Stephanie Peacock
MP for Barnsley South · Labour · United Kingdom
“It is a pleasure to conclude this debate. I am grateful to Members for their contributions and for the broad consensus that households facing fuel poverty and energy debt should receive support quickly, fairly and effectively. At its heart, this draft statutory instrument makes three targeted changes.”
“Secondly, the amendments, laid by the then Department for Science, Innovation and Technology on 6 July, specify that Department under the existing fuel poverty objective, enabling the Government Department responsible for data policy to support work assisting people living in fuel poverty, including the national data library kickstarter p…”
“We have cut VAT on electricity bills, expanded the warm home discount to around 6 million households, and are delivering the warm homes plan and fuel poverty strategy to reduce bills, improve energy efficiency and help to lift up to 1 million households out of fuel poverty by 2030.”
“I know that the right hon. Gentleman was a little bit late in arriving, but I did say that the scheme is the responsibility of the relevant Department. These regulations provide the legal framework for the data sharing. I now turn to the third amendment, which concerns the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero.”
“Member for North East Cambridgeshire asked me some questions about who is in scope and who will benefit from the scheme. Again, had he been listening to my contribution, he would have heard—I will repeat my comments—that the precise design of any scheme remains in development by the Government and Ofgem.”
“They provide the legal data-sharing basis that would allow an appropriately designed scheme to operate effectively. If such a scheme proceeds, it is estimated to reduce the administrative burdens involved in identifying eligible households and providing further support to families in need.”
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“The outcome of an internal review can be to uphold, vary or entirely cancel the original decision. This means that the applicable reviewer can correct a flawed or unfair decision. The regulator will have a statutory deadline of 14 days to conduct the internal review, with a maximum possible extension of a further 14 days in special cases. This should strike the fine balance between delivering a streamlined process and giving the regulator sufficient time to conduct a proper re-evaluation of the evidence. In the interests of an open and transparent appeals process, the regulator will be required to publish the outcome of any internal review. I turn to a series of Government amendments related to appeals. Government amendment 66 will add the regulator’s decision to trigger the backstop process to the Bill’s list of reviewable decisions.”
“Clause 82 sets out that, after the regulator makes a reviewable decision, a directly affected person can request that the regulator conduct an internal review. The clause outlines the procedure for internal reviews and empowers the regulator to refuse a review request in certain circumstances, including if the regulator considers that the request is vexatious. This should ensure that internal reviews are not used as a mechanism for clubs to frustrate and slow down the regulatory process. The clause guarantees that any individual who was involved in making the original decision will not be involved in conducting the internal review. That will ensure a fair review by fresh decision makers. Lastly, clause 83 outlines further procedure around internal reviews.”
“That should also streamline the overall appeals process, help ensure that litigation is a remedy of last resort, and hopefully minimise burdens on all parties and on the legal system. Schedule 10 is a list covering the majority of significant regulatory decisions the regulator will make that directly affected persons are likely to appeal. These are the decisions that can be subject to internal review and appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. More operational decisions have not been captured in the list of reviewable decisions, nor have “positive” decisions, where the likelihood of appeal is negligible, such as the decision to grant a club a licence. The right to apply for judicial review still applies in the usual way to decisions not captured in schedule 10.”
“It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair once again, Mr Turner. Broadly, this group deals with the first three clauses of part 9, on reviews and appeals. A key safeguard on any regulatory regime is the opportunity to challenge the regulator’s decisions. As we will discuss in subsequent groups, decisions can be appealed to the specialist Competition Appeal Tribunal, but, as a preliminary step, clauses 81 to 83 create a statutory right for anyone “directly affected” by many of the regulator’s decisions to request that the regulator conduct an internal review. Internal reviews will involve fresh decision makers reviewing a decision. They will provide a quicker and lower-cost option than immediately pursuing litigation.”
“I direct the hon. Gentleman to the regulatory principles, in terms of the individuals involved—whether that is the board or the expert panel—and schedule 10, which lists the major significant regulatory decisions. If we look again at the regulatory principles, we see that there is a requirement to be proportionate and to act in a fair way. I will write to him about his second question, on amendment 72, but I think that this refers to the three minor amendments we are making so that the system cannot be frustrated at each step of the way. But I will clarify that and write to him, in the interests of accuracy.”
