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VYSHINSKY

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1947-09-24
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1954-09-24
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un-general-debate

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  1. In submitting these proposals, the Soviet Union is fully confident, that they will receive very careful consideration and that they represent a cause which will help the United Nations to fulfil its duty of combating the danger of the use of atomic weapons, halting the armaments race, and averting the threat of a new world war, in the interests of the peace and security of all peoples.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  2. “This international organ shall have full powers of supervision, including the power of inspection on a continuing basis to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the convention by all States. “II. In connexion with the proposal concerning the prohibition of the ‘use of nuclear weapons except in defence against aggression’ in the Franco-British memorandum of 11 June 1954, the General Assembly instructs the United Nations Disarmament Commission to study and clarify this question and submit its recommendations.” 139.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  3. “The carrying out of these measures must be completed not later than the carrying out of the measures taken for the reduction of armament and armed forces referred to in paragraph 2 (a), and the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons shall cease immediately, as soon as a start is made with the reduction of armaments, armed forces and appropriations for military requirements in respect of the remaining 50 per cent of the agreed standards. “(c) States shall institute a standing international organ for the supervision of the implementation of the convention (treaty) on the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, the discontinuance of the production of these weapons and their elimination from the armaments of States and the reduction of armaments, armed forces an appropriations for military requirements.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  4. On completion of the measures referred to in paragraph 1, the following measures shall be taken simultaneously: “(a) In the course of six months (or one year), States shall reduce their armaments, armed forces and budgetary appropriations for military requirements by the remaining 50 per cent of the agreed levels from the strength of armaments and armed forces existing on 31 December 1953, and shall reduce their appropriations from the amount of actual expenditure on military requirements during the year ending 31 December 1953. “(b) A complete prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction shall be carried into effect, the production of such weapons shall be discontinued and they shall be entirely eliminated from the armaments of States; all existing atomic materials shall be used only for peaceful purposes.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  5. “(b) For the purposes of supervising the fulfilment by States of the obligations in connexion with the reduction of armaments and armed forces provided for in sub-paragraph (a), a temporary international control commission shall be established under the Security Council with the right to require States to provide the necessary information on the measures taken by them to reduce armaments and armed forces. The commission shall take the necessary steps to supervise the fulfilment by States of the obligations assumed by them in connexion with the reduction of armaments, armed forces and appropriations for military requirements. States shall periodically supply the commission at established intervals with information concerning the implementation of the measures provided for in the convention. “2.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  6. The following measures shall be taken simultaneously : “(a) In the course of six months (or one year), States shall reduce their armaments, armed forces and budgetary appropriations for military requirements to the extent of 50 per cent of the agreed levels. Armaments and armed forces shall be reduced from the strength of armaments and armed forces existing on 31 December 1953, and appropriations shall be reduced from the amount of actual expenditure on military requirements during the year ending 31 December 1953.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  7. The General Assembly instructs the United Nations Disarmament Commission to prepare and submit for confirmation by the Security Council a draft international convention (treaty) designed to strengthen peace and increase international security and providing for the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction and their elimination from the armaments of States, a substantial reduction in armaments and the establishment of international control over the implementation of these decisions on the basis of the French and United Kingdom proposals of 11 June 1954. “Accordingly, the convention (treaty) should contain the following basic provisions: “1.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  8. The Soviet Union delegation accordingly submits the following draft resolution [A/2742 and Corr.1] to the present session of the General Assembly; it is entitled “Conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction”. “I.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  9. The Soviet Union resolutely and consistently follows a policy of peace, emphasizing the need for sound and radical measures capable of removing the threat of a new world war, and thus preventing incalculable further suffering and the death of countless million human beings. 137. At every session, the Soviet Union has devoted its efforts, and will do so at the present session also, to securing a successful solution of this important task, indeed this task of paramount importance. The Soviet Union is firmly convinced that the General Assembly can solve it. It must solve it, and thus fulfil the desire of the peoples clamouring for peace and security. 138.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  10. The most pressing, vital and practical need of all capitalist States, as had become crystal clear during the past few years, was, he said, the development, regulation and expansion of trade with Russia. Disputes and quarrels might develop; various groups might break away — it was even extremely probable that they would do so — but in the final analysis, he continued, this interest, this basic economic need would triumph. It could be asserted with some degree of confidence that the expansion of normal trade relations between the Soviet Republic and all the other capitalist countries of the world would inevitably continue. 136.