Stephanie Peacock
MP for Barnsley South · Labour · United Kingdom
“It is a pleasure to conclude this debate. I am grateful to Members for their contributions and for the broad consensus that households facing fuel poverty and energy debt should receive support quickly, fairly and effectively. At its heart, this draft statutory instrument makes three targeted changes.”
“Secondly, the amendments, laid by the then Department for Science, Innovation and Technology on 6 July, specify that Department under the existing fuel poverty objective, enabling the Government Department responsible for data policy to support work assisting people living in fuel poverty, including the national data library kickstarter p…”
“We have cut VAT on electricity bills, expanded the warm home discount to around 6 million households, and are delivering the warm homes plan and fuel poverty strategy to reduce bills, improve energy efficiency and help to lift up to 1 million households out of fuel poverty by 2030.”
“I know that the right hon. Gentleman was a little bit late in arriving, but I did say that the scheme is the responsibility of the relevant Department. These regulations provide the legal framework for the data sharing. I now turn to the third amendment, which concerns the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero.”
“Member for North East Cambridgeshire asked me some questions about who is in scope and who will benefit from the scheme. Again, had he been listening to my contribution, he would have heard—I will repeat my comments—that the precise design of any scheme remains in development by the Government and Ofgem.”
“They provide the legal data-sharing basis that would allow an appropriately designed scheme to operate effectively. If such a scheme proceeds, it is estimated to reduce the administrative burdens involved in identifying eligible households and providing further support to families in need.”
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“Our policy intention has always been to prevent any foreign state influence over the affairs and policies of UK newspapers and news periodicals. Although a remote risk, we acknowledge that, in some circumstances, different state-owned investors from different states could, in theory, each acquire up to 15% of a UK newspaper enterprise. They would then be able to organise arrangements so that each was treated as a passive investor with no ability, at least on paper, to influence a newspaper in any way, but still collectively own the majority of the enterprise.”
“This means that action can be taken years after the transaction is completed, if relevant information was concealed beforehand, which will act as an important deterrent. Finally, the legislation includes specific provisions for joint arrangements. These state that if a foreign power and other entities—potentially other foreign powers—own shares in a UK newspaper as part of a joint arrangement, each party is considered to hold the combined shares or voting rights of all. If these provisions applied to a joint arrangement between state-owned investors from different countries, and the total of the state-owned investors’ combined shares or voting rights in a newspaper exceeds 15%, the Secretary of State would again be required to take action.”
“If the Secretary of State has grounds for suspecting that a state-owned investor has secured, or will secure, the right to direct, control or influence a UK newspaper, they must ask the Competition and Markets Authority to review the case. If the Competition and Markets Authority concludes that the transaction has resulted, or will result, in a foreign state acquiring control or influence, the Secretary of State must take action to unwind the transaction or block such a transaction. The four-month time limit for the Secretary of State to intervene in a completed merger will start running from the point at which facts about whether there is foreign state influence come to light.”
“The regulations will, as the previous Government proposed and as permitted by the 2002 Act, come into force with retrospective effect on 13 March 2024. There are three important considerations that relate to the 15% threshold that are relevant to the Committee’s deliberations. First, state-owned investors acting on behalf of foreign powers can benefit from the exception only if the investment is a passive one. The legislation will not permit state-owned investors to acquire rights to directly, or indirectly, appoint directors or other officers of the company, or any rights to direct, control or influence the policy or activities of a UK newspaper.”
“It is also well below the 25% level, which is the lowest trigger point for mandatory notifications under the National Security and Investment Act 2021. The changes we have made to the thresholds carefully balance the need for strong protections from foreign state influence, with the need for UK newspapers and news magazines to have access to a range of investment. The changes will also avoid the need for the Secretary of State to refer low levels of investment by state-owned investors to the Competition and Markets Authority where there is no likelihood at all of foreign state influence, such as where state-owned investors acquire shares in newspaper groups that are part of listed companies.”
“First, there is the need for strong measures, which is what Parliament intended when, with Labour party support, it passed the amendments, creating the foreign state influence regime. Secondly, there are the concerns about the unintended effects of the exception regulations, such as risking a chilling effect on investment in the UK newspaper industry. Having considered that, we have decided to set the threshold for state-owned investment at 15% of shares or voting rights in a newspaper or news magazine, where this is a passive investment. In our view, this is an effective, simple and proportionate approach. The 15% threshold is below the level where the Competition and Markets Authority typically believes that material influence may arise.”