“In summary, we think that the standard of appeal, and the wider appeals process set out in the Bill, strikes the correct balance between offering appropriate scrutiny of regulatory decisions and not allowing those decisions to be constantly challenged and undermined. I therefore commend the clauses to the Committee.”
“That will ensure appropriate deference is given to the regulator as the expert body that is best placed to make decisions of technical judgment in the football market. However, there are some particularly significant enforcement decisions that the regulator can take under the Bill. We expect these actions to be rare, as they are for extreme and serious circumstances only. But, if taken by the regulator, these punitive actions could have a significant impact on a person’s rights. That is why, for the six decisions, we believe that a merits appeal is more appropriate, which means that the Competition Appeal Tribunal can substitute its decisions over the regulator’s. Finally, as is standard, clause 84 also establishes an onward route of appeal of the Competition Appeal Tribunal’s decisions to the Court of Appeal.”
“Clause 84 sets out when appeals can be made, who can bring an appeal and how they are sequenced with internal reviews. Clause 85 sets out the standard of appeal that is to be applied by the Competition Appeal Tribunal on appeal of different types of decision. The majority of decisions will be appealable on judicial review grounds, having been first internally reviewed. That will provide a streamlined process for the majority of appeals. The regulator reviews internally to ensure that its decision is robust, and the reviewed decision can then be scrutinised by the Competition Appeal Tribunal. In judicial review appeals, the Competition Appeal Tribunal will also be able to quash flawed decisions, but not substitute the regulator’s decision for its own.”
“The clauses relate to the appeals of the regulator’s decisions to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. An appeals process should provide the appropriate opportunity to challenge that a regulator is acting fairly and within its statutory remit. It should also be a focused and efficient process that does not excessively delay the final resolution of decisions or hinder the regulator in achieving its objectives. Finally, while providing effective assurance of the regulator’s decision-making process and judgment, the appeals system should not unduly undermine the expert independent regulator. We believe that the appeals process, and the standard of appeals set out in the clauses, effectively balance those different considerations.”
“My officials engaged with legal experts and senior members of tribunals while developing the Bill. That is why we have set out the Competition Appeal Tribunal process, and why we believe that it will be proportionate and appropriate for all levels of the pyramid. Question put and agreed to. Clause 84 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 85 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 86 Disclosure of information by the IFR Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“Clauses 87 to 89 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 90 Rules Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“This is to give those bodies confidence that sensitive information can be shared safely. The clause also permits the regulator to exclude information from disclosure that might significantly harm the legitimate personal or business interests of the person to whom the information relates. These are all important safeguards around the treatment of potentially sensitive information. Finally, clause 89 creates criminal offences and penalties related to the safeguards for HMRC information set out in the previous clause. The penalties for these offences are commensurate with other regulatory regimes and are a proportionate but robust deterrent against the unlawful disclosure of information. I commend the clauses to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 86 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.”
“It also gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations to enable other public authorities to share information with the regulator, if they do not already have the ability to do so. That will help to future-proof the regulator’s regime and ensure that it can obtain information from all the relevant bodies so that it can effectively deliver its functions. Clause 88 sets out some restrictions and protections on the processing and disclosure of information by and to the regulator. That includes ensuring that a disclosure is in line with data protection legislation and does not prejudice the prevention, investigation or prosecution of a crime. It also prevents the disclosure of certain information, received from the National Crime Agency or HMRC, without their consent.”
“This group of clauses relates to the disclosure of information both to and from the regulator. Clause 86 will enable the regulator to share relevant information with bodies within the industry and regulators that are dealing with similar and relevant issues. As well as allowing those bodies to benefit from the regulator’s knowledge and information, that should encourage those bodies to reciprocate by sharing relevant information they hold with the regulator. These two-way sharing relationships should help to establish an effective network of communication that strengthens the efficiency of regulation in the industry and across the economy. Clause 87 concerns the disclosure of information to the regulator, for example by His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs.”
“Rules will allow the regulator to fill in the technical and operational details of its regime within the framework afforded to it by this Bill. It could amend, replace or revoke those rules in future to adapt to developments in the market. The clause sets out some procedural safeguards around the making of rules and what these rules may do, including that the regulator must consult specified competition organisers and anyone else it considers appropriate before making, amending or replacing any rules. As outlined previously, this consultation is an important part of the participative approach that the regulator should take to make sure its regime works for the industry.”
