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VYSHINSKY

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1947-09-24
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1954-09-24
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un-general-debate

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  1. 52. What is important, however, is not that certain proposals should be studied, but the content and value of those proposals; whether or not a real and absolutely necessary solution can be found to this serious, vital problem. And there can be no serious solution of the problem of atomic armaments without their unconditional prohibition, a subject which the United States of America, England and France persistently avoid in their statement. That is the fact. 53. The three Powers also propose in their statement that a resolution should be adopted concerning the provision of information on armaments, it being understood that this information would be furnished progressively, or, in the words of the statement, “ in successive stages Some people, including the last speaker, General Romulo, are enthusiastic about this proposal.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  2. The plan is entirely unsatisfactory and cannot be accepted by any sensible person who really wishes to solve the problem and really stands for prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes and for its use exclusively for peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, the plan is praised to the skies here by Mr. Acheson and Mr. Eden, who are attempting to win us over by advancing, among their other proposals, one for the inclusion of atomic weapons in the same “system of disclosure and verification” as conventional armaments. Mr. Eden calls this an advance with respect to atomic armaments, and says that had the three Powers made no other proposal their statement would nevertheless deserve study by the Assembly. Even for the wisest it is never too late to learn; the proverb contrasts “the light of learning with the darkness of ignorance”.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  3. An international control organ is to be set up to ensure that no one should be able to produce the atomic weapon; and provision is made for that control organ to include a special research institution for the further study of the possibilities of further developing the atomic weapon! 51. That is the plan which, according to the tripartite statement, is to serve as the basis for that part of the general programme for the reduction of armaments which concerns atomic weapons. Naturally the Soviet Union was and still is unable to agree to a plan which instead of prohibiting atomic armaments, legalizes the production and use of those barbaric weapons for mass slaughter.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  4. In the terse expression of the head of the USSR Government, Stalin, it is a take-off, a travesty of international control. 50. Note that this plan, which is supposed to be a plan for the international control of prohibition of the atomic weapon — notice this point particularly — not only fails to provide for prohibition of the atomic weapon, but provides — and this in my opinion is monstrous — that the international control organ, responsible for ensuring that the future decision prohibiting the atomic weapon is correctly, honestly and conscientiously carried out, the very organ created for that purpose, should possess a research department of its own which would deal, as is stated in various American documents, with the development and use of the atomic weapon. It is enough to make a cat laugh!

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  5. Thus the plan which is now cited by the tripartite statement not only does not provide for prohibition of the production of atomic weapons but, on the contrary, stipulates that the United States may continue to produce atomic weapons after the international control plan goes into effect. This is one of the characteristic features of the Baruch Plan. Another is that it provides for the kind of international control system for atomic energy that must inevitably lead to the unlimited power of American monopolists, who would thereby become masters of the whole world’s economy, including the resources of atomic energy. Thus this plan is not a plan for international control but for American control, which bears no relation to the objectives of a genuine international control organ.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  6. I will gladly make room for them on this rostrum, which I shall not occupy forever. 48. Perhaps they will reply to the question as to the meaning of the letter, signed four or five years ago by Mr. Acheson, to the then Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, in which it was stated that even after the so-called international control plan had been put into effect the United States would by no means be obliged to discontinue production of atomic weapons, but that everything would still depend on ratification, on discussion of political conditions, on the international situation, which the Senate would be bound to take into account when it finally decided the question along with the House of Representatives. 49.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  7. Lilienthal, one of the authors of the “Baruch Plan”, and composed of such prominent specialists in the production of atomic weapons as Barnard, Oppenheimer, Thomas and others, pointed out in referring to this so-called international control plan, which the tripartite statement now cites, that the plan did not require the United States to discontinue the production of atomic weapons even after the international control plan had been put into effect? Is that a fact or is it not? 47. Up till now I have received no reply to this question. Such eloquent members of the United States delegation as Mr. Austin, who, as we know, replies to any question with a wide variety of objections, have hitherto given no answer. Perhaps they will answer this time, if only under rule 74.