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  11. The external links between the USSR and the Western countries are constantly increasing and are injecting a spirit of confidence and respect for mutual interests and advantages into the international political atmosphere. 134. Soviet foreign trade policy, aimed at strengthening the free and extensive development of international economic relations, is an integral part of Soviet foreign policy which reflects the firm desire of the Soviet nation to live in peace and harmony with all peoples and to strengthen peace and international security. 135. Over thirty years ago the great founder of the Soviet State, Lenin, pointed out with reference to the Genoa Conference that co-operation between the Soviet Republic and capitalist countries was possible and even inevitable.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  12. Matters are held up by obstacles such as the Battle Act, by various restrictions which must be removed, if the hopes of the world are to be fulfilled. This is precisely the aim of the policy of the Soviet Union, which is expanding and developing its relations with all countries prepared to reciprocate. With every year the Soviet Union is expanding its foreign trade relations and the volume of its foreign trade has more than doubled since 1948. The course of events itself is eliminating the obstacles which attempts are being made to place in the way of the development of economic relations between the Soviet Union and Western countries.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  13. As the experience of the past year has shown, the overwhelming majority of business circles throughout the world are anxious to expand trade and economic relations with the USSR, the People’s Republic of China and the peoples’ democracies, realizing that such relations would open the door wide to economic, cultural and political prosperity. 132. Only the other day, the British periodical The Economist (I happened to come across this item) published a statement by the deputy president of the Associated British Chambers of Commerce. In that article the deputy president stated that “the biggest short-term hope for an expansion of oversea markets lay in an increase in East-West trading.” 133. What then is the difficulty? What is holding matters up?

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  14. It should be noted that a recent report of the United States Foreign Operations Administration — I should also like to mention some favourable aspects of the activities of institutions in other countries, including the United States — contains a statement to the effect that there is a growing belief in Western Europe that great possibilities exist for trade between East and West, and that for the Western countries this trade could be a source of real prosperity, capable of remedying unemployment, poverty and exchange difficulties and of laying the foundation for a lasting and secure peace. This is not propaganda on my part; I am basing myself on one of the recent reports of the United States Foreign Operations Administration. 131.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  15. It also corresponds to the interests of peace and international security, in the maintenance of which trade plays an important part by bringing individuals closer together, eliminating mutual distrust and providing an opportunity for genuinely peaceful co-operation. 130. It is quite natural that there should be a wide spread movement throughout the world in favour of the normalization of international economic relations and in particular trade relations.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  16. The resumption of imports from Eastern Europe, the USSR, the People’s Republic of China, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and other countries, at the level prevailing before the passage of the Battle Act and other restrictive measures, would, according to experts, enable the countries of Western Europe to save about $600 million on commodities such as wheat, maize and barley, raw tobacco, lumber, crude oil and oil products alone. 129. There is clearly an urgent need to eliminate artificial barriers to the normalization of trade and of economic relations in general. This is required by the fundamental and vital interest of all peoples. It is required by the interest of the under-developed countries for which the lifting of the embargo and similar trade restrictions is particularly urgent.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  17. The latter is being aggravated by United States measures restricting trade, the embargo on trade with the People’s Republic of China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and other similar measures, which also done serious harm to the countries of Western Europe. Western Europe could easily overcome the “dollar famine” if the restrictions imposed on its trade with the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China and the people’s democracies were lifted.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  18. The policy of negotiation from strength also Provides the United States monopolies with an important pretext for maintaining a military economy at the highest possible level with a view to preventing the intensification of the depression cycle which the country has already entered, and to reaping further profits from military deliveries. 128. The symptoms of a crisis in the United States are having harmful repercussions on the economy of the other Western countries as well as of agrarian and Colonial countries. The economic policy of the United States, with its high tariffs, legislation regarding the preferential purchase of American goods, and so forth, is hampering exports from Western Europe to the United States and is resulting in the “dollar famine”.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  19. The success of the Geneva Conference, which thwarted the aggressive designs of the advocates of the policy of negotiation from strength, the failures sustained by United States foreign policy in efforts to secure the ratification of the so-called European Defence Community Treaty, and the failure of attempts to prevent a cease-fire in Indo-China, have driven the reactionary circles of some countries, including the United States and its Western allies, into further endeavours to prevent the relaxation of international tension and the normalization of international relations. We do not doubt that these endeavours are doomed to failure, as the nations’ will for peace is growing ever stronger, while the forces of war are steadily weakening. This is an important development which is deeply gratifying to all supporters of peace. 127.