“These included a complex cap on investments held by state-owned investors, which was set at 5% of shareholdings, but at 10% if the state-owned investor held shares in a UK newspaper indirectly as part of a diverse business. We have looked carefully at the responses to the consultation. In particular, we have paid close regard to the views of UK newspaper groups. They are concerned that the level of threshold settled on by the previous Government was drawn too tightly and could have a detrimental impact on their ability to raise investment funding that they may need to support future sustainability. In coming to a final view, we have had to carefully weigh up a number of things.”
“The question on the level of acceptable thresholds for investments made by state-owned investors was not settled, which is of course why we are here today, and these regulations will address that issue. State-owned investors include sovereign wealth funds and public pension or social security schemes that make long-term investments on behalf of states. In many cases, these are operated at arm’s length. They are global investors, holding interests in a wide range of UK and international companies and businesses. The previous Government consulted on proposals to create exceptions for passive investments made by state-owned investors using powers contained in the amendments to the 2002 Act.”
“It is therefore vital that the UK has in place strong measures ensuring that foreign states, whether allies or foes, cannot control or influence UK newspapers or news periodicals. The Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 amended the Enterprise Act 2002, creating a new foreign state influence merger control regime for UK newspapers and news periodicals. The changes were introduced by the previous Government in response to concerns raised by Parliament about gaps in the UK’s media merger regime. There was wide cross-party support for the principle that all foreign states, including long-standing allies, should not be able to control or influence the policy of UK newspapers or news periodicals.”
“I beg to move, That the Committee has considered the draft Enterprise Act 2002 (Mergers Involving Newspaper Enterprises and Foreign Powers) Regulations 2025. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Roger. I also begin by wishing the Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Meriden and Solihull East, happy birthday. These regulations were laid before the House, in draft, on 15 May. This Government are clear in our commitment to a free and pluralistic media where all citizens, in all parts of the UK, can access high-quality news and other information from a range of sources, enabling them to form their own opinions. The public’s continued access to diverse news, views and information is fundamental to the health of our democracy and wellbeing as a nation.”
“The change balances the need to protect our press from foreign state influence against sufficient flexibility to support inward investment by newspaper groups that poses no risk of foreign influence or control. I will endeavour to follow up on that letter from the shadow Secretary of State. On the question on new powers from the hon. Member for Meriden and Solihull East, there is now a duty for the Secretary of State to report to the Competition and Markets Authority if there are any concerns or uncertainty. Also, the “state-owned investor” definition will include public pension funds if they satisfy the conditions for eligibility in the legislation. I am happy to continue the conversation with Members from across the House. Question put and agreed to.”
“Safeguards in the legislation will prevent multiple states each investing up to 15% via state-owned investors from acquiring control or influence over the policy of a newspaper enterprise, whether acting alone or in a joint arrangement. We have listened to the concerns, however, and have committed—I commit to this again now—to further legislation to put this beyond any doubt. To respond to the points made, we have reached a final position on thresholds due to the concerns expressed by newspaper groups about the unintended effects of the strict threshold proposed by the previous Government. We have considered those points, and we agree with the concerns to reset the level of the threshold, which is still below the level at which material influence generally arises in merger cases.”
“This has been an important and interesting debate and I am grateful for the contributions by the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats. The debate has shown the wide support across the House for stronger measures to protect UK newspapers and news periodicals. It also highlights the challenge in setting exceptions in a way that balances Parliament’s desires against the legitimate concerns about the ability of UK newspapers to raise investment if restrictions are set too tightly. Government need to balance the importance of creating certainty and sustainability for our newspaper industry with the need to protect against the risk of foreign state influence by setting a clear threshold for exceptions within the regime at 15%. We believe that we have done that effectively.”
“For the reasons I have set out, I hope the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup will withdraw the amendment. Question put, That the amendment be made.”
“The regulator must also see a tangible risk to its ability to deliver its objectives before the process can be triggered. If the leagues agreed a good deal for a period longer than five years, while a league could still apply to trigger the backstop, the threshold of jeopardising the regulator’s objectives would not be met and the backstop would not be triggered. There is an inherent imbalance of negotiating power between the distributing leagues and the recipient league. Allowing industry to contract out of the backstop completely could inhibit agreements that appropriately finance the football pyramid while preventing involvement from the regulator. That would badly damage the regulator’s ability to protect and promote the sustainability of English football and leave it unable to address what is currently a clear issue in the industry.”
