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Krishna MENON

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1956-09-24
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1961-09-24
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  1. 41.] The President went on to say: "Today, every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the day when this planet may no longer be habitable. Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation, or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us." [Ibid., para. 50.] 228. I do not think that I could conclude my observations in this general debate on a better note than my placing before the Assembly the sentiments in the two quotations I have just cited. I submit these observations to the Assembly for its consideration.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  2. 46.] "We say sincerely to all countries: As against the slogan 'Let us arm!', which still enjoys currency in some places, we advance the slogan 'Let us disarm completely!' Let us compete as to who builds more homes, schools, and hospitals for his people and produces more bread, milk, meat, clothing and other consumer goods; let us not compete as to who has more hydrogen bombs and rockets." 227. President Kennedy, speaking to us only the other day, said: "Mankind must put an end to war, or war will put an end to mankind*" [1013th meeting, para. 40.] "Let us call a truce to terror. Let us invoke the blessings of peace. And, as we build an international capacity to keep peace, let us join in dismantling the national capacity to wage war." [Ibid., para.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  3. Living people may perhaps not be effectively quoted since they may change their opinions next day. I remember a gentlemen with whom I was discussing a particular article in the Encyclopaedia Britannica. I quoted the article against his position. At the end of it he said, "I have changed my opinion, since I wrote that". So there is always that danger. 226. However, Mr. Khrushchev said, when he visited us here at the fourteenth session of the General Assembly: "The peoples are thirsting for peace; they want to live without fear for their future, without fear of losing those who are dear to them in the conflagration of a new year." [799th meeting, para 45.] "For centuries, the peoples have dreamed of putting an end to the destructive methods of waging war". [Ibid, para.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  4. If the Americans want to make peace with East Germany we shall not object to it, and if the Russians want to make peace with West or East Germany we shall not object to that. 1-2 spite of such instructions as I have, I have refrained from going into any detail in this matter because the situation changes from day to day, and for us to make observations on details would not be of any assistance. But it would be a bad thing for people to be told, as they are constantly told in the lobbies of the Assembly, that the world is getting accustomed to the idea of a nuclear war, so let the other side take care. Each side says, "Let the other side take care"—not that it itself should take care. 225. I conclude with two quotations. Normally one goes back to history, to somewhere else and to remote periods.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  5. We have made this appeal in this way in the hope that, in the next few days, haying come so far—that is, the idea of a veto having been eliminated and the idea( of one man not being agreeable at all being now not the case, the idea of one man plus having come into being—we shall, with a degree of give and take, find that action will be possible, especially if in the intervening period we can have five or six, or whatever number is required for the purpose, to go on with the duties as they are at present. 224. The world is exercised about the situation in Berlin, but not because people do not understand why a city should be divided like this or otherwise. So far as we are concerned, when any country makes peace with anybody we shall not say "no".

