YouSaid · the spoken record

VYSHINSKY

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673
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1947-09-24
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1954-09-24
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8
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un-general-debate

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  1. In the West, the insupportable burden of armaments is causing increasing unrest, and the conviction is daily growing that the so-called strategic requirements determined by the leaders of the North Atlantic bloc are quite unjustified, and that the “threat from the East”, by which those leaders attempt to justify the armaments race, is non-existent. 44. The reactionary forces in the countries of Western Europe are putting their money on Adenauer’s Western Germany, declaring that its armed forces are of vital importance for the “viability of Europe”. Now the point of the so-called Bonn Agreement and the so-called Paris Agreement is -the incorporation of the armed forces of Western Germany, organized under the command of hitlerite generals, in the so-called “European Army” and thus in the armed forces of the North Atlantic bloc.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  2. It is typical that at the precise moment when United States diplomats talk, as we have heard them do here in the Assembly, about the alleged intention of their country to “win the battle for peace”, Mr. Wilson, the United States Secretary of Defense, assures the Senate that the armed forces of the United States, supported by those of its allies — that is, presumably the armed forces of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Italy and so forth, and above all, of course, the armed forces of Western Germany, in which the United States is especially interested — will be able to “win the war” against the Soviet Union, and General Clay tells the graduate class of the West Point Military Academy that the atomic war is the key to the United States national security. 43.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  3. Their attitude was regarded as a crime against the State, for which they were condemned and severely punished. This is plain proof that Syngman Rhee and his protectors were really preparing to invade North Korea and effected the invasion at the suitable moment. In face of this and the other unchallengeable evidence, how is it possible to go on calmly spreading the false and disproved story that it was North Korea which committed aggression, and to sing the praises of this disgraceful passage in the history of the United Nations, when the Organization was used as the tool for a policy of aggression and a cloak for foreign intervention in Korea? 42.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  4. If you read the indictment against these thirteen representatives, setting forth the counts against them, you are bound to note the fourth charge: protesting against the South Korean forces invading North Korea. You see what this means? Obviously that members of the National Assembly were sentenced by Syngman Rhee, thrown into prison and sent to hard labour simply for having spoken against the invasion of North Korea which was then being undertaken. Now the wording of this count was: protesting against invasion. Does not this mean that preparations were being made for invasion? And that those who tried to prevent the preparations were thrown into prison, although they were members of the National Assembly and thus representatives of the people?

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  5. I want to bring this fact to your attention, and to the attention of those speaking after me who again talk about aggression having been committed by North Korea, so that they may finally renounce their conspiracy of silence concerning the value of the evidence which for over three years I have consistently repeated from this rostrum, and which has been sedulously ignored by those who simply repeat the parrot cry: “The Government of North Korea is the aggressor, the attack came from North Korea”, and so on, without bearing out their contention in any way. I should like to put before you one last, comparatively new, piece of evidence to show that the opposite is true. 41. In the spring of 1950, thirteen members of the National Assembly in South Korea were tried and given sentences of up to ten years’ imprisonment.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  6. But since the subject invariably comes up, and some representatives speaking after me will probably be referring yet again to aggression on the part of North Korea, I must remind you of just one thing which gives conclusive support to the abundant evidence that the attack on the territory of North Korea was planned in advance and carried out by the armed forces of Syngman Rhee’s puppet government, with foreign support.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  7. There is no need, of course, for me to go into the details of this question, which is fully three years old already, and I do not believe that anybody would expect me to do so. All through the last three years, since 1950, we have repeatedly adduced much evidence of what the real situation was in 1950, when the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea was attacked by the armed forces of Syngman Rhee, that had been organized, equipped and trained by American military instructors and officers.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  8. Now we are told that this so-called “community defence system” is, if you please, the safeguard, the bulwark and the mainstay of the United Nations. What is being done under this disguise of so-called “community defence” is really aimed against collective security. The talk about collective security is simply a smoke-screen for military plans, which of course are incompatible with measures to promote real collective security. 39. A vitally important question, that commands universal interest, is that of Korea, of the unification of that country and of the political conference which is to be convened not later than 28 October: 40. Certain representatives, in particular the representative of the United States, have repeated in this connexion the long since disproved and discredited charge that the aggression came from North Korea.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  9. In view of this, it is easy to understand the statement made by the Swedish Government that it would not be able to take the responsibility of joining in possible sanctions if the probable result of its participation were to involve the country in a world war. 38. This is most important and throws light on the whole question of so-called collective measures, which have been reinforced by very far-reaching rights to proclaim any country an aggressor. The handful of countries which declared Korea an aggressor after attacking it, or rather, which supported the original attack made by Syngman Rhee and then embarked on an operation of intervention, have the power under the North Atlantic Treaty to proclaim any country an aggressor. But under the Charter that power lies solely with the Security Council.