Dame Angela Eagle
MP for Wallasey · Labour · United Kingdom
“The Kremlin increasingly relies on proxy organisations to pursue its objectives, seeking to undermine our security while maintaining a degree of plausible deniability. The so-called GRU Volunteer Corps is a clear example of that approach. It is not an independent force or a loose collection of volunteers.”
“This Government have introduced support for the Jewish communities who have been threatened and directly targeted by IRGC proxies. Just a couple of days ago, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister announced an extra £250 million for policing to ensure that we can support and protect our Jewish communities.”
“I will move on to the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right. The IMCR has publicly claimed seven attacks at UK locations linked to Jewish and Israeli communities and to Persian-language media, including the antisemitic arson attack on four Hatzola ambulances in Golders Green on 23 March.”
“We expect platforms to act responsibly and not to provide space for state threat-linked activity, propaganda or recruitment. We will be keeping a close eye on that, as well as liaising with social media companies to tell them about how this law impacts them.”
“The IRGC Quds Force and the IRGC Intelligence Organisation, together with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, form the Iranian intelligence apparatus. As a key component of the Iranian state’s security apparatus, the IRGC is answerable directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader.”
“It provides a targeted and proportionate means of disrupting those involved in foreign power threat activity based on the recommendations of Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of state threat legislation. To answer the hon.”
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“The Prime Minister made it clear right at the beginning of his time in office that the Government will be bound by the international obligations that we have signed up to. I hope that gives the hon. Gentleman— [ Interruption. ] Well, he is a sceptical man, as I would expect, but I have said what I have said about that. Is he suggesting that we should change the law as a result of the High Court?”
“As I said earlier, the Border Security Commander and the Border Security Command will work within the confines of international obligations and human rights law.”
“Clause 9 builds on that by ensuring that the Secretary of State can hold the Border Security Commander to account for the delivery of improved border security outcomes. As an elected official, the Secretary of State is accountable to the Cabinet and to Parliament, and can assure that the actions of the commander are being carried out in the interests of the British public. Question put and agreed to. Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 4 Duty to prepare annual reports”
“The provisions of clause 3 recognise the varied responsibilities of partners, and deliberately ensure that the duty does not prevent partner authorities from exercising their existing constituted mandates or from setting their own wider priorities. The UK intelligence community are exempted from definition as partner authorities, in order to ensure that they can carry out their functions without constitutional conflict. However, UKIC will continue to work closely with the Border Security Command on border security matters, and arrangements are being developed, and will be agreed by the Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary, to ensure that that takes place. Such arrangements are required by clause 5.”
“Clauses 3 and 9, taken together, outline the functions of the Border Security Commander and the directions given to the commander by the Secretary of State. Clause 3 ensures that the commander has the ability to bring partners together to provide an authoritative source of information on priority and emerging threats to border security. Through the strategic priority-setting process, the commander, working collaboratively with partners and with consent from the Secretary of State, will have the authority to issue strategic priorities on border security, to which partners must have regard. That creates a new mechanism to ensure that there is a whole of Government understanding and a collective response to border security threats.”
“Gentleman will accept that the annual report will allow public and parliamentary accountability for the work of Border Security Command and that he will not press his amendment, as it would create too inflexible an annual report for the commander, with too much outside interference through primary legislation.”
“I am not sure what he does not understand about serious crime prevention orders or interim serious crime prevention orders. The idea of some of the new powers—the counter terror-style powers, which we will talk about in due course—is that they will prevent crossings and crimes from happening in the first place. They will allow the police and the National Crime Agency to intervene much earlier and to stop crime happening. In those circumstances, there may be a lesser sentence rather than a prison sentence, but lives would be saved and exploitation would be prevented. That is the nature of counter terror-style powers. I hope that the hon.”
“Gentleman wants such statistics to be published, under statute, in the annual report that the commander puts before Parliament but, with all due respect, I think it is important that the commander is able to write his report himself without primary legislation directing him what to put in it, especially given that those statistics are regularly made available and are well looked at and reported upon. What the hon. Gentleman is suggesting is cumbersome and would not assist in ensuring that we have parliamentary and public accountability for the commander’s performance. The hon. Gentleman also quoted from the assessments of the number of prison places that would be created by the new crimes that we will talk about when we debate subsequent clauses.”