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  8. But we all know that this so-called plan for the control of atomic energy and prohibition of atomic weapons, which has already been imposed upon a majority of the States Members of the United Nations by the United States, although it may speak of international control of atomic energy and of achieving the prohibition of atomic weapons through such control, in reality contains neither international control nor prohibition of atomic weapons. 46. Have we already forgotten that as long ago as 1946 the United States Committee on Atomic Energy — the Chairman of which was the present Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Acheson, whom I am pleased to see among us — in a report prepared with the assistance of its Board of Consultants, headed by Mr.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  9. Take, for example, such an extremely important matter as the prohibition of atomic weapons; it turns out that the statement does not provide for the prohibition of atomic weapons at all. This is utterly unacceptable. It is certainly no accident that the tripartite statement, in paragraph 5, merely mentions casually that the basis “for the atomic energy aspects of any general programme for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces” should continue to be the so-called “United Nations plan for the international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons”.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  10. We have already pointed out that these proposals of the three Powers [A/1943], submitted in their much advertised plan for the reduction of armed forces and armaments, including atomic weapons, and allegedly aimed at reducing the danger of war and strengthening the security of all countries, by their very nature do not conform to the advertisement. A careful analysis of the tripartite statement containing these proposals is enough to convince us that this is so. 44. In my first appearance here [336th meeting] I was not able, of course, to subject that statement to the thorough analysis it fully deserved. I confined myself then to a few passing remarks, and shall not conceal the fact that I also informed the Assembly that the statement had made me laugh. But more of that later, if at all. 45.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  11. By his leave I will now speak on the substance of the matter. 42. During the general debate which has now reached its closing stages, many representatives have touched on a series of extremely important questions arising mainly from the statements and proposals of the United States, United Kingdom and French delegations on the one hand and of the delegation of the Soviet Union on the other. Although considerable attention has already been paid to those proposals, not all the questions have been sufficiently clarified; they cannot therefore be regarded as exhausted. 43.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  12. I might of course retort by asking the leader of the Australian delegation, who is also the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tell me what he regards as unusual. I might answer his question by another; but assuming that the question is put in a friendly way my reply is that what I intended to say will be unusual from his point of view and entirely usual from mine. The Australian representative pointed out that this is a democratic assembly. But his speech proves that his position at least has nothing whatsoever to do with democracy. 41. To conclude these explanations, I would, with respect, ask the President to allow me to speak on the substance of the matter without wasting any more precious time in empty prattle and in a slanging match with the Australian delegation.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  13. Thus the way I have chosen is the usual, constitutional way and no one is entitled to prevent me from speaking again in accordance with rule 74. I would ask the President to be guided by rule 74 as well as by rule 69. It is argued that in such circumstances the plenary meeting might turn into an endless “long parliament”. But that depends on the members and on the President. If anybody wants to answer my statement, the President must permit him to reply under rule 74. Some representatives will probably desire to do so, the Australian representative himself, for instance. I am not going to ask him now what he intends to say; I have enough patience to wait a while and hear him. 40. It is suggested, if you please, that no objection would be raised if I had anything unusual to say.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  14. It is humiliating to the Assembly — I am not referring to the personal humiliation, inflicted on me — to reply to the question of the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has apparently not mastered the elementary rules of courtesy which prevail in international gatherings. 39. I must point out that I did not reach the rostrum at which I now stand by some devious way, but through the legitimate method of putting my name down two days ago to speak, again in accordance with rule 74 of the rules of procedure, and in the knowledge that neither the rules of procedure, nor the Charter upon which those rules are based, contain provisions depriving any delegation of the right to speak twice on any question.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  15. The USSR delegation calls on all the representatives present here to support these proposals, which it firmly believes will be welcomed by all nations striving for peace and by all peace-loving peoples. 