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  6. We are a country with little capacity to influence these decisions between the giants either by force of arms, by economic power or even by the power of persuasion. Even when a proposition is submitted on merits and without partisanship's it usually takes six or seven years for it to become even acquiesced in. We find that very often the approach is the same in this matter.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  7. I do not want to argue that. If the time comes when it is necessary, we will argue it but there are no precedents—so that whatever arrangements were made would not be on all fours in terms of the letter of the Charter or precedent. Certainly they could be in the spirit of the Charter, in the sense that the Security Council and the Assembly may be able to subscribe to them. 222. The man must be able to work instead of having one party or the other being suspicious of him so that he will be unable to go forward in other ways. We hope that any further progress between the great Powers with regard to the issue of war and peace agitating the world—which is really disturbing people far more than anything else—will be helped by some movement towards that end. 223.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  8. That would be our position. Therefore, I make this suggestion that it may be possible for the representatives of the great Powers to come together on this basis and to be able to earn the gratitude of large numbers of people, especially people like ourselves who do not want to be divided in this manner and who would like to see a unanimous decision somehow or other taking place. 221. Whatever decision we take , it will not be in conformity with the Charter because the authors of the Charter—in their great anxiety to say something in a few pages, or whatever it may have been—did not make any provision for this contingency. Perhaps they thought that Secretaries-General would not die? That is also possible. But, anyway, there is no precedent which can help us in the present context. It has been said that there are precedents.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  9. Given this background, we do not see any difficulty about these other functionary and collective factors being brought in on the basis of geographical considerations—five or six as the case may be by agreement—if the countries behind them do not try to condition those officials. , 219. For its part, whether it be in the Congo or in the Secretariat, the Government of India has never given an instruction to any Indian personnel, either here or in the field of operations. Once they are handed over they are international civil servants, and we have scrupulously respected that position. Even with regard to the Congo operations my Government collected all its information from other sources and not from anybody within the United Nations, because there were Indian officials in charge and we did not want to embarrass them. 220.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  10. We think that it is possible to reach such an agreement because the Soviet Union has moved away from the "troika" position and a built-in veto: it said in its statement of 1 October 1961 that it was not asking for a veto. It has agreed to an acting appointment of one man as Secretary-General. Therefore, I hope that, in the next few days, it will be possible to come to some agreement. It will depend on the two sides being able to have confidence not only in each other, but in the kind of person who would come in, a person who would riot be pushed one way or the other. My person who is likely to be not totally objective and not have the courage to mention correct positions, would find himself in difficulty. 218.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  11. We are not a member of the Security Council, but we are a Member of this Organization and, therefore, if the Secretary-General is merely a creature of the General Assembly appointed by a majority vote or even a unanimous vote and not related to another Charter organ, the Security Council, it would put the Security Council outside the competence of the appointee and vice versa. This is a serious matter. I have tried speaking privately about it, but so far with no "results. 217. I think that it is necessary for me to say, on behalf of the Government of India, that we would support any arrangement on which there is comparative agreement between the great Powers, an agreement which would enable things to function.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  12. For the first time, the armed forces of India have gone beyond their shores with lethal weapons. It is true that they went to Korea, to Gaza, to Lebanon and elsewhere, but today they are in the Congo as a fighting force on the demand of the. United Nations. Increasing demands are made upon us each day and, what is more, we have responsibilities to our? people and our parliament in regard to their performance and conditions. The whole of the Congo action emanates from the Security Council's functions and decisions. It would be a bad day if things of this kind were to be decided by a majority vote in the Assembly and not by the Security Council.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  13. We think that it should be possible for them to come to an agreement on some individual, and for that individual to appoint five or six deputies, according to geographical or other considerations. If it is felt to be more closely in conformity with the Charter if the appointments are made by the Secretary-General himself, these things can be easily provided for. We believe, therefore, that if a common individual can be agreed upon and that individual can go on immediately to accept the position and, in general, pour oil on the troubled waters, then we shall be able to proceed. 216. The Indian Government is a little concerned about the fact that an arrangement of this character must come through the Security Council—and for this reason. The Government of India has today 7,000 personnel in the Congo.