“The clause envisages that the report will be laid before Parliament and published. That will provide public and parliamentary accountability for the work of the Border Security Commander across all threats, although the strategic priorities may change over time as the threats against which the commander will need to report evolve. Amendment 14 in the name of the hon. Member for Stockton West is quite prescriptive about what should be in the report, and includes a range of statistics. In the UK, we have quarterly publication of immigration statistics, which are organised by the Home Office and under the code of practice of the independent UK Statistics Authority. Statistics are regularly made available about what is going on in this area. The hon.”
“Therefore, it is unnecessary to detail explicitly that that should be in the report. That does not mean that it will not be, as the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire recognised when he withdrew amendment 1. He has made his point powerfully. Amendment 14 would create a requirement for the Border Security Commander to include in the annual report a range of statistics relating to the new offences created by the Bill, and wider relevant statistics in relation to irregular entrants who have arrived via a sea crossing, and to deportations. The amendment proposes that the annual report must state how the commander has carried out the functions of their office in the financial year, and set out the commander’s views on the performance of the border security system, with particular reference to the strategic priorities that have been set.”
“Amendment 2, tabled by the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire, would require the Border Security Commander to clearly outline how they have paid due regard to the Human Rights Act and the European convention on action against trafficking by including that information in the annual report that is laid before Parliament. As discussed when we debated amendment 1, the Border Security Commander will be a public authority within the meaning of section 6 of the Human Rights Act, and must act in compatibility with the human rights legislation. The commander will be aware of the risks in relation to trafficking and modern slavery through their work, and will continue to comply with the obligations, as part of the Government, under the European convention on action against trafficking in human beings.”
“Clause 5 places a duty on partner authorities to co-operate with the commander in the carrying out of their functions. The commander is tasked with maximising the effectiveness of our collective response to border security threats, which requires a whole of Government response and will be enabled by the clause. It is recognised that partner authorities have wide-ranging functions that extend well beyond tackling border security threats. The duty set out in the clause extends only so far as is appropriate and compatible with partner authorities’ other functions. That ensures that partners across the system are working in lockstep to enhance border security, while continuing to enable the vital work undertaken by partners beyond border security matters.”
“That ensures that partner authorities across the system work in lockstep to enhance border security while continuing to enable the vital work undertaken by partners in other contexts, beyond border security matters. Question put and agreed to. Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 6 The Board Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. It will be the first occasion of many, I am sure. I hope you enjoy chairing Bill Committees as much as I enjoyed doing so in the previous Parliament. Clause 5 places a duty on partner authorities to co-operate with the commander in the carrying out of their functions. The commander is tasked with maximising the effectiveness of our collective response to border security threats. That requires a whole-of-Government response, which will be enabled by this clause. It is recognised that partner authorities have wide-ranging functions that extend well beyond tackling border security threats. The duty set out in the clause extends only so far as it is appropriate and compatible with partner authorities’ other functions.”
“Clause 6 places a duty on the Border Security Commander to establish and maintain a board to assist with the exercise of their functions. That unique forum enables senior representatives from across the border security system to convene to shape our collective response to organised immigration crime and other border security threats. The commander will consult the board when developing strategic priorities for border security, which makes the board a crucial forum in shaping the whole-of-Government response to these threats.”
“Clause 7 Delegation by the Commander Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“However, this works best if there is not a battle between different bits of the Government—if there is co-operation and co-ordination—and that is what these structures are designed to try to achieve. The Bill will, for the first time, provide a clear and long-term vision for border security, bringing together and providing leadership to all parts of the system that work to maintain the integrity of our border and immigration systems both domestically and internationally. I hope that that has provided a little more explanation for the Opposition on the thinking and approach behind some of the powers set out in the clauses we are considering, and most specifically in clause 6. Question put and agreed to. Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.”
“The operational commander can also lead on international engagement diplomatically, and has accompanied both the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary on journeys to Italy, Germany and Iraq to ensure that we have meetings at the highest levels with people in other jurisdictions, to try to get more co-operation going to deal with the cross-border issues of border security. The Bill provides a new significant wide-ranging power to lead the border security system strategically, which is being done for the first time. All partner authorities, defined as those public bodies with functions in relation to border security, must, as a legal duty, have regard to the strategic direction set by the commander.”
“The commander is already using the role and its associated capabilities to deploy key functions to lead on border security across Government, including deploying additional resources across partners, such as the additional £150 million for border security that has been announced by the Government, and developing border security legislation to be used by operational partners, such as the powers in this Bill. In last week’s evidence sessions, we heard from operational partners such as the police, the NCA and the Crown Prosecution Service on how useful they felt the powers in the Bill would be in their everyday operational capacity.”
