Dame Angela Eagle
MP for Wallasey · Labour · United Kingdom
“The Kremlin increasingly relies on proxy organisations to pursue its objectives, seeking to undermine our security while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability. The so-called GRU Volunteer Corps is a clear example of that approach. It is not an independent force or a loose collection of volunteers.”
“This Government have introduced support for the Jewish communities who have been threatened and directly targeted by IRGC proxies. Just a couple of days ago, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister announced an extra £250 million for policing to ensure that we can support and protect our Jewish communities.”
“I will move on to the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right. The IMCR has publicly claimed seven attacks at UK locations linked to Jewish and Israeli communities and to Persian-language media, including the antisemitic arson attack on four Hatzola ambulances in Golders Green on 23 March.”
“We expect platforms to act responsibly and not to provide space for state threat-linked activity, propaganda or recruitment. We will be keeping a close eye on that, as well as liaising with social media companies to tell them about how this law impacts them.”
“The IRGC Quds Force and the IRGC Intelligence Organisation, together with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, form the Iranian intelligence apparatus. As a key component of the Iranian state’s security apparatus, the IRGC is answerable directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader.”
“It provides a targeted and proportionate means of disrupting those involved in foreign power threat activity based on the recommendations of Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of state threat legislation. To answer the hon.”
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“Finally, clause 26 defines any additional expressions referenced throughout clauses 19 to 23. That will ensure that it is clear to users of the powers what key expressions mean. It is important to be transparent about what is meant and to ensure that the public and authorised officers fully understand these expressions.”
“The clause is integral in defining the key expressions relating to how the powers can be used. Clause 20 enables immigration officers within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and police constables in England and Wales only to search an irregular entrant if they have reasonable grounds to suspect that they are in possession of an electronic device that contains information linked to a facilitation offence. That power enables the search of a person, property, premises, vehicle or container. That is to ensure that, in any circumstances in which it is necessary to obtain a device, the authorised officer can use the powers to conduct a search. The clause contains safeguards to ensure the powers are used appropriately. Clause 20 provides clarity over how searches must be conducted in accordance with these powers.”
“It is a pleasure to welcome you back to the Chair, Mr Stuart, for what will be a marathon session. Clause 19 provides definitions for the key expressions used in relation to the electronic devices measure. These definitions mean that the measure will focus the powers only on irregular entrants who are in possession of an electronic device that authorised officers have reasonable groups to suspect contains information relating to facilitation offences under the Immigration Act 1971. Furthermore, clause 19 defines “authorised officer” as: “an immigration officer, or…a constable of a police force maintained by a local policing body”. The aim of the powers is to gain access to information held on such devices on the organised crime groups who help facilitate or plan migrants’ dangerous journey and, as a result, to save lives from being lost.”
“There are clauses that we will come to later, however, that would enable us to operationalise the information we have, particularly if other crimes come to light as a result of a search. Question put and agreed to. Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 20 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 21 Powers to seize and retain relevant articles Question proposed , That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“There is a current power to seize, but that power does not enable immigration officials or police constables to search and seize devices in many circumstances at all. First, a person must be under arrest before that can be done, and we think that, as part of our intelligence-led, counter-terrorism-style powers to defeat organised immigration crime, being able to search a bit ahead, and certainly ahead of an arrest, is a useful power, so that is what these clauses provide for. The hon. Member for Stockton West asked whether information found on phones could be used for asylum casework. No, we do not think that is appropriate. This focused power allows us to search for information and evidence about organised immigration criminality, not about any other aspect of the person’s existence.”
“I will not list things here, because I do not want to produce a list of things that people should not leave on their phones that is essentially public, but we all use our telephones and other devices in ways that we all know about, and we probably would be very sobered if we realised how much Apple knows about us, for example, just by looking at its own records. A lot can be gleaned, but there must be reasonable suspicion that the individuals whose devices are taken are involved in facilitation—not just coming over, under section 24, but under section 25, which is facilitation, the more serious offence. The hon. Member for Stockton West said he thought those powers already existed. In the Illegal Migration Act, yes, but they are completely uncommenced and not put into effect, and are far too blanket to be useful.”