38. I had never imagined that any representative, whether of a great or a small State, could have been placed in so humiliating a position as that in which the Australian representative has tried to place me, nor that any such attempt could have been made towards any representative enjoying equality of rights in our Organization. We have, of course, become used to all kinds of infamous proceedings, including police measures and police cross-examination, but I don’t submit to the latter.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  16. “The General Assembly recommends that the above mentioned World Conference should be convened at the earliest possible date and in any case not later than 1 June 1952. “4. The General Assembly calls upon the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to conclude a peace pact and to combine their efforts for achieving this high and noble aim. “The General Assembly also calls upon all other peace-loving States to join in the Peace Pact.” 108. The Soviet Union Government believes that the adoption of these proposals, some of which have been submitted previously by the USSR delegation for the General Assembly’s consideration, would play an important part in maintaining peace throughout the world. 109.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  17. The General Assembly recognizes it to be essential that: “ (a) The countries taking part in the Korean war should immediately end military operations, conclude a truce and withdraw their forces from the 38th Parallel within a period of ten days ; “ (b) All foreign troops, and also foreign volunteer forces, should be withdrawn from Korea within a period of three months. “ 3. The General Assembly calls upon the governments of all States, both those which are Members of the United Nations and those which are not at present in the United Nations, to consider at a World Conference the question of a substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments and also the question of practical measures for prohibiting the atomic weapon and establishing international control over the observance of such prohibition.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  18. On its Government’s instructions, and with a view to strengthening the peace and security of the peoples and averting the threat of another world war, the USSR delegation submits the following proposal for the consideration of the General Assembly [A/1944] : 1. The General Assembly declares participation in the aggressive Atlantic bloc and the creation by certain States, and primarily by the United States of America, of military, naval and air bases in foreign territory incompatible with membership of the United Nations. “ 2.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  19. The delegation of the Soviet Union, acting on its Government’s instructions, is submitting proposals which it firmly believes will be an important means of attaining the purpose which millions and millions of people throughout the world dream of and for which they live and toil. 106. The USSR delegation is convinced that the struggle for peace will end in a complete victory for peace. “Peace”, as Generalissimo Stalin has said, “will be preserved and fortified if the peoples take the matter of preserving it into their own hands and if they defend its cause to the end”. We believe that the General Assembly should listen to the voice of the peoples and fulfil its duty in this great and noble cause. 107.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  20. It is further essential that every State should take immediate steps to reduce its armed forces and armaments and to divert its funds from military budgets to satisfying the needs of the peoples, improving their material condition and safeguarding their welfare. 104. It is essential that the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Soviet Union should at last make a concerted effort to conclude among themselves a peace pact, such as the one we have been striving for four years, a fact which all peace-loving peoples should be asked to join. Action along these lines would frustrate the aggressive plans of the ruling circles in the United States, the United Kingdom and certain other countries, and would remove the threat of another world war. 105.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  21. We would counsel you to pay greater attention to these matters in your own country, in the vicinity of your own noses, so to speak, and to keep those noses out of other people’s countries. 101. It is essential that the manufacture of atomic weapons should be prohibited without delay and that a strict international control should be set up to see that this prohibition is obeyed, so that atomic energy and the existing stocks of atomic bombs could be used solely and exclusively for civilian purposes. 102. It is essential for nations to end the armaments race, stop the setting up of military bases in foreign territories, and finally, withdraw all their troops from foreign territories. 103.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  22. I too would like to refer to what I read in a French evening paper about a revolting crime recently committed in Florida. Two negroes, Leon Shepherd and Walter Irving, had been convicted by an American Court of the traditional crime of raping a white woman. They were later acquitted and set free by the United States Supreme Court because of the many and varied irregularities which had occurred during their trial. After their acquittal by the United States Supreme Court these unfortunate negroes were openly shot by the sheriff of Eustace, Florida, and a third negro was shot in the sheriff’s presence by a policeman. 100. This is apparently what human rights mean in America; this is apparently the meaning of the American Way of life, which we so firmly reject and which we would advise you to look into more closely.