YouSaid · the spoken record

Guehenno

lines on the record: 1,147
first: 2000-11-14
most recent: 2011-05-12
sittings or episodes: 58
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Only in this way can we best understand how effectively to help women and girls and how to lay down the foundations for a lasting peace. Women are also a source of strength and inspiration in our struggle. We recognize the tremendous impact that they can have when their knowledge, skills and energy are harnessed in the name of peace and of rebuilding a country devastated by war. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has greatly benefited from the support it has received from such agencies as United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), which have strong links with the national women's networks that exist in many countries. Over the past 12 months, the Department has taken concrete steps to implement resolution 1325 (2000).”
2003-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4852 (2003) · source
“Amy Smythe, will later speak on the practical realities of implementing resolution 1325 (2000) and will provide a perspective from the field level in the Democratic Republic of Congo on this issue. I would like also to acknowledge the contributions received from our partners in the United Nations system, as well as from non-governmental organizations, for this presentation. As we all know, women and girls do not experience conflict in the same way as men and boys. Women and girls suffer disproportionately in time of war. Pre-existing inequalities are magnified and exacerbated by conflict and social networks break down, making women and girls highly vulnerable to sexual violence and exploitation. We have learned that when a peacekeeping operation is deployed in such an environment, out first duty is to listen to the voices of the victims.”
2003-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4852 (2003) · source
“Three years ago, the Security Council took a bold stance on the role of women in conflict by adopting resolution 1325 (2000). It recognized that women and girls bear the brunt of armed conflict and also that they are an essential part of any lasting solution. This has significant implications for our peacekeeping operations and calls for a radical change in the way we do our work. I welcome the opportunity offered us today to take stock of the efforts made to date to implement resolution 1325 (2000) in peacekeeping operations and to highlight some of the challenges facing us in the year to come. The Senior Gender Adviser of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), Ms.”
2003-10-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4852 (2003) · source
“The expansion of security assistance provides a critical element of this equation; its expected benefits must now be realized.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“Those divisions were later downplayed, but they nonetheless demonstrate that a balance must be struck between moving the peace process forward and ensuring that the major stakeholders remain willing participants. As the Bonn process enters its final stage, the Afghan Government and the international community will embark upon their most challenging and far- reaching political undertakings. Afghans have many reasons to be optimistic that those undertakings will provide a solid foundation for a stable Afghanistan. However, there are still significant obstacles standing in the way, not least the lack of security. Maintaining the forward momentum that has been building in the months since Bonn will require the determination of the Afghan people and the will of the international community.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“The creation of a multi-ethnic Government, bound by a new, broadly agreed constitution, is essential to this process, as only in that way will all Afghans be able to have confidence that the central Government is accountable to and serves the interests of its people. In the short term, however, there are worrying signs that the political compact that has allowed the Government to press ahead with Bonn in spite of the differences among its individual members may be weakening. Over the past few weeks, the divisions between those who would turn the corner on Afghanistan's past and those who would preserve their entitlement appear to have deepened. This was most clearly demonstrated by the several meetings held among the so-called jihadi leadership during President Karzai's absence for the General Assembly.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“Over time, the proportion of funding supplied by domestic revenues and private investment will need to increase, as will the role of national institutions in providing services and protection for the Afghan citizenry. In the meantime, however, Afghanistan is still dependent on the continued support of the international community. Forward momentum across the parallel tracks of security, reconstruction and development and the Bonn political process must be maintained if the institutions of State are to take hold. Over the long term, guaranteeing peace and stability in Afghanistan will require national unity.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“Whereas in Tokyo donors pledged some $4.5 billion for reconstruction over five years, the Ministry of Finance now believes that $6 billion will be needed each year if its reconstruction needs are to be met. The recent International Monetary Fund and World Bank meeting in Dubai provided an opportunity for donors to recommit to Afghanistan. The only pledges actually made, however, were the announcement by the United States of some $1.2 billion for Afghanistan, including $600 million for security and $400 million in support of reconstruction, and a commitment by the European Union of 50 million euros to the LOTFA. Ministers and senior representatives from 22 Member States further reaffirmed their commitment to Afghanistan at the high-level ad hoc meeting held on the margins of the General Assembly last month.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“Insecurity has, without question, slowed the delivery of reconstruction - if not outright prevented it in the most insecure areas. Where construction projects have gone ahead in spite of the dangers posed by Taliban and other insurgents, delays and protective measures for staff have inflated the projected costs of those projects. Too often, this cost has also been paid in human life. Yet it is also true that when the international donors conference was held in Tokyo in 2002, the extent of Afghanistan's needs was not fully appreciated. At that time, estimates by the World Bank ran upwards of $10 billion. It is now clear that significantly greater resources are required if Afghanistan is to recover from the near total devastation of its infrastructure and social capital after years of war.