“It seems to us, from talking to organisations in the police, and the National Crime Agency, who follow these things very closely, that the best and most targeted way to get at some of this information is to have these criteria. There must be reasonable grounds to suspect, and that is not a blanket thing. These are intelligence-led powers, which will lead us potentially to certain individuals, so that we can take a device off them and analyse what is on it. Experience suggests that what is on such devices can be very revealing.”
“We are repealing that very wide power and replacing it with this one, which is much more targeted than the IMA one. The hon. Member for Stockton West hinted that we should use this clause to widen the powers, or allow all the information on the phone to be used for all purposes. That is not what we are suggesting. In fact, part of the reason why the Illegal Migration Act powers of seizure was never operationalised is that building the sheer capacity to take everyone’s phones off them and download the contents and analyse what was on all of them defeated the powers that be, and the technical ability to do so has not yet been developed.”
“The proposed powers will enable immigration officers and the police to search for, seize, retain and extract information from electronic devices, but only based on two criteria. The first is reasonable grounds to suspect that the person has a relevant electronic device and that it contains information that relates, or may relate, to the commission, whether in the past or future, of an offence under sections 25 or 25A of the Immigration Act 1971—the facilitation offence. The second criterion is that the person must be an irregular arrival or entrant. Currently, the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which is on the statute book until we get this Bill made into an Act, allows for blanket seizure, and searching for all purposes, of all phones.”
“Clause 21 provides immigration officers in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and police constables in England and Wales, with the power to seize and retain electronic devices. Clause 21 provides a clear and detailed approach for authorised officers to ensure that the powers are correctly, efficiently and effectively used.”
“Clause 21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 22 Duty to pass on items seized under section 21 Question proposed , That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“I am glad that the hon. Gentleman supports the powers, but I emphasise to him again that clause 21 is very much in the context of the clauses that we have just agreed. It is a more limited—not a blanket—power. It exists within the parameters that I set out in the previous debate. I emphasise again that none of the information seized in this context could be used in an asylum case; it is for the purposes of dealing with organised immigration crime. It is not for wider purposes, unless other criminality is found, in which case it becomes available and can be passed on. That will be dealt with in some clauses that are coming up. But these provisions are limited to collecting evidence and intelligence on organised immigration crime from people who have just entered the country illegally. Question put and agreed to.”
“If we discover evidence of such activities on a phone, we must act, and to act we have to have the processes in place to enable items to be forwarded to police or any other agency that needs to take possession of the device for its investigation into the other criminality. The clause provides for a robust step-by-step process to ensure that immigration officers know what actions to take to forward the device or if the agency to which we wish to forward the device refuses to accept it for an investigation.”
“Clause 22 will provide immigration officers using the powers with the duty to pass on electronic devices to other agencies, such as the police. The clause will be used if an electronic device seized contains information about a non-immigration offence—this is the case that I was hinting at earlier. Clause 22 provides the process to be used in these types of cases. We cannot seize an electronic device without that process in place, because we may discover information relating to a criminal offence, such as a counter-terrorism offence or an offence related to indecent and/or obscene material of a child—those kinds of offence.”
“However, one would assume that, with the appropriate training, it would be fairly obvious whether something would be a worry for the purposes of counter-terrorism or child sexual abuse, and police forces could understand whether they have an obligation to try to prevent criminal activity of a category other than that for which the phone was originally seized. Once we begin to seize phones for narrow purposes, we have to make certain that passing on that information is lawful, and that is the purpose of the clause. Question put and agreed to. Clause 22 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 23 Powers to access, copy and use information stored on relevant articles Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“It is a bit difficult to talk about specific circumstances in a generalised way. As the hon. Gentleman will perceive, there may be some material on a phone that police or immigration officers are worried breaks the criminal law—I talked about counter-terrorism and child sexual exploitation as potential examples. That information may be passed on and the relevant authorities might decide that it was not at a criminal level—that would be the kind of occasion that the hon. Gentleman was asking me about.”