“The Government removed that drafting when we introduced the Bill, because in our judgment five years is an appropriate period. Our strong preference, of course, is for football to reach an agreement without any regulatory involvement. We have done everything in our power to push for an agreement and continue to urge everyone to find a solution that works for all of football. The five-year period in the Bill has been chosen to ensure the regulator can only intervene in cases where a sufficient agreement has not been reached for a significant period of time. We believe that this is the correct amount of time. That is not to say, however, that the backstop will be triggered every five years. This is not the only threshold that has to be met to trigger the process. It is a two-stage test.”
“It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Jeremy. I will use the opportunity presented by amendment 130 to talk to another of this Government’s changes to strengthen the Bill. The Opposition amendments would amend clause 57, which sets out how and under what conditions a league can apply to the regulator to trigger the backstop. We will discuss clause 57 in more detail in the next group, but in brief, one of the conditions for triggering the backstop is that there has been no new distributions agreement between the leagues for at least five years. The amendments seek to reintroduce drafting from the previous version of the Bill that allowed leagues to reach an agreement to extend that five-year period.”
“This amendment provides that the IFR must be satisfied that the conditions in clause 59(2) are met before deciding to trigger the process in relation to a question or questions for resolution. Amendment 39, in clause 59, page 48, line 38, leave out “that season” and insert “each season to which the question relates or the questions relate”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38. Amendment 40, in clause 59, page 48, line 41, after “triggered” insert “in relation to the question or questions for resolution”. —(Stephanie Peacock.) This amendment is consequential on Amendment 38.”
“This amendment provides that the IFR must decide whether the resolution process should be triggered in relation to one or more of the questions for resolution to which the application under clause 57 relates. Amendment 37, in clause 59, page 48, line 33, after “relates” insert “(or a modified version of one or more of those questions)”. This amendment provides that the IFR may decide that the resolution process should be triggered in relation to a modified version of one or more of the questions for resolution set out in the application under clause 57. Amendment 38, in clause 59, page 48, line 36, leave out “qualifying football season” and insert “question or questions for resolution”.”
“Amendment 34, in clause 58, page 48, line 23, leave out “the application relates” and insert “that question relates or those questions relate”. This amendment provides that the application under clause 57 must specify the qualifying football season or season to which the question or questions for resolution relate. Amendment 35, in clause 58, page 48, line 27, leave out paragraph (c) —(Stephanie Peacock.) This amendment is consequential on Amendment 33 . Clause 58, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 59 Decisions by the IFR on applications under section 57 Amendments made: 36, in clause 59, page 48, line 33, leave out “the qualifying football season or seasons” and insert “one or more of the questions for resolution”.”
“Amendment 31, in clause 58, page 48, line 8, leave out “the application relates” and insert “that question relates or those questions relate”. This amendment provides that a notification under clause 59(1)(a) must specify the qualifying football season or season to which the question or questions for resolution relate. Amendment 32, in clause 58, page 48, line 12, leave out paragraph (c) This amendment is consequential on Amendment 30. Amendment 33, in clause 58, page 48, line 22, at end insert— “(za) set out details of the question or questions for resolution mentioned in section 57(1) to which the application relates,” This amendment provides that an application under clause 57 must set out details of the question or questions for resolution to which the application relates.”
“In order to actually trigger the backstop the regulator then has to assess whether the application meets certain legal tests set out in clause 59, which we will discuss further in a later group. I beg to move that clauses 57 and 58 stand part of the Bill. Question put and agreed to. Clause 57, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill . Clause 58 Applications under section 57: procedural and other requirements Amendments made: 30, in clause 58, page 48, line 7, at end insert— “(za) set out details of the question or questions for resolution mentioned in section 57(1) to which it is intended the application will relate,” This amendment provides that a notification under clause 59(1)(a) must set out details of the question or questions for resolution to which it is intended the application will relate.”
“That ensures that the regulator has the information that it needs from both leagues, so that it can make a considered decision on whether to trigger the backstop. The exchange of representations is also an early opportunity for the leagues to come to an agreement themselves, before the process is triggered. Ultimately, this clause is about creating transparency and promoting dialogue, which sets the tone for the rest of the backstop process. Clauses 57 and 58 together outline the requirements that must be met for a league to apply to trigger the backstop process. The requirements in clauses 57 and 58 are just the first hurdle that a league has to clear in order for the regulator to consider its application.”