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“The international community has also taken steps to improve the overall security situation in Afghanistan with available assets on the ground. A joint coordination cell has been established to improve coordination between the Afghan Government, the United Nations, NATO and the coalition in support of the Bonn process. The joint coordination cell should assist in coordinating security support and developing operational plans for parallel Bonn activities, particularly in insecure areas, as well as dealing with requests for coalition and ISAF assistance. Afghans expect their Government to provide security and social services. Without either, confidence in the peace process and the transitional administration will fade, opening the door for Taliban and other anti- Government forces.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“The decision by Germany to deploy a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to Kunduz is a welcome first step - one that will hopefully encourage other countries to consider how they can best contribute. However, the PRT concept provides only some, not all, of the possible benefits of a more robust ISAF expansion. In addition to the PRT concept, a more robust deployment of ISAF peacekeepers, short-term rapid reaction deployments and a presence on major highways - indeed, a mix of approaches for each region - could make major inroads in helping to resolve the security situation. Any initiative to improve the security environment in Afghanistan is welcome, provided that it supports the national agenda of furthering the Bonn process and of expanding Government authority in a coherent, commonly understood and coordinated manner.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“As this corresponds to areas that are heavily populated by Pashtuns, the result would be disenfranchisement, which would be politically untenable. The unanimous vote by the Security Council last week approving expansion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) beyond Kabul is a welcome and much-needed development. The new ISAF mandate clears the way for extending international security assistance to where it is most needed throughout the country, and I would therefore encourage Member States to provide necessary and appropriate resources to do that. ISAF expansion should help to provide a secure environment for the implementation of the Bonn process and to extend the authority of the central Government into the provinces by creating space for new national security institutions, as well as for other nascent State institutions.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“Under the plan, police contingents of four officers - two national and two provincial - will receive special training prior to being assigned to accompany registration teams. In this regard, the recent topping up of the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) by the European Union is a positive development. The success of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process and the electoral registration exercise will be dependent upon sufficient improvement in security conditions to allow deployment of staff beyond major urban centres. Indeed, if it were held today, the electoral process would not succeed. Some 60 per cent of the south and some 20 per cent of the south-east and east are at any one time not freely accessible.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“As soon as possible thereafter, registration will begin in 20 to 25 additional urban sites - preferably where there is a United Nations presence, and, obviously, subject to security assessments. That decision was taken because the current availability of funds was insufficient to implement the previous strategy of a broader start. The establishment of the regional offices of the Interim Afghan Electoral Commission will be completed in the coming days. The immediate task facing the Commission is to begin hiring the 800 registrars needed so as to ensure that the full complement of trained registrars are ready for December. The security project to support the registration is also moving ahead.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“The registration decree, establishing the guidelines for who is eligible to vote, was finalized on 9 September and the political parties law, laying out the legal framework for the formation of political parties, was ratified on 12 October. The Ministry of Justice has received requests for registration from more than 100 parties. Although the final political parties law is an improvement on the original draft, it is less than perfect. In particular, there may be room for concern regarding parties' rights to assembly and free expression as well as the threshold for parties' being dissolved by the Government. The timeline for deployment of the registration teams has been moved back from 15 October 2003, as originally envisioned, to 1 December. Deployment will begin in the eight regional centres.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“National advisory committees for special-category elections - including women, refugees and internally displaced persons, nomads and Hindus and Sikhs - are being established to provide guidance and oversight on nomination and election procedures as well as to assist in public education regarding the electoral process. The adoption of a new Afghan constitution by a Constitutional Loya Jirga will establish the legal foundation for re-establishing the rule of law and for ongoing reconstruction efforts. It will also determine the form of government and thus provide the basis for national elections. The legal and institutional structures necessary for the national election are gradually being put in place.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“In order to minimize potential acts of intimidation and violence against candidates, actual election of delegates is scheduled to take place just ahead of the Loya Jirga, with the exception of Badakhshan, where the onset of winter has necessitated early elections. But that is not expected to jeopardize delegates, as the north-east region has not experienced any security incidents during the registration phase. The rules of procedure for the Constitutional Loya Jirga elections have been finalized and distributed to all regions along with the final seat allocation per province.