Stephanie Peacock
MP for Barnsley South · Labour · United Kingdom
“It is a pleasure to conclude this debate. I am grateful to Members for their contributions and for the broad consensus that households facing fuel poverty and energy debt should receive support quickly, fairly and effectively. At its heart, this draft statutory instrument makes three targeted changes.”
“Secondly, the amendments, laid by the then Department for Science, Innovation and Technology on 6 July, specify that Department under the existing fuel poverty objective, enabling the Government Department responsible for data policy to support work assisting people living in fuel poverty, including the national data library kickstarter p…”
“We have cut VAT on electricity bills, expanded the warm home discount to around 6 million households, and are delivering the warm homes plan and fuel poverty strategy to reduce bills, improve energy efficiency and help to lift up to 1 million households out of fuel poverty by 2030.”
“I know that the right hon. Gentleman was a little bit late in arriving, but I did say that the scheme is the responsibility of the relevant Department. These regulations provide the legal framework for the data sharing. I now turn to the third amendment, which concerns the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero.”
“Member for North East Cambridgeshire asked me some questions about who is in scope and who will benefit from the scheme. Again, had he been listening to my contribution, he would have heard—I will repeat my comments—that the precise design of any scheme remains in development by the Government and Ofgem.”
“They provide the legal data-sharing basis that would allow an appropriately designed scheme to operate effectively. If such a scheme proceeds, it is estimated to reduce the administrative burdens involved in identifying eligible households and providing further support to families in need.”
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“That is, after all, the issue we are seeking to address through the legislation. I know that may not be the answer that my hon. Friend wants, but for those reasons I hope he will withdraw his amendments.”
“We are absolutely aligned on the intention behind amendment 5. This exact change—to ensure that the regulator need not adopt league proposals wholesale but can instead design its own solution—is core to new clause 4. Amendment 141, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East, seeks to shorten the transition period for parachute payments. While a timely distribution order is a priority, we must ensure that there are adequate protections for relegated clubs, to prevent a cliff edge. That is why the Bill guarantees that there can be no reduction at all in parachute payments, for an absolute minimum of one year from the end of the first season to which a distribution order applies. Shortening that period would give relegated clubs less time to plan financially, putting them at greater risk of financial trouble.”
“I will discuss that in more detail in a moment, but I gently say to the hon. Member that it will not be a personal decision by the regulator; as we have discussed, the regulator will make a decision based on the findings of the state of the game report and will be guided by the regulatory principles. I do not want to get drawn into speculating whether they will or will not do that. We need the state of the game report to be done quickly, so that if the backstop is triggered, the regulator can consider the findings in the whole and make an informed decision. On amendment 4, as the Government amendments show, the regulator will issue a notice that sets out the relevant findings of the state of the game report, which will need to be addressed by a distribution order, and the order must explain how it addresses those findings.”
“It is up to the state of the game report and the independent regulator to come to that decision, if the backstop is triggered.”
“I assure my hon. Friend that I have thought about it carefully—that was a fair challenge. Indeed, when in opposition, I tabled an amendment to the previous Government’s Bill. I think we have very much strengthened the legislation by ensuring that parachute payments are in scope. We thought it odd to have a Bill on the financial sustainability of football without including them. That is why this Government have strengthened the Bill. I completely acknowledge the strength of feeling on the matter. I say again that the regulator can consider it, but that does not necessarily mean that it will. It will need the evidence in the state of the game report. I appreciate and completely understand why hon. Members have shared examples from their own clubs, and are speculating on the impact of parachute payments, but that is not my role today.”
“No, I am afraid I am not in a position to do that. It is a one-year period from the end of the first season to where the order applies. We think that is a balance. It is obviously a challenging issue, with strong feelings, but formulating this part of the Bill is about striking a balance. We believe we have the right one, but I acknowledge my hon. Friend’s concerns.”
“We will come to about appeals and challenges shortly, so we might be able to explore that in further detail. I have a detailed breakdown of the process; in the interests of time, I will not read it out, but I will send a copy to the hon. Gentleman, because I think it will answer his question.”