“It is very much targeted at organised immigration crime and the facilitation of illegal entry to this country. Clause 23 will help the Government to tackle organised crime groups, protect migrants from exploitation and prevent lives from being lost on dangerous journeys across the channel. Obtaining that information will further focus our approach to tackling organised crime groups, identifying as early as possible the trends in the activities of gangs, including their modus operandi, and providing the Government with improved information to prevent future fatalities.”
“I will wait until the hon. Member for Stockton West has spoken to his new clause before I respond to anything he says about it; I will briefly outline what clause 23 does and if the hon. Gentleman wants a reply, I will come back at the end. Clause 23 will ensure that authorised officers can assess, examine, copy and use information stored on a relevant article. It will enable authorised officers to copy the information from electronic devices so that the device can be returned to the owner as soon as possible. The clause is vital to enable authorised officers to obtain the information needed in relation to facilitation offences under sections 25 and 25A of the Immigration Act 1971, to use for purposes relating to the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of such an offence.”
“Clause 24 Amendment of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“New clause 22 would also unnecessarily amend schedule 10 of the Immigration Act 2016. Where a person is subject to electronic monitoring as a condition of their immigration bail, the Home Office can access their location details via the GPS tag or non-fitted device. There is no need to access mobile phone location data, because there are already powers to monitor the whereabouts of individuals at risk of absconding. I hope that, having had that debate, the hon. Member for Stockton West will realise that those things are already covered in the way that we currently do things. I hope that he will not press the new clause to a vote, but obviously we will not know until we get on to voting on it—some time in the future. Question put and agreed to. Clause 23 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.”
“I know that is not always the most popular thing among Opposition Members, but as someone who voted for it in 1998, I am still quite proud of it. Defending our human rights and ensuring that such things are proper, proportionate and lawful is an important part of trying to pursue and deal with difficult cases with certain standards of behaviour. Although article 8 is a qualified right, we must ensure that interference remains necessary and proportionate to the level of criminality. By introducing specific crime types that do not meet the sentencing threshold, we risk eroding the safeguards in the regime. By taking away the rights of people who may seem marginalised at the moment, I submit that we are putting at risk our own rights, and human rights in general. That is not something that I would want the Government to do.”
“That is a technical point, but it is about keeping our statute book coherent, rather than adding things in for effect. Essentially, since offences under section 24 of the 1971 Act are indictable, the serious crime threshold would already be met, so events data can already be acquired as part of the investigation. We do not need to go through the rigmarole in the new clause to emphasise what is already possible. Where offences do not meet the serious crime threshold, it would not be proportionate to extend the use of events data to those crimes. The right to private and family life is set out in article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and it is important to uphold our obligations to the European convention on human rights.”
“Events data, which includes details of where and when a specific communication took place, is available only for crimes that meet the serious crime threshold. The threshold at section 86(2A)(a) of that Act is a crime for which a sentence of at least 12 months’ imprisonment can be handed down. The proposed new clause does not define illegal immigration, but many of the immigration offences in section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971, as recently amended by the Nationality and Borders Act, will already meet the serious crime threshold. There is no real reason to put immigration crime in there; it is already implicitly included. If we start to add particular instances, that will unbalance the way that the Investigatory Powers Act works.”
“With new clause 22, the question arises as to whether it is appropriate to add immigration issues to that area of the law, and whether, with an immigration issue, it would be necessary and proportionate to start acquiring covertly communications in an immigration setting. It is important to consider whether that would unbalance the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and cause some issues that would probably weaken it. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is intentionally neutral on the specific types of crime for which the powers within it can be deployed. Instead, it sets a threshold for serious crime, to enable access to more intrusive powers. The threshold for the acquisition of communications data—the who, when, how and where of communication, but not the content—is set out in section 86(2A) of the Investigatory Powers Act.”
“New clause 22 proposes an amendment to section 86(2A) of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. However, I do not think that this proposal is either necessary or appropriate. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 provides law enforcement and other relevant public authorities with the ability to acquire communications data covertly, where it is necessary and proportionate to do so. Members of the Committee should particularly focus on the seriousness of the powers conferred in the 2016 Act, including the ability to covertly acquire communications data where it is necessary and proportionate to do so.”