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  20. This policy, under which various national measures of a military character are planned, accordingly revolves around the atomic weapon, which has officially been declared the basis for the practical implementation of United States foreign policy. It engenders a national war psychosis, arouses enmity and hatred of other peoples, encourages propaganda for a new world war, which in turn inevitably leads to an armaments race, the establishment of an ever-increasing number of military bases in foreign territories, and the formation of an ever-increasing number of military blocs justified by misleading references to defence against some non-existent threat from the Communist countries. 126.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  21. Baruch adds: “The dangers of atomic attack would not be lessened.” “The atomic-arms race would not slacken.” 124. If we take the past year, we find that throughout the period since the proposal for an atomic pool was made, the United States has not reduced but has increased the tempo of the armaments race, the rate of stockpiling, nuclear weapons and the development of other military and aggressive measures. This is particularly true where nuclear weapons are concerned. 125. Numerous events during that year indicate that in its foreign policy the United States is still relying on the policy of “negotiating from strength”.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  22. In this connexion, I would like to refer to the opinion expressed by the famous scholar Mr. Bernard Baruch, a co-author of the well-known Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan for the control of atomic energy, in his book A Philosophy For Our Time, with which I recently became acquainted. In this book, which Is available in any bookshop in New York, Mr. Baruch acknowledges that there is a danger of the atomic weapon being used, notwithstanding the creation of atomic pools and other schemes aimed, and rightly so, at ensuring the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and deserving of general support. In his book Mr. Baruch states: “Whatever is allotted this international pool, different nations would still hold back the larger of available fissionable materials for developing atomic and other nuclear weapons.” Mr.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  23. As for our proposal that States should pledge themselves not to use atomic or hydrogen weapons, the need for such an agreement has certainly not passed. On the contrary, various facts which I have just cited and which there is no need for me to repeat, show that it is more urgent than ever, for no one can deny the reality of the danger of the atomic armaments race and of the use of atomic weapons, the danger even of the preparations being made for the use of such weapons; in other words, the danger of the launching of an atomic war, and primarily for preventive purposes. It is all the more important, therefore, that the United Nations should take steps to ensure that no country dares to use this weapon. Nor should anyone be allowed to produce this weapon, which should be outlawed. Such a danger undoubtedly exists. 123.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  24. Nor can we overlook the fact that the proposal of 8 December passes in silence over the question of prohibiting the use of atomic weapons, and ignores the persistent demands of the peoples for the outlawing of atomic weapons and their exclusion from national armaments. 121. But such a position on this matter is not calculated to promote the maintenance of international peace and security. The Soviet Union considers it essential that an international agreement should be reached ensuring the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for purposes of war and making possible the use of atomic energy solely for the peaceful needs of mankind. The possibilities of agreement with a view to international co-operation for the peaceful use of atomic energy are far from being exhausted. Of that we are profoundly convinced. 122.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  25. Lodge before he spoke on 24 September — it is clearly stated: “The Soviet Government declares its willingness to continue these negotiations for the examination of the proposals of the Soviet Government as well as the proposals of the Government of the United States of America.” How can it be said in these circumstances that the Soviet Government has refused to take part in such negotiations? How can anyone say that? For whose ears is such a statement intended? 119. Equally groundless are attempts to depict the USSR’s position with regard to participation in measures for the peaceful use of atomic energy as one hedged about with certain prior conditions. 120.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  26. The baselessness of these assertions may be seen if one refers, for instance, to that passage of the Soviet Union Government’s aide-memoire of 27 April to the United States Government which says: “Inasmuch as it is the constant aspiration of the Government of the USSR, to assist in strengthening peace among nations and under present conditions, in particular, to assist in the elimination of the threat of an atomic war, the Soviet Government has expressed readiness to take part in the appropriate negotiations.” 118. In the aide-memoire of 22 September — the contents of which were undoubtedly known to Mr. Dulles before he made his statement on 23 September, and certainly to Mr.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  27. Unfortunately this proposal has not as yet been crystallized in the form of some sort of programme or plan, and we shall therefore clearly have to revert to the question later, after we have received more concrete proposals and corresponding documents. 117. The correspondence between the USSR and the United States on this question [A/2738] has just been published. Anyone who reads it can familiarize himself fully with the Soviet Union’s position on the question of measures for the peaceful use of atomic energy. In this connexion I cannot but express my surprise at the fact that Mr. Dulles, in his speech to the General Assembly [475th meeting], and Mr. Lodge, in the General Committee [94th meeting], declared that the Soviet Union Government had rejected the proposal for negotiations on measures for the peaceful use of atomic energy.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  28. The Soviet Union Government was convinced that this would open up unprecedented possibilities for the expansion of industry, agriculture and transport, for the application of atomic science to medicine, for technical advance and the further progress of science. The Soviet Union Government believes that the United States proposal of 8 December [470th meeting] will do nothing to remove the threat of an atomic war, which is causing growing anxiety in many countries, particularly in view of the emergence of new and increasingly destructive types of atomic and hydrogen weapons. That is the Soviet Union’s position. 116. Now we have a new item on the agenda for this session: international co-operation in developing the peaceful uses of atomic energy [item 67].

