check whether your journeys overlapped with someone else who may have been positive. But I do not know when you switch it off or when you, as Mr Gerald Giam has mentioned, put it in a Faraday Cage. I do not know that, precisely because of the privacy respecting design of the system. This also relates, although you have not asked it, to the question about how useful is TraceTogether data for Police investigations. And again, I would reiterate my explanation that, by its very design, you know I was not designing a surveillance system. So, you can make a reasonable argument that therefore most times, it is not going to be very useful. Because it was never designed for that purpose. But the reason why I am still coming to this House and still asking for this carve-out for the seven categories of serious offences, is really about a value statement – to say that for these types of situations, you do not believe in tying the hands of your Police Force unnecessarily.”
“I thank the Leader of the Opposition for his vote of confidence and his advertisement of his use of TraceTogether. Let me deal with the first two questions. At the end of October, when I was asked, basically, what did I spend November doing? As I said, double checking the legislation and then having, among sleepless nights and conversations, asking: "Do we carve it out? How do we do it? What should we do?" So, that occupied us in November. Mr Christopher de Souza filed in December and I thought it was right that we should answer it in Parliament. If I could replay, if I could rewind time, I would not even have made this mistake in June. And I would also say if I could replay, I would also have looked for an earlier occasion to explain all this. But the key point which I am trying to make, is that there was never any doubt in my mind that we would clarify, that we would explain and we would be held accountable and that I would take responsibility. That is the way we operate. And for myself having been being in this Chamber now for almost 20 years, the older Members will know, I have always operated that way. Mistakes, warts, misunderstandings, misspeak – I have never shied away from clarifying it. So, I am grateful to you. I think it was last month when you said you accept in good faith my explanation. So, never any attempt, to shy away from transparency and from reflecting the mistake. On the second question about why I said 58% switch it on at least once a day. Again, if you look at your app, and if you see somewhere about the upper third, it will probably say you are okay.”
“It is not in the public interest to deny the Police access to the data necessary to ensure public safety and the proper conduct of justice. The nature of the legislation which this House is called upon to consider today is sui generis. It is a piece of legislation introduced during a public health crisis, being moved under a Certificate of Urgency, because of the situation that we are in. We are not trying to set a precedent here today. Privacy and data governance, especially, in the face of accelerating technological revolution, these are broad and complex issues, which I think Mr Singh also recognises, that need careful contemplation, consultation and open debate. This should not be settled on a Certificate of Urgency in one day. There will be proper occasions in the future to do this. Mdm Deputy Speaker, our response to COVID-19 has not been perfect, but it has been effective. This current state of affairs did not happen by chance. It is due to our concerted efforts on multiple fronts – our excellent healthcare system, our heroic frontline officers, our extensive testing capacity, our effective contact tracing regime that has enabled us to quickly identify, isolate close contacts, truncate transmission. Most of all, it is because of our social capital, the sacrosanct trust of our citizens and the collective responsibility that we have for one another. Madam, I beg to move. [Applause.]”
“Lastly, Members expressed a wide variety of views on the types of offences which Police ought to use personal contact tracing data for investigations or criminal proceedings. Some of you suggested expanding the list, some to include additional offences. Mr Vikram Nair, I believe, said that he preferred not to have any carve-outs. He said that this would be tantamount to saying that the Police should not look at all available information in pursuit of their investigations. Mr Sharael Taha, Ms Tin Pei Ling, Mr Alex Yam and Mr Christopher de Souza expressed concerns that the passage of this Bill may set a precedent for how the Government may use data collected by digital solutions in the future, and hamper the Government’s ability to function effectively. Mr Pritam Singh, in his considered speech, also referred to the future and what impact these decisions may have. I want to say that our decision today to only include serious offences, to tightly scope the use of personal contact tracing data is a result of a delicate balance between the right to public health, the right to public security and respecting the sensitivity of personal data during this extraordinary time. Mdm Deputy Speaker, this Bill is being tabled and read on a Certificate of Urgency in exceptional circumstances. It is intended to deal with the specific issue of the Government’s use of personal data collected via digital contact tracing systems in the midst of an emergency. We have taken this exceptional step because we need to focus on encouraging public participation and maintaining confidence in our public health measures. This Bill is about ensuring maximum support from the public in our fight against COVID-19. I want to stress this Bill is not a precedent.”
“We will accept Ms Nadia’s suggestion to have a report disclosing the use of the data beyond contact tracing. My team will work out the details on how often and the contents of these reports, but it should broadly encompass the types of data, how the data was used, as well as the number of occasions that the data has been used for purposes other than contact tracing from the day that this Act comes into force. Ms Nadia Ahmad Samdin and Mr Gerald Giam asked if it was possible for us to specify the conditions for the life cycle of the TraceTogether programme, such as the conditions to decide when it should be deactivated. Actually, this is a much wider question – what determines the changing points in the pandemic and what determines the end of the pandemic? Our approach has to be guided by science and public health. We will monitor the overall situation closely, consider all relevant factors before adjusting our measures, as we have indeed in the last one year with our three phases of re-opening since the circuit breaker. In other words, there is no rule book. There is no standard play book that we can rely on. We will have to respond to the situation as it evolves. And this approach has served us well, and we should continue to abide by this considered approach in determining the end of the pandemic. Even now, we know that the pandemic has been very unpredictable. Many places that previously contained their initial infections, are now dealing with second, third, fourth waves. New variants have emerged, some more transmissible, some even more lethal. Whether and when we can revert to normal will really depend on the global situation, not just the situation within Singapore and this is the nature of infectious disease epidemics.”
“In general, the Police will not be able to obtain data if the request comes in after the 25th day mark and this is because the data would have been auto deleted, either deleted on your personal token or app or deleted from the main server. There are some exceptional scenarios. Nowadays, I am very careful with all my caveats. There are some exceptional scenarios where the data may be stored for more than 25 days. One, when the data relates to a COVID-19 patient or an individual who is closely associated with the patient, and the data is used for active contact tracing purposes. And I think that, people will accept this is a legitimate use of data beyond the 25th day. Two, when the data has been used for investigations or criminal proceedings in respect of serious offences; the data may be retained until the investigation or criminal proceedings are over, including Court proceedings, I must add, and will be deleted when the data is no longer needed. The same applies to when the pandemic is being declared over. And then we can happily stand down our digital contact tracing programmes. As I mentioned in my opening speech, subsection 82(8) provides for the Minister to specify a date after which digital contact tracing system is no longer required to prevent or to control the spread of COVID-19. The data administrator must then delete any personal contact tracing data which is no longer required. Police will not be able to use any personal contact tracing data unless the data had previously been retained and used for investigations of criminal proceedings in respect of serious offences. Ms Nadia Ahmad Samdin asked if the Government would consider publishing disclosure reports to help the public understand how the data is being used.”