“Similarly, the clause ensures that the regulator will revoke an order if a league subsequently strikes a distribution deal covering the same seasons as the order. That again demonstrates the Government’s commitment to prioritising and encouraging industry-led agreements wherever possible. Whenever the regulator revokes an order, it will need to notify the parties and set out the reasons for its decision, continuing the underlying commitment to transparency at every stage of the process. I urge that the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“It is important to build safeguards into the backstop process, and clause 63 outlines what happens if circumstances arise in which a distribution order made under clause 62 is no longer viable or necessary. To provide clarity to the leagues, any distribution order will need to specify when it comes into force and how long it is in force. In ordinary circumstances, an order will remain in force until the specified period ends, but clause 63 allows the regulator to revoke an order in exceptional circumstances. The regulator might choose to do that if there was an unexpected change to the broadcast market that meant an order was no longer fit for purpose. It is important that the Bill provides that flexibility to prevent a scenario in which an unsuitable arrangement is left to stand.”
“Not very often, is the short answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question, and it might be helpful if I give a brief example. If there was a very significant reduction in broadcast revenues, complying with an order might actually threaten the sustainability of clubs in the distributing league. It is not a measure we expect to be used frequently. Question put and agreed to. Clause 63 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 64 Review of distribution orders, payment of costs, etc Amendment made: 54, in clause 64, page 54, line 18, leave out “62(8)(b)” and insert “(Distribution orders)(10)(b)”. — (Stephanie Peacock.) This amendment is consequential on the insertion of NC4 . Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“That could, for example, allow it to pass on the cost of mediation to the leagues. Finally, the clause also explicitly highlights the ability, at any stage, for the leagues to come to an alternative agreement. It is important to reiterate that the distribution order is a last resort power, only to be used in cases where football cannot come to an agreement itself. If the leagues reach an agreement to resolve the issues in dispute before the backstop process concludes, the regulator will not impose an order. If they reach an agreement after the backstop has run its course, the regulator must revoke its order. I commend the clause to the Committee.”
“For the backstop process to be viable as a regulatory solution, it needs to be legally enforceable. The clause sets out that, once the regulator has made a distribution order, it must keep the relevant leagues’ compliance with the order under review and monitor whether there is any need to take enforcement against the relevant leagues if they do not comply. Without this power, the sustainability issues that the backstop seeks to address will remain present. Although constructive engagement with clubs will be the regulator’s default first step, the clause references its ability to take enforcement action, as outlined in part 8 of the Bill, to ensure that a distribution order is upheld. Furthermore, the clause allows the regulator to make rules on how costs associated with the backstop are to be paid.”
“I am grateful for those questions. As I said, the clause sets out the rules for how costs associated with the backstop are paid. It could, although it does not have to, allow for the costs of mediation to be passed on to the leagues. If it is helpful, I am happy to write to the hon. Gentleman with more detail. The clause sets out the regulator’s ability to pass the cost on to the leagues if it feels it is appropriate, but I reiterate the regulatory principle of proportionality. Question put and agreed to. Clause 64, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 65 Power to require information Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“Such powers are regulators’ bread and butter, without which they would be unable to effectively regulate. I commend the clause to the Committee.”
“The clause gives the regulator the power to issue an information notice to a person, requiring the person to give the regulator specified information that it considers necessary in exercising its functions. For example, the regulator may require information in order to monitor clubs and investigate possible non-compliance with the regulatory regime. The ability to request information is not a unique or controversial power for a regulatory body. It is common practice among regulators to seek information from the regulated industry and from those subject to investigation. For example, the Competition and Markets Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority, Ofcom and many more all have information gathering and investigatory powers, which they use regularly.”
“Clause 65 is the first clause in part 7 of the Bill, which covers the regulator’s investigatory powers, and relates to information gathering. It gives the regulator a power to require specified information and sets out the associated procedures for obtaining the information. Accurate, reliable and timely information will be central to the regulator’s regime. Without a full and up-to-date picture of clubs and the market, it would not be able to regulate effectively. It would be reliant on voluntary disclosures or publicly available information, which could be incomplete, outdated or selectively presented. That is why the power in the clause is important to the regulator’s regime.”
