YouSaid · the spoken record

VYSHINSKY

lines on the record: 673
first: 1947-09-24
most recent: 1954-09-24
sittings or episodes: 8
sources: un-general-debate

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“I shall not deal with this aspect of the matter, as I am prepared to postpone detailed discussion of it until it is taken up in the First Committee; I shall merely say at this stage that we have demobilized thirty-three military age groups since the end of the war. It seems that Mr. Romulo is a general; he should know what thirty-three age groups means. If he does know and appreciate what they mean, he had no right to say what he did say from this rostrum. As I have already pointed out, however, he is an enthusiastic person and in his enthusiasm is often led to make statements which are contrary to the truth. 116.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Secondly, the General Assembly should recommend the permanent members of the Security Council, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to reduce the armaments and armed forces in their possession at the time of the adoption of this recommendation by one-third during a period of one year from the date of its adoption. The Philippine representative has, of course, grossly distorted the facts by saying that all countries have reduced their armed forces with the exception of the Soviet Union. He has forgotten or has not read a number of official documents.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“We propose that the General Assembly should instruct the Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commissions to prepare and submit to the Security Council, not later than 1 February 1952, for its consideration, a draft convention providing measures to ensure the implementation of the General Assembly decision on the prohibition of atomic weapons, the cessation of their production, the use of already manufactured atomic bombs exclusively for civilian purposes, and the establishment of strict international control over the observance of the above-mentioned convention. 115.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Firstly, we consider it essential that the General Assembly should adopt a resolution that: considering the use of atomic weapons, as weapons of aggression and of the mass destruction of people, to be at variance with the conscience and honour of peoples and incompatible with membership of the United Nations, it proclaims the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this prohibition.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“The immediate cessation of military operations in Korea, the conclusion of a truce, the withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel within a period of ten days, and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea within a period of three months; 111. The convening of a world conference on the reduction of armaments and armed forces, the prohibition of atomic weapons, and the establishment of international control over the observance of that prohibition; 112. The conclusion of a peace pact between the five great Powers: the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Soviet Union. 113. As a development of these proposals, which were made on 8 November the Soviet Union delegation deems it essential at the present time, for the reasons just stated, to make a number of additional proposals. 114.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“In those proposals an attempt is made to attach primary importance to secondary matters, and thus to divert the attention of the General Assembly from the main problems I have mentioned. 108. The delegation of the Soviet Union has already proposed to the General Assembly its positive programme of measures for averting the threat of a new war and guaranteeing the peace and security of the peoples. At the very beginning of our general debate we introduced our proposals [A/1944] on this matter under the following heads: 109. The incompatibility of membership in the United Nations with participation in the aggressive Atlantic bloc, and the creation by certain States, and primarily by the United States, of military bases in foreign territory; 110.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Why were those proposals introduced precisely on this occasion? 106. The New York Herald Tribune, The New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, and so on, replied to this question as follows: Because the rulers of the United States had to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union and to make some kind of concession to their partners, who, according to The New York Times, had rebelled against the plan of the Atlantic bloc at the last meeting at Ottawa. 107. That is the situation so far as the so-called pence proposals of the three Powers are concerned. As we have seen, those proposals evade the main questions requiring immediate attention. These questions are the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the reduction of armaments.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“What happens at Rome on 22 November will undoubtedly provide a rich illustration of the justice of this remark. 104. It is also impossible to ignore the statement by the American and a considerable part of the European Press that the tripartite proposal for the reduction of armaments was put forward because the idea of peace advanced by the Soviet Union, in conjunction with the part played by the Soviet Union as a champion of peace, has proved effective. The western Powers, as the New York Herald Tribune, for example, writes, have had to think in their turn of launching proposals for the reduction of armaments in order to win at least a propaganda battle at the General Assembly. 