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  29. The preamble to that declaration expressed the resolve to free mankind from the threat of a destructive war with the use of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction. It also stressed the desire to encourage, by every means possible, the application of scientific discoveries in the field of atomic energy solely to peaceful uses for the benefit of the peoples and the improvement of their standards of living. 115. In taking this position the Soviet Union Government was acting in line with its view that atomic materials should be used wholly, not merely in part, for peaceful ends alone; that the achievements of scientists in this field should serve not the purposes of war and mass annihilation but the purpose of promoting economic progress and the prosperity of mankind.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  30. Thus the frantic race to turn atomic energy into an instrument of death instead of a source of wealth — to use Mr. Dulles’ own words — has continued. 114. As early as last year, the Soviet Union Government, at the time of the proposal of 8 December, stressed the great significance of the practical possibility of using atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and expressed its readiness to take part in negotiations on this subject. On 30 January and 2 February 1954 the Government of the Soviet Union conveyed to the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France the text of a draft declaration for the unconditional abandonment of the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  31. And this policy also meets the wishes of influential military groups, headed by military leaders such as Admiral Radford and General Gruenther, who are at present busy on the preparation of what is called long-range strategy, again based on preventive war with the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons. 113. In the Western countries, and in particular in the United States, the past year has been one of intensified rearmament. In the United States this has been expressed primarily in the stockpiling of atomic and hydrogen weapons, reflected in turn in increased expenditure for the Atomic Energy Commission — according to statements by reliable persons, the appropriations for these purposes have reached a figure higher than in any previous year.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  32. This fact alone has strengthened faith in the great future of atomic energy in the service of the peaceful needs of mankind; at the same time, however, it has caused great disquiet in the camp of the militarists, who, as we know, are not interested in the development of the production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. 112. Many facts go to show that progress in this direction is of little importance to these people, whose entire attention and energy is directed to the maximum development of atomic weapons production. They continue to count on their presumed superiority in this field; and they are not beyond attempting to aggravate international tension still further, for such tension is the source of vast military programmes which the monopolies are only too happy to carry out.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  33. On the other hand, fabulous profits are being made in the production of atomic weapons by the great monopolies, in whose hands all military contracts are concentrated. The production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes is of no great interest to them, nor even perhaps to the political leaders of the United States. No wonder that according to reliable sources it will be three or four years before an atomic reactor for the production of electric power, that is to say for a peaceful purpose, will be put into production in the United States; whereas the Soviet Union has already constructed a power station using atomic energy. The inauguration of this power station in the USSR marked the outset of a veritable industrial and technical revolution.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  34. If you compare the military expenditure of the United States during the current financial year with its expenditure on social insurance, health, education and housing, you will see that for all these latter items the budget allocates only 4.2 per cent of total expenditure, whereas 66 per cent of the total goes directly to military purposes. This comparison clearly reveals the character of the budget, the character of national policy; for, I repeat, the budget is the most faithful mirror of State policy. These figures, which typify the current United States budget, eloquently illustrate what is really meant by the so-called policy of negotiation from strength; they show how heavy a burden it lays upon the taxpayers, and what serious deficiencies they suffer, as a result, in education, health and other social and cultural spheres. 111.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  35. national policy decision was made to take every advantage of such progress to assure that the United States maintains its superiority. The President directed the Commission to continue to produce atomic weapons during 1954 consistent with this decision.” Am I justified in saying that United States policy gives first place to the production of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons? I think I am. 109. It is well known that the life of a State is most faithfully reflected in its budget. While I do not wish to go into details here, I cannot but observe that the budgets of the Western Powers clearly reflect a policy of militarism. That is particularly true of the budget of the United States. 