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“The by- elections, held so far in 24 out of the 25 districts - the exception was Daulat Yar, in Ghor province - have added approximately 1,000 voters to the electorate. There has been some concern regarding registration in Logar, Samangan, Sari Pul and Ghor provinces, where higher than expected percentages of the electorate did not register. In some areas, that was due to problems with travel or to absence for work abroad, but elsewhere it was attributable to insecurity caused by factional fighting and to intimidation by local authorities and commanders. The Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission is considering ways to ensure that district representatives in those areas are given an opportunity to register at a later stage.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“Five hundred delegates will participate in the Constitutional Loya Jirga, of whom 344 will be elected on a provincial basis by the district representatives of the 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga, who make up the electorate that will vote for the elected Constitutional Loya Jirga delegates. The registration of that electorate began on 28 September in all provinces except Kunduz, where it began on 22 September, and in the eastern region, where it began on 1 October. To date, the registration process has been completed in some 20 provinces. It is estimated that nearly 76 per cent of the electorate has been registered in those areas. For the 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga, 25 districts did not elect representatives. Therefore, by-elections have been held to add those districts to the electorate.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“Further reforms are needed in national security ministries and all other government ministries - which remain influenced by factional and ethnic interests - so that they become the levers of the State instruments of a national system of government. Allow me to briefly bring the Council up to date on the status of the constitutional reform and the electoral registration. In September, in consultation with the Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission, President Karzai postponed the Constitutional Loya Jirga until the end of Ramadan, between the end of November and early December. The revised schedule - which is still within the timetable set by Bonn - has provided the Commission more time for finalizing the draft constitution, which is now with the President.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“Although the reform was less sweeping than expected, it marked a step in the right direction to permit the pilot disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programme to proceed, starting today in Kunduz. The initiation of the DDR programme ahead of the election of the majority of Constitutional Loya Jirga delegates should help to alleviate concerns over the constitutional deliberations. The programme's success, meanwhile, should provide the best indication of whether reform of the Ministry of Defence went far enough to generate the public confidence necessary for undertaking the full DDR exercise, and it will be a primary determinant of the extent to which the population at large believes that the outcome of national political processes is based not on the rule of the gun, but on the popular will of the Afghan people.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“The appointment of those individuals has gone some way towards better representation of the full ethnic and geographic diversity of Afghanistan, and should bring a level of professionalism and accountability to a State institution largely seen as above the law. Credible reform of the Ministry of Defence has been regarded as a prerequisite for successfully disarming factional armies. Of concern are indications that the majority of Afghans - particularly among the Pashtun population in the south - believe the reform has kept real power in the hands of the Panjshiris. The new Ministry of Defence will have to quickly prove that it is pursuing a national policy, despite the continuity provided by Minister Fahim and the new Panjshiri chief of staff, Bismillah Khan, and that the newly appointed staff have effective responsibility and authority.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“Those security precautions - particularly the suspension of operations - are considerably restricting reconstruction and the political process, including the ability of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to ensure effective monitoring of the registration of electors for the Constitutional Loya Jirga in the south of the country. (spoke in English) Despite serious challenges, the Afghan Government has made some progress in addressing the causes of insecurity. First among those steps, reform of the senior level of the Ministry of Defence has been completed. On 20 September, President Karzai announced the list of appointees to the twenty-two senior positions within the new organizational structure.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“The trend towards targeting civilians who support the central Government and the peace process supports the view that the United Nations itself must also be seen as a target. As a result of increased terrorist activities, the United Nations and humanitarian community have taken further security precautions, particularly in the south. All United Nations missions are temporarily suspended in Nimroz, Helmand, Uruzgan and Zabul provinces. In Kandahar, armed escorts are required in four districts, and the missions are suspended in the other five. Following the killings in Helmand province on 24 and 27 September, to which I have just referred, the majority of humanitarian organizations working in that part of the country have imposed a travel ban outside Kandahar city and its immediate environs.