105. And was not this confirmed here by General Romulo, who declared in his speech that the United States had never introduced such proposals as on this occasion.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“The New York Wall Street Journal called the American “ disarmament ” plan a chimera and a figment of the imagination, and went on to say that in selecting “ disarmament ” as a means of wresting the initiative from the Soviet Union the United States was really clutching at a straw, since the plan ignored reality for the sake of propaganda effect. 102. It is characteristic that The New York Times, asserting emphatically now that the primary task of the United Nations is to “elaborate” the western Powers’ plan for the purpose of displaying it to the whole world, at the same time affirms that the second task concerns the western Powers themselves, and is — according to The New York Times — to go full speed ahead with their rearmament programme. 103.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“The Washington Post, a newspaper which presumably is also well known to the United States delegation, states in its leading article that the “disarmament” proposal advanced by Mr. Acheson is only a “propaganda gesture”. 100. An article published on 9 November in the New York Herald Tribune affirms that the rejection of the western Powers’ plan by the Soviet Union will be used by those Powers in their campaign to shift the blame for the present armaments race on to the Soviet Union, and that this was precisely the purpose — this is the most important point — which American official representatives had in mind when they proceeded to elaborate their plans many weeks ago. 101.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“We behind the Iron Curtain do not know what goes on there, it is all hidden from us; but, according to The New York Times, at that last meeting of the Council the attitude of the European allies of the United States was transformed into a stubborn resistance to the American rearmament plan. 97. The New York Times writes that western Europe is disturbed by the recent aggressive statements of American representatives. 98. The New York Times writes that this was just the reason why the United States had to stress its “peaceful intentions”. For these propagandist purposes, writes The New York Times, the American plan is good, but it will not serve as a means of bringing the cold war to an end. 99.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“It is no coincidence that even the American Press has been compelled to acknowledge that the so-called three- Power plan for the reduction of armaments, as described in the tripartite statement, was intended to serve purely propaganda purposes. I should like to refer to a number of organs of the American Press which have a large circulation and which in the view of many Americans are authoritative, for example, The New York Times, 96. On this matter The New York Times contains the open admission that one of the main reasons for the submission of the “disarmament” plan by the United States Government was that at the recent session of the Council of the Atlantic bloc at Ottawa the attitude of the European allies of the United States was marked by stubborn rebellion against the American plan of rearmament.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“And it is necessary to defer the end of the war in Korea in order to avoid reducing armaments and prohibiting atomic energy. The logic of such an attitude is sufficiently clear. But it is a vicious logic calculated to appeal to the simplicity and, I must be outspoken, the foolishness of credulous people. I do not think that any people of that kind are to be found amongst ourselves. 94. It is quite impossible to agree with Mr. Truman’s assertion that the end of the war in Korea is the essential condition precedent to the reduction of armaments. It is becoming quite obvious that in actual fact the tripartite proposal is nothing but a propaganda manoeuvre to enable the negotiations for the reduction of armaments to be used as a screen for the continuing armaments race conducted by the organizers of the Atlantic bloc. 95.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Acheson, that no what they term real progress towards the reduction of armaments is possible until the war in Korea has been ended or while, as Mr. Truman said, the political questions which at present divide the nations remain unsettled. 93. If the termination of the war in Korea really must be a preliminary condition of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of the atomic weapon, why in that case are steps not taken to end the war immediately? Why in that case do General Ridgway and his associates at the Korean front in the extermination of the peace-loving population employ the most incredible chicanery to prolong the armistice negotiations themselves, as is apparent even from today’s papers? Why? Evidently because it is necessary to prolong the armistice negotiations in order to defer and delay the end of the war in Korea.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“For the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France to put forward the demand for the termination of this war in Korea as an essential prerequisite for a so-called system of reduction of armaments can be regarded only as a mockery of the idea of peace, of the desire for peace of millions of people in all countries. This attitude of the United States proves, more clearly than any words that that country does not in reality desire any reduction in armaments. 