“Mr Gerald Giam also asked if personal contact tracing data uploaded to MOH servers would be covered by this Bill specifically by section 82. The answer is yes. The Bill restricts the Government's use of personal contact tracing data collected from digital contact tracing systems specified in the Sixth Schedule. Mr Zhulkarnian Abdul Rahim suggested having a dedicated channel independent of the Police to investigate any complaints of TraceTogether data access breaches made by any party. If you peruse the Bill in front of you, you will realise that disclosure or misuse of contact tracing data on contravention of the COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) Act will be investigated by authorised persons from the Government Data Office appointed under this Act. These authorised persons would be appointed by Senior Minister Teo Chee Hean as the Minister overseeing this part of the Act. So, there is a clear separation of roles and duties. The Government Data Office will oversee the public sector data governance policy and requirements, similar to what the PDPC does for the private sector. And I can give this assurance that Police officers will not be appointed for this purpose. There were also other questions pertaining to data governance for personal contact tracing data. It was Mr Yip who asked whether Police would still be able to request the data beyond the 25-day mark, and if the data will be stored for more than 25 days, should it be required by Police for investigations and proceedings into serious offences. I think it was also Mr Giam who asked if Police will be able to access the data when the pandemic has been declared over.”
“I believe Ms Sylvia Lim asked if suspects and the Defence Counsel could access the personal contact tracing data for their Court cases and whether the time period of 25 days is sufficient to retain the data for such users. The Bill circumscribes the use of personal contact tracing data by public sector agencies, but I will reiterate, does not prohibit individuals from using or requesting for their own personal contact tracing data provided they have a right to access such data. For serious offences, the individual can share his or her own data with anyone including the Police, the prosecution, the Defence Counsel and offer his or her data to the Court as evidence. If the Prosecution is in possession of contact tracing data which strengthens the Defence's case or weakens the Prosecution's case, the Prosecution has to disclose such data to the Defence to comply with its common law disclosure obligations laid down by the Court of Appeal. I believe this is known as the "Kadar disclosure obligations". Again, the criminal lawyers here will understand what I am talking about. This is in the Bill – specifically, section 82(7) allows for individuals to continue to have access to personal contact tracing data if they have such a right of access under any "rule of law or otherwise". Mr Singh, you can confirm that clause. The right of access under "any rule of law" here includes the Kadar disclosure obligations. Ms Tin Pei Ling asked if TraceTogether data could be used in missing persons cases. A next of kin – father, mother, husband, wife – a next of kin may request the data of a missing person to the extent permissible today. This includes requesting for personal contact tracing data of the next of kin, if they have a right to do so.”
“I am not privy to the operational details but I do understand that SafeEntry data has been used for investigations into offences in a number of instances. I must state for the record that my previous assurances were on TraceTogether in this House and not on SafeEntry. Nevertheless, we have decided in this Bill to envelope SafeEntry and BluePass insofar as it interoperates with TraceTogether within the same protective cocoon that this Bill provides. It is also worth reminding Members of the House that, actually, SafeEntry is a digital visitor log. It is no different today. If it was not there, the Police would go to the security guard, say, of your condominium and say who has come in at what time, which car numbers were in here, look at your video surveillance. SafeEntry actually, in that sense, is not novel compared to TraceTogether. But it is different in the sense that it is a centralised database. Therefore, we decided we better take pre-emptive action to put the same cocoon of legislative protection around it. Let me now move on to clarifications on the legislative amendments themselves, and I hope Members will bear with me if some of this is a bit technical. Ms Nadia Samdin asked if an individual would be able to access their own personal contact tracing data including if one is being charged for a serious offence. The answer is yes. Members of the public can request for their own data for legitimate purposes as is the current practice today. The lawyers looking at the text of the Bill will realise we have been very careful not to circumscribe the rights of the individual to his data.”
“0 terms are also within the repository itself in a licence and markdown file, as is the standard practice, and maybe Ms Nadia Samdin can check on that after this. But I will convey your suggestions to the GovTech team and discuss what our next steps are for open-sourcing. Ms Nadia Samdin also asked if we would commit that TraceTogether data will always be stored on the user's device and shared with MOH only when the user uploads the data, and to delete the data at the request of the user. By design, TraceTogether data will be stored in the user's device before it is shared with the authorities. Again, for those of you who have ever been in the circumstance where you need to share it, you know that your participation is needed. We send you a PIN, you have to enter the PIN before the data is uploaded. This Bill limits the Government's use of TraceTogether data to the purposes of contact tracing with the exception, as I said earlier, for investigations and criminal proceedings in respect of serious offences, and it applies regardless of how the data is accessed or shared. The same applies for the suggestion on deleting the data upon request. Users can do so and we have done so, as I shared just now; we have deleted data for 350 persons in the last one month. But in certain cases, for instance, where the data has already been uploaded because there was a positive COVID-19 case, then MOH will have to retain that data as long as that cluster is active and they need it in order to break the chains of transmission. I am sure Members of this House will understand the need for that. Mr Gerald Giam asked about the Police's use of SafeEntry data. I believe the Member did ask just now.”