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  14. There is no reason why, in our submission, with a degree of the understanding of the position of the large number of nations in the Assembly, many of which would not want to be driven into the position of subscribing to a railroaded draft resolution—because we have seen resolutions in this Assembly adopted by fifty-five votes to five and nothing happened after—a solution could not be reached. Especially when the chief executive of one of the Charter organs may have to be appointed, such appointment must carry with it both moral and other consent of practically the entire body of people, and not become an issue wherein we merely count votes and get nowhere. 215. Therefore, we would be willing to support any agreement that is reached between the main contending parties, irrespective of our own views or desires on any aspect of this matter.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  15. While we are against any kind of arrangement which divides the world in three, while we are against any arrangement which provides for a built-in veto, we think that it is impossible for this Organization to function except by agreement between the great Powers. That is the basis on which the United Nations was founded. The United States was the main delegation responsible for the veto at San Francisco; no more powerful speeches could have been made than those by Senator Connolly at that time—for some time the Russians did not seem anxious about it in those days. Therefore, we think that the private talks being carried on by these great countries with minor and smaller people as well as between themselves have probably moved them nearer. 214.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  16. Although these persons should each be responsible for the functioning of a part of the Secretariat so as to ensure that their policy considerations would be rooted in realities, their main duty would be the development and over-all co-ordination of policies and programmes. ' "(c) To delegate through the Deputy Secretaries- General to the next supervisory level... the maximum responsibility for the day-to-day administration of the several areas of the Secretariat." 212. I have no desire to go into a great many details nor into Mr. Hammarskjold's report because it was intended for him to argue it, and since he is not here, it is not necessary. The same idea is carried through with different modifications. 213. So the idea of having a collective factor is nothing new.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  17. In that report we find the following: "The Secretary-General believes that many advantages would result from the introduction of a simplified scheme in which three Deputy Secretaries-General would replace the present Assistant Secretaries-General and more responsibility for day-to-day administration would be delegated to the Principal Directors. The main features of the plan would be: "(a) To enable the Secretary-General to devote his entire energies to the most important problems of policy and programme formulation by freeing him from questions of day-to-day operation, administration and co-ordination. "(b) To provide the Secretary-General with a small group of deputies of the highest competence and prestige to collaborate with him.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  18. The Assistant Secretaries-General should have responsibility, etc." Before that it was proposed that: "there should always be one Assistant Secretary- General amongst those referred to in recommendation 11 below, designated by the Secretary-General to deputize for him when he is absent or unable to perform his functions." 210. Looking back, after the event, it would seem that if this recommendation had been followed, we could have avoided our present difficulty. What I am trying to point out is that this idea of having more than one person carrying responsibilities, in whatever form, is nothing new. 211. In 1952 Mr. Trygve Lie submitted to the General Assembly his report on reorganization.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  19. We are not at present putting forward any proposals—because we do not want it to be thought that we are in any way hindering any bilateral agreement in regard to these proposals—but I should like representatives, particularly those with strong views, to look at the history of this matter. This idea of more than one Secretary-General is nothing new. In 1946 the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations submitted a report to the United Nations; and what is more, it was accepted—its proposals have never been carried out. At that time it was said: "the Secretary-General should be authorized to appoint Assistant Secretaries-General and such other officials and employees as are required...

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  20. At the same time, however, we believe there is some element of merit in the collective idea, because mistakes of various kinds have been made in the past. There is no reason at all why, through the ingenuity of the statesmen who are gathered here, a solution of this character could not be brought about. 208 We think that it is possible to find a solution. In the statement put out by the Soviet Union, it would appear, so far as we understand it, that it has come away from the idea of the veto. It has also moved towards the idea of having one person—of course, with certain modifications. 209.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  21. I have been asked by my Government to make our position entirely clear. We desire a United Nations that will function strongly. Last year when Mr, Khrushchev put forward the proposal of a tripartite Secretariat, my Prime Minister spoke in opposition at that time to it, and our position with regard to the troika is the same today. I used the word "troika", because it has been generally used, here and elsewhere in this connexion. 206. In other words, we do not believe in an executive which provides for the functioning of three heads that would cancel out each other. Therefore, we are against a Secretariat which possesses these three heads. 207. We are also against what the Americans call an arrangement which contains a built-in veto. We are against any kind of arrangement whereby forward movement would become impossible.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  22. General Putt, it is true, did in the end acknowledge that what the United States can do on or from the moon Russia can also do, but the moral which he drew was that the United States must also occupy Mars and Venus which, apparently, he considered to be beyond the reach of the Soviets. We are not told why. 203. The extract further states that all this curious speculation received much less publicity than might have been expected and that the writer would not have known of it but for the fact that it has been reported. 