“The Border Security Command is not an operational entity, but a strategic leader for border security. Representatives on the board would be Departments such as the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, the Department for Transport, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and the Cabinet Office, as well as operational partners such as the National Crime Agency, the UK intelligence community and security services, Border Force, Immigration Enforcement and policing. Those kinds of people will be convened for a strategic purpose. It makes sense, if we think about it, that the commander can bring these people together as and when he or she sees a need for them to meet, depending on what is on the agenda and what is going on.”
“The Bill is a framework within which the Border Security Commander operates, but it is not prescriptive because the people who drafted the Bill could not see what the priorities will be in the future. It is a framework that enables the Border Security Commander to respond to what is going on at the time, without limiting him. There has been a common theme throughout the speeches from the Opposition. They seem to feel that somehow the commander does not have sufficient empowerment to command the border security system, that he is not independent enough, and that he somehow cannot get things done, but the functions outlined in these clauses are not the sole capabilities of the commander’s role as empowered by the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister.”
“Clause 7 ensures that the functions of the Border Security Commander can be delegated to an authorised civil servant when required. Flexibility in the exercise of these functions will support the most efficient and effective delivery of the Government’s actions to tackle border security threats.”
“I set out in some detail in my reply on the previous clause some of the things that the commander is involved with, including some of the meetings he is involved in convening and the purpose of those strategic meetings. During the evidence we heard last week from operational partners, both the NCA and the police chiefs set out some of the benefits they felt there would be.”
“We are trying to get to the stage in legislation where we create the commander and give flexibility as to how the job can be put into effect in scenarios that may crop up, without being too prescriptive. I hope that the hon. Member for Stockton West will accept that example of the sort of thing that may crop up.”
“The Opposition have asked which bits of the commander’s functions may be delegated and to what level. In theory, it can be any of them. We are trying to ensure that there are no issues in primary legislation that would mean something is prevented from being delegated that would have been effective. I do not think that the hon. Member for Stockton West would expect me to go into great detail about what might happen with delegation in the future, but I can give an example. If there was to be a high-level visit to Iraq to conclude a memorandum of understanding on returns and activity against organised immigration crime, and the commander was detained elsewhere, it would be possible to delegate that function to somebody who would then go in his place.”
“My hon. Friend is right that circumstances often crop up that require this kind of provision. All clause 7 does is allow it, so I commend the clause to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 8 Designation of an Interim Border Security Commander Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“Clause 8 ensures that the functions of the Border Security Commander can continue to be exercised in the event that the post of commander is vacant for a period, or if the commander is incapacitated or temporarily unavailable. This ensures that the work to enhance our border security and undermine the people smuggling gangs threatening our borders continues in the event that the post either falls vacant or is effectively vacant for a period.”
“No time limit has been put into primary legislation because if there were a hard timeline it would make it harder in practical terms to get a replacement. It is very much a horses for courses thing, allowing there to be an interim in the case of incapacity, retirement or replacement while the replacement is advertised for and appointed in the usual manner. Question put and agreed to. Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 10 Exclusion of application to the armed forces Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.”
“Clause 8 is clearly there in the event of the commander being incapacitated or ill and unable to do the job for a while. It is not unusual that people have life experiences that mean they have to take time off work. In that kind of instance, an interim commander could be appointed, pending the return of the role holder, who may be receiving medical treatment or may be incapacitated in some way. There may also be a gap between the resignation or retirement of a commander and reappointment, although one would hope that planning ahead would mean that that would be minimised. The clause addresses the practical issue of having an interim in case there were an issue with appointment. The interim commander would, obviously, be expected to have the skills to do the job to the full extent.”
“Clause 11 amends the Data Protection Act 2018 to ensure that the Border Security Commander may process data for law enforcement purposes. That information is vital to build a shared understanding of the nature of border security threats and inform the priority setting process. Clause 12 provides definitions for the terms used in chapter 1 of the Bill for the reader’s understanding and to ensure clarity on definitions during the implementation and operation of the legislation.”
“Clause 10 states that the duties in this chapter of the Bill do not apply to the armed forces, clause 11 makes amendments to the Data Protection Act 2018, and clause 12 provides definitions of the terms used. The work of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence makes a significant contribution to the security of the United Kingdom. The Border Security Commander will work across Government, including with the Ministry of Defence, to enhance our border security. Clause 10 recognises the unique work of the armed forces. While the Border Security Commander will work closely with the armed forces, including through the military aid to the civil authorities process, it is correct that the important duty of our armed forces remains independent from the functions outlined in this chapter. That is achieved by clause 10.”