“I am grateful to Mr Singh and the Workers' Party that, unlike in other countries where wearing a mask or not wearing a mask is a badge of political identity, we have avoided that kind of political dichotomy. So, for people who are angry or disappointed at my mistake, you are entitled to do that but do not deprive yourself and your loved ones of the protection from this system. Ms Nadia Samdin asked a few suggestions regarding OpenTrace, and she asked if we would continue to make OpenTrace open-source such as by introducing open-source licences and regularly updating the GitHub repository. Actually, my engineers will know that I have been leaning on them repeatedly to keep updating the GitHub repository. But, again, those of you who are actual programmers will know it is a very big slog to tidy up your code and prepare it for public open-source perusal. But we believe in open-sourcing OpenTrace, it has served us well, it has been helpful, it has allowed experts to look at both OpenTrace and TraceTogether, and for them to conclude that the app does and continues to do what it is supposed to do, and to do so in a privacy protecting manner. Other governments have looked at our code base including Australia, Alberta, Poland. We have had discussions at the technical level. They have modified it, used it, changed it; we are completely open about that. To be clear to Ms Nadia Samdin, there is already an open-source licence. The OpenTrace repository is published under – sorry, to get technical here – a GNU General Public Licence Version 3.0. Those of you in the know will know that this is an open-source licence. The Standard General Public Licence 3.”
“Based on broad proxies, and I say proxies, and I will explain why it is only a proxy, but based on broad proxies, we estimate about 58% of users use the app at least once a day. This proportion has remained the same before and after the parliamentary clarification in January. Mr Ng also asked if we could provide more granular usage statistics, such as whether the mobile devices with the applications were on average pinging fewer devices than before. And, Mr Ng, I have to tell you, actually, the privacy-respecting nature of the system means we actually cannot collect that level of granular data to track active usage. The data is stored locally on your own device. The TraceTogether app only connects to the server periodically, only to download information. Some Members would be familiar – occasionally, when you have checked into the same place as someone else who has turned out to be COVID-19-positive, that message may light up to warn you that there may be a potential overlap in time and space between you and the COVID-19-positive patient. The point I am making is that, again, it reveals the privacy by design that we focused on in rolling out this programme. I want to remind everyone that TraceTogether is meant to protect us and our loved ones. The effectiveness of TraceTogether depends heavily on the rate of user participation. For those who switch off your Bluetooth or your app or engage in other forms of technical wizardry, I would just ask you why deprive yourself and your loved ones of the protection? Again, as Foreign Minister, I have looked round the world and one of the reasons why we are better off is that we have not politicised our response to COVID-19.”
“On the question of public trust and public participation, let me, in a rather limited way, share some numbers with you. You know that for TraceTogether, we give people the option of writing in to say, "Please delete my data". In the last one month, we have had 350 individuals who have asked us to delete their data – 350. Every one of that 350 who has requested us to delete is a source of regret for me. At least 350 have, for a variety of reasons, decided to forgo the protection that TraceTogether offers them and their loved ones. But on the other hand, in this same period, in this same one month, over 390,000 have come onboard the TraceTogether programme. I do not want to belabour this but my simple conclusion or inference is that Singaporeans know that I misspoke but they also trust the TraceTogether system is safe, it does what it is supposed to do, it protects public health, and they also trust the Police to always behave lawfully. Members also had questions on the features and safeguards of TraceTogether and SafeEntry. Let me quickly try to run through as many of these clarifications as possible. Mr Louis Ng, and I think Mr Pritam Singh as well, asked whether it has affected our adoption. I have just given you some figures on people who have signed on in the last one month. But I will also accept the point that Mr Louis Ng made, and I think Mr Gerald Giam made as well, that there may be individuals who are gaming the programme. You switch it on in order to do your SafeEntry and then you promptly switch it off. I think Mr Louis Ng also asked whether we have more granular data into how people are using the tokens and using the TraceTogether app. Today, more than 80% of Singapore residents are onboard the programme.”
“Today, I come before this House, moving legislation on a Certificate of Urgency to give legal force to the statements that the Minister for Home Affairs and I made in Parliament last month. This Bill ensures that personal digital contact tracing data can only be used for contact tracing, with a narrow exception for investigations and criminal proceedings in respect of seven categories of serious offences. I know there can be some debate. In fact, there has been some debate how specific are our definitions. Should we enlarge it? Should we constrict it? I think that is legitimate debate. But I believe that this Bill reflects the right balance between restricting the use of personal digital contact tracing data and, at the same time, enabling our Police to fulfil their duty to keep us safe – avoid false dichotomies. I will just reiterate a few scenarios which you would have, in fact, in the annex in front of you. If the next of kin of a murder victim asks the Police, "Please decrypt the TraceTogether data on his phone", would any of you refuse? If the parents of a kidnapped child found the token and desperately asked the Police to unlock it, which one of you would refuse? If a terrorist act is imminent, would you tie the hands of our Police and security forces? I believe I know the answer to these questions, and, certainly, the majority of Singaporeans outside this House. Singaporeans understand the need for Police to lawfully access information and I believe that public trust in our Police Force remains high, very high. And as Foreign Minister who has had to travel to many parts of the world, this confidence and trust is a huge competitive advantage that Singapore has.”
“The most important ingredient in that trust relationship between a doctor and a patient is complete transparency – that if anything goes wrong, I will tell you and if anything needs to be fixed, I will do so, and I will go all out to remedy the problem if I can humanly do so. My answer to this question today – how do you maintain trust when a mistake has been made – is actually quite straightforward. Acknowledge the error. Take full responsibility. It is no different from a complication in surgery. Acknowledge the error. Take full responsibility. And I have done so. Next, do the right thing rather than choosing the politically expedient option. You know I believe in transparency even if transparency is awkward and politically costly. But it is better to be transparent than to double down on a mistake. You see my point here? Better to be transparent, fix the error rather than to double down on your mistake. One further principle from my medical practice is beware of false dichotomies. The false dichotomy I have heard today is that you have to choose between saving the life of a child and you have to choose between participation in digital contact tracing. I believe by being completely open, transparent, answering every question, explaining and letting people see the purpose behind what we are doing and why we are doing it, I believe we can avoid this dichotomy. I believe it is possible for us to continue to have perhaps the world's most successful contact tracing programme; and at the same time, deal with people's expectations that Singapore will remain safe and secure. And that the Police are our guardians, our protectors. And that the Police have acted at all times strictly within the ambit of the law in order to fulfill their higher mission to protect us.”