204. I have not yet seen an account of similar plans of the Soviet Union, but I must look out for it! 205. I shall now dwell on a matter which has engaged the attention of the Assembly very recently, and that is the situation which has been created by the sudden death of the Secretary-General.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  23. Horner—the extract goes on—Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development, who saw in the establishment of lunar bases an opportunity of breaking through the nuclear stalemate. 202. It is further stated here that it is curious, and typical of militarist mentality everywhere, that both these two eminent gentlemen seemed at first loath to admit the possibility of Russia also installing missile stations on the moon. It is obvious that what one side can do the other also can do, and the only result of such plans, if they are carried out, must be warfare from the moon.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  24. The extract goes on to say that General Putt testified that the moon would provide abase of retaliation of considerable advantage over earthbound nations. Sounds rather mystic, does it not? He pointed out that an attack upon the moon by the USSR would have to be la inched a day or two before an attack upon the terrestrial United States if the United States was to be unable to retaliate from the moon. Such a preliminary attack upon the moon, he considered, would warn Americans of their danger. If, on the other hand, the Russians did not demolish the United States lunar installations, it would be possible from these installations to destroy Russia, although the terrestrial United States had been obliterated—a grim prospect. 201. General Putt's testimony was reinforced by Richard E.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  25. And on top of it there is also the prohibition of the use of the moon for this purpose. This is purely a lunatic effort. 198. There was a society in the eighteenth century which met on a day wherein there was a full moon. The reason was that various people wanted to get back to their homes which were thirty and forty miles away. They were called the "lunar society". They were the. beginning of the scientists of the world. 199. Now I have here an extract from testimony which was submitted to the House Armed Services Committee, which says that the United States Air Force intends to establish a missile base on the moon. There is nothing exclusively lunar about this. It is considered that the warhead would be fired from the moon to the'? earth without an enormous expenditure of energy, since the moon has no atmosphere and little gravity. 200.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  26. However, having regard to what has become part of present thinking, the imminence of a nuclear war and the preparations for the same—such as the resumption of test explosions—while we may not be contributors to such war, we all have the common concern of being the common victims of it, and therefore from the victims' point of view we think we have some reason to say something about these matters. 197. I do not propose to read from the pages and pages I have here that relate to various types of weapons. For the first time we have been able to get the particulars on Russian weapons, which were recently published j and on American weapons. There are these surface to surface, air to air, ground to air, water to air missiles—missiles all over the place, beautiful names with a great destructive capacity.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  27. It was stated that all countries should refrain from all forms of surprise attack and preparation for the same. This has also been eliminated in the agreed principles. 195. I have now dealt with most of these matters. All that now remains is an aspect or two with regard to the drift towards war. Now, we are not ourselves directly concerned in the Berlin dispute, in the narrower sense. It is not before the United Nations either. We have not sought to bring it before the United Nations because we think that if the great Powers concerned could bring about a settlement—and we hope they will—from all that has been heard that would be the best thing one could think of. 196.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  28. According to the agreed principles, the international inspecting officers would have unrestricted access, without veto, to all places necessary for the purpose of verification. This is a great advance as compared with the resolution which we submitted, and we welcome it—unrestricted access to all places, without veto. It would work out if there was agreement on general and complete disarmament. 193. On the other hand, the agreed principles omit altogether the provisions contained in the sixteen- Power draft resolution which relate to the use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes. No doubt that may well be a simpler matter, because there are only two countries concerned. 194. There was also a provision in the draft resolution with regard to surprise attacks.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  29. But, equally, we have always stated that, any form of disarmament, however well-intentioned or desirable, will take time, whether it takes one minute or one year or ten years; it will take time. But in this twelve-Power draft resolution it is clear that the first part of it is not supposed to be a sort of probationary period or trial experiment, to see how it works—that is, if everybody behaves properly, to go on to the next step. It seeks to commit the world as a whole to disarmament. 191. There has been discussion about this, and that part is still left in ambiguity in the statement of agreed principles. 192. I have dealt with the main aspects, with this exception.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  30. However, the draft resolution asked for the prohibition of these means of war, and this has been the position of the United Nations since 1952, when we accepted the prohibition resolution [502 (VI)]. In that sense, unless it is merely a verbal change, it is something on which we will have something to say afterwards. 