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VYSHINSKY

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1947-09-24
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1954-09-24
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un-general-debate

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  1. But the very fact that the majority of Asian countries, including countries such as India and Indonesia with populations totalling almost 450 millions, declined to associate themselves either with the Manila Conference or the Manila Treaty, and that these aggressive plans are opposed by the Chinese People’s Republic with its population of 600 million effectively disproves assertions that the purpose of the Manila Conference and the Treaty signed in Manila by its participants is the defence of the South-East Asian countries and that it corresponds to the interests of the Asian people.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  2. A satisfactory solution of the Korean question must be found without delay. 90. The fiasco of the European Defence Community in Europe and the failure of the plans of reactionary circles to prevent the cessation of military operations in Indo-China — the fact that such attempts were made is well-known — has not deterred these circles from further attempts to prevent a relaxation of the international tension which favours preparations for a new world war. One such attempt was unquestionably the Manila Conference at which a number of States under the leadership of the United States agreed on the organization of a new bloc serving the same purposes as the North Atlantic bloc, as was openly stated. United States propaganda is attempting to represent the Manila Treaty as a victory for the cause of the collective defence of South-East Asia.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  3. “The participants in the Conference express their confidence that both the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea will act in accordance with the present declaration in the interests of peace.” This Declaration holds out the best prospects for the urgently needed settlement of the Korean question. 89. A serious obstacle to the settlement of that question is undoubtedly the so-called Mutual Defence Treaty between the United States and South Korea, which is being used, and which certain parties are planning to use, to convert South Korea into a base for military operations in the Far East. We consider it essential for the States concerned to pursue their efforts to reach agreement on a peaceful settlement of the Korean question through the creation of a united, independent and democratic State.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  4. Despite the fact that no progress was made with the discussion of the Korean problem at the Geneva Conference, the delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea put forward concrete proposals for the settlement of this question, which were supplemented by the following draft declaration proposed by the Soviet Union: “The States taking part in the Geneva Conference have agreed that pending the final settlement of the Korean question on the basis of the establishment of a united, independent and democratic Korean State, no action of any kind shall be taken which might constitute a threat to the maintenance of peace in Korea.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  5. But the representatives of a number of other delegations did not share that view, the Belgian representative even going so far as to assert that the Soviet Union delegation’s Proposals would have, as he put it, appalling consequences for the United Nations. 88.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  6. At the Geneva Conference, the delegations of the Soviet Union, the Chinese People’s Republic and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea put forward constructive proposals for a peaceful settlement. During the discussion of the Korean question at that Conference, there was a rapprochement in the views of a number of delegations, for example, in those of the Soviet Union and United Kingdom delegations, both of which considered it important to establish the basic principles for the attainment of agreement on the Korean question. If this could have been done, progress would have been made in paving the way for the restoration of the national unity of Korea.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  7. But a settlement of the Korean question is urgently needed both in the interests of the unification of Korea and of the maintenance of world peace. It is, in our opinion, particularly necessary in view of the fact that systematic attempts are, as we know, still I being made to break the armistice in Korea and to unleash a further war against the Korean people. It is a I matter of common knowledge that special efforts are being made by Syngman Rhee and his clique to bring this about. 87. We are convinced that there is literally not a moment to be lost in reaching a settlement of the Korean question. The General Assembly must therefore exert every effort to bring about a solution.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  8. Those events make it essential to include in that treaty — this is a matter of the highest importance — a provision prohibiting the forcing upon Austria of plans for a new Anschluss with Germany, for a new military and aggressive alliance between Germany and Austria (there has been such a tendency during the past few years), and also to ensure that Austria has the possibility of democratic and peaceful development. But this is precisely what the United States is opposing, a fact which testifies to the objectivity of the statement on the position regarding the Austrian treaty made by the United States representative from this rostrum on 23 September. 86. As we know, a satisfactory settlement of the Korean question was not achieved at the Geneva Conference.