“You will know that my own strongly held view at that point in time was that even if the CPC applied and even if we were going to make data available, we should exercise this with utmost restraint. I was also aware that I had first made this assurance in this Chamber. I think it was in June in this Chamber. I told my staff regardless of the outcome of this internal review, we will come back here and we will clarify. We did that last month. Mr Christopher de Souza filed a question. I believe it was in early December – about a month after I commenced this process of internal discussion. I am sharing this with you so that you understand that there is nothing to hide. The CPC is written law. But I should have been aware and I should have made it clear right from the onset. I have reflected that if in June, I had added four words – subject to prevailing legislation – perhaps we would not be here this afternoon. Nevertheless, it has occurred. I want to, in the rest of this wrap-up speech, address the different queries, comments and suggestions under three categories: first, trust and participation in digital contact tracing; second, the technical features and safeguards of TraceTogether and SafeEntry; and third, to deal with the specific clarifications of clauses within the Bill. First, trust and participation. In an ideal world, no mistake would have been made. No question would have arisen. But I am now in a scenario where a mistake has been made and the real question then is how do we maintain trust when a mistake has been made? I will come back to my instinct as a doctor. The patient-doctor relationship is built on trust. Both the patient and the doctor hope that we will never make a mistake. But mistakes do occur sometimes, usually rarely.”
“In fact, if you think about the features that we built in – encrypted, decentralised data, auto-purging after 25 days, encrypted identities, no GPS, no cellular connectivity – I think any fair-minded person with some appreciation of technology will know that what we had in mind was digital contact tracing. We were not at all trying to create a surveillance tool. I say this so that you understand my state of mind when I said what I said in June. But what I said in June was wrong because in a sense, my own enthusiasm for the technology blindsided me and I did not read section 20 of the CPC. Because the law of the land, is that the CPC – specifically section 20 – does authorise the Police to access many databases, including contact tracing data. The next point is – when did I become aware that what I said was wrong? Basically, what happened was at the end of October, I was asked: are you sure that the CPC does not apply, even for a murder case? A member of the public asked me. When I received that query, I asked my staff – please go and double check. I am not a lawyer but please go and double check what the legal provisions are. At that point, I was informed that the CPC applied and that in fact, the Police had requested TraceTogether data on one previous occasion. Your next question should be: well, what did you do after that? I will tell you very frankly. In fact, I have shared that in the last month, I had many sleepless nights and I engaged in several rounds of discussion with some of my senior Cabinet colleagues on whether we should carve out and, if we did, how should we carve out the contact tracing data from the application of the CPC.”
“Mdm Deputy Speaker, Members of this House, let me first express my appreciation for, first, our points of agreement. I believe all of us are agreed – I am looking at the Leader of the Opposition – that we are facing a global life-and-death crisis which requires extraordinary measures. I believe all of us are agreed that contact tracing – effective, rapid contact tracing – is essential as part of our response to dealing with COVID-19. I also venture that all of us in this Parliament are agreed that TraceTogether and SafeEntry, representing our digital contact tracing tools, have made a real difference to the effectiveness of our COVID-19 response. In particular, I would reiterate that it has enabled us to shorten the period from four days to one and a half days. Members will know that I am by training and instinct a doctor. I am not a lawyer. I am a doctor. Perhaps one of the defects of being a doctor is that we focus very, very much on the individual – on the health and on the outcomes of the individual. I want to say that so that you understand in context because what I want to do now is to share my personal timeline, through this journey. Let me begin. We first stated that the Government would use TraceTogether data only for contact tracing simply because this was how and why we designed TraceTogether. I can tell you all categorically, again, as a doctor and perhaps a techno-optimist, that the potential use of the data by the Police did not cross my mind or the mind of my engineers at all. I state that categorically.”
“These regulations underpin the safe management measures adopted since the circuit breaker last year. As this pandemic will not go away soon, it is imperative that we remain vigilant and continue with safe management measures in our daily lives. Clause 4 of the Bill amends Part 2A of the Act to set out the Singapore Land Authority's (SLA's) role in the administration of the Rental Relief Framework. The SLA is working to operationalise the Rental Relief Framework. Mr Speaker, this Bill will give legal force to the statements made by the Minister for Home Affairs and me in this Chamber. You will notice that it has been tightly scoped. It is a specific amendment made in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic – that the Government will limit its use of personal contact tracing data for the purposes of contact tracing, except where there is a need to do so for investigations or criminal proceedings in respect of serious offences. These are extraordinary times, exceptional circumstances. We are introducing this Bill urgently, to remove any doubt among Singaporeans and to assure everyone that data will be properly safeguarded and used only for the appropriate purposes, so that we may continue to focus our attention towards battling this clear and present threat, the COVID-19 global pandemic. This is crucial because the virus is a clear, present and, in fact, on a global scale, a growing threat. And it will remain so for some time. So, we cannot afford to be distracted from our fight against COVID-19. We need to rally together, look out for one another, protect public health and safety even as we try carefully to re-open our economy. Mr Speaker, Sir, I beg to move. [(proc text) Question proposed. (proc text)] 1.53 pm”
“This will give added reassurance that there are no further scenarios where public agencies may use the data apart from the purposes stated explicitly in this Bill. Fourth, on safeguards and data deletion. Clause 7 of the Bill introduces subsection 82(8) which provides for the Minister to specify a date after which a digital contact tracing system is no longer required to prevent or control the spread of COVID-19. The data administrator must then delete any personal contact tracing data which is no longer required. We have also built other safeguards into our digital contact tracing systems. Today, TraceTogether devices and SafeEntry servers are purged automatically after 25 days, unless that data has been extracted for contact tracing purposes or for the investigations or criminal proceedings in respect of serious offences. This 25-day timeline is set based on the advice of our medical professionals, to account for the incubation period of the virus, which we currently estimate to be 14 days, and the time taken from the onset of symptoms and for the patient to visit a doctor and get tested and, if positive, to notify MOH. This data retention period could change on the advice of medical experts, if the virus continues to evolve and we have a better understanding of the disease, the virus and its incubation period. But the point here is that we will stand guided on the basis of science and medicine. Before I conclude my speech, I need to remind you that there are two other sections related to the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Law. Clause 2 of the Bill extends Part 7 of the current Act, for another year, until April 2022. Part 7 provides the legal basis for the Minister for Health to make regulations to prevent or control the spread of COVID-19.”