“We acknowledge that this is a new regime for football clubs to be operating under. They already submit information to the football authorities, and we expect that submitting information to the regulator should not be any different. As with anything it does, the regulator should act proportionately. In this context, that means that it will consider the burden that an information request might place on a club. For example, the burden might be higher for a smaller club, so the regulator might also consider the nature of the information request. For example, the volume and nature of the information required might differ depending on the circumstances of the club. Question put and agreed to. Clause 65 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.”
“We expect that the regulator will find the power useful when it would benefit from the expert reporter’s skills to combine and interpret information gathered at first hand or on a more continuous basis over a period of time. Based on a report, the regulator may be better informed to determine whether it needs to take action on a club, or which action to take—for example, whether to impose a discretionary licence condition or to take enforcement action. I commend the clause to the Committee.”
“For example, the report might deal with a specific issue or with the club’s circumstances and operations more generally. The expert reporter will have the ability to require information from as many persons as necessary for the purpose of preparing the report. The clause also covers other procedural matters relating to the appointment of the expert reporter, including rules on expenses incurred in the appointment of the reporter and requirements to co-operate with and assist a skilled person once appointed. There is precedent for such a power: the Financial Conduct Authority, for example, has the power to appoint a skilled person to a firm.”
“The clause gives the regulator the power to appoint a person to prepare a report on a regulated club. The person is referred to as an expert reporter, and they must have the necessary skills and expertise to prepare the report. The regulator will have expert staff and the ability to request the information it needs, but this power will allow it to draw on specialist third-party expertise and resources. For example, the expert reporter might be a firm with audit experience, where the regulator thinks that it would benefit from the firm’s ability to synthesise and analyse information gathered from the club at first hand. That could enable the regulator to exercise its functions more effectively. The report can be on any matter that the regulator considers appropriate in order to carry out its functions.”
“The regulator will be able, if it is thought appropriate, to provide for the club concerned to cover the costs associated with the expert reporter. That is because it will not be a commonly used tool and the cost will be specific to a single club, so, rather than all clubs picking up the cost through the levy, where possible, the regulator can ensure that the regulated party pays. However, the regulator will have discretion, and it might be the case that the club’s financial means are low and the regulator does not think it appropriate to impose additional costs on it. Question put and agreed to . Clause 66 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill . Clause 67 Meaning of “relevant infringement” Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“While the regulator must strive to carry out investigations promptly, we do not want the process to be curtailed artificially and risk affecting the quality or thoroughness of the investigation, nor do we want the regulator to be forced to burden clubs with repeat requests for the same information simply because the three-month deadline has passed. It is in the interests of all parties that the regulator follows best practice on the retention of information taken under warrant, including the Home Office powers of entry code of practice. This is why we tabled the amendment to remove the three-month timeframe. I urge the Committee to accept it.”
“Requiring notices to be published will enable transparency and clarity in respect of the regulator’s investigations. Government amendment 65 to schedule 8 will ensure that the regulator can conduct investigations thoroughly and without imposing unnecessary burdens. At present, if the regulator obtains information when entering business premises under a warrant as part of an investigation, it can only keep that information for three months. On reflection, we think that is an unnecessary and arbitrary restriction.”
“On clause 73, information is crucial to the work of the regulator. I have discussed the powers the regulator will have to obtain the information it needs. However, those powers will not cut across legal professional privilege. The confidentiality between professional legal advisers and their clients is an important protection and it would not be appropriate for the regulator to interfere with that. That is why the clause clearly sets out that the regulator cannot require any person to produce, generate or provide it with any privileged communications. Transparency has always been a key principle when designing the regulatory regime. Clause 74 requires the regulator to publish certain notices related to investigations. The specific requirements in the clause build on the general regulatory principle of transparency in clause 8.”
“Clause 71 is supplementary to clause 70 and sets out further detailed procedures for accepting, reviewing, varying and releasing a person from a commitment. It sets out safeguards, including to keep commitments under review to ensure that they remain effective, necessary and appropriate, as well as to issue notices when taking action on commitments, which may be published in the interest of transparency. Clause 72 imposes a duty on persons to preserve information that may be relevant to an investigation. That means that a person who knows or suspects that an investigation is being conducted or is likely to be conducted must not destroy, dispose of, falsify or conceal relevant information. As set out in schedule 9, which we will come to in the next group, failure to comply with the duty could be met by civil or criminal sanctions.”