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  9. After wasting two years and thereby delaying the settlement of the Austrian question, they repudiated the abbreviated treaty they had attempted to put through instead of the treaty in regard to which agreement had been reached on all points of principle as early as 1949. 85. Since that time, say during the past two or three years, events have occurred which must be taken into account in settling matters relating to the Austrian treaty today.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  10. As early as 1949, the four Powers — the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union — agreed on the main lines of the treaty with Austria. Agreement was then reached on all its most important sections with the exception of a few points which were not considered to be sufficiently important to preclude its signature. It was the Western Powers themselves, who, instead of standing by the treaty for Austria, in regard to which agreement had been reached on almost all points, put forward new proposals in the guise of the so-called abbreviated treaty, which differed substantially from the treaty previously agreed on 111 1949. The nature of this abridged treaty was so unacceptable to all the parties concerned that it was repudiated two years later by the United States, the United Kingdom and France themselves.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  11. Experience shows us that no settlement of the German problem is possible without a settlement of the question of European security. It should be emphasized, too, that a settlement of the German problem would undoubtedly also facilitate a settlement of the Austrian problem, as the two problems are interconnected. 84. In his statement in the General Assembly [475th meeting], Mr. Dulles also touched on the Australian question and made an attempt, which I presume to describe as unsuccessful, to give the impression that at the precise moment when the Austrian treaty was completely ready and appeared to be on the point of signature, the Soviet Union suddenly put forward new conditions. This is not in accordance with the facts.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  12. The all-European collective security agreement proposed in the Soviet Union’s plan would include all the European nations, and not some small and specially selected group of States. States parties to this agreement would pledge themselves not to enter into any coalitions or alliances or to conclude any agreements, the purposes of which were incompatible with the preservation of collective security in Europe. In our view, such a European system would provide a sound basis for the security of that continent. It would mark a substantial step forward in that vital matter and would also create conditions more propitious to a settlement of the German problem through the establishment of a united, independent, democratic and peaceful Germany.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  13. Furthermore, this plan, which would bind the future united Germany not to deviate, for a period of 50 years, from the so-called international obligations assumed by the Bonn Government unilaterally and, of course, entirely without the consent of the other half of Germany, contains no measures capable of preventing or arresting the continued growth of militarist aspirations and the desire for revenge. 83. It should be pointed out that the all-European agreement proposed by the Soviet Union was, on the other hand, based on the principle of the collective defence of the States which were parties to the agreement against an armed attack in Europe on one or more of such States.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  14. The other line of policy is embodied in the plan of the three Western Powers, the main feature of which is the attempt to bind the future all-German government to fulfil, for a period of 50 years, what the plan describes as the international rights and obligations of the Bonn Government. It should be obvious to everyone that such a provision would deprive Germany, during those 50 years, of any opportunity or justification for acting in accordance with its own interests, of acting freely or as a sovereign State in the true sense of those terms.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  15. The peace-loving peoples regard that action as beneficial to the cause of peace. Others tend to regard it as a misfortune for the cause of peace. Those are two different attitudes, and each speaks for itself. 82. The problem of European security is of course inseparable from the German problem. There are two fundamentally different lines of policy on both questions. One line of policy favours a united, peaceful and democratic Germany and the establishment of a provisional all-German government for the attainment of that objective, the unification of Germany being brought about by means of genuinely free and democratic all German elections to an all-German constituent assembly.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  16. At the same time they are continuing their attempts to find fresh means of ensuring the success of their plans, which are similar to the plans that were designed to establish the European Defence Community. 81. How different, when we consider the matter, are the interests of the countries in the camp of peace from those of the leaders of the countries in the opposite camp. The rejection of the EDC treaty by the French National Assembly is convincing evidence of the extent to which the policy of establishing mutually opposed groups of States in Europe is contrary to the interests of the peace-loving nations. The French Parliament’s decision was of course received with satisfaction by all those who, not in word but in deed, stand for the real security of the nations of Europe and the strengthening of universal peace.