91. The attitude of the USSR delegation to the question of reduction of armaments has been sufficiently clearly stated. It stresses the need to make a start with the reduction of armaments forthwith, whether the war in Korea is continued or ended. 92. We cannot agree with the statement made by Mr. Truman, and repeated by Mr. Eden and Mr.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“The hypocrisy of the position on the reduction of armaments adopted by the United States Government and by the Governments of the United Kingdom and France is absolutely obvious, since the United States, the United Kingdom and France, with other governments of the member states of the Atlantic bloc, bear the full responsibility for the barbarous war forced on the Korean people, a fact which some representatives present here and speaking from this rostrum do not appear to understand. 90. It was the United States which started the war in Korea. It is for that country to bring this aggressive war against the Korean people to an end.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Eden and in the tripartite statement can be regarded only as an attempt to prevent the adoption of practical steps for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons. 88. The treatment of the Korean question by Mr. Truman, Mr. Acheson and Mr. Eden makes this particularly clear. They regard the end of the war in Korea as an essential prerequisite for the reduction of armaments. They have all clearly stated that no general programme for the reduction of armaments and armed forces can be carried into effect while the war in Korea continues. 89. But the United States should first apply that requirement to itself; to lay down such a condition is mere hypocrisy and deceit.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Words are judged by deeds and no reliance is placed on them unless they are borne out by deeds. We are faced with a glaring contradiction between the juggling with words of the United States leaders, who are playing the chief part in the aggressive Atlantic bloc, and their deeds. 87. This contradiction fully exposes the hypocrisy and insincerity of the proposal made by the United States, the United Kingdom and France for the reduction of armaments, and shows it to be a screen for their real aims, and for the continued arms race and the preparations for a new war which those aims envisage. These reservations, these numerous other reservations scattered through the speeches of Mr. Truman, Mr. Acheson and Mr.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Le Monde goes on to make the melancholy observation that these activities have no regard for the sovereignty of France. 85. But, however tolerant our attitude to these facts may be, are we not justified in saying clearly, firmly and resolutely that statements to the effect that the removal of international tension is the essential prerequisite for the reduction of armaments are absolutely insincere? Such statements do not accord with the facts I have quoted. They are contrary to the activities which characterize the whole foreign policy of the United States. 86. We cannot in fact daily and hourly create complications which lead to tension in international affairs while simultaneously making hypocritical appeals for the elimination of such complications. Deeds speak louder than words.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
““English as you might hear it spoken near the banks of the Potomac or Lake Michigan is heard on a Saturday evening in the corridors of first-class coaches of the Limoges- Paris trains. With every week more American passengers get onto the trains in Chateauroux and Orleans. Many of them have put aside their khaki or air force blue uniforms for the week-end, but they all have military papers in their pockets... “Motor cars and lorries covered with dirty green tarpaulin impress the tourists more than the Packards and Chevrolets on the French roads. On their bumpers can be seen the letters E.C.C.Z., which signify ‘European Command Communication Zone’, since these vehicles form part of the fleet which the Americans are gradually building up in the rear of the occupation forces in Germany.” 84.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“An article in the issue of, the day before yesterday, 14 November, entitled “From the Atlantic to the Rhine with the American Army” has a bearing on what I have said. I will quote only a few passages from this article. 83. First, Le Monde says: “At present more than ten thousand American soldiers and officers are in France. This time they have not come to pay their respects to Lafayette. Their assignment is [the following] the U.S, Army in the rear of its forces stationed in Germany is creating services and building up stores of food and munitions for use in the event of a conflict. This is the supply line, which is planned to run from the Atlantic ports to the Rhine...”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“And what about the excitement surrounding the nervous activities of the American staff of the Atlantic bloc, of which we are now spectators here? And the present, gathering in Paris of the leading figures of the aggressive Atlantic bloc, in which the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. Lovett, is playing an active part, with General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mr. Harriman, not to mention Mr. Acheson, Mr. Perkins or Mr. Adenauer, who is said to have arrived in Paris, or even. General Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the armed forces of the bloc, and the other persons engaged in preparing for the forthcoming session of the Council of the Atlantic bloc in Rome on 22 November? 