“That prevents either league from being blindsided by the process being triggered. The notice must list the issues in dispute, explain why one of the relevant conditions in clause 57 is met, and invite representations from the other specified competition organiser. That act, in and of itself, may help to trigger useful discussion between the leagues, as clearly outlining the issues preventing an agreement from moving forward will bring the leagues closer to compromise. After the other relevant league has had a chance to make any representations, the applicant league may apply to the regulator to trigger the process. It must include the other league’s representations with its application.”
“Those are a complete absence of any distribution deal; a reduction in distributed revenue; a significant change in the circumstances surrounding distributions; and an old deal no longer fit for purpose but unable to be refreshed because the industry cannot agree. The conditions set an appropriate framework for when a league can apply to trigger the process. They help to avoid vexatious applications or fishing expeditions when a perfectly good, up-to-date industry deal is already in place. That is why clause 57 should stand part of the Bill. Clause 58 specifies procedural steps and requirements. The applicant league has to comply with those for its application to trigger the backstop to be valid. Before making an application, the league must first notify the other relevant league and the regulator of its intention.”
“Those four conditions are as follows: no distribution agreement is in place between the relevant leagues; there has been a material reduction in the amount of relevant revenue received by a relevant league since the last distribution agreement was reached; there has been a material change in circumstances in relation to the relevant revenue received by one or both relevant leagues since the last distribution agreement was reached; and at least five years have passed since the last distribution agreement between the relevant leagues came into force. Each of the conditions is designed to mitigate a specific risk to the sustainability of the pyramid.”
“Clause 57 sets out a basic set of conditions that must be met for a league to be allowed to apply to the regulator and request that the backstop be triggered. The regulator cannot unilaterally trigger the backstop process; it must receive an application from one of the leagues under clause 57. This clause sets out that a regulated league can apply to trigger the process if there are unresolved issues between it and another league in relation to the distribution of relevant revenue. We discussed the definition of relevant revenue when we debated clause 56. For a league to apply to trigger the backstop, at least one of the four conditions outlined in clause 57 must be met.”
“Friend’s amendment. If the regulator has already tried and failed to resolve a distribution issue using its other functions, that would be a reasonable basis for it to conclude that its other functions were not up to task. The existing test in clause 59 could then be met and an application trigger at the backstop could be accepted. It is important to clarify once again that the regulator would not be triggering the process itself. This is simply a clarification regarding a situation in which an application was submitted and the regulator had tried and failed to resolve the issue outlined previously using its other powers. In this situation the regulator would still have the discretion as to whether or not it triggered the process based on whether the application met the other high threshold. I hope this provides some reassurance.”
“I thank my hon. Friend for his amendment. We will discuss clause 59 in more detail in the next group. It sets out the tests that must be met for the regulator to justify accepting a league application so that it can then trigger the backstop. The amendment adds to clause 59 to give the regulator an additional basis on which to justify triggering. It could accept an application to trigger the backstop if it has tried and failed to resolve the disputed distribution issues using its other regulatory functions. I want to reassure my hon. Friend that the amendment is not necessary. Clause 59 already allows the regulator to accept an application to trigger if it considers that its other functions would not be able to resolve the disputed issues in a reasonable timeframe. That appropriately covers the scenario set out in my hon.”
“The regulator must also consider whether other regulatory tools could be utilised to resolve the issues instead. The regulator must be satisfied that at least one of the conditions in clause 57—which we have already discussed —is met.”
“As we discussed on clauses 57 and 58, the backstop can be triggered only in response to an application by a league. Clause 59 sets out how the regulator will assess an application to trigger, how it will decide whether to trigger at all and how it will determine exactly which issues need to be resolved under the backstop. The backstop has been carefully designed to deliver the right outcomes with minimal regulatory involvement. As part of this, it has been designed to be used as a last resort. That is why this clause introduces high statutory thresholds that must be met in order for the backstop to be triggered. In particular, the clause sets out that the regulator must have reasonable grounds to suspect that its ability to advance at least one of its objectives would be jeopardised if the backstop were not triggered.”