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  17. It is not surprising, remembering the lessons of the last two world wars, that broad popular movements in all countries, particularly the countries of Europe, including France, are firmly resisting ratification of this EDC treaty, which is so dangerous, not only_ to the French people but to all the States neighbouring on Western Germany, and to all peace-loving peoples. The collapse of this treaty in France was a great victory for peace. At the same time, it was a heavy blow to the policy of operating from a position of strength. In our view, it was a serious warning to the inciters of war and to those engaged in propaganda for war and the organization of it. 80. The supporters of the European Defence Community, of course, lament the failure of the treaty as a great misfortune.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  18. That the intention is actually to unleash a new war and in that war to gain revenge for the lost Second World War is surely proved by the following typically revengeful resolution of the Bundestag at Bonn: “The Government is instructed to inform the countries participating in the European Army treaty that the present frontiers of Germany, both in the East and in the West, are in no way acceptable to the Federal Republic.” The position could hardly be stated more clearly. 79.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  19. Under the cloak of conversations about “defence”, the militarization of Western Germany is proceeding apace, and special efforts to restore Western Germany’s military power are being made by the American monopolists, who have long been bound by ties of open or concealed collaboration with the West German monopolists in the matter of preparing war, such preparation being an important factor in the realization of the American plans of world hegemony. 78. This situation is still more sharply emphasized by the aggressively military nature of the so-called European Defence Community. The backbone of this Community is to be the armed forces of Western Germany, whose ruling circles nurture plans of revenge.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  20. The imperialist monopolists do not consider it a virtue to abide by treaties. Western Germany, which has revived the traditions of previous, and in the main, Hitlerite diplomacy, is no exception in this respect. Western Germany is controlled by United States and West German monopolies, particularly those of the Rhine and the Ruhr, who are the true exponents of the Kaiser’s policy of aggression, which has been inherited by the foreign policy of Hitler and Adenauer.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  21. Various so-called scholars in a number of Western countries including and in particular in the United States such as Spikien, Possony, Strausz-Hupe, who have been flooding the book market with their pseudo-scientific, scribblings, do not hesitate to justify military adventures and to glorify aggressive wars by claiming that they were fought in self-defence. These gentlemen have gone so far as to assert that demography was a military weapon in the Second World War and that war is the supreme arbiter which decides the fate of nations, force being the factor governing its decision. Thanks to the encouragement of influential militarists and aggressive circles, these widely circulated scribblings I have just mentioned have become best sellers in the United States. 77.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  22. Ten years after the Locarno Conference, Nazi Germany unilaterally broke the Treaty, thus taking a decisive step towards the preparation of a new world war which broke out in 1939. Even now, attempts are being made to justify the piratical war of the German fascists against the democracies and especially against the Soviet Union, by describing Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 as a defensive war partly necessitated by Germany’s future demographic position as compared with that of her enemies.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  23. There is talk of guarantees against the threat that a revived German militarism constitutes to the nations of Europe and there is also talk of special agreements similar to the Treaty of Locarno. In its day, the Treaty of Locarno was hailed as the beginning of a new era in Europe and in the world as a whole, and it was followed by hasty attempts to bring Germany into the League of Nations. Actually, the Treaty of Locarno, as Stalin rightly said at the time, was a plan for “the development of forces for a new war, rather than for peace”. “Locarno”, he said, “held the seeds of a new war”. Even Clemenceau described the Treaty as a scrap of paper which Germany would tear up when necessary. 76. That is exactly what happened, as we are all well aware. These facts cannot be expunged from history.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  24. It is the old Germany — not the Germany of Hitler— but the Germany which produced Hitler — the Germany of industrial magnates and political bureaucrats who somehow survive all political change . . .” 74. Sir James Headlam-Morley, the well-known British historian and one-time adviser to Downing Street, made the following statement as long ago as 1930 in his book Studies in Diplomatic History: “If Germany fully recovers her military power, the German army will as in the past be a sword constantly pointed at France and Belgium.” And this is true. I should merely add that German militarism constitutes a threat not only to the wellbeing of France and Belgium, but to other European countries, such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union — in fact to the rest of Europe. 75.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  25. This fact is appreciated by all thoughtful and clear-minded persons, including even some big businessmen in the United States. For example, in his book Germany, Key to Peace, published in 1953, James P. Warburg, the well-known United States banker, wrote as follows on the subject of the plans for the restoration of German militarism: “. . . we have created or helped to create a new, truncated German nation of 48 million restless inhabitants — an unnatural state which threatens the future of the German people no less than it jeopardizes the peace of Europe and, ultimately, the security of the United States. . . . This new Germany has been shaped exclusively by the West under our leadership. It is not the ‘new’, peaceful, democratic Germany which we talked about creating years ago.