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  23. The United States, however, is unwilling to take any steps to end the Korean war, as this would be against the wishes of the American multimillionaires, who are growing rich on this war, on war hysteria and on the armaments race. 98. Mr. Acheson saw fit to repeat the slander — I will refrain from using a harsher word out of deference to this Assembly, but no doubt you will all be able to provide a suitable epithet — about the infringement of human rights in, he said, a “ large ” area of the world, referring in this connexion to Hungary and Czechoslovakia. I shall not dwell on this matter particularly since these slanderous inventions spread about in Mr. Acheson’s camp have already been repeatedly and fully refuted. 99. But Mr. Acheson speaks of the infringement of human rights in other countries.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  24. Acheson today, “ and while the major political issues that divide the nations remain unsettled ”, — I am quoting from the relevant part of the speech made by the President of the United States yesterday — “real progress toward reducing armaments may not be possible”. 96. This remark is characteristic. It clearly reveals the true meaning of the so-called three-power peace offensive led by the United States of America at the sixth session of the General Assembly in 1951. That offensive is supposed to open a new era in the fight for peace, but in fact it has nothing to do with peace or the strengthening of peace. 97. If the purpose really is to strengthen peace, any sincere plan for the reduction of armed forces and armaments must be based on an equally sincere attempt to put an immediate end to the war in Korea.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  25. Instead of dealing with the vitally important and serious matter of making a real effort to avert the threat of another world war and ensure the security of the peoples, they attempt to evade that issue by empty chatter purporting to deal with the reduction of armaments, the first stage in which process — and no one knows how many years that stage may last — being devoted to the rearmament of States. 95. It is difficult to see what value can be attached to this whole scheme, as outlined in the so-called tripartite declaration, because, in submitting their proposals for a so-called reduction of armaments, the authors of the proposals declare that as long as the Korean war continues, as we were told by the President of the United States of America yesterday and again by Mr.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  26. The sponsors of these proposals stated yesterday and today, with their customary lack of ceremony, that they insist — this phrase, please note, is used in speaking to the Soviet Union — that they “insist” that the Kremlin accept their proposals. Is this all you wish to insist on, gentlemen? They will insist on the Soviet Union’s accepting these proposals, and at the same time they make slanderous allegations about the Iron Curtain and such nonsense which should have been dropped long ago and placed, where it belongs, in the archives of the State Department. 94. But what are these proposals worth?

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  27. Moreover, the President of the United States and his Secretary of State, as is clear from their respective speeches of yesterday and today, continue to insist that the most suitable plan for controlling the use of atomic energy is precisely the one which is clearly a mere mockery of all international control. 92. Is it necessary to state that all such plans, and all proposals of the kind contained in the three-power declaration and advocated here by the United States representative, though they may be submitted in the form of peace proposals and with the avowed objective of strengthening peace and removing the threat of a new war, are in actual fact nothing but sheer speculation on either the ignorance or the naivety of people seized with fear for their own future and that of their children. 93.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  28. Yet this plan is now officially presented to us as the very latest innovation in United States peace policy for 1951. But this same plan is modestly silent as to the necessity of prohibiting the atom bomb. 90. Neither Mr. Truman, nor Mr. Acheson, nor the three-power declaration, propose to lift a finger to prohibit the manufacture of atomic bombs. They cravenly shy away from the subject and pretend that a mere reference to last year’s General Assembly resolution, which referred in passing to the prohibition of atom bombs but in no way indicated the necessity of prohibiting them, will settle the whole affair, and that all nations will continue to thrive, awaiting the moment when that very same bomb bursts over their heads. 91.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  29. Acheson himself, in its report of its findings to the United States Government, entirely passes over the question of prohibiting the production of atomic bombs, since the whole matter is subject to the discretion of the Senate, which will act in accordance with its own prerogatives and the appropriate legislation. I quoted this report at the last session and I do not intend to abuse your patience by going further into the matter now. I will only say that it has been proved up to the hilt that the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan is utterly worthless: it provides no control whatever because, since there is no prohibition, there is nothing to control; it provides no guarantees because, since it is not an international plan, it is in no position to give them.