“The Bill provides a clear framework of powers and duties for the regulator to follow. In places, that is a detailed and prescriptive framework to direct and constrain the regulator’s regime more closely, but in other places there is greater room for the regulator to exercise discretion. That approach reflects regulatory best practice, which is to give the expert, independent and better informed regulator the flexibility to adapt regulations to the circumstances of different persons and to changing circumstances over time. Such flexibility will allow the regulator to be light touch where possible but intervene more strongly where necessary. The ability for the regulator to make rules facilitates that approach.”
“I make two points in response to that. Of course, there is the provision in the Bill—I believe we will come on to this, but we may have already covered it—for a five-year review. On this clause, the regulator must consult specified competition organisers and anyone else it considers appropriate before making, amending or replacing any rules. This is about future-proofing, and certainly not about scope creep. Question put and agreed to. Clause 90 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 91 Regulations”
“The Secretary State must consult with the regulator, the FA and the relevant leagues before using the power, and can use the power only when there has been “a material change of circumstances”. Any use of the power will be scrutinised by Parliament under the affirmative procedure.”
“As drafted, the “relevant revenue” in scope of the backstop expressly includes broadcast revenue, because that is the predominant source of revenue and distributions for the relevant leagues. However, there is no guarantee that that will always remain the case. As I covered in last week’s debate, the financial landscape of football is ever-changing. No one could have predicted 30 years ago just how much television broadcasting of English football would grow, and who can predict where technology may take us in another 30 years? That is why clause 56 allows the Secretary of State to specify other kinds of revenue to be included as “relevant revenue”. This will simply future-proof the backstop mechanism. However, as I outlined in the previous debate, there are still clear constraints and safeguards regarding this power.”
“I believe that amendment 127 is consequential on the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup’s amendment 124 regarding our changes to the Bill to include parachute payments, which we debated last week—although I think he gave a slightly more wide-ranging speech just now. Amendment 124 would have prevented parachute payments from being considered under the backstop, and it would have prevented the Secretary of State from amending the revenue in scope of the backstop in future. I will state here what I stated last week, and what has been my consistent position, even in opposition: for the regulator to make an informed decision regarding the financial state of football, it must consider all relevant factors, and that includes parachute payments.”
“I appreciate my hon. Friend’s intervention; he has put an important point on the record, and it is always nice to be able to pay tribute to Richard Caborn, the former sports Minister and my former south Yorkshire colleague. He has done a lot of work in this area; indeed, I know that he has worked very closely with my hon. Friend. This process is simply about future-proofing. Given that this Committee has already agreed to clause 56 and disagreed to the shadow Minister’s amendment 124, all that this amendment would achieve is to remove one of the safeguards, making regulations to update the definition of “relevant revenue” negative rather than affirmative. For those reasons, I hope that the shadow Minister will withdraw his amendment.”
“Clause 91 sets out the parameters and procedure around the powers of the Secretary of State to make regulations under the various provisions of the Bill. Question put and agreed to. Clause 91 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 92 Minor definitions etc”
“We believe that the existing definition of a conflict of interest is appropriate and will capture the correct issues. That definition is any interest that “is likely to affect prejudicially that person’s discharge of functions”. I reassure my hon. Friend that our definition is well precedented; for example, it can be found in the Pensions Act 2008 and the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018.”
“I thank my hon. Friend for tabling this amendment. I acknowledge its intent to fortify the provisions in the Bill for dealing with conflicts of interest. We will cover “Minor Definitions” in detail when we discuss the next group of clauses, which includes clause 92 stand part. However, I will touch on “Minor Definitions” briefly when responding to this amendment. As we discussed at length on day one of this Committee, when we debated conflicts of interest, it is essential that the regulator can deliver its regime free from undue influence and vested interests. The Bill already makes it clear that the regulator will be free from conflicts of interest and the Government amendments made in the other place strengthen those protections even further—indeed, beyond any doubt.”
“The shadow Minister is making a well-rehearsed argument. As we have discussed previously, the newly appointed chair of the regulator has been fully endorsed by a cross-party Select Committee. Returning to the amendment, we are confident that this definition and the conflict of interest protections in the Bill, supplemented by public law principles and non-legislative measures that are already in place, provide comprehensive safeguards to identify and manage conflicts of interest appropriately. For those reasons, I hope that my hon. Friend will withdraw his amendment.”