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  26. Theodor Blank, the de facto Minister of War of the Bonn Government has openly stated — to do this is to embark on the course of rearming a future Deutschland über alles which, as soon as it feels sure of its military strength, will undoubtedly again show its true nature and will fall upon its neighbours and the rest of Europe with fire and the sword. This is the logical course of events. 73. This is where the danger to European security lies. This is the risk. It is here that the lightning is already heralding the thunderstorm of war. Those who fail to see it must be politically blind or must be political opportunists interested in the kindling of a new world war. As the history of Europe has shown, the restoration of Germany’s military might unquestionably constitutes a threat to the security of Europe and of the whole world.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  27. Dulles, who further claimed that the fact that the EDC would merge the armed forces of such countries as France and Germany was proof of its non-aggressive character. Yet the facts say otherwise. The facts show that the militarists of Western Germany are at present exerting every effort to revive their war industry and their military strength. To begin by including 12 West German divisions in the armed forces of the EDC, subsequently to increase their number to 60 and to raise the total strength of the Western European army to 800,000 within two to three years — which is being planned in the West, as Mr.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  28. Dulles said that "the problem of peace in Europe has become further complicated because of the recent setback to the consummation of the European Defence Community.” It would be difficult to agree with such a statement, which seems to me to be without foundation, since it is precisely the attempt to force Europe to accept the EDC — which, as the European countries fully appreciate, is a threat to their own security and to the security and interests of all peace-loving nations — that is complicating the problem of maintaining peace in Europe. The European Defence Community is usually represented as an organic unity merging the armed forces of a number of Western European States. It was so described by Mr.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  29. We, or for that matter, anyone truly anxious to preserve peace and to remove the threat of a new war, cannot permit this to happen. We cannot permit history, whose pages are stained with the blood of two world wars, to repeat itself. We cannot allow our children and grandchildren to suffer the bloody tragedy of a third. 72. Mr.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  30. It is not evident that there are forces which are struggling for, and have in some measure already achieved, the remilitarization of Germany and the restoration of Germany as a militarist State, an objective which East Germany can never accept because it is against the interests of the German people as a whole? Hence, the remilitarization of Western Germany makes the perpetuation of the division of Germany more likely and indeed more inevitable than ever. 71. That is why the Soviet Union is so persistently and forcefully warning against the danger threatening Europe and the whole world from the lair of the fascist beast, which is waiting for the hour of a new war to strike, for the trumpet call of the Prusso-German militarists headed by the monopolists of the Rhine and the Ruhr, athirst for money and for blood.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  31. It is here that the real danger lies not only for Europe, but for the whole world, the real risk inherent in certain policies towards Germany. In his brief reference to the German question, Mr. Dulles tried to give the impression that the Soviet Union proposals would serve to aggravate the dangerous division of Germany. Such a conclusion is utterly unfounded. It is, on the contrary, the proposals of the Western Powers which are incapable of promoting the unification of Germany as a peace-loving, democratic and independent State, and which can only serve to perpetuate the division of that country. This is surely borne out by many facts in West Germany today.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  32. I venture to suggest that these risks; are that, instead of re-establishing a united, peace-loving, democratic and independent Germany, headed by an all-German Government — which is what the Soviet Union has been proposing — attempts will be made to re-establish Germany as a militarist State headed by men like Field Marshal Kesselring and his ilk who are eager for revenge. Such a settlement of the German question indeed involves grave risks — the risk of giving free rein to the militarist and aggressive forces which survived in Western Germany after the end of the Second World War, and the risk that these forces may pave the way for a new war, which would, of course, be contrary to the interests of the European nations and of the German people themselves. 70.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  33. In his statement of 23 September [475 meeting] the United States Secretary of State did not outline any such methods, although he devoted a few passing remarks to these questions, which were, however, by way of review. To do him justice, his remarks seemed to be impromptu and not in entire accordance with the facts — and that should be borne, in mind in discussing the ways and means of settling the questions raised in that statement. 69. In referring to the German question, Mr. Dulles said, for example, that “the division of Germany cannot be perpetuated without grave risks”. One cannot but agree with that statement. But what, in fact, are these risks? It would be useful to have further information on this point. What are the risks involved in the division of Germany?