190. Then we come to one of the main controversies on which there was a possibility of reaching an agreement in 1960, and that is with regard to what was called partial disarmament and complete disarmament. We are one of those countries who, on the one hand, think that it is not possible in today's world to reach any agreement on disarmament without controls, without inspections and without everything else agreed to.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  31. There is no such provision in the agreed principles. Here is the trouble. International forces had to be used at various times and unanimity could not be obtained in the Assembly, not necessarily as between one bloc or the other, but even as between countries. 188. Another important difference between these agreed principles and the draft resolution, is in regard to nuclear stockpiles. The draft resolution refers to the elimination of nuclear stockpiles and means of chemical and bacteriological warfare. 189. The agreed principles between the Soviet Union and the United States talk about the elimination of nuclear stockpiles. It is not said that once eliminated you cannot replace them.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  32. Until there is international law in the world and until the one- world principle has been agreed upon this is an impossibility. We are not, as Lord Home tried to persuade the Assembly [1017th meeting], ready to accept the doctrine of the balance of power. It is not possible for small countries to accept the idea that the great Powers would have armed forces which would be placed at the disposal of the international authority. The draft resolution as it is put out, and the agreed principles both contemplate such a force, a police force. In the twelve-Power draft resolution national contingents, constituting the international force, should, it is contemplated, exclude the possibility of their being used for purposes inconsistent with the Charter, including their use in the interest of one group of another.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  33. That is the difficulty in using this word because "goal" means that if all difficulties are overcome they will get there. 185. So far as the goal of negotiations is concerned, both countries, as in the draft resolution before the Assembly, have agreed to accept general and complete disarmament, which indeed was accepted even two years ago [resolution 1378 (XIV)]. 186. However, as far as our draft resolution, the twelve-Power draft resolution, is concerned, there is a paragraph in it which enjoins and urges countries to refrain from actions likely to aggravate international tensions. This has been taken out and has been substituted by reliable procedures for the settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace. 187. Now we go on to the other side with regard to the maintenance of international forces.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  34. Last year, my delegation, in common with eleven others , tried to persuade the Assembly to accept the giving of directives to the people who were engaged in disarmament negotiations. For the first time there was an attempt on both sides not to kill the draft resolution but to have it considered. It has been discussed now for a long time and certainly there is the advantage that there has been an agreement put out between the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to the goals of disarmament. And here may I say this. There are two ways of looking at a goal; one is a goal of something you try to reach; but if you look at a goal from the point of view of a goal-keeper, to prevent the other fellow from getting there, then the word "goal" has a different meaning.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  35. The USSR has gone up from 20.72 to 24, suppose that is because of different calculations. Anyway, in every country there has been an increase in military expenditures. 183. We explain the military expenditure in our country as irrelevant for this purpose because it does not come into this particular arms race. However, as a matter of interest it has decreased in the last three years from .613 to .510, so in a small way one makes whatever contribution one can. I do not intend reading out all these figures because, even though they are very important, this would not be welcome perhaps at this time of the evening. 184. With regard to the disarmament position, in 1946, directives [resolution 41 (I)] were given by the United Nations and then we came to a period of deadlock. Again in 1952 directives [resolution 808 (IX)] were formulated.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  36. The Soviets claim to be spending only $10.2 billion a year for arms and armed forces. 181. Ending the arms race absolutely would make it possible to double the incomes of 1.2 billion people who now make less than $100 a year. Or it would enable adequate housing to be provided for 240 million families which are now inadequately housed. 182. Thus while there has been all this talk of cutting down on arms, if you take the year 1950, as regards expenditures on arms of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR, you will see that the expenditure on military budgets in France has gone up from 1.55 to 3.2; in this particular case largely because of colonial wars. The United Kingdom has gone up from 2.38 to 4.2. The Felted States has gone up from 14.6 to 46.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  37. At least 15 million men are members of the various national armies, and a total of 75million men are engaged in tasks directly or indirectly connected with making war. Not included in these totals are an uncounted number of scientists whose research is more or less directly aimed at producing weapons or at improving existing weapons. 180. Of the total arms expenditure, the United States and the Soviet Union together account for 73 per cent, $88 billion a year. The United States has the largest armaments expenditure of any nation—$46 billion a year. This is 55 per cent of the total Federal budget. However, it has been estimated that the Soviets spend as much as $42 billion a year for military expenses, among which would be expenditures titled "Heavy Construction, "Education" and "Scientific Experiments".