“That means that, instead of carrying on with the investigation and potential enforcement action, the regulator is able to accept a binding commitment in lieu of the investigation. For example, a club could come forward during an investigation and offer to take certain action itself to rectify a possible infringement. The clause is intended to help facilitate a participative approach in place of formal investigation and enforcement. I want to reassure the Committee that a commitment is not a way that clubs can dodge scrutiny from the regulator, or reach settlements behind closed doors in order to avoid sanctions. The regulator is not obliged to accept a commitment and is still free to investigate different behaviour, even if a commitment is accepted.”
“Clause 69 sets out the potential outcomes of an investigation by the regulator. When investigating, the regulator must determine whether a relevant infringement has been committed and whether there is a reasonable excuse for doing so. The regulator can close an investigation by issuing a closure notice if no infringement is found to have taken place. The notice must clearly set out the regulator’s decision and the reasoning behind it. If the regulator decides that a relevant infringement has been committed, it can take enforcement action, which we will discuss in the next group. Clause 70 enables the regulator to accept a commitment from a person under investigation in relation to their behaviour in certain circumstances.”
“The powers will enable the regulator to obtain the relevant information that it needs to look into suspected non-compliance with its regime. It has two investigatory powers: the power to ask questions of or interview any individual, and the power to enter business premises under a warrant issued by the courts or the Competition Appeal Tribunal. Those are proportionate powers that are common across other statutory regulators; for example, the Financial Conduct Authority, Ofcom and the Competition and Markets Authority all have similar investigatory powers. Clause 68 also sets out important procedural requirements in respect of an investigation. Specifically, the regulator is required to give notice to a person under investigation explaining the matter being investigated.”
“Such powers are commonly exercised by regulatory bodies across a wide range of industries. Any enforcement action the regulator takes must be based on sound evidence. The regulator does not need to carry out an investigation before taking enforcement action if it has sufficient evidence through other means. However, the regulator will need to be able to exercise investigatory powers in cases where it does not yet have sufficient evidence to decide whether to take action. The specific investigatory powers of the regulator are set out in schedule 8. Like the general information-gathering powers in earlier clauses, the powers are exercisable only when the regulator opens an investigation into whether a person has committed a relevant infringement.”
“The regulator may apply sanctions in response to a relevant infringement being committed, in accordance with the enforcement provisions in the Bill, but any conduct that is not listed in schedule 7 as a relevant infringement will not warrant enforcement action by the regulator. A closed list of possible relevant infringements on the face of legislation provides up-front clarity to the regulated industry and other persons as to what conduct is not permitted. It also clarifies the limits of the regulator’s enforcement regime. Clause 68 gives the regulator the power to undertake an investigation if it has reasonable grounds to suspect that a relevant infringement has been committed. Powers of investigation are necessary to facilitate effective evidence-based enforcement.”
“That is why we have ensured that the regulator may investigate and enforce on not only clubs and owners of clubs that may commit a relevant infringement, but officers and senior managers of the club. In addition to the information offences, which we will debate in due course, the infringements in schedule 7 are a comprehensive and complete list of the possible non-compliance that might occur in relation to the Bill and the regulator’s regime. They include failure by a club to comply with a licence condition; failure by an owner to comply with a direction to cease to be an owner; and failure by competition organisers to comply with a distribution order.”
“This group of clauses and schedules covers the meaning of “relevant infringement”, investigations into any relevant infringements, and the regulator’s investigatory powers. Clause 67 explains the meaning of “relevant infringement” for the purposes of the Bill by reference to schedule 7. Relevant infringements are breaches of the requirements set out in the Bill and can be investigated and enforced by the regulator. Schedule 7 sets out the cases in which a relevant infringement is committed and the persons who can commit such an infringement, which could be a club or competition organiser, but also senior individuals at a club. The fan-led review made it clear that it was vital that those in senior positions at clubs—those who make the damaging decisions that hurt clubs—were made subject to sanctions by the regulator.”