“Clauses 92 and 93 and schedule 11 relate to definitions. Clause 92 defines various terms used throughout the Bill that are not already defined elsewhere. Clause 93 refers to schedule 11, which lists where in the Bill to find definitions or explanations of terms that apply to multiple provisions—for example, “competition organiser,” “football season” and “regulated club.” Clause 92 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 93 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 11 Index of defined terms Amendment made: 73, in schedule 11, page 123, line 4, column 2, leave out “62(3)” and insert “( Distribution orders )(9)”.— (Stephanie Peacock.) This amendment is consequential on the insertion of NC4. Schedule 11, as amende d , ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 94 Pre-commencement consultation”
“I beg to move amendment 55, in clause 94, page 76, line 14, leave out from “to” to end of line 15 and insert “— (a) a provision of this Act which requires the IFR to consult another person; (b) the provision made by section 10(5)(a) and (b).” This amendment includes the provision made by clause 10(5)(a) and (b) in clause 94.”
“Amendment 59, in clause 94, page 76, line 23, leave out “consultation carried out” and insert “anything done”.— (Stephanie Peacock.) This amendment is consequential on Amendment 55. Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“By making this change, we reduce the operational risk of the regulator not reporting its state of the game report as quickly as possible post Royal Assent, and therefore being up and running as soon as necessary. Amendment 55 agreed to. Amendments made: 56, in clause 94, page 76, line 18, leave out “carried out consultation” and insert “did anything”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 55. Amendment 57, in clause 94, page 76, line 20, leave out “consultation carried out” and insert “anything done”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 55. Amendment 58, in clause 94, page 76, line 21, leave out “consultation had been carried out” and insert “thing had been done”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 55.”
“These amendments relate to a simple administrative change to clause 94, the pre-commencement clause. Clause 94 will allow the shadow regulator to conduct consultation with relevant stakeholders ahead of Royal Assent. That clause was added to ensure that the shadow regulator would be able to begin consultation on its functions, and that, if deemed appropriate by the regulator post Royal Assent, that consultation could be relied on, ensuring no unnecessary delays to the set-up and commencement of the regulator. The change simply ensures that the clause captures the slightly different wording in the state of the game clause about the regulator inviting suggestions on the report.”
“Clause 94 will allow the shadow regulator to conduct consultation with relevant stakeholders ahead of Royal Assent, and for that consultation to satisfy the requirements placed on the regulator in legislation post Royal Assent. Clause 94, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 95 Offences by officers of clubs and bodies corporate Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“Clause 95 makes sure that if a club is found to have committed certain offences under the Bill, such as falsifying or destroying information, the individuals responsible can be held criminally liable. Question put and agreed to. Clause 95 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 96 Review of Act Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“During Committee in the other place, Peers raised the importance of evaluating the impact, intended outcomes and success of the regulator. The Government absolutely agree that it is good practice for the impacts of regulation to be monitored and evaluated post-implementation. That is why we have added this clause, which will require the Secretary of State to carry out a review of the operation of the Act and its impact on industry. That review must be completed no later than five years after the full commencement of the licensing regime.”
“I think we discussed this earlier. It is up to individual Select Committees whether they wish to call the independent regulator before them. I will write to the hon. Gentleman on the practicalities of laying the report. Question put and agreed to. Clause 96 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 97 Payments into the Consolidated Fund Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“Clause 97 covers situations in which the regulator must return money to the Exchequer and requires the regulator to pay into the consolidated fund amounts received through the levy to recoup its set-up costs. Question put and agreed to. Clause 97 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 98 Minor and consequential amendments Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“Clause 98 relates to minor and consequential amendments to other primary legislation. Those amendments are to existing Acts and are necessary for the Bill to function as intended. For example, they add the regulator to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and enable the competition appeal tribunal to hear appeals of the regulator.”
“I believe so, but in the interest of accuracy I will double check and write to the hon. Gentleman. Question put and agreed to. Clause 98 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedule 12 agreed to. Clause 99 Extent Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“Clause 99 sets out the territorial extent and application of the Bill. The regulator’s scope is intended to be limited to the top five tiers of English men’s football. That is where the fan-led review identified significant harms and structural challenges that the market had failed to resolve. Five Welsh clubs compete in the English football pyramid, four of which—Cardiff City, Newport County, Swansea City and Wrexham—would be captured in the scope of the regulator. One more, Merthyr Town, which was recently promoted to the sixth tier, could be in scope in the future. To ensure that all clubs within the English football pyramid are captured and protected equally under the same regulatory regime, the legislation must extend to both England and Wales.”