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  38. Thus, irrespective of the reasons, the facts are that on both sides armaments expenditure in money goes up more and more and more. An estimate of national defence expenditures for arms, armaments and personnel shows that the world is spending $14 million an hour for arms and armies. All this may not concern the great Powers so much, but I think that the peoples of the world, if they know more and more what is going on in these directions, will less and less use the legalisms and all the arguments, all the "pros" and "cons", all the finding fault one way or another. 179. This is $40 a year for every man, woman and child on earth. That is very much more than the per caput income of the African population of the Congo.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  39. The statement continues: "Taking into consideration the necessity of strengthening the defence potential of the Soviet Union in these conditions, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers of the USSR found it necessary temporarily to retain in the armed forces of the USSR soldiers, sailors, sergeants, sergeant-majors and petty officers of the appropriate arms of the service and qualifications, who have completed their term of military service established by law and are subject to transfer to the reserve, to the amount necessary for securing the combat readiness of the Soviet Army in case of any possible provocations by the aggressive quarters of the Western Powers." 178.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  40. Then it is stated in a statement of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR that it will not fulfil this decision if there is an intensification of war preparations in the NATO member States, threatening the security of the socialist countries. 177. We are not concerned with the reasoning in this matter but with the facts. The fact is that in I960, instead Of a cut-back of 1,200,000 men, they remain.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  41. We read in The New York Times of 5 September 1961 in a dispatch from Warsaw: "Marian Spychalski, Defence Minister, disclosed today that other Soviet-bloc countries, as well as the Soviet Union and Poland, had taken steps 'conducive to the strengthening of defence readiness'."— "Defence readiness" is what it is called politely. The article continues—"General Spychalski, addressing a graduation ceremony of the Czarniecki officers' academy at Poznan, reported in general terms that a military alert had been ordered within the Soviet bloc." 176. In 1955, 1956 and 1958 the Soviet Union claims that its armed forces had been reduced by 2,140,000 men. On 14 January 1960, a decision was taken on a further reduction of the numerical strength of its— the Soviet Union's—armed forces by 1,200,000 men.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  42. On 25 July 1961, the President of the United States asked for an additional grant of $3,247 million of appropriations for the armed forces* To fill out present army divisions and to make more men available for prompt deployment, he requested an increase in the Army's total authorized strength from 875,000 to approximately 1 million men. He requested an increase of 29,000 and 63,000 men respectively in the Navy and Air Force. These are all published figures, so there is no harm in repeating them. 175. Then we go on to the other side.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  43. However, I am sorry to say that already annotations have come out in the way of two statements," one by the United States [A/4891] and one by the Soviet Union [A/4892], which already show the difficulties involved when we embark on a question like that of full and complete disarmament. 173. This is the policy which has been put forward in the twelve-Power draft resolution. By full and complete disarmament we mean full and complete disarmament. I shall come to that in a moment. We may look at the whole of this discussion on disarmament from 1945 onwards. There is no doubt that there has been a considerable amount of debate. At one time it looked as though we would go further and further. But, as my Prime Minister said at Belgrade the other day, looking at the world we see more and more arms and not disarmament. 174.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  44. We have felt that the only way to get anything worth while done in the United Nations on One world issue or another is for the United States and the Soviet Union to come to agreement on it. We have found this to be the true, factual position and from 1952 onwards we have made the appeal each year that unless the United States and the Soviet Union come to an agreement, we are not likely to move forward. We still stand unreservedly by that position. 172. It is quite true that we are all equal here in "status, but as the late Lord Balfour said, equality of status does not mean equality of function! It is in the hands of the powerful nations that the peace of the world immediately rests. Therefore, we hope that this agreement will come about.