“Furthermore, clause 24 will ensure that this data is protected, but that operationally, the information needed can still be taken for the purpose of these powers, and that seized electronic devices are returned as soon as reasonably possible. Clause 25 provides the Secretary of State with the ability to extend the powers to other authorised officers, via secondary legislation, if they are required to support the disruption of organised immigration crime. The Government will ensure that any decisions on extending the powers to other authorised officers will be fully considered before action is taken.”
“Clauses 24 and 25 deal with amendments to the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, extending those powers to other authorised officers and to key definitions in the clauses. Clause 24 includes amendments to the 2001 Act to extend powers of seizure where a device may contain legally privileged material, excluded material and special material. The 2001 Act also contains essential safeguards for the handling of such material. Extending its powers will ensure that the seizure of any device will not be prevented by claiming that it holds legally privileged, excluded or special material, which is often an excuse that is raised when such matters come up.”
“One example that comes to mind in this context would be for a forensic data specialist to do analytics of the information that had been downloaded. [ Interruption. ] I am very sorry if that is me. Hopefully it is not. Some of this is about ensuring flexibility in the statute, within the protections that I have just talked about—the GDPR, data protection legislation and ECHR requirements —to be able to deal with the information in all circumstances without having to come back to primary legislation. Clearly, those people would be working under the same data protection expectations and requirements as any directly employed person working for the Home Office.”
“The first thing to say is that the powers under the Criminal Justice and Police Act are already used by law enforcement and apply in many statutes. Therefore, all of these powers will be used to ensure compatibility with ECHR protections, GDPR protections and data protection generally. We have a very high level of expectation when it comes to data protection in these instances. Both hon. Gentlemen—the hon. Members for Stockton West and for Woking—have asked about the extension to further authorised people, which is potentially available as part of the clause. It is not unusual—the hon. Member for Woking has made this point—for the Government to hire and use contractors, on either a short-term or a long-term basis, depending on demand or business needs.”
“The intent of clause 29 is a continuation of the safeguards laid out in clause 28, while ensuring that none of the restrictions go against the spirit of the overall information-sharing provision. Clause 29 protects information from being shared beyond the provision’s intent. I will not deal with new clause 23, tabled by the hon. Member for Stockton West until he has spoken to it.”
“The clause focuses on making clear the restrictions surrounding the reuse and onward disclosure of information supplied under clause 28. Any person supplying information in reliance on clause 28 or 29 must notify the recipients of these restrictions, as they apply to the reuse and onward disclosure of the information. In recognition of the particular importance of protecting HMRC information, which can include a great deal of personal information, clause 29 extends the existing criminal offence of wrongful disclosure under section 19 of the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 to apply to any person who discloses information in contravention of these restrictions.”
“They may not further disclose it to anyone without HMRC’s consent. However, there are a number of exceptions to this general rule that will enable certain recipients to use and disclose information more flexibly. UK Ministers, Government Departments and the police will be able to reuse customs information for any of their functions and further share it between themselves for specified border security and law enforcement-related purposes. Additionally, there will be extra onward disclosure permissions for the Home Secretary so that she may disclose the information to any person for use for certain immigration and customs-related purposes. Clause 29 regulates how the information supplied onwards in accordance with clause 28 may be used and disclosed by its recipients. The aim is to ensure that the information is fully safeguarded.”
“This will support key Government objectives, such as disrupting and dismantling organised crime groups, preventing the unlawful movement of people and goods into the country, prosecuting offenders and protecting vulnerable people, as well as the Government’s safer streets mission. Clause 28 regulates how the information supplied under clause 27 may be used and disclosed by its recipients. The aim is to ensure that the information is fully safeguarded while also enabling Government Departments to use information received for any of their functions. That will ensure that maximum benefit can be derived from the information received. Information shared under clause 27 is subject to a general rule: the person who receives it must only use it for the purposes for which it was supplied.”
“Existing statutory provisions to share this information are complex, fragmented and restrictive in ways that prevent the Government from taking full advantage of technology such as modern big data analytic tools. Clause 27 will create a new power for HMRC to supply information that it holds in connection with its customs functions to a range of recipients, including UK Ministers, Government Departments, police, and certain international partners. HMRC will be able to supply information for use for the purposes of any of the functions of the recipient. The sharing of entire datasets and the use of customs information for more than just customs purposes will enable the Home Office and other partners to analyse the information to identify suspicious activity that would not be apparent if each dataset were considered in isolation.”