“Clause 67 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 7 agreed to. Clause 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 8 Investigatory powers Amendment made : 65, in schedule 8, page 109, line 14, leave out “a period of three months” and insert “so long as is necessary in all the circumstances”.— (Stephanie Peacock.) This amendment provides that information obtained by the IFR under a warrant may be retained for so long as is necessary in all the circumstances . Schedule 8, as amended, agreed to. Clauses 69 to 74 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 75 Sanctions Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“On the shadow Minister’s point about reasonable excuse, I draw his attention to my previous comments that it is not about sidestepping responsibility, but about being collaborative throughout. We expect the regulator will publish some information about investigations that it undertakes. It is required to publish an investigation notice issued to a person under clause 68, as well as an investigation closure notice under clause 69. However, the Bill allows for certain information to be withheld from publication if the regulator believes the disclosure or publication would significantly harm a person’s personal or business interests. The regulator is not required to publish revenue and customs information or information that might contravene data protection legislation or prejudice the prevention of crime. Question put and agreed to.”
“I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his questions. I noted as many down as I could, but I will endeavour to check Hansard if I do not cover all of them. First, he spoke about scope creep. I draw his attention to my comments earlier about how any conduct that is not listed in schedule 7 as a relevant infringement will not warrant enforcement action, and how we believe a closed list of possible relevant infringements in legislation provides clarity to the regulated industry and other persons as to what conduct is not permitted. The scope therefore cannot expand. I absolutely agree that things should be done in a timely fashion. In debates on the Bill, we have talked continually about proportionality, and we would expect cost and disruption to be kept to a minimum.”
“As set out in clause 80, which we will debate in the coming groups, the regulator is obliged to publish warning and decision notices, to ensure complete transparency.”
“We do not expect the regulator to need to reach for this sanction, particularly given that it can target owners and officers at clubs first. However, it is a necessary part of a licensing system, and a deterrent for the most egregious behaviour—for example, the threat of clubs joining a prohibited breakaway competition. Clause 76 requires the regulator to give a warning notice before it takes any enforcement action. This is common practice and ensures a transparent and fair process by providing early warning and an opportunity for the target to make representations. Clause 77 requires the regulator to issue a decision notice once it has considered any representations received on the warning notice. The decision notice will set out whether the regulator has decided to take enforcement action and, if so, what that action is.”
“In particular, they include “name and shame” censure statements, and financial penalties. Where relevant, these sanctions can be applied to individuals making the decisions at clubs, as well as or instead of the clubs themselves. This can act as a better deterrent and avoid indirectly hurting fans. The regulator will also have the ability to appoint a skilled person to a club where relevant, to help the club to return to compliance. This presents a less punitive and more assistive enforcement tool for certain circumstances that call for it. Schedule 9 also provides for the ultimate sanction—suspension or revocation of an operating licence. That can apply to either a provisional or a full licence, but it has a very high threshold for use, in that one or more of the “aggravating conditions” specified in the schedule must be met.”
“Together, the clauses and schedule in this group cover the sanctions available to the regulator for a variety of infringements, and the procedure for taking enforcement action. Clause 75 sets out the enforcement actions that the regulator may take and the sanctions that it may impose, by reference to schedule 9. We expect that the regulator will seek to pre-empt and address instances of non-compliance through constructive engagement where possible, but that will not always be appropriate. That is why this clause empowers the regulator to reach for stronger and more direct tools, and gives it the mandate to use them boldly when necessary. The range of sanctions set out in schedule 9—sanctions of varying type and severity—will help the regulator to deter any non-compliance with its requirements.”
“That means that, where appropriate, the regulator can take enforcement action against individuals as well as, or instead of, clubs. Targeted enforcement of that kind will be effective in changing behaviour, deterring non-compliance and aligning the incentives of those calling the shots with the club itself. It will also mean that sanctions do not need to unduly punish a club, and so indirectly hurt its fans, when not appropriate. Question put and agreed to. Clause 75 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 9 agreed to. Clauses 76 and 77 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 78 Offences Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“The minimum period for representations on a warning notice is 14 days. A warning notice is an important procedural safeguard on the regulator’s enforcement process that ensures that the person in question can make their case. For example, that might be to explain that there was a reasonable excuse for non-compliance. We will talk about appeals in a moment. We have said throughout Committee and other proceedings on the Bill that appeals can be made. On the hon. Gentleman’s point on cost, as well as the ability to impose significant financial penalties, including fixed penalties of up to 10% of a club’s revenue, the regulator will be able to hold a club’s senior management accountable for the club’s compliance where relevant.”