110.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  36. The fact that stockpiling of atomic weapons is the primary consideration in United States policy may be seen from the recently published semi-annual report of the Atomic Energy Commission (Major Activities w the Atomic Energy Programme, January-June 1954). Some interesting things can be read in this report; for instance: “The nation’s atomic weapons stockpile, growing rapidly in total numbers, reflects a trend of increased variety and versatility of weapons.” The same report goes on to say: "Development of a ‘family of weapons’ ” — “family” indeed! — “has extended the military usefulness of available fissionable material. Paralleling fission weapon development since 1950 there has been in progress a concerted development effort on thermo-nuclear weapons. ... A.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  37. Clark, the former State Department lawyer whose words I have already quoted said, there need be no lack of pretexts then this massive retaliation will take place. 107. From what I have said it is obvious that to the authors of this theory everything is plain sailing. Enormous breaches will be opened; the attackers will pour through — and victory will fall into their laps. Everything will go smoothly according to plan. But in my country we have a saying for the boasting of such blusterers: “The road looks nice and smooth on paper, but you’ve forgotten the holes, and you’ve got to get over them first.” True indeed, they must not be forgotten. 108.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  38. The inveterate militarists are inflaming warlike passions by disseminating propaganda about the might of the American atomic artillery, which, they say quite frankly, could open huge breaches in the enemy’s lines, through which the attacking units would rush to complete the victory. So much for this so-called retaliatory blow. That is preventive war. The object of this policy is that one should be in a position to strike the first blow if there should suddenly appear on the political or international horizon the spectre of an impending attack — whether real or imagined matters little. Once such an imaginary danger appears in any quarter and even if it fails to appear it can always be invented — as Mr.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  39. Strauss, took the same line in the Senate Committee on Appropriations, when he said that in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, full advantage should be taken of the superiority in thermo-nuclear weapons in order to maintain United States pre-eminence. 105. In line with this decision to make extensive use of atomic and hydrogen weapons — which are essentially offensive weapons — measures are being taken for the maximum possible equipment of the armed forces with atomic weapons, artillery rockets with atomic warheads of the “Honest John”, “Corporal” and “Regulus” types, and so forth. 106.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  40. Surely these threats of open attack in every quarter of the globe reveal the truly aggressive intention of what is called retaliation. Defined in those terms, the policy would in fact inevitably be one not of retaliating blows but of striking the first blow. The talk of retaliation is intended to divert attention from the preparations being carried on to start a war. 103. The true intention of this policy has been even more clearly revealed by Mr. Gordon Dean, a highly responsible person and former Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. Recently, in one of the most striking numbers of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Mr. Dean made a direct appeal for a preventive atomic war against the Soviet Union. 104. The present Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Rear Admiral Lewis L.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  41. Those who are organizing the preparations for massive retaliation — which is not, cannot be and is not intended to be a matter of retaliation — proceed from the premise that if they are not to lose the war against the presumptive enemy, the American generals will be well advised to start it themselves. Such plans are a repetition of Hitler’s crazy blitzkrieg schemes, or of those of the Japanese militarists who attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor. 101. In a speech he made earlier this year, Mr. Dulles, advertising this massive retaliation policy, said that the United States must be ready to strike a blow in any part of the world. He said where: in the Arctic or the tropics, in Asia, the Near East or Europe, at sea, oh land or in the air, and with conventional or new weapons. There is retaliation for you. 102.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  42. The plan for so-called massive retaliatory action is in reality nothing more or less than a plan for a preventive war. The qualification “retaliatory” is patently false and is intended to mislead public opinion, to give the impression that the military operations in preparation are merely a counter-attack although the myth of a pending attack on the United States has long been exploded. 100. The policy of massive retaliation clearly stems from the desire to unleash a preventive war: to strike the first blow, for that is what preventive war means.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  43. This respected legal adviser to the State Department maintained in his memorandum that many pretexts had been given for such action. It had usually been justified by reference to humanitarianism, the defence of the citizens of the country concerned, and so on and so forth. Although this was written 50 years ago, it is just as apposite today. 