“Section 84 specifies that the Minister may add to the list of "digital contact tracing systems" if new systems or additional systems are created. However, any removal from the Sixth Schedule will require Parliamentary approval. We will come back here. This means that the Government cannot unilaterally remove any digital contact tracing system from the restrictions imposed by this Bill. Second, on authorised use and disclosure. The Government's use of the data will be ring-fenced to contact tracing, with the exception for investigations or criminal proceedings in respect of serious offences. Clause 7 of the Bill introduces subsection 82(1), which specifies that the data may only be used to "carry out or facilitate contact tracing". Subsection 82(2) states that the Police and other law enforcement agencies "in the exercise of any power under the Criminal Procedure Code (Chapter 68) or other written law", may not obtain personal contact tracing data, except for "an investigation or criminal proceeding in respect of a serious offence". There are seven categories of serious offences, set out, quite coincidentally, in the Seventh Schedule. These are offences of a significant severity and/or pose an immediate threat to life or public safety, such as the use of firearms, dangerous weapons, terrorism, murder, drug offences that attract the death penalty, kidnapping and rape. The Government cannot amend this list of offences in the Seventh Schedule without coming back to Parliament for approval. Third, the Government may not use the data for any purpose other than those mentioned, regardless of any other written law requiring or allowing the disclosure of the data. Just in case "I don't know what I don't know." This is added assurance. This trumps any other written law.”
“Singaporeans also understand and support the Police's continued access to such data for investigations or criminal proceedings in respect of serious offences, to bring perpetrators of crime to justice and to protect public safety and security. We are moving this Bill on a Certificate of Urgency, so that it may come into effect as soon as possible. Let me move on to the four key thrusts of this Bill. Scope of legislation. First, the legislation will cover "personal contact tracing data" recorded in any "digital contact tracing system". Clause 7 of the Bill introduces section 80 to define "personal contact tracing data" to mean "entry or exit records, proximity information or other data collected using any digital contact tracing tool or combination of digital contact tracing tools, that is part of a digital contact tracing system, and which, by itself or with other information, identifies any individual". I apologise for that mouthful of words. Basically, it means, the key point is, data that is personally identifiable. The "digital contact tracing systems" covered by the Bill are listed in the Sixth Schedule. This will include TraceTogether, SafeEntry and BluePass insofar as it is interoperable with TraceTogether. SafeEntry, as Members are aware, is a digital equivalent of the visitor record logs. BluePass is a contact tracing system, developed by the private sector, that is capable of interoperating with TraceTogether in order to support the national programme. We are concerned with protecting personal contact tracing data in the Government’s national digital contact tracing systems, and we will treat all data in the same way, however it enters the national system.”
“Prof Ang Peng Hwa of NTU very elegantly described our ethical dilemma as one in which we are dealing with a choice between "right" versus "right". A choice between "right" and "wrong" is very easy to make. But in this case, it is right to protect public health by protecting the data in TraceTogether. But it is also right, and just as important, to protect public safety, especially when it comes to serious crimes – "right" versus "right". It would indeed be unconscionable to inhibit the ability of the Police to act, when it comes to a serious offence that affects someone's life or safety. Someone came up to me and said, "Think about the example of a kidnapped child. And all that was left was a dropped phone or a token. And if that mother brought that token or phone to the Police, would it be right for us to say, 'No, we cannot and would not do anything about it.'?" In fact, it would be untenable – to adopt a purist ideological stance and to deliberately refuse to check that data and pursue all leads available. Singapore is one of the safest countries in the world. Our people walk the streets safely, day or night, alone or in groups, with peace of mind, precisely because there is high trust in an effective Police Force that always acts for the public good, that legally pursues all information and leads available to solve and to prevent crimes. We cannot take this safety and security that we value so much for granted even in the midst of this pandemic. Let me go through the specific legislative amendments that are being proposed. This Bill sets out what Minister Shanmugam and I said in Parliament last month. It represents a balance between two imperatives. Singaporeans want the protection of TraceTogether. They know it saves lives.”
“In the recent Royal Caribbean Quantum of the Seas case, the use of TraceTogether data helped MOH to quickly identify more than three-quarters of the close contacts – although thankfully, in this case, it turned out to be a false positive. TraceTogether has also enabled us to trace contacts more comprehensively and to identify many contacts whom the person may not have recalled meeting or even realised that he had been in close contact with. And this is particularly so, when you are with someone whom you do not already know. The probability of your forgetting that interaction is much higher. TraceTogether was always designed for contact tracing purposes. And this is obvious, if you consider the safeguards and the features of the system. TraceTogether only collects proximity data, which is necessary in order to identify close contacts. It does not collect GPS data; it does not collect movement data. The token does not even have cellular connectivity. These were conscious design decisions made at conception. Furthermore, the app and the token only keep a temporary record, in an encrypted form, locally on the device itself. And this data is automatically purged after 25 days. The Government also intends to deactivate TraceTogether, along with the other digital contact tracing programmes, once the pandemic is over. The GovTech engineers and I took great pains to create an app that was fundamentally privacy protecting at its core – privacy by design. We even open sourced the code. We invited experts to come and tear down the TraceTogether token to prove this. Perhaps, I was so enamoured by what I thought was the ingenuity and brilliance of this that I got blindsided.”
“And we had to rapidly expand the pool of contact tracers to keep up with the load. We even had to call in reinforcements from the Singapore Armed Forces. But we all knew that this would not be sustainable if the numbers continued to rise. And the numbers did continue to rise. So, we realised, very early on, that we needed to make better use of both technology and data, including especially proximity data, generated from Bluetooth technology, in order to help our contact tracers carry out their work more effectively and efficiently. And I say this with the experience of SARS 17 years ago. SARS had much fewer cases than COVID-19 and it was a manual contact tracing system. We would not have been able to cope with the sheer volume this time if we were still using the methods of 17 years ago. This was why we conceptualised and introduced TraceTogether – to reduce the time and the resources needed to collect some of these essential data for contact tracing. And, if I may add, these efforts have paid off. TraceTogether, alongside the other digital contact tracing systems, such as SafeEntry, has shortened the average time required for contact tracing from four days to now less than 1.5 days. This means that people who have been exposed, or potentially exposed, are isolated more swiftly. It reduces the probability of them passing on the virus to their family members, friends and the community at large. And where there is widespread adoption of digital contact tracing, the enhanced effectiveness can be very significant. Let me cite one recent example.”