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  30. With regard to so critical a weapon as the atom bomb, the sponsors of the proposals limit themselves to a publicity campaign in favour of the notorious Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan, claiming that it is the most suitable. But the complete worthlessness of this plan was exposed by the United States representatives themselves; if necessary, I can quote documents stating that this control plan in actual fact controls nothing, that this guarantee plan guarantees nothing; that it is in short a plan which, in the words of a commission under the chairmanship of Mr.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  31. I am not by nature given to laughter, but even on this platform — although, as the President will attest, I am refraining from laughter — I am unable to restrain my irony over this sensational peace offensive by which the United States delegation hoped to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, I trust they will accept our congratulations. 89. As long ago as 1948 we were asked to undertake the collection of information on armed forces and armaments. We are now being asked to undertake a census of all armed forces and armaments, and the supervision of this census. In accordance with its outcome, concrete measures for reducing armaments are to be elaborated. On the basis of this census it is suggested that we determine what weapons and armed forces each country shall have the right to maintain now and in the future.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  32. Is this not absurd? Of course, stock-taking is a useful procedure in every economy. Inventories must be made of boots, great-coats, bayonets, cartridges, rifles, machine guns, et cetera — all this needs to be checked over. But is this a task for the United Nations in the struggle for peace? For Mr. Acheson it is the main task, and yesterday Mr. Truman resoundingly proclaimed to the whole world that without the solution of this problem there can be no reduction of armaments and no peaceful settlement of outstanding questions. 88. After reading this speech I could not get to sleep all last night — because I was choking with laughter.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  33. In spite of all the impressive publicity which preceded these three declarations it may be stated without fear of error, in the words of a Russian and, I believe, an English proverb, that "the mountain has brought forth a mouse”, I will amend this only by saying that it has brought forth a still-born mouse; so frivolous and so manifestly specious are the peace proposals emanating from the North Atlantic camp. 87. What, in actual fact, do they propose as the most radical method, they claim, of removing the threat of a new war and strengthening peace? From a perusal of yesterday’s speech by Mr. Truman and from today’s statement by Mr. Acheson, it would appear that they propose the undertaking of a census or inventory of armed forces and armaments under the supervision of a new joint commission for atomic energy and conventional armaments.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  34. In view of the situation which has arisen in international relations the leaders of the aggressive North Atlantic bloc have been obliged to come forward with their plan for reducing the danger of war, as they allege, and increasing the security of all nations. This plan was the subject of the so-called three-power declaration by the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom to which I have already referred, and also of yesterday’s broadcast speech by President Truman and today's speech from this platform by Mr. Acheson.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  35. At the fourth and fifth sessions of the General Assembly the Soviet Union submitted a proposal for the conclusion by the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of a pact for the strengthening of peace. More than 500 million people throughout the globe warmly supported this proposal. They still continue to support it steadfastly, since this proposal inspires great hopes for the removal of the threat of a new war and for the strengthening of peace. 85. At the present time particularly energetic efforts are required to achieve a solution of this problem and to lead the world out of the dangerous situation into which it is being drawn by the criminal machinations of the instigators of a new war. 86.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  36. However, we shall have more to say about this in the First Committee and I shall reserve further comment for the future. I need hardly say that we welcome such further discussion. 83. Since they are in favour of atomic weapons the United States ruling classes desire neither the unconditional prohibition of the production of atomic weapons nor genuine international control. As J. V. Stalin stated in his reply to a Pravda correspondent on the subject of atomic weapons, what they really want is the legalization of the right of the warmongers to use atomic weapons for the destruction of tens and hundreds of thousands of peaceful human beings. 84.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  37. Most noisily of all, these gentlemen sow slanderous rumours to the effect that the Soviet Union is against international control over the execution of the decision to prohibit atomic weapons, and that the United States on the other hand is in favour of such control. In reality, however, the reverse is the case : it is in fact the Soviet Union which has always striven and still strives for the establishment of effective international control over the observance by all States without exception of measures to prohibit atomic weapons ; prohibition here meaning unconditional and unqualified prohibition. Let Mr. Acheson answer: is he in favour of the prohibition of atomic weapons with control, or of control without any prohibition of atomic weapons, as is stated in the documents which he has here read out?