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“And, on 27 September, in the same province, seven security guards from the Arghandab Valley Authority were killed in Lashkar Gah city when their vehicle was struck by a rocket-propelled grenade. These three incidents are only the most serious; elsewhere, mine-clearance teams and clearly marked NGO vehicles and offices have come under attack. Caution must be exercised in attributing all significant incidents to Taliban forces, as there other, non-Taliban forces that also take advantage of instability, including narcotics traffickers. Yet, regardless of the identity or the origin of the perpetrators, attacks against humanitarian workers seriously jeopardize the safety of personnel and limit the ability to effectively conduct reconstruction and to support political activities.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“Attacks by terrorists against Government, military and humanitarian personnel are steadily increasing. Recent attacks against humanitarian organizations have primarily targeted national, rather than international, personnel. In the past six weeks, four national staff of the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR), a non-governmental organization (NGO), were murdered by Taliban in Ghazni on 8 September. According to the sole survivor, before being shot, the victims were informed that they were to be killed as punishment for working with NGOs. This incident was followed by the killing on 24 September of two staff members of the Voluntary Association for Rehabilitation of Afghanistan (VARA), an Afghan NGO, in Helmand province.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“Sporadic tribal and inter-factional conflicts also contribute to insecurity in the provinces of the south, southeast and cast, but the primary source of insecurity remains the risk of terrorist attacks and continued and sizeable cross-border infiltration by suspected Taliban, Al Qaeda, and Hizb-I-Islami elements. With the exception of Badakhshan province, every border district - from Nimroz province in the southwest to Nuristan province in the northeast - was classified as high risk in the latest assessment of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) on 15 October. Indeed, in several border districts - Maruf in Kandahar and Barmal and Gayan in Paktika - the Taliban have been able to establish de facto control over district administration.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“When the Security Council was last briefed on the situation in Afghanistan some two months ago, the prevailing concern was the deteriorating security situation across large areas of the country. The past few weeks are a reminder that, as the final and most important stages of the peace process move ahead, many of the fundamental and structural causes of insecurity remain unresolved. This was recently clearly demonstrated in the north, when on 9 October, after months of relative calm, the arrest of elements affiliated with J amiat sparked factional tensions that flared into the worst fighting in the region since the signing of the Bonn Agreement.”
2003-10-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4848 (2003) · source
“We have been in the peacekeeping business for more than half a century now, and we will have failed in our responsibility to suffering populations throughout the world if we neglect to learn and apply the lessons of the past half a century. I hope that we can count on your continued support and commitment as we strive to ensure that the rule of law obtains the central, strategic role that it merits in all peacekeeping efforts.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source
“What remains to be seen, however, is how effective we - the United Nations Secretariat, our other United Nations system partners, the Security Council, Member States, and outside entities who are able to contribute - will be in effectively developing peacekeeping mandates, by determining budgets that are appropriate to needs, by deploying human and material resources that are equal to the challenge, and - most difficult of all - by taking into account, with a sense of realism, the difficulties we will face in the field. We cannot hope to effectively assist in building stable, peaceful societies if the crucial area of the rule of law is neglected.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source
“Indeed, those who will ultimately be subject to the system of law to be established have far more at stake than we do and must take the lead in developing and implementing any strategy for reform of the criminal justice sector. And we must ensure that the reference point for all of our work is international norms and standards - whether in the area of human rights, international humanitarian law or criminal law. The United Nations is learning lessons from past experiences, strengthening its capacities, and developing new ways to work together more efficiently and more effectively.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source
“(spoke in French) We all recognize that, while there is a wealth of universal norms and standards developed by the United Nations in this field and through their experience in the field, there is no single approach to justice and the rule of law. We must begin with sound assessments on the ground to determine if our assistance is needed. Any strategies we adopt must be tailored to the needs and conditions of the host country and must have as its primary objective the promotion of national ownership of their justice system and capacity-building. We must avoid the mistakes of the past, where imported solutions failed to take into account local culture and traditions and our activities were sometimes carried out without adequately consulting national actors.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source
“This is what the United Kingdom has done in Kosovo, by providing staffing for an entire criminal investigation unit. Another model is for Member States to serve as lead nation for assistance to a particular sector. In Afghanistan, for example, Germany is in the lead for policing and Italy for the justice sector. We must also explore stand-by arrangements whereby Member States commit to providing an integrated package of resources and personnel as soon as the need arises. This was attempted in East Timor, but with very little success. Without significant assistance from Member States, however, the United Nations will not be able to carry out these complex mandates.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source