“Mr Speaker, on behalf of the Minister for Law, I beg to move that "The Bill be now read a Second time." Let me begin with a mea culpa. We acknowledge our error in not stating that data from TraceTogether is not exempt from the Criminal Procedure Code. I take full responsibility for this mistake and I deeply regret the consternation, the anxiety that was caused by my mistake. In Parliament last month, the Minister for Home Affairs and I stated that the use of TraceTogether data in investigations or criminal proceedings would be restricted to serious offences. This Bill before us gives legal force to these statements. The legislation specifies that personal data collected through digital contact tracing systems can only be used by public agencies for the specific purpose of contact tracing, except where there is a need to use that data for investigations or criminal proceedings in respect of serious offences. We have decided that these restrictions will cover personal contact tracing data not only from TraceTogether, but also SafeEntry and a private sector system called BluePass insofar as BluePass is interoperable with TraceTogether. Mr Speaker, this pandemic is not going to go away for quite a long time more. In fact, I do not know exactly when the pandemic will end. What I do know is that contact tracing, augmented by digital tools, enables us to quickly break the chains of transmission by identifying and isolating close contacts. This is precisely why we need high participation rates in digital contact tracing. Contact tracing is traditionally a manual, painstaking and very resource-intensive task. Members of the House may recall that – cast your minds back a year ago – at the start of the pandemic, when the number of cases started to grow.”
“On Ms Sylvia Lim's second point about what she described as the dynamic political situation in Malaysia, the state of emergency and the rest of it, what I would say from an MFA perspective is that throughout this entire crisis – and Members must remember, in the case of Malaysia, they have even gone through a change of government in the past one year – nevertheless, throughout this crisis, we have been able to maintain good functional communications and relations between the Prime Ministers, between the Ministers, certainly between myself and the Foreign Minister of Malaysia Dato' Sri Hishammuddin Hussein, and as well as at the public service, civil service level. So, all those ties, those communications, both formal and informal, including WhatsApp messages, are flowing. I can tell you that there have been occasions where I have even had to call him up personally because a Singaporean got stuck in a particularly delicate situation and he has obliged. So, the point is, on both sides of the Causeway, we are dealing with a very difficult situation. My objective is to keep relations open, keep communications honest, constructive, helpful. Not to make things worse, not to put undue pressure which would actually cause damage to the long-term challenge of both countries having to deal with this pandemic. So, all in all I would say that our relations remain in a very good state. I am sorry that we have not been able to persuade the authorities in Malaysia to agree to every request that has come from Singaporeans, but we will do our best.”
“I thank Ms Sylvia Lim for the two supplementary questions. I said just now we had facilitated more than 250 cases. The Member is quite right. In fact, the majority of cases did not get through. For each case that MFA is aware of, we would first inform the Singaporean or PR concerned that they need to get approval – specific approval from the Director-General of Immigration of Malaysia. We always ask them to keep us informed so that we can also reach out informally to the Malaysian High Commission to try our best to persuade. But the legal and diplomatic position is that the ultimate discretion and the final decision rest with the Director-General of Immigration of Malaysia. So, I am not in a position to say on what basis he agreed to some of our requests and disagreed with many of the other requests. I would also say that I have also come across many cases, when the Singaporean is made aware of how difficult the hurdles are in place, they have sometimes decided that because of the lack of time, that it would be pointless to try to get across the Causeway and to delay the funeral. So, all in all, it has been a very tough, a very heart-wrenching time for these families. And what I can assure is that MFA takes seriously each and every single case. We will do our best.”
“Even our previously agreed Reciprocal Green Lanes and travel bubbles have had to be opened and shut, sometimes quite quickly. So, I hope all Members understand that this is a dynamic and difficult situation. We are doing our best but, from time to time, we will sometimes have to take tough decisions.”
“Mr Speaker, many of us have family or close friends across the Causeway. So, in the last one year, the enforced separation by the border closures has had a profound emotional impact on many families in Singapore, especially when confronted by family bereavement. I have lost count of the number of emails I have received from people who were deprived of that opportunity to be with a family member at the end of life. So, we particularly sympathise and understand the feelings of Singaporeans and, indeed, Malaysians who are caught in such circumstances. Having said that, we also fully understand the need for public health precautions, of which border closures are part. And we also recognise that it is the responsibility of each government to do whatever it takes in order to protect public health. Throughout this epidemic, we have been in close contact with the Malaysian authorities and we have worked with them to facilitate travel for Singaporeans with essential or compassionate reasons for travel. Since March 2020, we have helped to facilitate travel for more than 250 appeal cases from Singapore Citizens or PRs who wanted to enter Malaysia. We have also facilitated the repatriation of more than 350 Singaporeans who were stranded in Malaysia, and these were usually the elderly or very young, or people with disability and mobility issues, and we have had to run special services across the Causeway to bring our people back home. We have reached with the Malaysian authorities an in-principle agreement to have protocols for travel in such circumstances, including family bereavements. The exact details are still being worked out. As Members of the House are aware, the COVID-19 situation keeps evolving very rapidly.”
“Mr Speaker, copies of the Bill have been provided to the Clerk, who will distribute it to Members now. [Handouts were distributed to hon Members.]”
“Mr Speaker, on behalf of the Minister for Law, I beg to introduce a Bill intituled "An Act to amend the COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) Act 2020." [(proc text) Bill read the First time. (proc text)]”
“Sorry. Mr Speaker, I have a Certificate of Urgency signed by the President in respect of the COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) (Amendment) Bill, to be laid on the Table. [(proc text) Certificate of Urgency signed by the President in respect of the Bill, laid upon the Table by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. (proc text)]”
“The Government understands the difficulties faced by Singaporeans.”
“Third point: on legal provisions. Under section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), the Police have the power to order anyone to produce data for the purposes of a criminal investigation. And the key word here is criminal investigation. We have gone to great lengths to protect the privacy of all TraceTogether users in all normal use cases. But TraceTogether data is not exempt from section 20 of the CPC.”