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  10. The lack cannot be compensated for by politicians, however able; or by diplomats, however astute; or by scientists, however inventive; or by bombs, however powerful.” Yet the whole so-called “community defence system” is based on the use of force, on the application of sanctions, in other words, on recourse to war against any State that may be declared an aggressor — I should like to stress this — by the members of the North Atlantic bloc, although such a declaration in itself is illegal and is a gross violation of the United Nations Charter, which provides that such matters are to be decided by the Security Council and by the Security Council alone, not even by the General Assembly. 37.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  11. Coming as they do from the North Atlantic bloc, they cannot but inspire all peace-loving peoples with the gravest fears for peace and international security, just as the entire activity of the North Atlantic bloc inspires fear, for, though ostensibly formed for purposes of defence, it is in fact the main threat to world peace. 36. The “community defence system”, as it is called, can no more safeguard peace or establish neighbourly international relations than can the policy of force out of which it arose. The United States representative, Mr. Dulles, seems to have realized this, judging from what he wrote in his book, War or Peace, in 1950, setting forth his views on the foreign policy of the United States. He wrote as follows: “What we lack is a righteous and dynamic faith. Without it, all else avails us little.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  12. In reality — and there are many facts to prove this — a system of military measures to attain aggressive purposes is being set up under the pretext of the so-called system of “community defence”. The creation of this system is designed to weaken and undermine the United Nations and cannot possibly be reconciled with the statement that its organizers allegedly want to make the United Nations a more effective instrument for peace. How can there be any question of an “enlightened way” in the face of a mad armaments race, a race to manufacture atomic bombs, a constant increase of the staggering burden of military budgets for the peoples of the Anglo-American bloc? In such circumstances, it cannot be claimed that these so-called collective measures represent an “enlightened way”.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  13. It is impossible, however, to conceal the true nature and purposes of the military measures which are being carried out openly and energetically by the countries of the North Atlantic bloc, in pursuance of their policy of increasing international tension, this despite references to defence and the utilization of methods authorized by the Charter, methods which, as Mr. Dulles said, no one need fear and which he described as an “enlightened way” of ensuring international security. 35. How can anyone describe as an “enlightened way” the so-called “community defence system”, when it was created in contravention and violation of the Charter, which does show the proper way to combat aggression and defend peace and international security?

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  14. Soviet foreign policy is indeed a peace-loving policy, a policy of peace and friendship among peoples. The nature of this policy, its purposes and principles, determine the position taken by the Soviet Union on all international questions, including those on which Mr. Dulles dwelled in his statement. The United States Secretary of State tried very hard to represent the foreign policy of the United States as a policy of peace. 34. We have seen similar attempts in the past. This is not the first time that conciliatory declarations about economic and political co-operation and various so- called mutual defence pacts and treaties, etc. etc., are used to conceal the true purposes of the United States policy of world domination, a policy utterly at variance with professions of love for peace.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  15. The enemies of peace are now trying to frighten the peoples with the fact that the Soviet Union possesses the secret of manufacturing the hydrogen bomb; they did the same thing a few years ago when the Soviet Union mastered the secret of manufacturing the atomic weapon. They are trying to cause alarm by these facts for the purposes of the armaments race. 33. In its communication of 20 August, the Soviet Government declared that, now as before, any such alarm was unfounded, because the Soviet Union continued to pursue an unswerving policy of strengthening the peace and developing co-operation and economic relations with all the States which pursued the same purposes, a policy truly designed to promote the settlement of contentious international questions.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  16. These are the views of a rather well-informed person, a man who served for thirty-four years in the United States Army, and is a member, as I said, of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States, and the author of a number of other books on military, political and other topics — this is his reply to the question which concerns some of those present here: “Why do we fear?” That is why. 32. I must say that, although the foolish fabrications spread by the enemies of the peace about the threat supposedly represented by the USSR are credited less and less by fewer and fewer people, the manufacture and dissemination of such subversive rumours continue.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  17. If the Pentagon and certain politicians can keep the fear of communistic aggression fresh in the public’s mind for a few years longer, all of our men of military age and many of our women will belong to the professional armies. We will then be a military State similar to that of Hitler’s, with which he terrorized the world.” And further along the author states that “the fear of a Russian attack will pass as soon as the public understands that the fear... was generated by the Pentagon to frighten Congress into authorizing our big professional army”. 31.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  18. Dulles touched on this theme, seeking to answer the question which he himself had asked: “Why do we fear?” 30. A book recently published in New York, called Pentagon Politics, by the former President of the Reserve Officers Association of the United States, Colonel Neblett, seems to me to provide a direct answer to the question which puzzles Mr. Dulles. In that book we read: “… we have lived through seven years of fear of a Russian surprise attack and of communism at home. The Pentagon has converted these fears into military control of our nation... The public has been frightened into giving our military leaders a regular military force of 5 million men and women...