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  38. Particularly vociferous have been certain members of United States ruling circles who make no secret of their plans to use the atom bomb against the Soviet Union and who view with equanimity even so infamous and cynical an expression of their devotion to the atom bomb as the article which has just appeared in one of the latest numbers of Collier's Magazine, accompanied by disgusting illustrations. These gentlemen clamour at the fact that an atom bomb — and indeed more than one — has been manufactured in the Soviet Union. However, they are not willing to adopt our proposal, which is to prohibit the atom bomb, to destroy atom bombs or even to use those bombs already manufactured, as generalissimo Stalin has said, for civilian purposes — which is entirely feasible.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  39. Acheson, Baruch and Lilienthal propose is not an international but an American control organ, designed to legalize and sanction the production of atomic weapons, and not to supervise the implementation of decisions to prohibit the production of atomic weapons, as proposed by the Soviet Union and as demanded by millions and millions of people and by all the peace-loving nations of the world. 82. In the light of these facts the true worth of the outcry raised in the United States and certain other member countries of the North Atlantic bloc over the atom bomb tests in the Soviet Union will be clear to all.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  40. The Soviet Union has also repeatedly advocated the establishment of strict international control, in order to ensure the meticulous and conscientious fulfilment of decisions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy exclusively for civilian requirements. But here also the aggressive North Atlantic bloc has constantly wrecked the Soviet Union’s proposals for international control — as indeed occurred again today — and has put forward its own proposals, which have in fact nothing to do with genuine international control. I refer to the notorious Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan, which is no more than a mockery of international control and which no self-respecting State, genuinely desirous of preventing the leakage of atomic energy for military purposes could ever accept. For what Messrs.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  41. Notwithstanding the resistance of the Anglo-American bloc to these proposals, the General Assembly, as you will remember, substantially accepted [63 rd meeting] these Soviet Union proposals. Throughout the subsequent period, unfortunately, the Anglo-American bloc has hampered, in every way possible, their implementation. 80. At subsequent sessions, from 1947 to 1950, the Soviet Union has steadfastly demanded the prohibition of atomic weapons; not their reduction I would stress, as in the proposal just submitted by the United States of America, but their complete prohibition. However, the Soviet Union has encountered constant resistance from the powers of the North Atlantic bloc. 81.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  42. In its political relations with other countries, the Soviet Union has always stood and still stands for friendly co-operation and is opposed to any discrimination, and to all artificial barriers preventing the free inter-course of the Soviet people with others. The Soviet Union has always stood and still stands for friendship among the peoples. 79. Ever since the General Assembly began its activities, the Soviet Union has, year by year, advocated the adoption of measures to strengthen peace and international security. Sufficient it is in this connexion to recall that as early as 1946 the Soviet Union submitted a proposal for a general reduction of armaments and for the prohibition of the production and use of atomic energy for warlike purposes.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  43. The new irrigation projects will permit the irrigation and reclamation of over 25 million hectares of land, an expanse equal to the entire area of several European States. The purpose of these huge projects, in the construction of which the Soviet Union is investing thousands of millions of roubles, is to promote the development of the peaceful economy of the country and to enhance the welfare of its people. 78. In the Soviet Union the entire population is engaged in creative work, is directing all its efforts towards the development of the national economy and is achieving success after success in the continued promotion of culture, technique, science and art.