“Third point: on legal provisions. Under section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), the Police have the power to order anyone to produce data for the purposes of a criminal investigation. And the key word here is criminal investigation. We have gone to great lengths to protect the privacy of all TraceTogether users in all normal use cases. But TraceTogether data is not exempt from section 22 of the CPC. [Please refer to "Clarification by Minister for Foreign Affairs", Official Report, 5 January 2021, Volume 95, Issue No 15.] [(proc text) Written statement by Dr Vivian Balakrishnan circulated with leave of the Speaker in accordance with Standing Order No 29(5): (proc text)] I wish to make the following factual correction to the “Clarification by Minister for Foreign Affairs” that I delivered in Parliament at the Sitting of 5 January 2021. The following portion of the statement should read as follows:”
“I thank Mr Leong. How many instances? That is an operational question. As far as I am aware, so far, I think there has been only one in which involved a murder case. But I am not privy to operational details and I should not be and, therefore, I am not in a position to comment further on the investigations. I told you just now that I made the comments and statements earlier. The CPC was not in my mind. Subsequently, we have been having discussions, especially over the last few weeks as to whether, and I alluded to it earlier, we should in fact change the law or whether we continue as we are now. In any case, we decided it is better to be upfront and that is why we were very glad that Mr de Souza asked the question and Minister of State Mr Desmond Tan answered it yesterday. I have been in the House now for almost 20 years. All the staff who have worked with me over the years will know that I am obsessively concerned with accuracy, needless to say, absolute adherence to honesty. And that means over the years, from time to time, when I have misspoken, I have said so. I have never shied away from saying so because, as I said, it is far more important to maintain trust. And that I might be right or I might be wrong or I might have mistaken some thing or overlook something but, rest assured, when I discover it, I will say so. And to the best extent possible we will find a solution together. That is my approach and I do not see any need to change from that. And I hope you understand.”
“I thank Ms Tin for those three questions, some technical, some operational. First, on the technical point. The token has no GPS chip and we have opened it up, we have allowed external parties to dissemble it. I can guarantee you there is no GPS chip. There is no way that the token can keep track of your location. Ms Tin makes the point that most smartphones nowadays do have a GPS chip. But we have been very careful in our coding for the TraceTogether app – that it does not keep a record of GPS locations. The only thing that the TraceTogether app keeps track of is proximity on the basis of Bluetooth data. On your second question – whether this is useful? I mean that is an operational question, which I will leave to the Police – whether proximity data is useful or not and how they would use it. But, again, I will stand by what the Minister for Home Affairs has said – that this is not something to be accessed lightly or trivially, only for serious crimes and to be used very judiciously, and with utmost discretion applied. The final question was to give an assurance that the majority will not be affected. Ms Tin, I will put it to you this way. The vast majority of Singaporeans are not involved in or assisting in criminal investigations. In that sense, they are not affected. But TraceTogether and its success affect the welfare and the public health of all of us. In that sense, confidence in this programme makes a difference to all of us.”
“We know now that in fact, they paid millions of dollars to get a hacking firm to hack that phone in order to gain access to the contents. Now, I am not making this as a criticism or offering it as a model for us. I am just making the point that every society has to get that balance right. In Singapore, I submit to you that we have a Police force that is not only excellent in its investigative methods but a Police force that enjoys the trust and the cooperation of all of us. It is this relationship, this trust, that enables us at any point in time, regardless of the crisis confronting us, to set the balance right and to be effective. I will tell you very frankly. After I realised that the CPC applied to this, I did think, I did have sleepless nights wondering, "Should I try to persuade my colleagues to change the law?" But, having thought about it, discussed, consulted people both within and outside this House, I have come to the conclusion that right now we are doing well. We are able to keep Singapore safe, we are able to keep and deal with the current crisis. And so long as this Government is able to maintain our reputation for openness, transparency, reliability, I think we are still on the right track. But if you have specific suggestions on legislative or policy changes, we would be happy to hear from you and from the Leader of the Opposition. Thank you again, Mr Giam.”
“Mr Giam, I might be right, I might be wrong. You might agree with me, you might disagree with me. But regardless, at all times, in this House and outside, we must be forthright, honest, open, transparent and do the best that we can. It is in that spirit, therefore, that we have these open discussions and why I remain confident that the participation rate in contact tracing, using the latest tools that we have available, will remain high and why I hope we will continue to one of the bright spots in the world. This is a new year but I can tell you at a worldwide level, this is not going to be the year that COVID-19 lifts its impact on the world. Let us wait and see, but I appeal to you – by all means, continue to push us, ask us, question us, disagree with us. This is the attitude by which we will make progress and overcome. Your final point was on the pandemic. You tried to juxtapose between what we need to do in the immediate short term as an emergency response to the pandemic and the longer term interest of how the Police needs to be able to safeguard public security and safety. I am not the Minister for Home Affairs but let me give you some insight from looking at the situation across the world. In different jurisdictions, the thermostat for how much investigative power you give the Police versus the individual's right to privacy is different. If you go to the United States, for instance, you will recall the case where there was a terrorist – I think it was at San Bernardino – and his phone was locked. The terrorist was obviously dead but the FBI needed access to that data and could not legally get access to the data. This is their system and they are entitled to make their own regime and their own thermostat. But what happened at the end of that?”
“The Member will recall – in fact, I know he had paid attention to this issue even before coming into Parliament this time. There were people who said, "Well, you have got a tool. Make it compulsory. Just enforce it. This is a clear and present emergency." Members will recall that on numerous occasions in this House and outside this House, I have asked that to the maximum extent, I am going to try to make this voluntary. A much harder target, an approach which requires constant explanation – sometimes, I will get it wrong and when I get it wrong, I will just come clean and say so – and persuasion. You should be asking me, "Why do you take such a 'ley chey', labourious approach?" That is because I believe that our victory over this pandemic is not by us sitting up here and issuing rules and edicts, but that our people must understand not only the measures that we are implementing but why we are implementing it, the spirit behind it, so that with their understanding and voluntary and full cooperation, we can achieve success. The reason we are now in this happy situation – and I tell you, in stark contrast to virtually anywhere else in the world – is not just because we have two wonderful co-chairmen, Minister Gan and Minister Lawrence Wong. It is not because we have such technological wizardry. It is trust, it is understanding, it is cooperation and it is collective responsibility. The answer to the question yesterday – when Minister of State Desmond Tan answered it – is that we want to be completely above board and transparent. The reason I asked the Speaker's permission to make this clarification is precisely because of this. If there is disquiet, if there is uncertainty, we must answer it. I must answer it openly, transparently.”