82. Even the Paris Le Monde has not been able to conceal the real meaning and significance of all these facts.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“At least, he is not correcting me now. 78. And what of the war in Egypt, which, as the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Salah-el-Din, has said, is now being waged against Egypt by a country purporting to be its ally? And what of this year’s events in Iran, of which Mr. Entezam has spoken? 79. Do these events not indicate the nature of the present policy of the United States and the United Kingdom towards economically and militarily weaker countries? 80. What about all the continuing excitement over the armament and rearmament of Europe, which are crippling a number of countries, including the United Kingdom, one of the chief promoters of that armament, as well as France which has also joined in? 81.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“It is not a matter of isolated events here, it is sufficient to recall only the repeated attempts of the United States to sabotage the armistice negotiations, first in Kaesong and now in Pan Mun Chom! 76. Should we evoke the peace treaty with Japan, the division of Germany, the attempts made by the United States to re-establish or expand the bastions that they have installed on the borders of the USSR, North and South, East and West? Is it necessary to recall the story of the so-called defence of the Near East, which the United States is eager to defend without obtaining the consent of the Near Eastern countries? 77. With all his restraint, Mr. El-Khoury could not help pointing out that this bears a strong resemblance to preparations for American intervention in the Near East. I seem to have understood him correctly.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“In fact, is this not the main objective of the attack by Tito's bullies in his slanderous and provocative denunciation against the USSR and the countries of popular democracy, which could never have been presented here if it had not been sponsored and even directly incited by the United States? 74. How could the representative of the failed Kuomintang regime been seen again during this period of sessions, at the General Assembly, and even worse, in the rostrum of the Assembly, which can be characterized by the French saying "The dead man takes over the living", if the silhouette of Mr. Acheson wouldn’t have been so clearly outlined behind Mr. Tsiang? 75.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Paul Boncour, then head of the French delegation, when he wanted to torpedo the concrete proposals regarding disarmament, then presented by the USSR delegation. He declared, and this formula has become somewhat classical: "Security first and then disarmament". 72. In the course of the preceding sessions of the General Assembly, opponents of arms reduction have only repeated this formula. Now it has just been modernized a bit by Messrs. Truman, Acheson and Eden, who have made the reduction of the current “international tension” a pre-condition for the reduction of armaments. But the hypocrisy shown by the United States in this regard stems from the fact that the entire policy of that country is intended to aggravate and not lessen the tension of international relations. 73.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Acheson, in turn, has made the stepping from one stage to the other dependent on a condition that depends on the proofs of "good will" of such and such States. Messrs. Truman, Acheson and Eden have put as another precondition to the reduction of armaments, the elimination of the current international tension. As it is remembered, the politicians who deliberated in the sessions of the sadly remembered League of Nations, profited abundantly from this condition whenever it was a question about the reduction or even the prohibition of armaments, that is, of disarmament. It should be noted that it was precisely this circumstance that served as an argument after 1930 and particularly on the occasion of the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission for the Conference on Disarmament of the League of Nations, to a person we all know, Mr.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“(I wonder if there is not a discreet allusion to the right of the veto in there, which apparently, would make both our Organization and its procedure unsafe. I think that this is precisely what he wanted to say.) Anyway, until is not elaborated, in accordance with Mr. Truman's proposals, a fair and safe procedure, and an adequate international organization, the United States will not be prepared to proceed with any armament reduction. Therefore, it would seem that the organization we currently have is not adequate for such objective; nonetheless, this does not prevent – as curious as it may seem - that the promoters of this plan for the reduction of armaments submit it to that same organization that does not seem adequate. 71. We also see that Mr.