“Most notably, the mediation—and the process as a whole—will end if an agreement is reached. However, the mediator can also end the process if it is not producing meaningful, good faith negotiations. The process can also end if it reaches the 28-day deadline. If the leagues are engaging in meaningful discussion but the deadline is reached, the mediator can extend the process by up to another 28 days. We believe that process is flexible enough to encourage negotiation but concrete enough to ensure the backstop remains an effective regulatory intervention. I commend the clause to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 60, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 61 Final proposal stage”
“Once the backstop is triggered, clause 60 requires the leagues to enter mandatory mediation as a first stage. As we have made clear, the Government’s strong preference is for a football-led solution to the financial distribution issues. I welcome the shadow Minister’s comments along those lines. A mediation stage gives the relevant leagues an opportunity to reach an agreement with minimal intervention from the regulator. The stage is designed to facilitate meaningful negotiation and compromise between the parties. To this end, it encourages the leagues to appoint a mutually agreed mediator, but if they cannot, it ensures the regulator will appoint someone with the appropriate skills and experience. The leagues can end the mediation process for multiple reasons.”
“Friend’s amendment, but I hope that his concerns will be appropriately addressed by the Government amendments that we will debate shortly.”
“When creating a distributions order between any two leagues, the regulator must have due regard for the wider impact the order may have on all the clubs and leagues it regulates. The regulator must make an evidence-based decision that takes into account all relevant considerations, and its final decision must advance its objectives. It is also important to clarify that, while the order will be limited in scope to the questions set out when the process is triggered, it will not be without context. Given the important role a satisfactory distributions order will play in the future of the entire sport, the regulator will need to come to a solution that works for all of football. For those reasons, I cannot accept my hon.”
“We will discuss the new clauses in more detail shortly, but they clearly require that the regulator sets out any relevant findings from the state of the game report and that any league proposals include evidence about how they address those findings. They will also require that any order the regulator makes addresses the state of the game findings, and they highlight the importance of the regulator’s objectives and its general duties, including the regulatory principles. I also make clear again that, after we set out the competitions in scope of the regime, the regulator’s objectives, namely to protect and promote the heritage and financial resilience and soundness of English football, will apply to the top five divisions of English men’s football.”
“I thank my hon. Friend for his amendment. Although we are still keen for an industry deal on distributions, part of getting it right is ensuring that the regulator is best placed to act if needed. As the Government amendments that we are due to debate in the next two groups show, we have reflected on many of the same points. We think it is right that any distribution order shows how it aligns with the findings of the state of the game report and with the regulator’s objectives and duties, including the duty to have regard to its regulatory principles. That is why Government new clauses 3 and 4, which amend the final stages of the backstop, already address these issues.”
“League proposals must be shared both with the regulator and between the disputing leagues themselves. That will allow for a more fruitful negotiation, as the leagues will be more informed about each other’s position on core issues. Leagues will also be able to submit revised proposals, ensuring both sides have the best chance possible to outline their position to the regulator, and allowing the regulator the opportunity to request additional relevant information. That structure will ensure the regulator is in the position to make the best and most evidence-based decision possible while driving the leagues closer together, encouraging them to come to their own agreement. For those reasons, I hope hon. Members will support the new clause.”
“New clause 3 sets out what happens if there are still unresolved questions between the leagues when mediation ends. It requires the regulator to invite proposals from the leagues and sets a framework and timeframes for the regulator and leagues to collaborate towards a solution. The Government’s strong preference is for the industry to come to an independent solution, so the proposal stage is designed to incentivise that. The regulator will have to outline clearly the expected scope of the proposals, set by the questions for resolution that we have discussed previously. It must also set out any relevant findings from the state of the game report. That will ensure that proposals remain focused on addressing the most pressing issues facing the game.”
“I thank Lords Birt, Pannick, Thomas and Burns for their thoughtful scrutiny of this part of the Bill in the other place and for their comprehensive suggestions. Their engagement has been invaluable in the continued development of this policy. In the light of that work, we are making targeted changes to the backstop mechanism, primarily through the replacement of clauses 61 and 62 with Government new clauses 3 and 4. The new clauses will move the mechanism from a binary choice mechanism to a staged regulator determination. In our new model, the regulator can impose its own solution, drawing on the leagues’ proposals, the state of the game report and other evidence in order to best deliver the regulator’s objectives. This ensures a more collaborative, data-driven solution.”
“Over the course of engagement on the Bill, specifically in the other place, we have heard concerns about the risk posed by the binary choice distribution mechanism outlined in the Bill. While I have always acknowledged the merits of the previous binary mechanism in the Bill, specifically the powerful incentive it created for the leagues to come to an industry-led solution, we want to provide the industry and its investors with the certainty they need. Although the previous model had significant strengths, the uncertainty it introduced into the process made it higher risk than other options. We want to get this policy right and we will always be open to sensible, well-made points on the design of the regime.”