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  34. Although little was accomplished at the Berlin Conference, that little was of great international importance inasmuch as the Conference overcame the obstacles to meetings between representatives of the four Powers, and paved the way for the Geneva Conference. The Berlin Conference also served the useful purpose of demonstrating more clearly than before the essential link between the solution of problems such as that of Germany and that of ensuring European security. 68. These questions are of course of great international moment, and it is therefore particularly important to form a clear and correct conception of the methods by which they can be solved.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  35. The present session of the General Assembly has opened at a time when international tension has somewhat eased as a result of the termination of the war in Korea and the restoration of peace to Indo-China. There can be no doubt that the year 1954 has been marked by a relaxation of international tension. This, we believe, was partly due to the Berlin Conference of the four Foreign Ministers, but even more due to the Geneva Conference of the Foreign Ministers of five Powers — the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People’s Republic of China — with the participation of representatives of other States.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  36. Only where these principles are observed do we find peaceful and friendly co-operation among nations, which in turn serves to strengthen international confidence and mutual respect, to consolidate general peace and international security. 66. In this connexion I must recall the five principles which, on the conclusion of the negotiations held at New Delhi and Rangoon in July of this year, India, the People’s Republic of China and Burma proclaimed to be the essential basis for their mutual relations. These principles are: (a)mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; (b) non-aggression; (c) non-intervention in each other’s internal affairs; (d) equality and mutual advantage; (e) peaceful coexistence. We wholeheartedly support these principles. 67.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  37. Instead, we propose the union in a single camp of all the European States which are anxious to preserve their security and to achieve lasting peace in Europe.” This appeal applies not only to European States, but to all the countries in the world. 65. On the basis of its conviction that if peace is to be preserved the world must form a single camp, the Soviet Union Government has objected and continues to object to the organization of separate and exclusive alliances of certain States — such as the European Defence Community (EDC) — which are directed against other States and are nothing more or less than military blocs for clearly aggressive purposes. Such a situation is contrary to the basic principles of international law and international relations on which the Soviet Union’s foreign policy is based.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  38. The Soviet Union is convinced that only a policy based on the aforementioned principles can lead to a strengthening of mutual trust and international cooperation and can prevent the countries of the world from being divided into hostile camps. In this connexion, I cannot but recall what Mr. Molotov said in his statement on the results of the Berlin Conference: “It is our earnest desire that neither Europe nor the entire globe should be divided into two camps on the question of the defence of peace. We appeal to all European States to renounce the formation of military alignments directed against each other; for the formation of such alignments cannot but result in war.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  39. Such a policy naturally precludes any preponderance of allocations for war purposes in the Soviet Union’s budget, while anything having to do with the armaments race, the installation of military bases in foreign territories or the formation of military blocs is altogether out of the question. 63. The Soviet Union rejects any such policy both in practice and as a matter of principle. That is why it constantly endeavours to bring about the prohibition of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the prohibition of war propaganda and a substantial reduction in armaments and armed forces. 64.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  40. Vast sums, amounting to many thousands of millions of roubles, are expended on such social and cultural activities as universal education, vocational training, the development of science and the arts, social security, pensions, and aid to mothers of large families and destitute mothers. In the Soviet Union’s budget for the current year, the allocations for social and cultural needs are 40 per cent higher than the allocations for defence. Furthermore, this year the allocations for defence amount to only 17.8 per cent of the total, or 2.6 per cent less than last year.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  41. Malenkov, said at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: “We are consistently pursuing a policy of peace and of strengthening international co-operation.” Such are the basis and the purpose of the Soviet Union Government’s entire foreign policy. No matter what is said to distort and twist the truth, this purpose and this basis of the Soviet State’s genuinely peaceful foreign policy tell the entire world that this is how the Soviet State conceives and carries on its relations with other States. 62. The objective of the Soviet Union’s domestic policy is steadily to raise the level of its economy and the material and cultural level of Soviet citizens and of the entire Soviet society. The great bulk of State funds is used to promote the growth of industrial production, agriculture, trade, and all forms of transport.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  42. Nowadays only arch-reactionaries in Western countries continue to oppose the recognition of this important principle with its great practical significance, a principle which has always played and must continue to play an important part in the development of normal international relations and which is, indeed, essential to that development. 