“Clause 13 Supplying articles for use in immigration crime”
“The hon. Member asked why the Border Security Commander should be processing data collected from electronic devices. He will know that later in the Bill, there are some new powers that involve collecting, in an intelligence-led way, data from suspected organised immigration criminals. The point is to ensure that data is collected in a lawful manner, and that is why clause 11 allows the Border Security Commander to process data for law enforcement purposes. Some of that is about the counter terrorism-style powers, which we will discuss in relation to later clauses—I do not want to have that debate here—but it is really an enabling power to put beyond doubt the legality of the collection of such material. Question put and agreed to. Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 11 and 12 ordered to stand part of the Bill.”
“It will allow for earlier intervention, as in the example I have just used, potentially before boats have even been launched and lives risked. That is the prevention side.”
“Turning more broadly to what the clauses will achieve in practice, clause 13 creates a new offence of supplying or offering to supply an article where the individual knows or suspects that the article is to be used in relation to an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971, which covers illegal entry, or section 25, which covers the facilitation of unlawful immigration. Criminal smuggling gangs are using wide international and transnational networks to supply items for their criminal ventures. The new offence is intended to allow law enforcement to target those who act in a way that removes themselves from the direct act of people smuggling, so as to allow them to be caught under existing legislation.”
“Excluding asylum seekers fuels abuse and exploitation of the asylum system, as well as the intentional frustration of our criminal justice system, with those involved in the supply and handling of articles able to claim asylum on arrival or arrest and therefore evade prosecution. I am sure that that was not the hon. Member’s intention, but I hope he will also take at least some comfort from what I have said about this power not being applied to everybody, but instead being very focused and intelligence-led. We cannot provide blanket exemptions. I hope given the explanation, he will therefore withdraw the amendments.”
“We know that that is exactly what happens because we can track and follow some of them. It is therefore important that we can bring these powers to bear. We know there are individuals who have claimed asylum in the UK and operated criminal activity from within the UK as part of a wider criminal gang with networks overseas in order to facilitate smuggling into the UK—I have just given the Committee an example. That is a phenomenon we are aware of today and we cannot exclude anyone with an asylum claim from the scope of these new offences, as the hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire would want us to, regardless of the circumstances.”
“I want to be clear—it is important that I put this on the record, so I will say it again—that it is not the intention to target asylum seekers with these new offences. The offences do not penalise individuals for entering illegally any more than they are penalised already, but they criminalise the conduct of activities connected to facilitation and illegal entry offences through the supply or handling of articles. In practice, the focus will be intelligence-led and targeted at those who law enforcement believe to be working in connection with organised criminal networks. Believe you me, Mr Stuart, those networks exist in the UK and they come across on small boats themselves. They also travel between the UK and some of the countries of origin they are working with.”
“That is not the intention. The intention of these powers is to be completely intelligence-led and focused on perpetrators, whether they are on the periphery or directly involved. More than 95% of people whom we know of who arrive illegally on small boats claim asylum. The hon. Member’s amendments, which would take all people who claim asylum out of consideration of these offences, would be an obvious way of avoiding the offences being brought to bear and could be used by any of the people who are involved in organised immigration crime to avoid the powers being used against them. Therefore, while I am sure it was not his intention at all, the effect of the amendments is to wreck the approach to prevention and disruption that these powers represent in the Bill.”
“To sit, watch and wait until something has happened and people have perhaps died is one way of doing it, but the entire approach of the counter-terrorism style powers, of which the powers in this clause are an example, is what the NCA and other people have asked us to assist them with. They see the pattern in their information gathering: how these things are organised, what the patterns are, who is involved and how they do their business. They have demonstrated to me and others that these kinds of powers would be really useful in a preventive way and may very well save lives. I hope that giving those two examples will mean that we have more of a handle on the kind of things that the clauses are trying to do. The hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire was worried that the powers will criminalise all asylum seekers.”
“The preparatory acts offence would have enabled prosecution in that case, as the individual took part in the research and planning of acts to facilitate organised immigration crime, despite not being directly involved in the facilitation and illegal entry of migrants. Both the type of information and the circumstances the information was collected under would be captured by the new offence, and the evidence that the NCA had would have been sufficient for a sentence of up to five years. We are talking about doing prevention work, to disrupt, to interdict and to stop some of this stuff happening before it has reached its full maturity and people’s lives have been put at risk in the channel. It is a different approach.”