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  19. Dulles was able to say — and here I have no reason to disagree with him — speaking of the results of his journey to Europe, that the so-called European defence community, the core of which, according to him, was composed of the six countries which signed the Paris Treaty, must be based on German armed forces, meaning, of course. West German armed forces. 29. Reactionary elements in the United States and certain other capitalist countries are stimulating the war psychosis by an armaments race, military manoeuvres, and the elaboration of various plans for acts of provocation and strategic plans, and are trying to induce terror among their populations by lying propaganda concerning the military preparations of the Soviet Union and absurd rumours about the supposed “Soviet menace”. In his statement to the General Assembly on 17 September, Mr.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  20. This is particularly clear today, when the bloc has been in existence for four years, despite all the attempts and devices of its organizers to depict it as the best, if not the only, hope for peace. 28. As we know, a special role within the North Atlantic bloc is assigned to the so-called European army. This is proved by the fact that Mr. Dulles and Mr. Stassen made a special journey to Western Europe to secure the ratification of the treaty and the rapid completion of arrangements for organizing such an army with the participation of West German armed forces; those forces, under the command of former hitlerite generals, bent on revenge, are given a very important place in that army. Hence Mr.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  21. The aggressive intentions of the organizers of that bloc were evident from the outset; the bloc was created for purposes entirely foreign to the defence aims by which its organizers tried to justify it, claiming that defence was its basic, or even its only raison d’être. This bloc is not defensive, as its instigators and organizers maintain. It is intended to prepare for a new world war to achieve the mad idea of world domination. The North Atlantic bloc is really a military alliance working towards purely aggressive ends. It constitutes a major threat to the cause of peace. Its existence is in the interests only of those who are not concerned with strengthening peace, whom peace does not suit and who have placed their stakes on war rather than peace.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  22. 26. The Soviet Union is carrying out its policy of peace in close and friendly co-operation with the countries of the democratic camp, a camp where there are no internal contradictions or struggles and whose members are linked by the strong bonds of complete mutual trust and respect, sincere friendship and disinterested mutual assistance. This is a mighty source of strength and progress for the peace-loving, democratic countries. In the face of such incontrovertible facts, of such universal historical significance, how pitiful are the attempts to distort and cast a shadow over the relations, based on mutual confidence, respect and fraternal co-operation, between the Soviet Union and the countries in the democratic camp. 27. The picture is not the same among the countries in the North Atlantic bloc.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  23. Thirty years ago Lenin, the great founder of the Soviet State, declared: “Our experience has bred in us the firm conviction that only if the greatest attention is paid to the interests of the various nations can the grounds for conflicts, mutual mistrust and fear of intrigues be removed, and the kind of confidence created, particularly among workers and peasants speaking different languages, which is absolutely essential for the achievement of peaceful relations among nations and the successful development of all that is valuable in contemporary civilization.” This is the path the Soviet Union follows firmly and consistently in order to develop and strengthen international relations in accordance with the unshakable principle of its foreign policy, namely, respect for national freedom and the sovereignty of all countries, large and small.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  24. After a long period of growing tension, and for the first time in post-war years, the international atmosphere has become somewhat less charged and millions upon millions of people have been strengthened in their hope that a way can be found to settle outstanding international disputes. Such a policy is in line with the hopes and deep yearnings of all peoples for a lasting and solid peace, as the head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Malenkov, strongly emphasized in his speech to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. The whole course of its policy from its earliest days proves that the Soviet Union seeks to strengthen good-neighbourly relations with other countries and that it has no territorial claims on any State, including its neighbours.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  25. Day by day the demands for the settlement of unresolved international questions are growing stronger, and the weight of international opinion behind them is constantly increasing as the Soviet Union, in unswerving pursuit of its policy of peace, and achieving new successes in its internal affairs, overthrows the obstacles which the enemies of peace have sought to place in the way of such a settlement. 25. Soviet foreign policy is consistent and seeks to defend peace and international security. The considerable improvement in international relations shows that that policy produces positive results.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  26. It is impossible to overlook the ever-growing demand of large sections of the community in a number of countries belonging to that bloc, and also in a number of other countries, that international disputes should be settled by negotiation, so that States might conclude appropriate international agreements which could help to relax international tension. It must be pointed out that, while the enemies of peace are hypocritically calling for negotiations, they are at the same time imposing conditions which are clearly designed to make the negotiations either impossible or useless.