“We must also keep in mind the need for broad geographic representation, which can be difficult to achieve, particularly in our missions in Africa, where some of our largest police contributors are reluctant to participate. Equally challenging is the issue of gender. Indeed, only 3 per cent of our police and corrections officers seconded to peace operations are women. Experience in the broad range of legal systems found in United Nations Member States - whether civil law, common law, Islamic law, or other systems - is also crucial. These are other areas in which we need your urgent assistance. In addition to providing individual personnel for rule-of-law activities, Member States can assist by providing staff for an entire sector.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source
“Our assessment report for Liberia offers another example of how Member States can help bolster our achievements in the rule of law. It recommends components that would assist in the training of Liberian legal professionals, provide advisers to work alongside national counterparts in judicial reform efforts, engage in trial monitoring to protect human rights and improve the functioning of the judicial system, and support and monitor the corrections system. We look to Member States to support these strategies. Staffing remains one of our greatest challenges. We must ensure that we have access to high-quality police, corrections and judicial officers to complement the work of our own staff experts, ensure that that personnel are trained in international human rights standards and that we deploy them to the field as quickly as possible.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source
“In terms of addressing post-conflict justice, the practical lesson to be drawn is that we should conduct case-by- case assessments of the range of mechanisms available, rather than relying solely on the establishment of ad hoc institutional mechanisms. In addition, there should be a move towards broader assistance and support to national justice systems. We must also ensure that any amnesty clauses in peace agreements exclude amnesties for war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and other serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. When domestic justice capacities have collapsed, we must mandate interim measures, including international support for the establishment of temporary courts, policing capacities and detention facilities, and the provision of provisional codes for criminal law and procedure.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source
“Thirdly, creating specialized courts, whether at the international or the national level, does little to help re-establish the rudiments of the rule of law in post- conflict societies. Indeed, creating such specialized institutions may divert resources from support for the rebuilding and operation of the "ordinary" court system. Ideally, these crimes should be addressed within the framework of the ordinary court system, which may require the assignment or the allocation of prosecutors and judges who have the requisite expertise and other forms of specialized assistance. There is much that the Security Council can do to facilitate our efforts in the field of the rule of law.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source
“Secondly, if the international community limits its response to post-conflict situations to the creation of traditional criminal justice mechanisms such as courts, focused on delivering retribution and meting out punishment, then it will fail to respond to many of the expectations that victims and "victim societies" have concerning mechanisms of post-conflict justice, in particular reparation, a full accounting of what happened and national reconciliation. Among other judicial or quasi-judicial mechanisms, truth and reconciliation commissions seem to offer the best prospects for meeting the various expectations and demands both of individual victims and of the societies from which they come. But if courts alone are not enough, neither are truth and reconciliation commissions.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source
“By and large, though, the international tribunals have so far not always proved to be efficient or effective instruments for prosecuting and trying those suspected of the most serious crimes, and they have been too slow and too costly. This is certainly so in the case of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and it appears that the same might prove true in the case of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source
“I will now turn to the subject of post-conflict justice. By this, I mean the process whereby those who have committed the most serious violations of international humanitarian law - genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions - are held accountable and punished. The United Nations has attempted to meet the challenge of post-conflict justice in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone and Cambodia. Both the United Nations and the Security Council can draw a number of useful lessons from these experiences. First, the international tribunals that the United Nations has established, or helped to establish, have proved that it is possible to deliver impartial criminal justice on the international plane.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source
“Those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia were conducted, probably for the first time, by police, judicial and corrections experts working together in an integrated fashion, as had been recommended by the Brahimi panel report. The Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit is also exploring the desirability of establishing a Rule of Law Trust Fund as one way to draw upon the resources and the expertise of entities outside the United Nations system - including governmental, non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations - to support rule- of-law aspects of peace operations. In the coming months, we hope to discuss with interested Member States our recommendations on how best to designate voluntary funds - through existing or new mechanisms - for rule-of-law initiatives in peace operations.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source
“This is a good start, but in order to make good on our stated commitment to the rule of law, the Unit will need significant additional resources. Rule of law focal points in 11 United Nations departments and agencies now confer regularly on rule- of-law issues that arise in peacekeeping. It remains to be seen, however, whether the network will fulfil its potential of providing support to the Unit on the core aspects of its rule of law work, as the ECPS Task Force recommended. We are, however, beginning to see concrete results from this initiative, providing evidence of the degree to which the rule of law has come to be recognized as a standard element of peace-building efforts. Recently, for example, we have conducted rule- of-law assessments in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Democratic Republic of the Congo - in Bunia specifically - Liberia.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source