61. The Soviet Union Government, while bending all its efforts to further a mighty development of peaceful economic construction within its country, is at the same time taking all possible steps to ensure normal relations with other States, in other words, to bring international relations back to normality. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  43. But even then experience clearly showed that trying to ignore the importance of diplomatic and trade relations between the Soviet Republic and other States of the Western world brought no positive results. The Western countries were forced to recognize that the coexistence of States with different social structures was possible. 60. The Soviet Union has consistently maintained that position. The entire subsequent development of the Soviet Union’s relations with capitalist countries has confirmed that the principle of coexistence is important, realistic and necessary.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  44. Lenin’s reply was: “This seemed inconceivable both, politically and militarily. That it is nevertheless possible, both politically and militarily, has already been proved; it is a fact. But what about commerce?” he continued. “What about trade relations? What about communications, assistance, an exchange of services between backward and ruined agricultural Russia and the industrially advanced and rich group of capitalist Powers — are these possible? Have we not been threatened that we would be surrounded by barbed wire and that therefore there would be no trade relations ?” 59. Certainly such threats were uttered, and attempts were made to take corresponding action.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  45. I could site numerous facts in support of my words, but it should suffice to recall that as early as 1922, more than thirty years ago, Lenin, the great builder of the Soviet State, speaking of the possibility of a rapprochment on the basis of economic interests _between the Russian Republic and capitalist countries, particular the United Kingdom, said when interviewed by a correspondent of the Observer and the Winchester Guardian: “We feel that perfectly friendly Rations with both Powers” — the reference is to Great Britain and France — “are entirely possible and constitute our objective ... We feel that the interests of England and France, if they are properly understood, will also operate in this direction.” 58. The question as put at that time was: Is it conceivable that a Socialist republic could survive in a capitalist environment?

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  46. Dulles did in his speech at Williamsburg on 15 May of this year, that (I am quoting from a newspaper) “coexistence is not part of a Soviet Communist creed or practice except in the sense that non-Communists are allowed, in a Physical sense to exist.” The Chilean representative in his turn, speaking at the 475th plenary meeting, called the principle of coexistence a mere slogan, launched, as he said, by the propaganda machine of the aggressor. Neither remark has any foundation in fact. 57.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  47. We are convinced that the possibility is a real one, mainly because we feel confident that all peoples are anxious for peace, international co-operation, and the development of peaceful international relations. Our confidence is based on Lenin’s doctrine of the possibility of the peaceful coexistence of States in spite of differences in their social structure, and it is further confirmed by almost forty years of experience, during which the Soviet Union has maintained good-neighbour relations with many countries whatever their social structure. 56. Attempts are often made to disparage the principle of peaceful coexistence by intimating that it is being used either for propaganda or as a temporary, fortuitous or tactical measure, designed to provide a breathing space. It is said, quite unjustifiably, as Mr.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  48. There can be no doubt that the adoption by the General Assembly of agreed decisions on these important questions would have the welcome effect of further easing international tension and improving international relations. 55. The Soviet Union is profoundly convinced that there is every possibility of reaching an agreement on all these unresolved questions which would strengthen international peace and security, on condition that we respect the principles of sovereign equality of States, non-interference in the affairs of other States, mutual respect for the rights and interests of States, and fulfilment of international commitments. Under such conditions there would a very real prospect of settling outstanding international problems, however important or acute they might be. We are convinced of this.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  49. Some of the problems facing the United Nations are of the utmost importance, and their solution would avert the threat of a new world war and strengthen universal peace. These are not empty words. This is reality itself, knocking at the door of the United Nations. Among the measures which must be taken to achieve that end are several of outstanding importance, such as the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction and their elimination from the armaments of States, a substantial reduction of armaments and the establishment of control over the application of these decisions, to name but a few of these measures.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)

  50. The Soviet Union, for its part, is deeply convinced that the just demand that the People’s Republic of China should not be prevented from taking its rightful seat in the United Nations must be complied with and that the participation in our work of the representatives of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China will be of the greatest assistance to countries which endeavour, through the United Nations, to work for peace and to achieve international co-operation in solving the world’s economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems. We shall not weary of drawing attention to this abnormal state of affairs, this denial of a most important demand made by peace-loving States. 54.

    1954-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 9 (1954)