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  27. It should also be noted that the State Department is trying to draw into the campaign certain private United States organizations and groups — as Mr. Dulles said — on whose support the State Department counts in this reactionary enterprise. There is every indication that the campaign for the revision of the Charter is to be turned into a cold-war campaign in order to arouse reactionary sentiments and thereby to increase international tension. 24. If the present international situation is analysed, numerous facts inevitably lead to the conclusion that the divergencies of opinion among the Atlantic bloc countries are becoming more marked.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  28. This is a further proof of the absence, among ruling circles in the United States, of any desire to remove international tension. The raising of the question of revising the Charter, therefore, particularly at this juncture, undoubtedly can and will give certain Powers the opportunity of making fresh attempts to undermine the United Nations and particularly the Security Council, thereby undermining the very cause of peace. For to undermine the instrument for peace, with which the struggle for peace may be successfully waged, is tantamount to undermining the cause of peace itself. 23. It is patent that the United States Senate has already been enlisted in the campaign to revise the Charter. It has appointed a special committee under the chairmanship of Senator Wiley.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  29. Dulles’ speech devoted to the revision of the United Nations Charter or, rather, to propaganda to the effect that advantage should be taken of a revision of the Charter to do away with one of the fundamental principles on which the United Nations is based, namely, the principle of the unanimity of the permanent members in the consideration and solution of problems in the Security Council. This principle ties the hands of those who wish to weaken the Security Council’s role and its significance. The protagonists of revising the Charter do not wish to transform the United Nations into the effective instrument for peace of which the United States representative, Mr. Dulles, spoke, but into the tool of an aggressive policy threatening and undermining peace.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  30. There is a manifest tendency, here, to adopt an intolerant attitude to anyone who does not support, or fully support, the United States point of view. By adopting such a position the United States has repeatedly shown that in order to attain its ends it will not shrink from flagrantly violating the sovereign rights of peoples and States who are going their own way, regardless of its orders. 22. The fact that the United States is not interested in relaxing international tension is also clear from the part of Mr.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  31. Such a policy, which aims at settling international questions without the participation of the legal representatives of the Chinese People’s Republic, is inevitably doomed to failure. 21. At the beginning of his statement on 17 September, Mr. Dulles said that the United States recognized that its views might not always prevail. “When that happens,” he said, “we shall no doubt regret it, but we shall not sulk. We shall try to accept the results philosophically...” Only a few days ago, however, we saw what Mr. Dulles meant by “philosophically”. The incident involved India. The United States delegation, headed by Mr. Dulles, adopted its own particular brand of philosophical approach to the question of Indian participation in the political conference on the Korean question, categorically opposing any such participation.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  32. Dulles, on the question of the representation of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations, is another eloquent indication of the lack of any real desire on the part of the United States to relax international tension. Only a few days ago, the United States delegation exerted every effort to prevent the Assembly from inviting the representatives of the People’s Republic of China to occupy China’s legitimate seat in the United Nations and its organs. The aggressive policy towards the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese people and the support and protection given to the Chiang Kai-shek bands, as the alleged “government” of China, are incompatible with the interests of peace and international security and co-operation.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  33. The unity of Soviet society has never been as monolithic, nor the brotherly friendship of the Soviet people as strong and indestructible, as now, a fact which is most disturbing to the enemies of peace, who nurture vain hopes of shaking that unity and preventing the further progress of the Soviet State and its development in the economic, political and cultural spheres. Is the plan to offset Soviet unity compatible with any truly peaceful purposes and activities? There can be no doubt that the only possible answer to this question is in the negative. A policy directed at destroying the social and political structure of any other country cannot be tailed a policy of peace, nor can it have any justification. The position adopted by the United States delegation, headed by Mr.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  34. Dulles praised other aggressive blocs and alliances such as the so-called security or mutual defence agreements between the United States and the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and Japan, the so-called agreement on mutual defence with Chiang Kai-shek, a similar agreement with Syngman Rhee and a whole series of other agreements on military bases which will, according to Mr. Dulles, give United States armed forces facilities for more effective operations. Later on in the same speech, Mr. Dulles spoke of the need to offset what he said the Soviet Prime Minister had called the monolithic unity of the Soviet system. 