“Again, I will reserve my comments on the new clause until after I have heard what Members on the Opposition Front Bench have to say about it. The group entails clauses 27 to 29, which cover the arrangements for HMRC to supply information that it holds in connection with its customs functions. The group also covers new clause 23, which I will try and separate out so that I can try to answer the questions from the hon. Member for Stockton West, once he has put them. Government Departments like the Home Office and law enforcement partners rely on information sharing for a range of purposes, including law enforcement and border security-related purposes. Key datasets are held by His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, many of which are held in connection with HMRC’s customs functions.”
“We have a strong history of maintaining high data protection standards. The legislation permits the use of personal data for legitimate purposes, such as immigration control, while giving the public the reassurance that such use will be subject to proportionate safeguards. Our approach will be to rely on the proportionate safeguards, rather than to disapply the entirety of data protection laws to certain groups of people who happen to be in our society at the moment. The proportionality test, with the focus on organised immigration crime, is important.”
“I thank the hon. Lady for speaking to new clause 23. As she said, it seeks to disapply the protections afforded by the UK GDPR regulations to people who have entered illegally or who are foreign criminals. I think that would massively complicate data protection legislation, given that we would always have to keep an eye on who is a foreign national criminal or an immigration offender, over time as well as in the moment. That could make it harder to apply some of the data-sharing rules. We believe that with the protections in clauses 27 to 29, we can get and share the information that we need to share, to its greatest effect, while protecting people from unlawful disclosure, without complicating things further by trying to check whether somebody is a foreign national offender or has entered the country illegally.”
“Disapplying data protection rules in a blanket fashion for certain groups is unnecessary and could disadvantage some of the most vulnerable people in society, such as victims of trafficking. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member for Weald of Kent will not press new clause 23, with the reassurance that we think that these clauses give us the power to use big data and big data analytics in a way that is in keeping with data protection laws, the GDPR and the ECHR.”
“Complicating them by trying to disapply them for certain individuals who are in our society whether we want them to be or not implies that we would have to keep very up-to-date, regular records of every single person in the country to check their status. That sounds like ongoing identity checks across the whole population, and that is easier said than done. It is not Government policy, and I did not think it was Opposition policy either. Although the new clause is well meaning, it is a complication rather than an assistance. Where the exercise of data subject rights, such as the right to seek access to personal data, could undermine the tasks, appropriate exemptions can be applied on a case-by-case basis.”
“It is certainly a good idea to create legislation that can actually be commenced. Otherwise, we are just all having a fun time in Committee— I can see everyone agreeing with me—and not affecting the statute book, making it easier to do what must be done or enabling the law to help with that rather than having a gigantic problem. As a Minister, I am certainly in favour of enacting laws that we can commence, and I hope that we will be able to commence large parts of the Bill as soon as it has made its proper progress through both Houses. The UK has a long history of maintaining high data protection standards.”
“The measure is designed in recognition of the limited timeframes that law enforcement bodies have to review information and take decisions when risk-assessing thousands of lorry movements into the UK each day to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute crime, and to conduct checks at the roadside. Border Force intends to use this information, alongside customs information and other information it holds, to develop a richer picture of vehicle movements and enable timely interventions. For the police, the National Crime Agency, HMRC and recipients in the Crown dependencies and Gibraltar, the value of the information will be realised via the law enforcement data service, which will provide it on demand at the point of need.”
“Clauses 30 and 31 concern the sharing of trailer registration information. Clause 30 creates a clear discretionary power for the Transport Secretary and, in practice, the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency to share some or all of the trailer registration information they hold with the Home Office, for specified purposes related to border security and law enforcement; the National Crime Agency and HMRC, for use in connection with their statutory functions; policing bodies, for purposes of policing law enforcement and safeguarding national security; and specified persons in the Crown dependencies and Gibraltar for purposes equivalent to their UK counterparts.”