“Clause 78 backs up the regulator’s information-gathering powers by creating information offences, including offences relating to the destruction or concealment of information and the provision of false or misleading information. The possible penalties for a person guilty of those offences include a fine or even imprisonment. The ability for the regulator to impose strong sanctions for what are clear offences should deter any person from information-related misconduct that would hamper the regulator. Information offences and sanctions are well precedented among other regulators, and their existence acts as a powerful and necessary deterrent. I commend the clause to the Committee.”
“Those regulators tend not to have to ever use criminal sanctions, but having them available sends a clear and strong message that misconduct related to information will not be tolerated. Question put and agreed to. Clause 78 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 79 Urgent directions Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“The effect of the clause is that it is a criminal offence to destroy, dispose of, falsify or conceal relevant information; to permit the destruction, disposal, falsification or concealment of relevant information; to provide false or misleading information to the regulator or an expert reporter; to give to another person information that is false or misleading, knowing that the information will be given to the regulator; and to obstruct an officer of the regulator exercising a warrant. We are talking only about information-related offences, so it is fairly unobjectionable that persons should not be able to conceal or destroy information that the regulator asks for. The potential for criminal sanctions is normal for offences of that kind at other regulators.”
“There is precedent for that among other regulators. The Financial Conduct Authority has similar “voluntary requirement” and “own-initiative requirement” powers. If a person fails to comply with an urgent direction, the regulator can apply to the courts for an injunction. Clause 80 will require the regulator to publish certain notices and directions related to enforcement. This will ensure complete transparency around enforcement proceedings for fans, the industry and the wider public—something that has been lacking in the industry to date. I commend the clauses to the Committee.”
“Clause 79 will enable the regulator to give urgent directions to respond quickly to a risk of serious harm. These are directions to a person, such as a club, to take or to cease a certain action within a specified timeframe to bring an infringement to an end. Urgent directions will give the regulator a strong tool to intervene quickly where serious, ongoing non-compliance jeopardises the regulator’s objectives. We expect compliance to be the norm and that, if necessary, most cases of non-compliance can be addressed using the sanctions set out in schedule 9. However, urgent directions will provide a more direct enforcement option to bring the most serious and potentially harmful issues to an end swiftly. Given the urgency, the regulator will not be required to give the person an opportunity to make representations.”
“An urgent direction will be used only in response to non-compliance that is ongoing and of sufficient seriousness. That is reflected in the statutory threshold for the use of an urgent direction. The threshold—that the infringement must jeopardise or risk jeopardising the regulator’s objectives—is used in multiple places in the Bill as a high bar for more severe actions, for example revoking an operating licence. A person can appeal against an urgent direction, although, as per the appeals provisions in the Bill, the urgent direction would be binding while the outcome of the appeal was being decided. Question put and agreed to. Clause 79 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 80 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Vicky Foxcroft.)”
“The amendments simply remove the ability to challenge and frustrate the regulator at every step of an investigation. I commend the clauses, schedule and Government amendments to the Committee.”
“Government amendments 69 and 72 will remove the statutory route of appeal for three minor procedural decisions—the decisions to conduct an investigation under clause 68, to ask questions as part of an investigation, and to not accept a commitment in lieu of an investigation. This will reduce unnecessary opportunities to hamper the regulator by appealing interim procedural steps of an investigation. It would be inappropriate to allow a club to appeal the rejection of a commitment in lieu of an investigation, as this should be entirely at the regulator’s discretion as the investigating authority. I reassure the Committee that these changes will not limit access to justice. Affected parties will still be able to appeal the final decision—that is, the outcome of any investigation—to the Competition Appeal Tribunal.”
“This will add a statutory route of appeal for the decision. Currently, the Bill makes only a decision not to trigger the backstop a reviewable decision. Making either decision at this vital stage reviewable will strengthen the regulator’s accountability by providing competition organisers with statutory avenues to appeal. Government amendments 67, 68 and 71 will make the board, not the expert panel, the applicable reviewer of the three distribution decisions: to trigger the backstop, to make a distribution order and to revoke a distribution order. The regulator’s board will be the regulator’s most senior decision makers and so will be best placed to make and review these momentous decisions.”