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Truman, President of the United States, in his speech on November 8, included in his proposal on the reduction of armaments - which, as I have already mentioned, is reduced to a simple census of basic simpler weapons - a reserve; according to this, the proposed reduction of armaments cannot really be undertaken until there is an adequate international system, adding that, in order to reduce armaments, it was necessary above all to have an equitable and safe procedure. Mr. Truman did not bother to explain what he meant by this: a safe international system and a fair and safe procedure. Can it not be inferred from his speech that the United States will not be ready to implement the arms reduction program until this fair and safe international procedure has been developed?”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Truman, Acheson and Eden, and in the tripartite statement, the proposals concerning measures related to the reduction of armaments are accompanied by a series of reservations. If you carefully read the speeches, documents and statements of those gentlemen, you always find certain reservations; it is clear that these reservations are intended to prevent practical steps from being taken to reduce arms and ban atomic weapons. This is the meaning that can be attributed to all of these reservations. I propose to quote some of them. 70. First, Mr.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Churchill and you will see that I have not added nor taken away a single word of what he has said. 68. Despite the importance of the military bases of the different parts of the armed forces of the Atlantic block of aggression, nothing has been said neither in the tripartite statement, nor in the speech of Mr. Acheson - who has repeated the statements From Mr. Truman - not even in the intervention of Mr. Eden - who, in turn, repeated what Mr. Acheson had said - about the need to eliminate these military bases that are in foreign territory. This is where one of the most important causes of the tension in international relations can actually be seen, which, as is known, is far from mitigating. 69. In the statements by Messrs.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“All kinds of maps, widely disseminated by the instigators of a new war, attest to this, indicating the direction of the attacks that must be launched, starting from these bases, against specific objectives, against the USSR, against the countries of popular democracies and China, that is, the People's Republic of China. 67. The role and destiny of the American bases stems from the statements made by Mr. Churchill - a person who speaks with full authority, as you know - according to which England has become the main atomic base of the United States. Mr. Churchill's statement shows that this main North American atomic base has been created, in accordance with the plan of the Atlantic block of aggression, for hostile purposes against the USSR. Read the speech delivered on November 9 by Mr.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“It is not necessary to underline the undeniable fact that the purpose of the North American bases is to encircle the USSR and the countries of people’s democracy, to the North with the help of the Scandinavian countries, to the South, with the help of Turkey and Greece, in the west with the help of the countries of western Europe, and at the east with the help of Japan, which now becomes a springboard for aggression, arsenal and strength of the Atlantic bloc, whose head point is directed against the USSR and the People's Republic of China.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“But in the meanwhile these bases are being established month after month by the organizers of the aggressive Atlantic bloc, although they do not mention the fact, and although the issue of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons is closely connected with it. They cannot, however, be convinced of this. 66. This is an important issue, as the fact that the United States organizes military, naval, and air force bases in foreign territories constitutes one of the important measures in the preparation program for a new war. According to the incomplete and voluntarily reduced information published by the North American press, the United States has established 400 or more military, naval, and air force bases in the territory of foreign States.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“It is of course impossible to ignore military bases in any reference to armaments and armed forces; for, when a military base is situated on foreign territory it is one of the ways of using armaments and armed forces which constitutes the greatest danger to peace. But, gentlemen of the American delegation here present, that is precisely the matter which we are discussing. 65. The tripartite proposal does not refer at all to military bases. You know, even under the strongest microscope you won’t find a trace of them, no trace at all of military bases on foreign territory.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“I must state that, of course, as soon as resolutions are passed for the reduction of armaments and for the prohibition of atomic weapons by all States — I stress this, by all States — information on armaments must be furnished as soon as possible. 64. As long ago as the first session of the General Assembly, in New York in December 1946,” the Soviet Union submitted a proposal to recognize the necessity for all States Members of the United States to furnish information on all their armed forces and armaments. The tripartite proposal, however, does not refer at all to military bases.