“Border Force routinely works with the National Crime Agency and the police for the purposes of criminal investigations connected with the smuggling of people and illicit goods, and with HMRC for customs purposes. The police, in turn, need to be able to alert law enforcement partners to identify specific trailers of interest. Border Force and the police also need to be able to alert European law enforcement partners to intercept trailers where there might be a threat to life and in support of cross-border co-operation against illicit goods. This clause, subject to safeguards contained in clause 32, enables just such an outcome to be achieved.”
“I certainly agree with my hon. Friend. That is at the higher end of the harms that one would hope could be prevented by more timely access to this kind of information. These clauses will ensure that those charged with securing the border and beyond can use the information in line with the range of threat types enabled by cross-border lorry movements such as the one my hon. Friend just mentioned, to ensure that the law enforcement community engaged in tackling organised immigration crime, and wider serious and organised crime, are able to tackle it at pace. Clause 31 complements clause 30 by setting out how information received by the Home Office and the police may be disclosed onwards, with whom and for what purposes. Robust inter-agency and international co-operation is crucial to smashing the criminal gangs.”
“Such an extension would be subject to consultation with policing bodies across the UK, Scottish Ministers and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, and it would require the affirmative resolution of both Houses. With those reassurances, I hope members of the Committee will be happy to support clauses 32 and 33.”
“Use of “other person” accommodates all these cases, so it is all-encompassing, and I hope we have not missed anybody out. Thirdly—this applies only to the trailer data—we have worked with the Crown dependencies and Gibraltar to identify persons undertaking statutory functions equivalent to their UK border security and law enforcement counterparts. We have defined them as a non-UK authorised person and specified them in a table along with the authorising officers. Finally, the clause establishes a regulation-making power for the Secretary of State to define the meaning of specified purposes related to policing to ensure that the data requirements are met today and can be updated from time to time as operational requirements evolve.”
“For “UK authorised person”, the term constable, which includes special constable, is used. The clause also refers to “other person who is under the direction and control of a person who has the direction and control of a body of constables”. Such is the poetry of legislative diction, but lawyers know exactly what that means. Instead of police civilian staff, or similar terms with prescribed meanings, we have that rather long and convoluted explanation, which includes everybody. That is because not all forces employ police staff subject to employment contracts. Some also use police volunteers. The MOD police uses civil servants in such roles, while the Police Service of Northern Ireland has powers to use civil servants separately from employed police staff.”
“Secondly, it seeks to capture all UK police forces and bodies that might be the end users of the information, referring to a “UK authorised person” and a “UK authorising officer” for the purposes of clause 30, and defining what it means in this clause. The use of the terms “UK authorising officer” and “the person under whose direction and control the constable…is” avoids reliance on references to chief constable, commissioner and chief officer, because those terms have prescribed legal meanings that exclude the commanders of the very important ports police and the even more important Mersey Tunnels police, which rely on other ranks to command. That ensures that the definitions apply to everybody, whatever the force. The ports forces and the Mersey Tunnels police are an extremely important part of defending the border, for obvious reasons.”
“It does not tie the hands of a named party to disclosing information subject only to the regime established here if another information gateway exists. Secondly, it clarifies that nothing in clauses 27 to 31 authorises disclosure where it would contravene UK data protection or investigatory powers legislation. In deciding on that, the clauses are to be taken into account. Clause 32 neither treads upon other legal regimes to disclose information outside of the scope of this legislation nor permits anything that would fall foul of existing statutory safeguards—a perfect, balanced approach. Clause 33 makes provision for the interpretation of clauses 27 to 31—the terms used, their scope and limits. First, it defines the meanings of certain terms through direct definition and in reference to other legislation.”
“This group includes clauses 32 and 33, which provide for safeguards with respect to the customers and trailer registration information-sharing provisions, which we have just agreed will stand part of the Bill, as well as providing clarity about the meanings of terms within those clauses. Clause 32 makes general provision about the disclosure of information with respect to clauses 27 to 31. That is information held by HMRC in connection with its customs functions, as set out in clauses 27 to 29, and the DVLA’s trailer registration information in clauses 30 to 31. The clause does two things. First, it clarifies that clauses 27 to 31 do not limit how information may be disclosed outside of the scope of this legislation.”