“I will make that commitment. Question put and agreed to. Clause 99 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 100 Commencement Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“The Bill provides for the majority of provisions to be brought into force by commencement regulations. Different provisions may be brought into force on different days, enabling the new regime to be brought into force in a structured and considered manner. The main exceptions to that are the provisions that establish the regulator and its governance structure. In addition, there are some basic initial functions that the regulator needs to stand up the regime, such as putting rules in place and preparing a state of the game report. These provisions will be brought into force on Royal Assent to enable the regulator to get on with the task of standing up the new regime without unnecessary delay. Question put and agreed to. Clause 100 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 101 Short title”
“I beg to move amendment 60, in clause 101, page 80, line 11, leave out subsection (2). This amendment would remove the privilege amendment inserted by the Lords.”
“New Clause 7 Duty not to promote or engage in advertising and sponsorship related to gambling “A regulated club or English football competition must not promote or engage in advertising or sponsorship related to gambling.”— (Max Wilkinson.) This new clause prevents regulated clubs and competitions from promoting or engaging in gambling advertising or sponsorship. Brought up, and read the First time.”
“(12) The IFR must, as soon as reasonably practicable after making a distribution order, publish the order or a summary of the order.”— (Stephanie Peacock.) This new clause substitutes clause 62 with a new clause providing that the IFR may make a distribution order that distributes relevant revenue in the way that the IFR considers most appropriate for the purpose of resolving the question or questions for resolution. Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.”
“(11) At the same time as making a distribution order, the IFR must give the two specified competition organisers a notice— (a) including a copy of the order, (b) giving reasons for the order, (c) explaining how the order applies the principles mentioned in subsection (8), (d) explaining how the order addresses the findings set out under section (Proposal stage)(3)(c), and (e) including information about the possible consequences under Part 8 of not complying with the order.”
“(10) A distribution order— (a) must impose on the specified competition organisers such obligations as the IFR considers appropriate for the purpose of securing compliance with the requirements set out in the order, and (b) may, where a distribution agreement is in force between the specified competition organisers in relation to the same qualifying football season or seasons to which the order relates, provide for that agreement to have effect subject to provision contained in the order.”
“(9) For the purposes of subsection (8)— ‘relegation revenue’ means revenue distributed by a specified competition organiser to a club in consequence of a team operated by the club being relegated from a specified competition organised by the specified competition organiser; ‘relevant period’, in relation to a distribution order, means the period of one year beginning with the final day of the first football season in respect of which relegation revenue would be distributed in pursuance of the order.”
“(8) The principles referred to in subsection (7)(a) are that— (a) the distribution order should not place an undue burden on the commercial interests of either specified competition organiser, and (b) the distribution order should not result in a lower amount of relegation revenue being distributed to a club during the relevant period than would have been distributed to the club during that period had the order not been made.”
“(6) As soon as reasonably practicable after the end of the period specified under subsection (4)(d), the IFR must make an order requiring relevant revenue to be distributed in a way that the IFR considers appropriate for the purpose of resolving the question or questions for resolution set out under section (Proposal stage)(3)(a) (a ‘distribution order’). (7) In making a distribution order the IFR must— (a) apply the principles mentioned in subsection (8), and (b) have regard to any proposal submitted under section (Proposal stage)(9)(b). See also section 7 (in particular the IFR’s general duty to exercise its functions in a way that advances one or more of its objectives and to have regard to various matters).”
“(4) A notice under subsection (2) must— (a) give reasons for the proposed distribution order, (b) explain how the proposed order applies the principles mentioned in subsection (8), (c) explain how the proposed order addresses the findings set out under section (Proposal stage)(3)(c), (d) invite each of the two specified competition organisers to make representations about the proposed distribution order, (e) specify the period within which such representations may be made, and (f) specify the means by which they may be made, and the IFR must have regard to any representations which are duly made. (5) The period specified under subsection (4)(d) must be a period of not less than 14 days beginning with the day on which the notice is given.”
“New Clause 4 Distribution orders “(1) This section applies where the IFR has given a notice under section (Proposal stage)(9). (2) Before the end of the period of 60 days beginning with the day on which the notice under section (Proposal stage)(9) was given, the IFR must give the two specified competition organisers a notice of the distribution order it proposes to make. (3) The IFR may extend the period in subsection (2) by up to a further 14 days if it considers it appropriate to do so.”