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“That is why we are urging that the Assembly should not shelve this matter but should resolve to prohibit atomic weapons, to establish strict international control to ensure that this prohibition is conscientiously and honestly observed and to reduce all other types of armaments. This resolution must be adopted and duly registered in the miracle book of the General Assembly. Afterwards it will be easy to agree on the important practical measures. But until this is done, alas! we shall be unable to move from our present position owing to a number of circumstances about which I, with your permission and if the Australian representative has no objection, shall have to speak further. 63.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“We have already said that all these proposals of the three Powers amount in substance to proposals for a census of armaments, which is to be carried out without any preliminary resolution for the reduction of armaments and before prohibition of atomic weapons, and which is designed to drown the main issue of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons in a flood of words. This, however, is the main issue. Until the Assembly passes two resolutions on these two supremely important questions, anything else will have no practical significance whatsoever and will remain empty verbiage. 62.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“An attempt is being made to apply this system even now, although the United States has lost its former monopoly of production of atomic weapons and so should realize by now that what is convenient for a monopolist is no longer convenient for him when he stops being a monopolist. The United States should know that it must find new paths to the solution of this problem and not repeat the same thing over and over again, like the magpie in our proverb which used to repeat the same things about everybody, no matter whom. 61.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“The system of stages in the Baruch Plan for so-called international control was intended to confine such control to the first stage in the production of atomic energy, that is, to subject to control only the extraction of raw materials, including uranium and others, and to prevent the extension of international control to the subsequent stages of production of atomic weapons. Under the conditions existing when the United States held the monopoly of atomic weapons, this system of stages, elaborated in the Baruch-Acheson-Lilienthal Plan, admirably suited the United States in atomic matters, for it placed under control only those engaged in extracting raw materials for atomic weapons, and freed from all control those engaged in the actual production of atomic weapons.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Naturally we cannot agree with this way of formulating the problem. A programme for the reduction of armaments in general, based on this principle, would be just as unacceptable as the similar system of stages underlying the Baruch Plan for the control of atomic weapons. This “ system of stages ”, in the hands of the masters of the situation, which the United States of America aspires to be, would constitute a convenient means of refusing for an indefinitely long period to carry out inconvenient and, from their own point of view, embarrassing control measures, or of implementing these measures unilaterally with respect to others States. 60.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“This can only mean that the fate of the whole plan for collecting data on armaments, for verifying these data and for implementing measures for the reduction of armaments will reside in the hands of the possessors of the more powerful and dangerous weapons. This, finally, may well mean that the decision as regards the transition from one stage to the next will be entirely up to those same Powers, which will decide in accordance with their interests. If they recognize that it is possible to make known the more secret and dangerous types and forms of armaments, they will accordingly do so, and will proceed to the ensuing stage; if they do not recognize this to be possible, they will not do so and will not transmit the information to anybody. Thus the whole affair will come to a standstill and stop at the preceding stage. 59.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“He states directly: “As we move from stage to stage, we would have increasing evidence of good faith and honesty. We would not go forward”, he adds, “without that evidence”. This way of stating the issue can only mean one thing: that the transition from one stage to the next in the submission of information on armaments under the three-Power plan will be made directly dependent on whether those States possessing the most powerful, dangerous and threatening weapons, on which information has to be published and made known at succeeding stages, will be prepared to accept as satisfactory the results of submitting the required information at the first stage.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Acheson underlined that “in a world charged as ours is with suspicions and dangers, our peoples want the safeguard that disclosure and verification can provide”. It is entirely understandable and a matter of elementary logic that if this is in fact so, then an effort must be made to disclose as soon as possible the most important features which give the best safeguard. But the tripartite statement turns the whole matter upside down, or, as the English and Americans are fond of saying, “puts the cart before the horse”; or as it seems the Australians and Canadians say, evidently preferring oxen to horses, “puts the cart before the ox”. Mr. Acheson says that safeguards are necessary and that only if such safeguards are forthcoming will transition from one stage to the next be possible.