20. Such talk about offsetting the unity of the Soviet system certainly does not agree with what we have heard here about the allegedly peaceful purposes of United States foreign policy.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  35. Dulles argued the need for and advisability of aggressive organizations such as the North Atlantic bloc, to which the United States had entrusted the responsibility of safeguarding international security. That was clear from his speech. The reason given for this step was that the United Nations had failed to safeguard international security. It is clear that such a statement is directly at variance with the statement Mr. Dulles made here, to the effect that the primary purpose of the United Nations was to maintain international peace and security and that the Charter itself had given the United Nations the mandate “to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations”. In Boston, Mr.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  36. Dulles said on 17 September. 18. Such statements by responsible political leaders warrant careful consideration. On the other hand, the numerous facts which are at variance with them cannot be ignored. Mr. Dulles’ statement to the General Assembly on 17 September contained no evidence to corroborate his words. The same is true of his other speeches, for instance, those he made to the American Bar Association in Boston on 26 August and to the American Legion Convention on 2 September. It is also true of the whole trend of United States foreign policy. On the contrary, many facts could be cited as evidence of entirely opposite intentions. Let us examine this question. 19. In the speech he made in Boston, on 26 August, to the American Bar Association, Mr.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  37. Dulles, in his speech to the Assembly a few days ago, said that the United States was quite prepared to explore ways to end the present tension and that the United States would never grow weary or discouraged in its quest for peace. He particularly emphasized that the need for harmonizing the actions of nations, as the United Nations Charter requires, was never more urgent than now. We were also told that the United States had, as it were, opened the doors of the house of peace and invited the Soviet Union to enter. This, according to Mr. Dulles, was not a chance remark,but a stage already provided for in the development of the Eisenhower foreign policy. He added that the time had come for the United States to embark on a true peace offensive and to act realistically in order to win the battle for peace. That is what Mr.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  38. This is a clear indication that new adventures are being planned of the type perpetrated in Berlin in June of this year, adventures which are obviously bound to cause further international tension. The imperialist magnates, desirous of maintaining the huge profits which they derive from the arms race and the militarization of industry, wholeheartedly support the policy of aggravating international relations; as before, they are gambling on war. This policy poisons the international atmosphere, heightens international tension and injures the vital interests of all peace-loving peoples. 17. The head of the United States delegation, Mr.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  39. It is significant, in this connexion, that the so-called Psychological Strategy Board, in the United States, has quite recently been converted into a new specialized body with even more specific functions. This new organization, according to the American Press, has to elaborate and carry out various tasks of vital importance to the nation in the sphere of high strategy. The main reason for the creation of this special new organization, also psychological in character, is, as the American Press frankly puts it, that words are no longer enough in the cold war, and that the ruling circles in the United States believe that deeds are more effective than words in the cold war against the Soviet Union. 16.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  40. The historic service rendered by the heroic Korean people and the gallant Chinese People’s Volunteers was that they repelled the attempts of the interventionists in Korea and dealt a heavy blow to the far-reaching plans of the reactionary forces which were seeking to suppress the people’s liberation movement in Asia. 15. One cannot fail to note the recent increase in the activity of aggressive circles in the western world, which are opposing, more than ever before, all endeavours to ease the tension in international relations, and which are extending their subversive activity against the Soviet Union, the Chinese People’s Republic and the peoples’ democracies, in accordance with the plans of their so-called cold war strategy.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  41. Malenkov, head of the Soviet Government, pointed out, was an important landmark in the struggle of all the forces of peace against aggression and, international gambles. It clearly showed that the forces of peace can achieve just solutions of thorny international problems if they remain firm and unyielding. The head of the Soviet Government further pointed out that it would be unforgivable to ignore the latest intrigues of the aggressive forces in the East, which are seeking to disrupt the armistice in Korea and to aggravate the situation in Asia and the Pacific basin, 14.