“An investigation into an Albanian organised crime gang using small boats to facilitate illegal immigration to the UK led to the arrest of an individual who was identifying rigid-hulled inflatable boats for sale on behalf of that gang. The gang subsequently bought and used the identified boats for organised immigration crime purposes. The individual was never directly involved in the movement of migrants or the purchase of those boats; he simply sourced them. The NCA provided evidence that they were on the periphery of the organised criminal gang and were researching for the gang to support their criminality. Despite that evidence, he was never directly involved in the actual facilitation, so the case could not go through to charging.”
“This man was also moving between the UK and Iraq regularly, meaning that these powers would have assisted investigators. He was overseas, but he had access to some of these articles when he was in the UK, so he would have been in the scope of the offence, and we would have been able to interdict and arrest him earlier and prevent those crossings from happening. Part of the idea of the new offences is that they are intelligence-led, but they relate to preparatory acts. They are attempting to disrupt before the more serious section 25 offence happens, and therefore they will prevent some of the damage done if that is allowed to happen because the authorities do not have enough evidence to arrest on the more serious offence. Let me tell the Committee about another case study.”
“In November 2024, a man called Amanj Hasan Zada, who organised cross-channel small boat crossings from his home in Lancashire, was jailed for 17 years after being found guilty of people smuggling charges following an investigation by the National Crime Agency. Investigators were able to link him to three separate crossings made from France to the UK in November and December 2023, and he was convicted under section 25. Each crossing involved Kurdish migrants who had travelled through eastern Europe into Germany, Belgium and then France. It is possible that the reasonable suspicion element meant that investigators would have met the requirements to arrest and charge him earlier, ahead of the section 25 powers becoming an option, if the new offences had been on the statute book when this was going on.”
“The NCA gave evidence last week in which it said that its strategy is to prevent, which is to deter participation in organised immigration crime; to pursue, which is to disrupt the way that organised criminals work; to protect, which is to detect and act before the damage has been done—not wait until there are deaths in the channel, but stop small boats being launched in the first place—and to prepare, which is to manage and deal with the issues. I am going to read into the record a couple of examples, to give Members an insight into what we are trying to achieve. These powers are short of those in section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971, because they relate to preparatory acts, which is what these clauses deal with. These are two case studies from the National Crime Agency. The first relates to the offence of handling articles.”
“We all agree that the right way to go about this is to ensure that the decisions about who is allowed to come into our country are taken by the authorities in the country, rather than by sophisticated, internationally organised criminal gangs with supply chains that go across many jurisdictions, and which make millions out of their illegal trade. I want to give the Committee a couple of examples to put some flesh on the bones of what we are trying to do with the clauses in this group. Although people may think they are wide-ranging, their purpose is not to criminalise every asylum seeker, or even the vast majority of asylum seekers. Our approach will be intelligence-led. The National Crime Agency and others who police our borders have told us that these powers will assist them in doing the things they most want to do.”
“We have had an interesting debate, and Members have come at this complex problem from different angles. The hon. Member for Perth and Kinross-shire would give everyone who gets on the boats the benefit of the doubt, the hon. Member for Weald of Kent was somewhere towards the opposite end of that spectrum, and we had everything in between. The important thing that we need to get right in this Bill is that we must give those who are trying to prevent dangerous boat crossings all the tools they tell us they need to help them deal with the criminal gangs that have been allowed to take hold across the channel and who are currently perpetrating this evil trade. We all agree that we want to stop that. I am starting by talking about what we agree on, and I will then explain how the clauses will assist.”
“Will the hon. Gentleman not take my word that the offences will be intelligence-led? They are not targeting all asylum seekers, but they certainly would target someone coming over on a boat who may claim asylum, who has been involved in an organised immigration gang, and who has been organising the supplies for it.”
“This clause is levelled strongly against people-smuggling gangs and their associates. It includes a defence for someone of undertaking these specified activities for their own journey only. Also included as a defence is a non-exhaustive list of reasonable excuses, where one express excuse is conducting these activities to carry out or to prepare to carry out the rescue of a person from danger or serious harm. The maximum sentence for this offence is five years’ imprisonment.”
“The provisions in clause 16 create an additional tool to act earlier to disrupt criminal gangs smuggling people into the UK. The new offence targets specified preparatory activities associated with people smuggling. These activities relate to the collection, recording and possession, viewing or accessing of information that is likely to be useful to a person organising or preparing for a journey of more than one person into the UK, where their entry or arrival constitutes an offence under section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971. These specified activities must also be conducted in circumstances giving rise to reasonable suspicion that the information being collected, recorded, possessed, viewed or accessed will be used in organising or preparing for such a journey.”