“I thank Mr Giam for that very useful set of supplementary questions. His first point was – what happens post-pandemic? We all look forward to that day. First, let me deal with the data in your phones and in your tokens. As I said, all that data, first of all, is encrypted and is auto-purged after 25 days. You do not need to wait for the end of the pandemic before your longer term historical data beyond 25 days is auto-deleted. I will volunteer an extra supplementary question for you – what about the data on patients and close contacts? Which with the patient's consent or with the close contact's consent and, in fact, active participation – you will know if you look at the app, you actually have to receive a PIN from MOH and you will have to authorise that upload – that data would reside, when you upload it, in a database that MOH's contact tracers have. I would imagine that so long as the pandemic is alive and posing a clear and present threat, MOH will want to have that data available because it may be the start of a larger transmission chain. But I believe that once the pandemic has passed, that data – certainly, the specific, personalised data – those fields should be eliminated. For research purposes, I believe MOH may want to still have epidemiologic data but it should be anonymised. It should not be personalised, it should not be individualised. This is a very important point that you have raised and I think you should continue to ask this point as the pandemic and our response to it evolves. Your second question is a very important point as well, which is what impact does all this open discussion have on participation and on the way we handle the pandemic itself?”
“There may be serious crimes, like murders or terrorist incidents where the use of TraceTogether data in Police investigations may be necessary in the public interest. The Police must be given the tools to bring criminals to justice and protect the safety and security of all Singaporeans. And especially in very serious cases and where lives are at stake, it is not reasonable for us to say that certain classes of data should be out of reach of the Police. But this power – on the part of the Police to access data – must be exercised judiciously and with utmost restraint. Mr Speaker, we do not take the trust of Singaporeans lightly. We cannot prevail in the battle against COVID-19 if Singaporeans did not trust the public health authorities and the Government of Singapore. We are grateful that more than three-quarters of our residents have chosen to participate in the TraceTogether programme. It reflects not only their willingness to play a part in our collective fight against COVID-19, but also their confidence in the Government's commitment to protect the data so collected. I want to again assure Singaporeans that your confidence is not misplaced. We will protect your privacy. I would add that, once the COVID-19 pandemic is over and there is no longer a need for contact tracing, we will most happily and cheerfully stand the TraceTogether programme down. Mr Speaker, Members of this House, every society has to find the right balance, the right balance between protecting public health on one hand and personal privacy on the other hand. I believe it is possible to find that optimal point by being transparent, by being open, by being diligent, disciplined and doing our best all the time collectively. Thank you, Mr Speaker. I will be happy to take questions with your permission.”
“The data is then stored in encrypted form locally on your device – either your phone or your token. And that encrypted data is automatically purged after 25 days. So, you can see that we have taken maximum efforts to protect privacy while enabling contact tracing to be facilitated through digital means. Third point: on legal provisions. Under section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), the Police have the power to order anyone to produce data for the purposes of a criminal investigation. And the key word here is criminal investigation. We have gone to great lengths to protect the privacy of all TraceTogether users in all normal use cases, but TraceTogether data is not exempt from section 22 of the CPC. [Please refer to "Clarification by Minister for Foreign Affairs (Correction by Written Statement)", Official Report, 5 January 2021, Vol 95, Issue No 15, Correction by Written Statement section.] The Police can only do so – meaning can only ask for access – by requiring a person involved in or assisting a criminal investigation to produce either his smartphone or his token. Frankly, and I think Members know me well and I am always very frank. Frankly, I had not thought of the CPC when I spoke earlier. This application of the CPC is not unique to TraceTogether data. Other forms of sensitive data, for example, phone or banking records, which may be protected by specific privacy laws are also, nevertheless, subject to the provision of the CPC. And from time to time, the Police have done so, with proper safeguards and with the good outcomes that Singaporeans have come to expect from our Police investigations. I think Singaporeans can understand why section 20 of the CPC confers such broad powers.”
“Thank you, Mr Speaker. I wanted to make some clarifications with respect to TraceTogether. You will recall that the hon Member Mr Christopher de Souza had raised the question yesterday. I want to make three points. First, on the purpose of the programme. Second, the built-in protection for privacy. And third, the legal provisions governing the use of TraceTogether data. First point: contact tracing is absolutely essential for the control of COVID-19. We need to quickly identify everyone who has been exposed or potentially exposed to a patient who is infected in order to provide the necessary care to this close contact and to reduce the probability of them passing on the virus. In other words, to be able to truncate chains of transmission quickly, effectively and early. We have today in Singapore perhaps the most successful contact tracing programme in the world, with a TraceTogether participation rate of around 78%. This is one of the key reasons for our current good control of the COVID-19 situation in Singapore today. Second point: we have always been conscious of the need to protect personal privacy. To this end, we took great effort in the design of the system, the coding of the application. We even open-sourced the code for public scrutiny and to share with overseas jurisdictions. TraceTogether only collects Bluetooth proximity data on a temporary basis. It does not collect – and I want to emphasise – it does not collect GPS location data nor movement data. Let me reiterate this. The TraceTogether app and token were not designed to allow any Government agency to track the user. The app or token only keeps a temporary record of who you have come into close contact with for a prolonged basis. Neither the app nor the token tracks a user's location.”
“You realise many times now, you do not need to keep filling up forms repeatedly because the private sector wants to have access with consent to those fields of data which the Government verifies and that is why the banks today would prefer that you use Singpass Mobile and that you authorise them so that they can get the data that they need in a way which they feel is more accurate. So, the point I am trying to make is that these are possibilities which emerge because we are a Smart Nation, because we use the digital tools available. But even as we do this, we must make sure nobody gets left behind. And that is why the focus on training, on hand-holding, on physical counters to get people past this hurdle. Thank you for that very important point.”