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  44. There is the project for the extensive multi-purpose exploitation of the Volga, Don, Dnieper and Amu-Darya rivers, designed to satisfy the requirement of the national economy in regard to power, agriculture, transport et cetera. The huge construction projects already undertaken by the Soviet Union, such as the hydro-electric plants at kuibyshev, Stalingrad and elsewhere and the Grand Turkmen, Southern Ukrainian and other canals, are also well-known. The new electric power plants will yield a daily output of 22,000 million kilowatt hours of cheap electric power, which, as L. P. Berya, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, has pointed out, is equal to the entire annual output of electric power in Italy.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  45. The Soviet Union steadfastly adheres to these principles, which have determined every course and every step taken by the Soviet Government in international affairs. 76. In the pursuit of its peace policy, the Soviet Union is utilizing its entire resources, not in order to expand its armed forces or to conduct an armaments race, not to expand its war industry or to organize military bases on foreign territory, but in order to expand to the full its civilian industry and develop the national economy as a whole. 77. The successful reconstruction and development of the postwar economy have enabled the Soviet Union to tackle gigantic projects; projects, I maintain with full justification, such as have never before been undertaken by any other single country in the history of mankind.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  46. It was important politically, he said, because it improved the chances of preserving peace, and economically because it brushed aside secondary considerations and made it possible for the two countries to discuss questions of common interest on a business-like footing. Lastly, it paved the way towards mutual co-operation. 74. These words were uttered twenty years ago, when diplomatic relations were established between the Soviet Union and the United States for the first time. But these words are of the greatest importance, and do not apply alone to the United States. 75. These words of the leader of the Soviet people reflect the fundamental principles of Soviet foreign policy, the policy applied by the Soviet Government in its relations with all other nations.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  47. Are not all these facts sufficient to confirm the fact that the trend of American foreign policy is aggressive, and that its purpose is not to support peace but to unleash a new world war, whatever the cost to mankind in new bloodshed and disaster? 72. The foreign policy of the USSR is a policy of peace. The Soviet Union is waging a ceaseless struggle against the menace of war, a struggle for peace, for the strengthening of friendly relations among the peoples, for close international co-operation based on mutual respect for the independence of nations and for the sovereign equality of States. 73. When, nearly twenty years ago, diplomatic relations were established between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, Generalissimo Stalin characterised that event as one of momentous importance.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  48. Wilson, director of the United States office of so-called defense mobilization stated in a radio broadcast on 9 July 1951 that the Soviet proposal for cease-fire in Korea was a manoeuvre undertaken for the purpose of “ weakening the vigilance of the United States and obstructing the fulfilment of the country’s defence programme ”. That is his description of the military programmes for the implementation of American aggressive plans. Furthermore, Mr. Wilson expressed his conviction that the United States Congress would not embark on so dangerous a path. The path of peace, in Mr. Wilson’s eyes, is a dangerous one. 71.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  49. Rubin, who is the president of the powerful investment company Selected American Shares Incorporated, frankly asserted at a bankers’ conference in Los Angeles that “ if peace is achieved, it is difficult to imagine what will take the place of the defence programme as a support of our economy ”. 69. Thus, two presidents, equally authoritative, have stated their views in favour of war. 70. It is for this reason that the USSR proposal for a ceasefire in Korea created serious alarm in the governing circles of the United States. In order to exert appropriate pressure on American public opinion, Mr.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)

  50. The July issue of the bulletin published by the American National City Bank of New York, which is well-known to be under the control of the influential Morgan group, frankly states that any reduction in expenditure on armaments will make the situation of the monopolists a difficult one. 67. The President of the United States, Mr. Truman, stated at one of his many Press conferences that an armistice in Korea may lead to delay in the fulfilment of the American armament programme, which, to quote his words as reported in the Press, “would be the most catastrophic thing that could possibly happen in the United States”. 68. Another president, Mr.

    1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)