“In short, support for the rule of law is a good investment. In light of last week's ministerial statements, let me highlight some of the steps that we have taken over the last year to enhance our rule-of-law capacities. And today is a fitting day to do so, given that it was one year ago today that the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) approved the recommendations of its rule-of-law Task Force. Recognizing the need for peacekeeping operations to address the entire criminal justice chain, we established, in February, the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit within the Civilian Police Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, with two staff members dedicated to criminal law, judicial and corrections issues.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source
“In the case of Liberia, the Secretary-General recommended that we address the criminal justice chain in a comprehensive manner, and those recommendations were adopted, albeit with some hesitation, by the Security Council. Liberia will be a real test of our ability to move beyond a piecemeal approach to the rule of law and lay the foundations for a truly just and peaceful society. In addition, focusing on the full criminal justice chain may prove to be a more effective and efficient use of resources which, in the long run, does more to prevent relapse into conflict and saves both dollars and lives. And, as far as costs are concerned, judicial and corrections mission components are quite small when compared with the more substantial costs of deploying large military forces or police-training and restructuring programmes.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source
“Indeed, while the Security Council recognizes that activities such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, elections and policing are essential elements of a peacekeeping mandate, other rule-of-law activities are often included only in relation to law enforcement efforts. I cannot overemphasize, however, that the maintenance of peace and security requires the establishment of the rule of law in post-conflict settings; and the establishment of the rule of law requires more than just a focus on policing. It requires that all components of the criminal justice chain - the police, the judiciary, the defence bar, prosecutors and corrections - be included and funded.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source
“And the recent riot, and tragic deaths, in the Dubrava prison, represent a serious setback in our efforts to develop and administer the corrections system. Since the establishment of the missions in Kosovo and East Timor, we have learned - perhaps the hard way - that significant assistance in the judicial and corrections areas should not be limited to interim administration missions. At the same time, it has become clear that United Nations effectiveness in promoting the rule of law in many parts of the world has been hampered by the inadequacy of our mandates and resources, both at Headquarters and in the field.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source
“As a check on corruption and misconduct, we have instituted a Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, which is involved in the appointment of judges and prosecutors and in disciplinary matters. Pillar III of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which is led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, has established a judicial training centre, a trial monitoring programme, a Criminal Defence Resource Centre and an Ombudsman Institution. It has also assisted the Kosovo Bar Association in restarting its activities. Despite these successes, UNMIK has difficulty recruiting qualified international judges and prosecutors. Ethnic bias can still taint cases handled by the local judiciary.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source
“In the case of Kosovo, Member States were not organized to provide us with qualified personnel, especially police, quickly enough, which slowed our deployment. As the first of two interim administration missions, we had not appreciated the need for international judges and prosecutors or a full cadre of corrections personnel. We lacked budgeted funds even to provide pencils and paper to the new national judiciary. We were unsuccessful, for several months, in appointing a sufficient number of local judges and prosecutors to get the judicial system up and running. After a difficult start, international judges and prosecutors are now active in Kosovo, handling the most sensitive war crimes and inter-ethnic crime cases.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source
“It was not until July 1998 - two and a half years after the Dayton Peace Agreement - that the Security Council passed a resolution that specifically referred to legal reform and authorized the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina to engage in monitoring and assessment of the judicial sector. The loss of valuable time may explain why we were unable to achieve the same level of progress in the judicial sector as we did with the police. In contrast, transitional administrations in Kosovo and East Timor have provided the United Nations with broad mandates and authority in the area of the rule of law, bringing to light a number of important lessons and paving the way for subsequent operations that dealt more effectively with that crucial sector.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source
“It is essential, therefore, to ensure that the rule of law figures more prominently from the early stages of peace negotiations onwards. Equally, the rule of law must be recognized as a key element of any post-conflict effort - and this must be reflected by political actors and donors when drafting peace agreements, adopting and interpreting peacekeeping mandates and funding programmes. This issue surfaced in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, when ambiguities in the United Nations mandate were interpreted very narrowly as being limited to traditional policing functions, rather than including broader support for the justice sector.”
2003-09-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4835 (2003) · source