“I am grateful to the shadow Minister for his general support for this change. He is absolutely right to acknowledge that it comes from the other place, but also from working with various stakeholders, in particular the leagues, which have welcomed it. The regulator must follow its objectives and duties at all times and criteria that simply restate those obligations are unnecessary. We did consider more specific criteria but did not want to be overly prescriptive, so I draw the attention of hon. Members back to the regulatory principles in the Bill and the state of the game report. Question put and negatived. Clause 61 accordingly disagreed to. Clause 62 Distribution orders”
“We think that greatly increases the chances that the process will reach a satisfactory conclusion, and ensures that football will not go without a distribution deal. On that basis, I ask for the amendment to be withdrawn.”
“In light of that, I hope that Members will support the addition of new clause 4 and the consequential Government amendments in this group. On the non-Government amendments, I will first address those tabled by the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup, and then those tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East. Opposition amendment 125 addresses the regulator’s ability to terminate the distribution process if it does not receive a viable proposal from either league, but Government new clause 4 already gives the regulator discretion to deal with that scenario. As I have said, under new clause 4, the regulator need not accept either league’s proposal wholesale. It can design its own solution, drawing on the league proposals as appropriate.”
“That is a slightly more flexible system that moves away from the inherent risk of a “winner takes all” model, and allows the regulator to carefully design a solution. The model also allows for more evidence-based and data-driven decisions. It gives the regulator enough discretion to ensure that any order is as effective as possible in addressing the core financial issues facing the game. We are confident that the regulator, keeping in mind its objectives to promote sustainability and its duties to avoid adverse effects on growth and sporting competitiveness, can come to a balanced solution. I thank everyone who has engaged meaningfully with this part of the Bill throughout its passage to help us to reach this version of the model. I am confident that the new approach is the right one.”
“That order will take into account any relevant issues raised by the state of the game report, the evidence that the regulator has gathered throughout the process, the engagement it has had with the leagues and any proposals they have submitted. The regulator will be best placed to design a solution that addresses the problems it identifies and delivers on its objectives. If the backstop reaches that point, it is because the industry has failed to strike a deal, but we still want the solution to be as industry-led as possible. The regulator will be required to have due regard to the league proposals submitted. It can choose to directly lift aspects of the proposals into its order, but it is not required to adopt a league proposal wholesale.”
“The order the regulator designs must adhere to clear principles: it must not place an undue burden on league commercial interests; it must observe a delay before any reduction in parachute payments—I will address that in a moment; it must have regard to any duly submitted league proposals; and it must explain how it addresses relevant state of the game findings. The regulator’s objectives and general duties are paramount. The leagues will then be able to submit representations on the provisional order. That feedback will help the regulator to shape an order that works for industry. The regulator will consider the representations and finalise all that into a full distributions order.”
“New clause 4 sets out how the regulator will create a distribution order as a last resort if, after all those stages, the leagues cannot strike a deal. The regulator will first have 60 days to create a provisional order. We expect that during that period it will engage with the leagues as necessary to keep the process as collaborative as possible. Even at that stage, the regulator can continue to encourage an industry deal. Unlike the binary “winner takes all” model in clause 62, new clause 4 allows the regulator to design its order based on the evidence and drawing on any league proposals submitted.”
“Our new clause 4 addresses many of the concerns reflected in hon. Members’ amendments, and I hope I can satisfy the Committee that new clause 4 is a positive change to the final stage of the backstop. We should remember that by this stage of the backstop process the regulator will have assessed an application and representations from the leagues, set out the scope of the backstop by defining the questions of resolution, and highlighted the relevant findings in the state of the game report. The leagues will have been through mediation to resolve those questions. They will have been asked to exchange proposals to solve any questions outstanding after mediation, giving them another opportunity for compromise and negotiation.”
“The amendments deal with the final stage of the backstop mechanism. I will respond to the shadow Minister, and then I will respond to the wider debate, including to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East. The final stage of the backstop mechanism is when, if the leagues have not been able to agree a complete deal themselves, the regulator will make an order to resolve whatever issues remain. That stage is set out in clause 62, and Members have tabled amendments relating to their concerns about the existing clause 62. The Government have tabled new clause 4, which would entirely replace clause 62, so the shadow Minister need no longer be troubled by many of the concerns he has set out. He was particularly bothered by clause 62(1)(c), but that will be taken out in its entirety.”