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“We have not the slightest doubt that this cautious approach is due solely to the desire to avoid, in actual fact, providing any information on the atomic weapon, which of course belongs specifically to that most secret category which, according to Mr. Eden, is particularly difficult to handle. It is like, if one might say so, a very sensitive lady who must be handled with special care and tenderness, and never exposed to the public view. 58. Here is just where we see the real point of the system of successive stages devised by the three Powers. The actual shift from one stage to another will, according to Mr. Acheson’s and Mr. Eden’s statements, be made at the discretion of those who hold the mechanism controlling the reduction of atomic weapons and all armaments, as well as the prohibition of atomic armaments. Mr.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“He went on to explain what was meant by those more important categories. They are the more secret ones, and, consequently, he went on — another remarkable expression! — “more difficult to handle”. You see, when we reach the last, or some later stage, and it comes to the disclosure of secrets, then, says Mr. Eden, we come up against the need to disclose even things which are difficult to handle. 57. What are those things? Atomic bombs, perhaps hydrogen bombs, tactical or maybe non-tactical ones, I do not know; at any rate some special ones which Mr. Eden places in the more important categories, to use his own expression, or which, in the words of Mr. Acheson, constitute “more sensitive areas”. Those I believe are the delicate questions which the three Powers relegate to the last stage.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
““We suggest”, he said, “that this should begin with the less important categories of armed forces and armaments”. Was I not right in saying that a start would be made with ordinary rifles, machine guns and so on, that is to say, with the less important weapons? That is what Mr. Eden said. I merely repeated it, though in doing so I evidently caused a certain person displeasure. Apparently one must not repeat what other people have said even when it is to the point; one must bring out something fresh, indeed unusual, as the Australian representative requested me to do today. Clearly he must be satisfied, as I am saying something really unusual. What I am saying now is probably absolutely new to him. And then, Mr. Eden said, that is to say, after going through the less important categories, we shall go on to the more important ones.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“Romulo, I must disappoint you and ask you to approach the study of this statement more carefully and without enthusiasm. 55. “ The least vital information ”, said Mr. Acheson, “ would be disclosed first, and we would then proceed”; here Mr. Acheson used a remarkably apt expression — you will observe that I can speak of him not only harshly and rudely, but also gently and kindly — “ to more sensitive areas”. The sensitive area, Mr. Representative of the Philippines, is ultimately atomic armaments, and the statement promises that we shall come to it later on. Even that would be all right if later on were not postponed to what the ancients called the Greek calends; you will remember that the calends only existed in the Roman calendar and never in the Greek. 56. This was confirmed by Mr. Eden in his speech of 12 November [339th meeting].”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“I am using: the text of the official translators of the General Assembly, whose work is well known to be excellent. At any rate the delegation of the Soviet Union has no complaint to make against their translations; it finds them indeed highly satisfactory. I repeat, Mr, Acheson said [335th meeting] that “this system of disclosure and verification must be a system which progresses”. That is the first principle: it progresses. “Which progresses from stage to stage as each one is completed”: that is the second principle. “The least vital information”, he continued, “would be disclosed first”. Where did General Romulo get the idea, which made him so enthusiastic, that notifying, reporting and providing information concerning atomic armaments would begin immediately? Nobody said anything about that. On the contrary, Mr.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)
“I do not share his feelings, though I know him to be a very enthusiastic man and not very difficult to inspire with enthusiasm; to command his enthusiasm a proposal has merely to originate in the United States of America. We are used to that and must of course expect it. An enthusiastic man like General Romulo can be enthusiastic even about this proposal. But what, in reality, is this system of successive stages? I should, with your permission, like to go into that. 54. Mr. Acheson said — I should mention here that I am using a Russian translation: it is possible that in places it may not quite tally with some other Russian translation, and differ from the English text in some trifle of a comma or quotation mark; but in the main it is clearly accurate since it is the work of responsible translators.”
1951-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 6 (1951)