98. An attempt was also made at Manila to camouflage this new act of aggression by references to the objectives of protection and security, although such references could mislead no one. 99. Simultaneously with the organization of the Manila bloc the work of staff officers and other experts is proceeding on the drafting of plans for a new world war. In this connexion, attempts are being made to base the whole system of military measures on a plan for so-called massive retaliatory action.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  44. Revealing as they do the military designs of their organizers and participants, such agreements give the lie to declarations of peaceful intentions and to assertions that their purpose is to ensure the protection and security of the peoples of areas which have attracted the special attention of the monopolies. 97. Long ago though it was, the eminent United States jurist, J. Reuben Clark, was right when he stated in a memorandum written 50 years ago: No single country had so often used its armed forces for the temporary occupation of parts of the territory of foreign States as the United States. Such intervention, he went on to say, had developed into actual intervention in “the political affairs of foreign States.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  45. This is a matter of special concern to the United States monopolies, which lay claim to world leadership, but are being frustrated by the success of the national liberation movement in the East and Asia. 95. The strength of these interests, which the United States discovers in all parts of the world, is well known. Equally well known are the methods by which the United States has invariably and persistently defended these interests since the time of President McKinley. 96. These admissions make it clear that objectives and schemes such as those activating the authors of the Manila Treaty have nothing in common with the interests of peace.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  46. He described the former as a “rice bowl”, “an area that is rich in many raw materials, such as tin, rubber, oil, iron ore.” He said later that the loss of the Chinese continent was a great disaster for the United States, a disaster which would be heightened if to it were added the loss of the millions of people, the vast economic resources and strategic positions of South-East Asia and the Pacific islands. 94. All these admissions leave no room for doubt that the Manila bloc was organized to enable the imperialist monopolies to continue, unimpeded, their exploitation of the natural wealth of the Asian countries and of the peoples of these countries themselves.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  47. Then in between are the islands themselves, Japan, the Ryukyus, embracing Okinawa, Formosa, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. The United States has a security tie, of one sort or another, with each of these areas, not formalized in some cases, in the form of a treaty, but nevertheless very real and very actual.” 93. Some time later, on 29 March, Mr. Dulles made a further statement on the same question — namely, Indo-China and South-East Asia.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  48. But what are these “important interests” which are at stake in southern Asia? 92. An idea of the nature of the “important interests” in southern Asia, with which the United States is so concerned, can readily be obtained from a perusal of the official record of the meeting of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 13 January 1954. According to this record, Mr. Dulles made the following statement in the Committee: “The interest of the United States in that part of the area is, from a strategic standpoint, very closely tied into what is commonly called the offshore island chain. The offshore island chain has, in essence, two land bases: At the north, the Korean mainland, and in the south, we would hope in Indo-China.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  49. Having decided to camouflage these objectives by references to the need to guarantee the so-called freedom and independence of the Asian peoples, the sponsors of such plans do not, however, conceal the fact that the concept of independence does not interest them in the slightest. All that matters is to state that it does, in order to facilitate the recruitment of troops for the armies of the puppet regimes and thus more readily to conceal their own participation in this military adventure, their own interest in this war. With that end in view, they are again planning to make use of the title and flag of the United Nations, which, according to a State Department representative, must give its moral sanction to this military undertaking allegedly organized for the defence of “important interests at stake”.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  50. The real intention underlying the plan for the so-called defence of South-East Asia is to undertake armed intervention in Asia with the help of some Asian countries, intervention on a “collective basis”, to use the term coined by some of the leading proponents of the plan. The plan is similar to the plan for the Korean war, involving the organization of foreign intervention with the participation of a few unimportant Asian countries in order to conceal the special interest of the colonists in dominating and in continuing to dominate the area it is a plan to suppress the national-liberation movement in the South-East Asian countries by means of a perfidious scheme to set one group of Asian peoples against another. 91.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)