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  42. The conclusion of the agreement bore witness to the growth of the, forces of peace, and it justifies the rising hopes for the success of future endeavours to ensure a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and other controversial issues, and the restoration of normal international relations. The Armistice Agreement also bore witness to the defeat of the so-called dynamic foreign policy, the policy of strength, which reactionary circles in the United States and its allies have persistently tried to put into effect; they have sought to proceed, not by negotiation, but by using dictatorial methods, apparently overestimating their own strength and the means at their disposal, and misjudging the realities of the international situation and the real balance of power in the world. 13. The signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement, as Mr.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  43. Dulles made it quite clear in his statement that the United States intends to seek a solution to this problem which is absolutely unjustified and totally divorced from reality, involving what amounts to the subjugation of North Korea under the anti-national regime of Syngman Rhee, whose power would then extend over the whole of Korea. 12. We are firmly convinced that the General Assembly recommendations concerning the political conference on Korea must be brought fully into line with the Armistice Agreement. The conclusion of that agreement was a great victory for peace, and that victory must be consolidated.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  44. Dulles did not hesitate to say that the political conference would be a test of the will to peace of the other side, thus showing that the conference itself and the important problems which it is called upon to decide are of no great interest to the United States. It must further be said that, on the matter of the unification of Korea too, the position of the United States, as it appears from the speech Mr. Dulles made here on this very rostrum on 17 September [434th meeting], is identical with that of Syngman Rhee. Mr.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  45. It felt that the just demands of the Korean and Chinese Governments with regard to the composition of the conference must be met; if they were not met, the sovereign rights of those peoples and States would be grossly injured, to the great advantage of the enemies of peace who — make no mistake about it — have no interest in the convening and successful conduct of the political conference on Korea. 11. It is to be observed, however, that the United States remains obdurate in this matter. It refuses to withdraw from the position it has wrongly taken up on the question of the composition of the political conference. It is doing all in its power to prevent the discussion of the question at the present session of the General Assembly. Mr.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  46. Li Don Gen, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea, that neither of those countries find it possible to accept the recommendation adopted at the seventh session, and they propose that the Assembly should reconsider the question. 10. As representatives already know, the Soviet Union proposed in the General Committee [88th meeting] that the Secretary-General’s note [A/2480] should be included in the agenda of this session.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  47. Such a situation can in no way be regarded as satisfactory. 8. The Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sunario, rightly declared [437th meeting] that the participants in the conference on the Korean question should include not only the belligerents but also non-belligerent countries for which a Far Eastern settlement was a matter of immediate concern and which might contribute to the success of the conference. 9. It is also clear, from the telegram sent by Mr. Chou En-lai, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and from the statement of Mr.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  48. Proof of the fact that the so-called policy of strength is suffering defeat after defeat was given recently, during the discussion of the Korean question at the General Assembly’s seventh session, when nearly one-third of the delegations failed to support the fifteen-Power draft resolution which opposed a round-table conference. The situation is in no way changed by the fact that the pro-American camp succeeded in putting through, in the name of the United Nations, a General Assembly decision which was clearly not in accordance with the Armistice Agreement and was a flagrant violation of paragraph 60 of that agreement, which certainly does not stipulate that the conference shall consist only of representatives of the two sides whose troops fought in Korea, as the United States and its followers have insisted.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  49. Surely it is to these obstacles that some representatives have referred in their speeches at this session, as for instance when Sir Zafrulla Khan, representative of Pakistan and its Minister for Foreign Affairs, spoke [437th meeting] about the instability of peace in the Far East, Korea and elsewhere, and said that Korea and the Far East were not the only places where the tension threatened the peace. This is the result of a policy of imperialism or colonialism, as some representatives have called it when speaking here of the necessity of putting an end to it. 7.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)

  50. It is well known, too, that in an article called “A policy of boldness”, published in Life in 1952, Mr. John Foster Dulles elaborated a programme for such an underground war. Syngman Rhee sought to act in accordance with that policy, if we can call it by such a name, when he tried to prevent the signing of the Armistice Agreement in Korea, and so did those who tried to stir up trouble in Germany, hired and organized by those extreme reactionary groups who fear any lessening in international tension. 6. But this policy has seriously missed fire, the criminal plans of the enemies of peace have miscarried. This policy is meeting ever greater obstacles.

    1953-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 8 (1953)