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  45. I wish he had not, because it is my duty to say that while we have subscribed to that communiqué, my Prime Minister has made it clear beyond any doubt that my country stands by the twelve-Power draft resolution that was submitted to the First Committee in I960 and is still under discussion. We are glad to think that the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations issued by the United States and the USSR in very large measure adopts the substance of the phraseology of the draft resolution. But there are some very significant omissions and significant additions to which I shall briefly refer today. My delegation will no doubt take this up in the First Committee if it comes there for discussion and if the discussions are not taking place among the great Powers outside that context.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  46. Either there are to be nuclear explosions or there are not to be nuclear explosions. It is not sufficient if somebody says that the radiation is greater in Minnesota than somewhere else. It makes no difference to the World as such, because apart from the radiation there is a stepping up of the nuclear arms race, and that concerns us even more than anything else. 170. With regard to disarmament, our Prime Minister recently expressed his views. The ruling party in India yesterday passed a resolution with reservations expressing appreciation of the agreement or whatever you would like to call it—resulting from the exchanges between the Soviet Union and the United Stages. 171. The Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, speaking here the other day [1017th meeting] , referred to the communiqué of the Commonwealth Conference.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  47. "I am confident that some at least of the Russian leaders are anxious to halt testing and development of nuclear weapons before the danger becomes even more uncontrollable. "The good faith of the negotiations is decisive, because indefinite suspension amounts to a test ban without inspection. "... the argument goes, disarmament is impossible until political settlements have been reached and confidence restored. "I disagree. I believe the nuclear arms race with weapons of mass destruction is a new element and in itself a cause of tension... fear will not vanish until the arms race is arrested." 169. It is quite true that there are reservations in the statements, but they both show an attitude of mind which, if I may say it with respect, coincides with the views we have expressed, namely that there cannot be a half-way house in this matter.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  48. This would spur resumption of an absolutely unrestricted drive in the testing of nuclear weapons of, any capacity and under any conditions. The Government that would be the first to resume testing would be assuming grave Responsibility to the nations." 168. Mr. Stevenson, some time before that, said the following: "The recent proposal by some of our leaders that the United States resume underground nuclear tests, just when the first break in the deadlock seems possible, shocked me, I can think of few better ways to chill the prospects, deface our peaceful image, and underscore the Communist propaganda that they are the peacemakers and we the warmongers. We should extend our test suspension so long as negotiations continue in good faith and Russia maintains a similar suspension.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  49. Today, so far as nuclear testing is concerned, with the renewal of tests by the Soviet Union, two or three tests by the United States and the continuation of tests by France, we are in a much worse position than we were in 1959. 167. We hope that the efforts which were made; by the Geneva Conference and which nearly came to a successful conclusion can perhaps be renewed. We may quote what was said recently on the one hand by Mr. Khrushchev and, on the other hand, by Mr. Stevenson. In January 1960, Mr. Khrushchev told the world: "It should not be hard to realize what consequences would follow if, in the present situation, any country were to resume weapons testing. Other nuclear powers would be obliged to follow suit.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)

  50. Then we come back to the same position, that whether it be underground or over ground, with the amount of material available it is quite obvious that there are all sorts of diabolical weapons with either side whish can be released from one place or the other. There is only one way of dealing with the atomic weapon, and that is to do away with it. There cannot be any kind of half-way house. 166. From 1945 to 1958, the United States has been responsible for 169 explosions, the Soviet Union for 55 explosions, the United Kingdom for 21 explosions and France for 4 explosions, making a total of 249. Of course they are of different sizes. The total yield is estimated to be 170 megatons, which is equal to 170 million tons of TNT.

    1961-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 16 (1961)